In re P.B.

Filed 3/30/06 In re P.B. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Carol Isackson, Judge. Affirmed.

The court declared P. B. a continuing ward after entering true findings he committed attempted robbery (Pen. Code, §§ 664/211),^[1] and assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). It dismissed claims he personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). The court committed P. to Camp Barrett for a maximum term of 547 days. P. contends there is insufficient evidence to support the true findings.

FACTS

During the afternoon of August 15, 2004, Thomas Wooten was riding on the trolley when he was accosted by a group of people. After a brief conversation, "then from there just black darkness" Wooten woke up in the hospital with a nasal fracture and bruises to his face.

Another passenger on the trolley, Anthony McNeal, testified that when the trolley stopped at the 47th Street station, a group of six or seven young men ran from a nearby apartment complex and got on the trolley. One man in the group, wearing a football jersey with black numbers on it asked Wooten where he was from. Wooten responded, "I ain't from nowhere and I don't want no trouble." Members of the group began hitting and kicking Wooten. Other members in the group went through Wooten's pockets. The group left the trolley and returned to the apartment complex. McNeal rode to the next trolley station and returned with police to the apartment complex the group had run to. He identified P. as the person wearing the football jersey. He testified P. was "within the circle" or "crowd" but he was not sure whether P. was one of the "main players."

San Diego Police Officer Arnie Ambito responded to a report of the incident. McNeal told him that a group of "Black males and another mixed-race male" were involved in an assault. One of the group was wearing a white Atlantic Falcon jersey with a red number on it. Ambito took McNeal to the apartment complex that McNeal said the assaulters had run from and back to. McNeal identified P. as "one of the main players that beat the dude." Ambito interviewed P. at the downtown headquarters. P. initially told Ambito that he had not been on the trolley that day. When Ambito told P. that blood had been found on his shoes, P. admitted being on the trolley and said there must have been blood on his shoes when the "victim's head landed near him."

DISCUSSION

We affirm a judgment supported by substantial evidence. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576.) Substantial evidence is evidence of legal significance, reasonable in nature, credible and of solid value. (People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 505.) The court must review the entire record most favorably to the judgment below and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the fact finder could reasonably deduce from the evidence. If the evidence permits a reasonable trier of fact to conclude the charged crime was committed, the opinion of a reviewing court that the circumstances may also be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal. (See Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 318-319; In re Roderick P. (1972) 7 Cal.3d 801, 808-809.)

P. argues the true finding for assault likely to produce great bodily injury is based on his mere presence at the scene and is not supported by the evidence because the witnesses failed to show he committed a specific act, and the true finding for attempted robbery lacks evidence he had knowledge of the perpetrator's intent to steal. However, there is evidence of more than P. 's presence at the scene and the People need not present evidence of a specific act when the true finding is based on P. 's role as an aider and abettor. The knowledge of an aider and abettor to attempted robbery may be shown by circumstantial evidence.

"A person aids and abets the commission of a crime when he or she, (i) with knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, (ii) and with the intent or purpose of committing, facilitating or encouraging commission of the crime, (iii) by act or advice, aids, promotes, encourages or instigates the commission of the crime." (People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1158, 1164.) "The logical basis for conviction as an aider and abettor is that with knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act, one renders some independent contribution to the commission of the crime or otherwise makes it more probable that the crime will be successfully completed than would [be] the case absent such participation." (People v. Brady (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 124, 132.) The test for aider or abettor culpability is "whether the accused in any way, directly or indirectly, aided the perpetrator by acts or encouraged him by words or gestures." (People v. Villa (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 128, 134.) An aider and abettor's state of mind may be proven circumstantially from his volitional acts with knowledge of their probable consequences. (People v. Beeman (1984) 35 Cal.3d 547, 559-560.) " 'The presence of one at the commission of a felony by another is evidence to be considered in determining whether or not he was guilty of aiding and abetting; and it has also been held that presence, companionship, and conduct before and after the offense are circumstances from which one's participation in the criminal intent may be inferred.' [Citation.]" (People v. Moore (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 303, 306; accord, People v. Gonzales (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 593, 600.) "A person who knowingly aids and abets criminal conduct is guilty of not only the intended crime but also of any other crime the perpetrator actually commits that is a natural and probable consequence of the intended crime. The latter question is not whether the aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether, judged objectively, it was reasonably foreseeable." (People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133.)

Here, two San Diego police officers testified that after the incident, the witness McNeal identified P. as one of the "main players" in the assault. Testimony given " 'by one witness is sufficient for the proof of any fact.' [Citation.]" (People v. Rincon-Pineda (1975) 14 Cal.3d 864, 884-885.) Substantial evidence supports a finding that P. aided and abetted in the crimes.

P. argues he was merely present at the scene of the crimes and mere presence is not sufficient evidence to support a conviction as an aider and abettor. (See People v. Nguyen (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 518, 529-530.) However, it is rational to infer that when a group of individuals attacks a stranger, each member of the group is aided by those in the group. This is a practical application of the age-old principle of power in numbers. When a group attacks a stranger and rifles the victim's pockets, it is logical to infer, as the trial judge did here, that each member of the group is assisting those who attacked the victim. It is not the mere presence, but the force in their numbers acting together, that makes each member of the group aider and abettor. P. 's denial of being on the trolley until the officer pointed out blood had been found on his shoes reinforces the finding that P. aided and abetted the assault and robbery of Wooten.

Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's true finding that P. aided and abetted in the commission of the assault and attempted robbery.

P. claims that the trial court was precluded from entering the true findings for assault with force likely to produce great bodily injury and attempted robbery because it found P. did not personally inflict great bodily injury on the victim. His claim is without merit because there is substantial evidence that P. aided and abetted the crimes.

DISPOSITION

The order declaring P. a continuing ward is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

NARES, J.

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^[1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code.