Filed 5/8/17 In re P.B. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re P.B., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
R.F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
D071138
(Super. Ct. No. J516235H)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Sharon L.
Kalemkiarian, Judge. Affirmed.
Clare M. Lemon, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County
Counsel and Kristen M. Ojeil, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Judith Klein, for Respondents Martha and Lisa S.
2
When P.B. was approximately four months old, the juvenile court removed her,
along with her seven siblings, from her mother, R.F. (Mother) and placed her with foster
parents. P.B. remained with the foster parents for the following 18 months before having
a 60-day trial visit with Mother and her siblings. P.B. struggled to adjust and started
displaying negative behaviors during the visit, and although the juvenile court returned
the siblings to Mother, it placed P.B. back with the foster parents, terminated Mother's
reunification services as to P.B. and, eventually, terminated Mother's parental rights to
allow the foster parents to adopt P.B. Mother appeals the order terminating her parental
rights and argues the court erred by not applying either the beneficial parental-child
relationship or the sibling bond exception set forth in Welfare and Institutions Code1
section 366.26, subdivisions (c)(1)(B)(i) and (v). We conclude the exceptions do not
apply to outweigh the benefits of permanency through adoption and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2014, the San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency)
received a referral after a police officer conducting a well check found P.B. and her seven
older siblings2 unsupervised in the living room of a home deemed to be unsanitary and
unsafe for children. P.B. was approximately four months old at the time but did not have
a birth certificate, or medical insurance, because Mother had not registered her birth.
Although this was the Agency's first encounter with P.B., Mother had a history of

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 The present appeal relates only to P.B. and, as such, we discuss facts related to the
other seven siblings only to the extent relevant to P.B.
3
substantiated referrals for general neglect of the older siblings. The juvenile court took
jurisdiction over P.B. and her siblings and placed each of the children in various foster
homes. The Agency recommended reunification services, noting Mother's inability to
provide suitable housing was the result of a lack of resources and not substance abuse or
mental health issues, and the court adopted the Agency's recommendation.3
Mother initially told the Agency she planned to clean the house the family had
been living in so the children could return, but later determined it would not be possible
to do so and began looking for alternative housing. The Agency gave Mother a list of
available shelters but she was not willing to go to a shelter due to a previous negative
experience so the Agency provided a list of additional housing resources.
While she continued to search for housing, Mother visited all of the children
regularly despite their various locations and her reliance on public transportation. With
respect to P.B., Mother had weekly individual unsupervised visits as well as weekly
group visits with P.B. and her siblings. The visits generally went well but the foster
parents expressed concerns over Mother bringing sugary drinks and snacks despite a
number of the children undergoing significant dental repairs. In addition, Mother
routinely brought friends or family to help with the visits with all eight children and,
while the Agency applauded Mother's use of her support network, it remained unsure of
Mother's ability to care for the children on her own.

3 The court ordered reunification services for P.B.'s father (Father) as well but his
participation was limited and he is not a party to this appeal.
4
By August, Mother had begun working two jobs. She continued to visit the
children regularly but the visits became less consistent due to the demands of her jobs.
She was still looking for suitable housing and told the Agency that, because she was
reliant on public transportation, she wanted to stay near her support network and jobs,
despite the higher cost of housing in that area. The Agency reminded her that few
situations would be perfect, encouraged her to focus on getting housing wherever
possible to get the children back, and referred her to Casey Family Programs (Casey), a
program that provides monetary assistance and case management to help families stay
together. Casey accepted Mother's case.
In November 2014, Mother told the Agency two family friends would provide her
with a home and a vehicle for transportation. About a week later, the friends informed
the Agency Mother had been demanding and disrespectful, a physical altercation had
occurred involving Mother and her then boyfriend, and thus they were no longer willing
to help. Mother later informed the Agency the address of the home the friends gave her
did not exist.
