In re Patricia F.
Filed 6/20/13
In re Patricia F. CA1/2
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
>
In re PATRICIA F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
ALAMEDA COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SHANNON T., Defendant and Appellant. | A137017 (Alameda County Super. Ct. No. OJ11016843) |
In
2011, the Alameda
County Social Services Agency (the agency) filed a petition pursuant to
Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)
on behalf of Patricia F. The petition
alleged that Patricia had suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering
serious physical harm as a result of the failure or inability of Shannon T.
(mother) to supervise or protect her.
Subsequently, K.A. (father) was offered reunification services and
elevated to presumed father status.
Father filed a petition to change the child’s name from Patricia Lucille
F. to Heather Mariam A. After a hearing,
the court found that it was in the child’s best interest to change her name and
mother appeals from that order. Mother
does not object to the change in the child’s surname but contends that the
record does not contain substantial evidence to support a finding that it is in
the child’s best interest to change her first and middle names. We affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUNDhref="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">[2]
On
April 26, 2011, the agency
filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) on behalf of
Patricia, who was less than six months old at that time. The petition alleged that the baby had
suffered or there was a substantial risk that she would suffer serious physical
harm or illness as a result of mother’s failure or inability to supervise or
protect her adequately. The petition
further alleged that mother had serious substance abuse problems, that
Patricia’s sibling was born drug-exposed and hit himself, that there was
domestic violence between mother and her boyfriend, that Patricia was born with
a positive toxicology screen for various drugs, that Patricia was born six
weeks premature with difficulty breathing and swallowing, that mother was found
incapacitated outside the hospital, that mother’s boyfriend was a registered
sex offender, and that Patricia’s father was homeless and unable to provide
shelter or care.
The
agency filed a detention report on April
27, 2011. The report
provided that Patricia’s sibling had been placed in a foster home and that
Patricia was residing at the hospital due to her special medical needs. She remained medically fragile.
Jurisdiction and Disposition
The
agency filed a report for the jurisdictional hearing and recommended
reunification services for mother and father.
A paternity test on March 30,
2011, indicated that father was Patricia’s biological father. Patricia’s special medical needs required her
to remain in the hospital. Once father
learned about the positive results of his paternity test, he visited Patricia
for several hours nearly every day.
On
May 12, 2011, the agency
filed a second amended petition and added an allegation pursuant to section 300,
subdivision (g). The agency alleged that
father was unable to provide care for Patricia because of her special medical
needs.
On
June 6, 2011, the agency
filed an addendum report and recommended family reunification services for
mother and no services for father. The
report indicated that the hospital had restricted mother and her boyfriend from
visiting Patricia because she had “presented high too many times, and ha[d]
‘nodded off’ while holding the baby . . . .â€
On
June 21, 2011, father filed a statement regarding parentage and requested the
court to enter a judgment of parentage.
He requested that the court find him to be the presumed parent of the
child.
The
agency filed another addendum report on August 10, 2011, and recommended family
reunification services for both mother and father. Patricia continued to have special medical
needs and was diagnosed as failing to thrive because of her difficulty
breathing and slow weight gain. Father
stated that he wanted Patricia’s last name changed to his surname instead of
the last name of mother’s boyfriend.
The
juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing over multiple days
beginning on August 11, 2011, until December 13, 2011. The juvenile court elevated father to
presumed father status on August 17, 2011.
On
October 6, 2011, the agency filed another addendum report. It recommended that both mother and father
receive reunification services and that the agency have the discretion to place
Patricia with father.
In
November 2011, the agency filed another addendum report and requested that
Patricia have in-home visits with Maria, a friend of father’s. Maria had agreed to have father and Patricia
live in her home. Maria was to provide
day care for Patricia while father was at work.
Patricia’s health was improving, but she was still “very fragile.â€
On
December 13, 2011, the juvenile court found the section 300, subdivision (b)
allegation was true. The court
determined that the welfare of the child required custody to be removed from mother. It found that mother had made minimal
progress and that father had made partial progress. Reunification services were ordered for both
mother and father.
Status Review Hearing
The agency filed
its status review report and recommended terminating family reunification
services for mother and continuing services for father. Mother was incarcerated and had maintained
intermittent contact with the agency.
Mother had not attended any scheduled visits with Patricia and had told
the social worker that she did not need to participate in drug testing. Father had completed extensive medical
trainings during visits with the foster mother with the help of an Arabic
interpreter. He visited Patricia
consistently and the child was happy to see him.
The
report indicated that Patricia was making great progress, although she still
needed constant supplemental oxygen. She
continued to feed intravenously through a g-tube that was surgically implanted
in her stomach.
