Filed 4/16/18 In re Oliver A. CA1/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE


In re OLIVER A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
OLIVER A.,
Defendant and Appellant.
A149637

(Marin County
Super. Ct. No. JV25737)

Oliver A. sought the sealing of juvenile wardship petitions and related records under Welfare and Institutions Code section 786, which governs dismissal upon “satisfactory completion” of probation. The juvenile court granted Oliver’s motion only as to his most recent wardship petition. Oliver appeals, arguing he met the requirements of section 786 with regard to another wardship petition and related probation violations and sealing was required. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In December 2012, Oliver set fire to paper towels in a school bathroom. In February 2013, the Marin County District Attorney filed a wardship petition pursuant to section 602, alleging that Oliver (then 14 years old) recklessly set a fire in violation of Penal Code section 452, subdivision (d) (Petition A). The following May, Oliver admitted the violation, was declared a ward of the juvenile court, and placed on supervised probation for one year.
In January 2014, NOV B was filed alleging Oliver violated the terms of his probation by violating curfew, being suspended from school for misconduct, twice refusing to be searched at school, and testing positive for THC. Oliver admitted the curfew violation and the other allegations were dismissed with a Harvey waiver. He was continued on probation with seven days to be served in juvenile hall.
On March 4, 2014, NOV C was filed alleging Oliver violated the curfew term of his probation by absenting himself from home with his whereabouts unknown for an entire week during a school break. Oliver admitted the violation. He was continued on probation with 14 days to be served in juvenile hall.
On March 19, 2014, Petition D was filed alleging Oliver made criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422 and committed petty theft from a merchant in violation of Penal Code section 490.5, both misdemeanors. Oliver admitted the petty theft charge, and the other charge was dismissed with a Harvey waiver. He was declared a ward and placed on indefinite probation.
In May 2014, NOV E was filed alleging Oliver violated the terms of his probation by repeatedly missing or arriving late to school, testing positive for THC on five occasions between March 11 and April 8, and resisting arrest. Oliver admitted the alleged drug use, and the other allegations were dismissed with a Harvey waiver. He was continued on probation with 12 days to be served in juvenile hall.
In June 2014, NOV F was filed alleging Oliver violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for THC on five occasions (between May 1 and June 6) and being absent from home for three days in June. Oliver admitted the alleged drug use, and the other allegation was dismissed with a Harvey waiver. He was continued on probation with 15 days to be served in juvenile hall.
In September 2015, Petition G was filed alleging Oliver bought or received stolen property in violation of Penal Code section 496, subdivision (a), and drove without a valid driver’s license in violation of Vehicle Code section 12500, subdivision (a), both misdemeanors. Oliver admitted the driving violation, and the other allegation was dismissed with a Harvey waiver. He was continued as a ward on indefinite probation and ordered to serve one day in juvenile hall.
In September 2016, having incurred no further NOV’s or wardship findings, Oliver moved to dismiss Petition G and seal related records pursuant to section 786. Oliver asserted that dismissal of Petition G would thereby render his prior petitions and related records eligible for dismissal and sealing under subdivision (f)(1) of the statute. The People did not object to the sealing of Petition G, but opposed sealing the prior petitions and related records. The matter was deferred pending briefing on the proper interpretation of section 786, subdivision (c)(1). While not expressly construing the statute, the juvenile court granted Oliver’s motion as to Petition G and denied it as to Petitions A and D and as to NOV’s B, C, E, and F. Oliver appeals the denials.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Criteria for Section 786 Relief
As relevant here, the juvenile court must dismiss and seal a petition and related records when a movant has “satisfactorily” completed the term of probation associated with that petition. (§ 786, subd. (a).) A term of probation is considered satisfactorily completed if two conditions have been met: (1) “the person has no new findings of wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during the period of supervision or probation”; and (2) “he or she has not failed to substantially comply with the reasonable orders of supervision or probation that are within his or her capacity to perform.” (§ 786, subd. (c)(1).) Oliver appropriately concedes in briefing that he did not meet the first condition for satisfactory completion of probation for Petition A (and related NOV’s B, C) because of the finding under Petition D that he committed a new misdemeanor involving moral turpitude—petty theft (see People v. Carter (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 322, 329 [theft is a crime of moral turpitude]). Therefore, our section 786 analysis is restricted to Petition D and related NOV’s E and F.
The parties disagree on the proper interpretation of the requirements of section 786, subdivision (c)(1), that a minor suffer “no new findings of wardship or conviction for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude during the period of supervision or probation.” In the trial court, the public defender argued the passage meant the person has no “findings or convictions, whether misdemeanors or felonies, . . . [that] involve moral turpitude.” In other words, only an adjudication (either a finding or a conviction) of a crime (either a felony or a misdemeanor) that involves moral turpitude is disqualifying. The district attorney argued the passage means the person has “avoided any one of the three specific types of law violations—a new felony conviction, a misdemeanor conviction involving moral turpitude or a new wardship finding.” The trial court did not expressly address interpretation of the statutory language, but concluded the sealing recommendations of the probation department in each of the affected cases was correct, dismissing and sealing only Petition G. We review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. (In re G.F., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at pp. 4–5.)
The essential disagreement between the parties is whether the phrase “for a felony offense or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” qualifies both “finding of wardship” and “conviction” or only “conviction.” Oliver contends the quoted phrase qualifies both “finding of wardship” and “conviction” such that only a finding that the minor committed a covered felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude would be disqualifying. The People contend the phrase qualifies only “conviction” and that any finding of wardship—including a misdemeanor not involving moral turpitude such as driving without a license—disqualifies the minor from relief.