Mother had told the children they would be spending Thanksgiving together in the
new home and when the home did not work out, she told them they would spend
Thanksgiving together in a hotel. The Agency worked with each of the caregivers to
allow the children to spend the day together with Mother at the hotel, and confirmed pick
up and drop off times the day before Thanksgiving. However, Mother cancelled the
gathering at the last minute and stated she could not pay for the hotel room.
5
In December 2014, Casey facilitated a meeting to discuss possible housing
solutions for the family. Mother said a family friend would stay with her to help with
child care and half of the rent. Casey asked the friend to provide documentation
supporting her ability to pay half the rent but she did not immediately do so and a couple
of months later Mother informed the Agency the friend was no longer employed. Around
this same time, Casey learned a potential landlord had refused to rent a home to Mother
after Mother failed to return phone calls or view the house, so a Casey worker began
going with Mother to view potential homes to ensure she was communicating effectively
with property owners.
In February 2015, a court appointed special advocate (CASA) filed a report
describing her observations of Mother's visitations with P.B. The CASA noted Mother
gave a lot of attention to P.B. and P.B. seemed to enjoy the attention, but P.B. was doing
well in foster care and it was unclear whether Mother would be able to provide a stable
home for the children on an ongoing basis as she continued to struggle with finding
housing. The CASA recommended P.B. remain in her placement with the foster parents.
Shortly before the scheduled 12-month review hearing in March, Mother found a
house for rent within her budget. However, she was not able to move in right away as the
home needed some repairs. The juvenile court continued the matter to a combined
contested 12- and 18-month review hearing.
Meanwhile, P.B. began having trouble sleeping and exhibiting signs of separation
anxiety such as fussiness and clinginess whenever separated from either of her foster
parents. Her foster parents reported these behaviors occurred simultaneously with
6
increased visitation with Mother and the Agency referred P.B. to therapy. P.B.'s foster
parents also expressed concern Mother was not following the lactose free diet that P.B.
needed during visits, causing her to have digestive problems upon return to their care.
In April 2015, approximately 15 months after the children were removed, Mother
began having overnight visits with the older children on the weekends at a hotel and, in
May, Mother had two overnight visits with P.B. at the hotel. Mother was able to provide
for the basic needs of all of the children, including P.B., during the visits but the CASA
described the visits as chaotic and the Agency continued to have concerns regarding
Mother's ability to care for all eight children at once, particularly when she did not have
assistance from another adult.
At the end of May, Mother moved into the rental home and had two overnight
weekend visits with all eight children, both of which went well. Shortly thereafter,
though, the Agency discovered Mother had allowed Father to visit with the children in
the home, in violation of the court's visitation orders. As a result, the juvenile court
returned the visits to weekly supervised visits in a park and, later, in the home.
In June, a Casey social worker supervised a visit in the home and noted P.B. was
reluctant to leave the foster parent, but eventually did so without concern and was then
clingy and stayed directly in contact with Mother throughout the visit. The social worker
also noted all of the children appeared to be bonded to Mother and each other. On two
subsequent visits, the social worker observed that P.B. cried when initially handed to
Mother, but settled and stopped crying within a couple of minutes after the foster parents
7
left. After observing several visits, the worker stated it was evident there was a loving
and positive parent-child relationship between Mother and each of the children.
The CASA submitted another report in July 2015 in which she expressed concern
Mother had not demonstrated she had benefited from services and had shown poor
judgment by letting Father into the home against the court's orders. Thus, the CASA
recommended the juvenile court terminate reunification services for Mother with respect
to the youngest siblings, including P.B. Around the same time, the Casey social worker
observed additional visits and noted again that the children were bonded to one another,
and the Agency social worker noted Mother interacted with and held P.B. during most of
an observed visit. P.B.'s therapist indicated P.B.'s anxiety around transitions had
decreased.
At the combined contested 12- and 18-month review hearing in late August 2015,
the court returned Mother's visitation to unsupervised with overnights, ordered a 60-day
trial visit, and continued the matter for an additional 75 days to allow all parties to report
on the trial visit. Before the 60-day trial visit began, the children continued with
extended overnight visits. The Agency reported the house was messy but there were no
safety hazards, and the children seemed happy but noted the children's caregivers had
expressed concerns that Father was frequently at the home and Mother was short
tempered with the children. Two of the children reported their Mother had gotten upset
and told the children "I'm going to beat your ass," and another reported Mother had
chased him around the house and almost slapped him. Thus, the Agency expressed
concern Mother was becoming frustrated with the children on these extended visits.