On
September 13, 2012, the agency filed an ex parte application requesting that
the juvenile court permit Patricia to begin a trial visit in father’s
home. The court granted this
request.
In
a memorandum to the court filed on September 24, 2012, the agency recommended
that Patricia be returned to father, and that the order for out-of-home
placement be set aside. Patricia’s
placement in Maria’s home with father was going well. Patricia had taken her first steps and no
longer required the use of supplemental oxygen during the day. Mother had not visited Patricia since October
2011, and father had a restraining order against her.
Mother
was not present at the hearing on September 26, 2012. Mother’s counsel claimed that mother did not
have proper notice and objected to the hearing going forward. The juvenile court found that proper notice
was provided and ordered family maintenance services for father. The court terminated services for mother.
On
March 21, 2012, father filed a petition for a decree changing the name of the
minor from Patricia Lucille F. to Heather Mariam A. The matter came on for a contested hearing on
June 28, 2012, and the juvenile court found that father did not have to
republish the order to show cause regarding the change of name.
Father’s
counsel argued that the minor’s surname should be changed from that of mother’s
boyfriend to his surname. Father
asserted that the first name of Patricia and the child’s current middle name of
Lucille were names in the family of mother’s boyfriend and that he did not want
his daughter to be named after an unfamiliar family. Counsel for father explained the following
reasons for father’s wanting to change the child’s first name to Heather: “[I]t’s a nice American sounding name, and
that when she comes to live with him and pursuing her education, it will be a
name that is accessible and make a good impression [or] a homogenous impression
with her friends and classmates the people with whom she grows up, so he
selected that name for that reason.â€
Father wished to change the minor’s second name to Mariam
because this name was in his family and he wanted to honor his own family. Additionally, since father would soon be
charged with the raising of the child, he believed that he should be permitted
“to call her and name her what he thinks is best for her.â€
Counsel
for the minor did not have a position on the matter but agreed with the
argument of father’s attorney. Counsel
for the child commented that father had “honestly earned the right to name his
daughter what he deems is appropriate.â€
Counsel
for mother stated that mother objected to the changing of the first and second
names but had no objection to the change of the surname. She was not opposed to adding Mariam, which
is Mary in Arabic and the name of her own mother, to the name of Patricia
Lucille, but she was opposed to removing Patricia Lucille from the child’s
name. Counsel argued that father’s
petition did not support a finding that the name change was in the minor’s best
interest and that Patricia Lucille was just as Americanized as Heather. She added that the name of Patricia was the
name of one of mother’s favorite maternal aunts and that the name Lucille was
the name of mother’s great-grandmother.
The
juvenile court heard testimony on the name change and the best interest of the
child at a hearing on July 12, 2012. The
court received confirmation that mother was not contesting the change in the
last name to father’s surname but was objecting to changing Patricia Lucille to
Heather Mariam.
title="">[4] The court explained that under
Cal.3d 640 (Schiffman) it was to
determine whether the changed name was in the child’s best interest and to
consider the length of time the child had used the original name. In the present case, the court noted that the
child was under the age of two and thus the period of time she had used the
name of Patricia Lucille had been short.
The court observed that it must also consider the effect of the name
change on the preservation of the father-child relationship and the
identification of the child as part of the family unit.
Mother
testified that when she was five or six months pregnant she decided to name her
daughter Patricia Lucille. She stated
that Patricia is the name of her maternal aunt and that her maternal aunt’s
family had supported her throughout her life.
She said that she spent time with her aunt, her mother’s sister-in-law,
when she had problems with her mother.
She commented that she considered her aunt to be one of her closest
family members. She declared that
Lucille was the middle name of her paternal great-grandmother and that it “was
a classy name, an old fashion[ed] name, and a name†that had been in her father’s
family. She disclosed that her father
had died a couple of years earlier and that she had started to get to know him
six years ago. She asserted that she
wanted to have a name from his family included.
She claimed that she had informed father about her name choices for her
daughter when she was pregnant and he expressed no objection.
Mother
explained that she did not object to the change of her daughter’s surname to
father’s surname, but she maintained that the names of Heather and Mariam were
traumatic for her. She said that Heather
was the name of an earlier dependency investigation worker and that name
reminded her “of trauma.†She said that
Mariam is the Arabic name for Mary, and that Mary is her mother’s name. She maintained that her mother had “been very
neglectful and abusive†and that she did not have a good relationship with her
mother. She added, “So it’s kind of a
slap in the face to name my daughter that, and it’s disturbing to me.†She claimed that her daughter knows her name
of Patricia Lucille. She commented that
she had gone through her pregnancy alone even though father had known he was
the father of her child; she should therefore be able to name her daughter.