We agree with Oliver that the disputed language in section 786, subdivision (c)(1) is ambiguous. The language lacks punctuation or parallel construction language that might otherwise have made the Legislature’s meaning clear. (See White v. County of Sacramento (1982) 31 Cal.3d 676, 680 [punctuation and grammatical construction are relevant to statutory construction]; cf. § 781, subd. (a)(1)(A) [“convicted of a felony or of any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” (italics added)]; In re J.W. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 663, 668, fn. 4 [implying § 781 refers to “a felony or moral turpitude misdemeanor”]; Gov. Code, § 19572, subd. (k) [allowing discipline of civil service employees for “[c]onviction of a felony or conviction of a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude” (italics added); also referring to “a felony or any offense involving moral turpitude”]; Pen. Code, § 11102.1, subd. (f)(1) [“either of the following: [¶] (A) Conviction of a felony offense. [¶] (B) Conviction of any other offense that . . . involves moral turpitude . . .”].) Oliver asks us to consider legislative history supporting what he urges is a broad remedial purpose of the statute and, accordingly, to broadly construe the statute in light of the alleged objectives.
While raising issues meriting discussion and analysis, we find it unnecessary to parse the language (and grammar) of the statute and to resolve those questions in the matter before us. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implied finding that Oliver “failed to substantially comply with reasonable orders of supervision or probation,” and therefore denial of section 786 relief for Petition D (and related NOV’s E and F) was not an abuse of discretion. (See In re A.V. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 697, 701 [§ 786 decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion]; In re M.V. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1495, 1506–1507 [appellant bears burden of demonstrating discretion was exercised in “ ‘arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd manner that resulted in a miscarriage of justice’ ”; reviewing court “must indulge all reasonable inferences” and not disturb findings supported by substantial evidence].)
B. Substantial Compliance with Terms of Probation
Substantial compliance with the terms of probation under section 786, subdivision (c)(1) requires only a “ ‘passing grade’ ” of compliance. (In re A.V., supra, 11 Cal.App.5th at p. 708.) “ ‘ “Many probation orders in delinquency cases are checklists of conditions that are difficult or impossible for many adolescents to perform at an ‘A’ grade level. . . . On occasion, children on probation backslide by perhaps failing a drug test or skipping an appointment—but this does not mean that they cannot or do not rebound to a level of satisfactory overall performance. . . . [¶] Our goal, after all, is to support the re-entry, rehabilitation and employability of juveniles having justice system histories, and not to impose lifetime barriers to success based on probation performance criteria that are too rigid or unrealistic from an adolescent development perspective.” ’ [Citation.] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Substantial compliance is not perfect compliance. Substantial compliance is commonly understood to mean ‘compliance with the substantial or essential requirements of something (as a statute or contract) that satisfies its purpose or objective even though its formal requirements are not complied with.’ ” (Id. at pp. 708–709.) By contrast, “successful” completion of probation has been construed as compliance with every condition of probation. (Id. at p. 709.)
As noted ante, on March 19, 2014, Petition D was filed alleging Oliver made criminal threats in violation of Penal Code section 422 and committed petty theft from a merchant in violation of Penal Code section 490.5, both misdemeanors. Oliver admitted the petty theft charge and the other charge was dismissed with a Harvey waiver. He was declared a ward and, on April 30, he was placed on indefinite probation. On May 5, less than one week after he was placed on probation for Petition D, NOV E was filed alleging five positive drug tests predating April 30 (i.e., before Oliver was placed on probation for Petition D); truancy and tardiness to school on unspecified dates, and resisting arrest on May 2. A little more than one month later, on June 16, NOV F was filed alleging five positive drug tests after April 30 and absence from home for three days in June. No other NOV or petition was filed in the following 15 months. Petition G was based on a single incident that occurred September 14, 2015: Oliver was pulled over for driving a car with his tail lights off late at night and the odor of marijuana came from the car, which had four other passengers. Oliver admitted driving without a license. A friend (apparently one of the passengers) told police he had lost his iPhone early in the evening and Oliver had denied taking it. Officers searched Oliver’s person and found the phone.
The disposition report for Petition G described a marked improvement in Oliver’s behavior during the period of probation for Petition D: “Oliver has been doing very well prior to the instant offense. Oliver was able to transition back to [his high school] has been involved in structured pro-social activities and according to [his] parents, Oliver has been behaving appropriately [in] the home.” At school, Oliver had two unexcused absences and 10 tardies, but no major behavioral issues. While concerned about his continued drug use and lack of close supervision at home, the probation officer opined that Oliver “made tremendous strides since being placed on probation in 2012. . . . Prior to the instant offense [in Petition G], . . . [he] was consistent in following the majority of his terms and conditions of probation and leading a crime free lifestyle.” Oliver was placed on probation for Petition G and had no further NOV’s or findings of wardship. In September 2016, the juvenile court found Oliver had satisfactorily completed probation on Petition G.
Here, the implied finding that Oliver did not satisfactorily complete probation for Petition D is supported by the undisputed evidence that Oliver was twice found to have violated the terms of his probation (NOV’s E and F) and to have committed a new offense (Petition G). The fact that another court could have come to a contrary finding of satisfactory completion is of no moment. (In re Carlos T. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 795, 804–805 [where more than one inference can reasonably be deduced from the facts, “ ‘the appellate court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the trier of fact’ ”].) On this record, we cannot hold that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying section 786 relief for Petition D and NOV’s E and F.
III. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s section 786 order is affirmed.
 



_________________________
BRUINIERS, J.


WE CONCUR:


_________________________
JONES, P. J.


_________________________
NEEDHAM, J.


























A149637