8
The 60-day trial visit officially began in October 2015. P.B. stopped receiving
therapy at that time as the referral had been to help with transitions between Mother and
the foster parents and P.B. was now placed with Mother. A CASA observed P.B. once a
week during the trial visit and noted that P.B.'s personality changed dramatically; P.B.
was now shy, withdrawn, whiny and at times cried for her foster parents. Mother allowed
P.B.'s foster mother to continue to take P.B. to a music class she was enrolled in once a
week and the CASA noted P.B. clung to the foster mother during class and did not
participate as she had done in the past. The foster parents reported it was always difficult
to return P.B. to Mother after their visits because P.B. would cry and state that she
wanted to go to "my house, not mamas." P.B. also began using swear words and making
statements like "I'm gonna hit your bot bot."
By December 2015, Mother was unemployed and no longer had a source of
income besides cash aid and food stamps. Although Mother continued to believe she
could stay in the home she was currently renting, the CASA expressed concern Mother
would not be able to maintain the household absent continued support from Casey, which
was not guaranteed. The CASA also noted that P.B. and the other younger children had
formed significant bonds with their foster parents who had raised them for the majority of
their lives and expressed concern that Mother would fall back into old patterns absent
ongoing assistance resulting in further trauma to the children, particularly since she had
expressed poor judgment in allowing Father into the home in violation of court orders.
The CASA therefore recommended the juvenile court place P.B. with the foster parents
and terminate Mother's reunification services.
9
The Agency also noted P.B. was having a difficult time transitioning back to
Mother, had become surprisingly aggressive, and had begun using inappropriate
language. As P.B. had sustained several minor injuries from the other children while in
her care, the Agency expressed concern about Mother's ability to supervise the younger
children as well as Mother's long-term ability to safely parent P.B. and the other children.
At the conclusion of the continued 18-month review hearing in December 2015,
the juvenile court returned P.B. to the care of the foster parents, terminated reunification
services for Mother, and set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing for P.B.4
Mother appealed the order and the appellate court stayed the permanency hearing
pending the outcome of the appeal.
While the appeal was pending, Mother had liberal unsupervised visitation but only
asked for one four-hour visit with P.B. each week. During the visits, Mother bathed, fed
and cared for P.B. P.B. often fought with her next oldest sibling, but Mother intervened
when they hit or yelled at one another. On one occasion, P.B. immediately ran to her
foster parents when they arrived to pick her up and pulled back when Mother attempted
to hug her goodbye.
In May, this court affirmed the juvenile court's order placing P.B. with the foster
parents and terminating Mother's services, noting that Mother's actions, including failing
to provide adequate housing and disobeying the court order regarding visitation with
Father, were a significant factor in the length of time P.B. was living with her foster

4 The court placed the other seven siblings with Mother.
10
parents and the trauma caused by her going back and forth between Mother and her foster
parents. Following this court's appellate decision, the juvenile court set a date for the
section 366.26 permanency hearing.
At the section 366.26 hearing, Mother and the siblings argued the court should not
terminate Mother's parental rights as to P.B. based on the parent-child relationship
exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i), and the sibling bond exception in
section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). The juvenile court heard testimony from two
Agency social workers, Mother, and two of P.B.'s siblings and accepted a number of the
reports into evidence. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court acknowledged this was
a difficult case but ultimately determined neither exception applied and terminated
Mother's parental rights to allow for adoption.5
Mother appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
Once the juvenile court terminates reunification services, the court's focus shifts
from preserving the family to promoting the best interest of the child, and that includes
the child's interest in a stable, permanent placement that allows the caregiver to make a
full emotional commitment to the child. (In re Fernando M. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
529, 534.) At the section 366.26 permanency hearing, the court has three options:

5 We discuss the reasoning of the juvenile court regarding each exception in more
detail below.
