In re Oscar R.
Filed 3/30/06 In re Oscar R. CA2/3
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California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
In re OSCAR R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. _____________________________________ THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. OSCAR R., Defendant and Appellant. | B182750 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ31814) |
APPEAL from an order of wardship of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Rudolph A. Diaz, Judge. Affirmed.
Phillip I. Bronson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Richard F. Katz and Lauren E. Dana, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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Oscar R., a minor, appeals from the order continuing wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) entered following a determination that he committed second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 211). The court ordered him placed in camp for a maximum term of physical confinement of five years four months.
In this case, we hold there was sufficient evidence to convince a rational trier of fact, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant committed the above offense. Appellant claims there was insufficient evidence identifying him as a robber because, according to appellant, there were two robbers and the victim could identify neither. However, there was substantial evidence that there were three robbers, the victim identified appellant as one, and any difficulty the victim had in identifying the other two robbers did not render insubstantial the substantial identification evidence as to appellant.
We also hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering appellant placed in camp based on, according to appellant, the nonexistent factor that appellant had a gang â€