On
cross-examination, mother acknowledged
that Patricia was a name in the family of her boyfriend. She denied that she actually named her
daughter Patricia after his family member.
She stated that Lucille was not a name in her boyfriend’s family. When questioned by the attorney for the
child, mother admitted that it had been a few months since she had seen her
daughter.
Father
testified that mother never consulted with him or informed him about any name
for the minor. He stated that he liked
the name Heather because it is a good American name. He wanted the name Mariam because that was
the name of his late mother. He said
that he did not select Mariam or Mary to name the child after her maternal
grandmother. He insisted that he wanted
this name because it was his mother’s name.
On
cross-examination, father stated that he had no other children. His girlfriend had a daughter but he denied
being the biological father of that child.
He insisted that he did not want the name Patricia because the name was
from the family of mother’s boyfriend.
When asked whether he knew that the name of the mother of mother’s
boyfriend was also Mary, he said that he knew that. He stated that Mariam was the name of his
mother and that was the reason it did not bother him that the boyfriend’s
mother had the name of Mary.
The
social worker advised the court that the child did respond to the name of
Patricia. Counsel for the minor agreed
that the child did respond to Patricia but believed that it would not be
confusing, at this young age, to change the name.
The
juvenile court held the continued hearing on October 18, 2012. Counsel for father quoted from the concurring
opinion of Justice Mosk in Schiffman: Justice Mosk concluded after reading
Pennsylvania law that “it would seem that a parent deemed fit to have custody
ordinarily should be deemed fit to select a name that accords with the child’s
best interest.†(Schiffman, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 649, conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) Counsel argued that there is a presumption
that the custodial parent is acting in the child’s best interest in matters
such as name changes and that was sufficient to justify the requested relief.
Counsel
for father summarized father’s reasons for wanting the name change: “[Father] was not happy because he was of the
belief that Patricia Lucille were names that were common in [the family of
mother’s boyfriend], and he felt they were naming his child in honor of a
non-relative. We have heard testimony to
the contrary. But he chose Heather
because he likes it. He thinks it is a
very American sounding name. That she
will do well in school and in the American society with a name such as
that. And he chose Mariam in honor of
his mother. He’d like to change the last
name of his child [to his surname] as opposed [to the surname of mother’s
boyfriend].†When questioned by the
court, counsel agreed that Patricia also sounded like an American name.
Counsel
for mother argued that the proposed changes to the first and second names were
not in the minor’s best interest and that mother had named the child for people
in her family. She stated that there was
no credible evidence linking the names to the family of mother’s
boyfriend. Counsel added that custody
could change again and the fact that father had custody of the minor did not
give him a right to change her name, especially since the child recognized the
name of Patricia.
Father
told the court that he was comfortable with having Patricia as a nickname but
not as the first name.
Counsel
for the agency added that father was “the one who has stepped in and taken care
of the child who has tremendous needs.
He has done everything that he needed to do in this case to get
custody. He finally has custody.†Counsel maintained that she believed “that
the case law supports the parent having custody providing the name.â€
The
juvenile court commented that father had “really excelled in obtaining the
training that he needed to deal with this very special needs child, who has
done everything required of him, both with Patricia and with the court
process.†The court granted father’s
request to change the child’s name to Heather Mariam A.
Mother
filed a timely notice of appeal.
The
sole issue on appeal is the changing of the child’s name from Patricia Lucille
F. to Heather Mariam A. Mother does not
object to the change in the child’s surname but contends the evidence in the
record does not support a finding that it was in the child’s best interest to
change her first and middle names.
The Supreme Court in
what factors should be considered when the parents cannot agree to the child’s
court held that the child’s surname should be decided according to the best
interest of the child. (
best interests’ is one of fact.†(
Cal.App.3d 1046, 1054.) Thus, we will
affirm the juvenile court’s decision if it is supported by substantial
evidence. (See In re Marriage of McManamy & Templeton (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th
607, 610 (McManamy).) Under the substantial evidence standard, all
conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the name change and all
legitimate and reasonable inferences indulged to uphold the lower court’s
decision. (Douglass, at p. 1055.) “
‘When two or more inferences can be reasonably deduced from the facts, the
reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for those of the
trial court. [Citations.]’ †(Ibid.) The burden is on mother to establish that the
order is not supported by substantial evidence.
(Adoption of Allison C. (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1011.)