11
(1) terminate parental rights and order adoption as the permanent plan, (2) appoint a legal
guardian for the dependent child, or (3) order the child placed in long-term foster care.
(Ibid.) If the child is adoptable, adoption is the preferred plan. (In re Autumn H. (1994)
27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) Thus, the juvenile court will terminate
parental rights to allow for an adoption unless that termination of parental rights would be
detrimental to the child under statutorily specified exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).)
Here, there is no dispute P.B. was generally adoptable and her foster parents were
willing and able to adopt her, but Mother argues the court erred in terminating her
parental rights because two of the statutory exceptions, a beneficial parent-child
relationship and beneficial sibling relationships, applied to outweigh the presumption
towards adoption. (See § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i) and (v).)
We review the juvenile court's determination as to whether any of the exceptions
set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) apply under a mixed standard of review.
(In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395; In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
428, 437-438.) We review any underlying factual findings for substantial evidence but
defer to the juvenile court's weighing of the relevant factors, and thus review the court's
final determination for an abuse of discretion.6 (In re Anthony B., at p. 395; In re Isaiah
S., at p. 438; see also In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315
[confirming the mixed standard of review applies to both exceptions].)

6 We note that some courts have applied only a substantial evidence standard (see In
re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621), but, as a practical matter, the analysis is
essentially the same as broad deference is afforded to the juvenile court's determination
under either standard. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.)
12
II. The Beneficial Parent-Child Relationship Exception
The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies when "termination
would be detrimental to the child" (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)) because "[t]he parents have
maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) A child will almost always
benefit to some degree from interacting with his or her natural patent, but pleasant visits,
frequent and loving contact, and even an emotional bond between the parent and child are
not sufficient, without more, to establish the beneficial parent-child relationship
exception applies. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575; In re Derek W.
(1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826-827.) Instead, the "parent must show he or she occupies
a 'parental role' in the child's life" (In re Derek, p. 827), and that their relationship with
the child "promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the wellbeing
the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents." (In re
Autumn H., at p. 575; In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 555; see In re Derek W., at
p. 827.)
Here, the juvenile court determined the benefit of maintaining the parent-child
bond between Mother and P.B. did not outweigh the permanency of adoption. The court
found Mother had been diligent about maintaining regular, weekly visits with P.B. but
that her contact with P.B.'s caregivers had decreased leading up to the section 366.26
hearing. The court then found that because P.B. was so young when she was removed
and had spent much of the next two years relying on her foster parents for her day-to-day
care, she viewed her foster parents, as opposed to Mother, as the primary parental figures
13
in her life. Most importantly, the court found P.B. suffered harm when removed from the
foster parents but that there was no evidence suggesting P.B. had any difficulty adjusting
or suffered any harm when removed from Mother after the 60-day trial visit. Finally, the
court expressed concern about the impermanence of guardianship, particularly since there
was evidence indicating Mother did not approve of the foster parents. Thus, the court
concluded a bond had not developed between Mother and P.B. that outweighed the
benefits of adoption.
The evidence supports the court's determination that Mother and P.B. did not have
a beneficial parent-child relationship within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i). There is no dispute Mother made it a priority to visit P.B. regularly and the
two interacted in a loving manner during the visits with Mother often carrying P.B.
around. However, the court removed P.B. from Mother's care when she was only four
months old and she spent much of the next two years of her life with her foster parents
attending to her daily needs. By contrast, her visits with Mother lasted a few hours and
occurred at most a couple of times a week, often with several other children present. P.B.
had trouble transitioning to Mother and asked for her foster parents at times, and easily
transitioned back to her foster parents at the end of visits. Thus, the evidence supports
the courts conclusion that although Mother had a friendly and loving relationship with
P.B., she did not have a parental relationship with P.B. of the nature contemplated by the
statute. (See In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 529; In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29
Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419 [mother had frequent and loving contact with children but
children considered caregiver to be their primary mother figure]; In re Angel B. (2002) 97
14
Cal.App.4th 454 [child was removed at a young age, spent few hours visiting with
mother as compared to foster family, and mother-child interactions were positive but not
indicative of a parent-child relationship].)
Further, even if the evidence was sufficient to establish a beneficial parent-child
relationship between Mother and P.B., it was reasonable for the juvenile court to find as it
did that the benefits of adoption greatly outweighed any detriment P.B. would suffer by
the severance of that relationship. There was no evidence indicating P.B. asked for
Mother when she was with her foster parents or had trouble leaving Mother at the end of
visits, but the evidence did indicate she asked for, and at times cried for, her foster
parents when away from them and excitedly returned to them with no hesitation or need
to transition. Perhaps even more telling, P.B. displayed anxiety and actual emotional
harm when removed from her foster parents but as the juvenile court noted, there was no
evidence P.B. suffered similar, or any, harm when removed from Mother at the end of the
60-day trial. (See In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 954 [beneficial parent-child
relationship exception did not apply where child separated easily from mother but
exhibited irritability and temper tantrums after visits, and child's mood stabilized when
visits stopped].)7 Mother asserts these behaviors demonstrate nothing more than an ageappropriate
need to adjust, but this explanation does not account for P.B.'s return to a

7 We recognize there were additional factors weighing in favor of adoption in the
case of In re L.Y.L. that are not present here, such as the mother not expressing an interest
in parenting L.Y. and L.Y. not wanting to visit with her mother. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101
Cal.App.4th at p. 954.) However, as was the case with respect to L.Y.L., we conclude
P.B.'s behavioral changes in response to visits with Mother were a significant and
relevant factor for the juvenile court to consider in the present case. (Ibid.)
15
happy, seemingly well-adjusted child when placed back with her foster parents, despite
this move being yet another adjustment for her, a fact the juvenile court reasonably
considered to be significant. Moreover, while Mother asserts P.B. would benefit from a
parent-child relationship with her, she does not cite any evidence indicating termination
of her parental rights would significantly harm P.B.
Mother argues this case is similar to In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, where
the court found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception applied and precluded
termination of parental rights. While there are some similarities, there are also significant
differences. S.B. was three years old when the juvenile court removed her, her father had
been her primary caregiver for those three years, and thus she had previously established
a strong parent-child bond with him. (Id. at pp. 293, 298-300.) They then maintained
that bond throughout their frequent visits, as evidenced by a bonding study and her
expressed desire to stay with her father at the conclusion of their visits. (Id. at pp. 298-
300.) By contrast here, P.B. was only four months old when the court removed her, she
asked for her foster parents during visits, and she willingly went with her foster parents at
the end of visits. Further, Mother did not present a bonding study or any other evidence
beyond the reports of generally positive and loving interactions during their visits
indicating the existence a parent-child relationship between herself and P.B. (See In re
Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1316 [exception did not apply where court
removed child at two days old and interactions during visitation were more akin to
playdates with a loving adult than parental in nature].)
16
Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings, and the
court did not abuse its discretion in determining Mother did not have a beneficial parentchild
relationship with P.B. within the meaning of section 366.26, subdivision
(c)(1)(B)(i) that would preclude the termination of parental rights.
III. The Sibling Relationship Exception
There is also an exception to the preference for adoption where "[t]here would be
substantial interference with a child's sibling relationship, taking into consideration the
nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was
raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common
experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing
contact is in the child's best interest, including the child's long-term emotional interest, as
compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption." (§ 366.26, subd.
(c)(1)(B)(v).) The purpose of the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental
rights is to preserve long-standing sibling relationships that serve as anchors for
dependent children whose lives are in turmoil. (In re Isaiah S., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 437-438.)
In determining whether the exception applies, the juvenile court must first
determine if termination of parental rights would harm the potentially adoptable child by
substantially interfering with a significant sibling relationship. (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101
Cal.App.4th at p. 952.) The court considers the nature and extent of the sibling
relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same house,
shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds.