As the
juvenile court in the present case noted, the Supreme Court in
evaluated when deciding whether to permit a change to the child’s surname. The Supreme Court specified that the
following factors should be considered:
the length of time that the child has used the present name, the effect
of a name change on preservation of the father-child relationship, the strength
of the parent-child relationships, and identification of the child as part of a
family unit. (Schiffman, supra, 28 Cal.3d at p. 647.) We are not aware of any California published
case that has considered a challenge to a change of a child’s first or middle
name but we believe that, as with a request to change the child’s surname, we
consider whether the requested change is in the child’s best interest.
In the
present case, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s decision to
permit father, the person “who has stepped in and taken care of the
child,â€
to change the child’s name from Patricia Lucille to Heather Mariam. Although the child responded to the name
Patricia, the child was under the age of two when the court issued its order to
change the child’s name. The court
concluded after hearing from the child’s attorney that the child would not
suffer any detriment if her name were changed because she had not had the name
for a long period and, at that young age, had not yet developed an attachment
to the name. Mother did not present any
evidence indicating that a name change would be harmful to the child.
Father
wished to change Patricia to Heather because, among other things, he liked the
name of Heather and believed the name of Patricia was related to the family of
mother’s boyfriend. Mother testified
that she named the child after mother’s aunt but on cross-examination she
admitted that Patricia was a name in the family of her boyfriend. The juvenile court could thus conclude that
it would be in the child’s best interest not to have a name connected to the
family of mother’s boyfriend.
With regard
to the name Lucille, father wished to replace this name with Mariam because he
had no connection to the name of Lucille.
The child would be connected to his family if she had the name of
Mariam, as that was the name of his mother.
Thus, the name helped identify the child as part of father’s family and
helped connect her to his family.
Mother was
not opposed to adding the name of Mariam to Patricia Lucille but opposed
changing Lucille to Mariam. The juvenile
court, however, could conclude that it would be unwieldy and not in the child’s
best interests to add another name.
There was nothing in the record to indicate that the child responded to
her middle name of Lucille or that she would suffer any detriment if that name
were replaced with Mariam, the name of father’s mother.
Accordingly,
we conclude that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s decision
to grant father’s request to change the child’s name. The record clearly established that the child
had a stronger relationship with her father than mother. Mother had not consistently visited the child
and her reunification services had been terminated. In contrast, father consistently spent time
with the child and the child had been placed with him under the agency’s
supervision. There was evidence that
Patricia was a name in the family of mother’s boyfriend, father was the person
caring for the child, the name of Mariam was in father’s family and thus helped
identify the child as part of father’s family, and the child had not had her
name for a very long period of time.
Mother
argues that the present case is similar to the situation in
the trial court presiding over the parties’ marital dissolution granted the
father’s request to change the three-year-old daughter’s surname to include his
surname hyphenated with the mother’s surname.
(Id. at p. 610.) The father’s argument was that the surname
was that of the mother’s prior husband and he was a complete stranger to the
child. (Ibid.) The appellate court
reversed and stated that the father in his declaration did not provide any
“meaningful link between the proposed name change and his relationship with his
daughter; instead he simply voiced his unhappiness with the mother’s choice of
surname for the child.†(
Mother
argues that here, similarly to the situation in McManamy, father made no showing as to why the name change was in
the child’s best interest and simply argued that he, as her father, had an
inherent right to change her name. He,
like the father in McManamy, simply
disliked the name choices of mother. She
claims that the juvenile court improperly changed the child’s name in deference
to father’s preference.
We
disagree with mother that the present situation is similar to the facts in
Here, father did present a meaningful link to the middle name of
Mariam. As to the first name of Heather,
father did not present any meaningful link to that name but showed the reason
for replacing the first name of Patricia.
Mother argues that father mistakenly believed that this name was based
on a person in the family of mother’s boyfriend. However, as already noted, mother
acknowledged that there was a person in the boyfriend’s family with that name,
and we resolve all conflicts in the evidence in support of the juvenile court’s
decision. (See, e.g.,
Cal.App.3d at p. 1055.) The trial court
was entitled to disbelieve mother’s testimony that she did not name the child
after the person in her boyfriend’s family.
We can infer from these facts that the trial court concluded that it
would not be in the child’s best interests to have a first name connected to
the family of mother’s boyfriend.
We
disagree with mother that the record shows that the juvenile court failed to
consider any factors reflecting on the child’s best interests. The record shows that the court specifically
stated that it was considering the child’s best interests and the inferences
that may be drawn from the facts in the record support the granting of father’s
request to change the child’s name.
DISPOSITION
judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Lambden,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Kline, P.J.
_________________________
Richman, J.
to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
the issue on appeal are only briefly summarized.