17
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E).) If such a relationship exists, "the court then weighs the
benefit to the child of continuing the sibling relationship against the benefit to the child
adoption would provide." (In re L.Y.L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952-953.) In
making this determination, the court considers the best interests of the child being
considered for adoption, and not the best interests of other siblings. (In re Isaiah S.,
supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 438.) The exception rarely applies when the child at issue is
young, as the need for a competent, caring and stable parent is particularly paramount in
such cases. (In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)
Here, the juvenile court considered the bond from P.B.'s perspective and found
that although P.B. loved her siblings, she would not be emotionally damaged if she was
no longer able to see them. Further, the court found any potential harm was minimized
because P.B.'s foster parents had made ongoing efforts to allow P.B. to spend time with
her siblings and had expressed a willingness to continue to do so, although it also stated it
would have concluded the sibling exception did not apply even if the foster parents had
not done so. Thus, the court concluded it would not be detrimental to P.B. if the
termination of Mother's parental rights interfered with the sibling relationship, and that it
would be in P.B.'s best interests to be adopted despite any impact adoption may have on
the sibling relationship.
The evidence supports the juvenile court's findings. As with Mother, P.B. had not
spent a significant portion of her life living with her siblings. She was only four months
when the court placed her in foster care and initially only saw her siblings during weekly
visits for the majority of the two years that followed. Although she showed affection to
18
some of her siblings at times, there was no evidence indicating she was particularly close
with any of them, and there was some evidence her younger siblings were aggressive
towards her. The older siblings testified they loved P.B. and wanted her to remain in the
home, but the court correctly conducted its analysis from P.B.'s perspective, and not the
siblings' perspective, and found little evidence the sibling bond was particularly
beneficial to P.B.
Mother argues there was evidence P.B. was part of a bonded sibling group and we
agree. The Agency noted at the outset of the case that the children were part of a bonded
sibling group such that reunification would be in their best interest, and the Casey social
worker noted on several occasions that the children were bonded. However, the majority
of these comments were in reference to the sibling group as a whole and not just P.B.,
who was the youngest and only four months old when removed, such that she was likely
not as bonded to the siblings as they were to her or one another. Mother also asserts the
children visited frequently and maintained these bonds, but the sibling visits occurred
only one morning a week and the court only extended them to longer visits in the hotel
and then the home for a short period approximately 15 months after P.B.'s initial removal.
Meanwhile, as discussed above, P.B. had formed strong bonds to her foster parents over
the course of those 15 months. The social worker and the CASA thus agreed that while
P.B. loved her siblings, she would not suffer any significant harm because of the
termination of Mother's parental rights and the severance of any sibling relationships, and
that the benefits of adoption outweighed any harm that might occur. The juvenile court
was entitled to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to give significant weight to the
19
social worker and CASA's concurring opinions. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th
38, 53.)
Further, as the court noted, the foster parents had facilitated sibling visits in the
past and agreed to do so on an ongoing basis. Although this was not the determining
factor in the court's decision, it was reasonable for the court to consider the likelihood
that P.B. would continue to have contact with her siblings even if the court terminated
Mother's parental rights. (See In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 175.) Mother
asserts future visits were even more tenuous because of her own deteriorating relationship
with the foster parents, but there is no indication the foster parents would not allow for
sibling visits based on any conflicts they had with Mother. Further, as noted, the court
considered the circumstances of mother's relationship with the foster parents and found, if
anything, they weighed in favor of affording P.B. increased permanency through
adoption.
Further still, the juvenile court expressly considered the option of formal
guardianship as opposed to adoption but determined guardianship was not in P.B.'s best
interests because it could lead to instability. Substantial evidence supports that finding.
P.B. had already demonstrated substantial harm from instability insofar as she had
experienced anxiety, withdrawal, and other negative effects when she separated from her
foster parents.
Thus, we conclude substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings and
the court did not abuse its discretion in determining, based on those findings, that the
20
sibling-relationship exception did not outweigh the benefits of adoption for P.B. or
preclude the termination of parental rights.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, J.
NARES, J.