In re Pedro N.
Filed 7/11/13 In re Pedro N. CA1/5
NOT TO BE
PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
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as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF
APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE
DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
>
In re PEDRO N., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. PEDRO N., Defendant and Appellant. | A136452 ( Super. Ct. No. 35954-J) |
Pedro
N. (appellant), a minor, appeals from a dispositional
order committing him to juvenile hall for a period of 180 to 300 days after
he admitted to receiving stolen property.
(Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602.) Among other things, we reject appellant’s
contention the juvenile court lacked authority to impose an extended commitment
to juvenile hall. We affirm the court’s
order but remand for specification of the maximum length of confinement and
appellant’s custody credits toward that maximum.
Background
Appellant,
born in January 1995, was declared a ward of the court in March 2011, after he
pled no contest to an allegation in a Welfare and Institutions Code section
602, subdivision (a) petition (602(a) petition) that he committed
§ 459). A second allegation in the
petition that he received stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a))
was dismissed, as was another residential burglary (Pen. Code, § 459)
allegation in a second 602(a) petition.
The juvenile court placed appellant in his parent’s home and directed
him to participate in the Assertive Community Treatment (ACT) program.
In
July 2011, appellant admitted allegations in a third 602(a) petition that he
drove under the influence of alcohol and without a license (Veh. Code,
§§ 12500, subd. (a), 23152, subd. (b).)
On July 6, the juvenile court removed appellant from his parent’s home
and placed him at juvenile hall. On July
20, appellant was released from juvenile hall with orders to participate in
several programs (including substance abuse programs) in addition to the prior
ACT referral. On October 20, the
juvenile court vacated the referral to the ACT program and referred appellant
to the WRAP
title="">[1]
program, due to appellant’s ineligibility for funding for the ACT program.
In
November 2011, appellant admitted to violating the conditions of his probation
by leaving home without permission and drinking alcohol, as alleged in a
Welfare and Institutions Code section 777 petition (777 petition). Appellant was directed to continue to
participate in the WRAP program.
In
January 2012, appellant admitted allegations in a new 777 petition that he
violated the conditions of his probation by leaving home without permission,
taking money from his mother’s backpack, being suspended from school due to
disruptiveness, and using alcohol and marijuana. Appellant was directed to continue to
participate in the WRAP program.
In
March 2012, appellant admitted to allegations in a new 777 petition that he
violated the conditions of his probation by leaving home without permission and
being suspended from school due to daily refusal to adhere to the school dress
code. Appellant was directed to continue
to participate in the WRAP program and to serve 30 days in juvenile hall and 30
days on community detention.
In
May 2012, appellant admitted allegations in a new 777 petition that he violated
the conditions of his probation by being suspended from school for stealing
another student’s shirt and refusing to follow directions from school
staff. The juvenile court removed
appellant from his home, vacated the WRAP referral, and committed appellant to
probation camp.
On
July 6, 2012, the district attorney filed a fourth 602(a) petition, alleging
appellant escaped from camp (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 871, subd.
(a)). A supplemental disposition report
stated that, when appellant was home on his first six-hour furlough from camp,
he left home without permission and did not return to camp. On July 24, the district attorney filed a
fifth 602(a) petition, alleging appellant received stolen property (Pen. Code,
§ 496, subd. (a)). The supplemental
disposition report stated that appellant and a co-offender were seen abandoning
a stolen vehicle.
Appellant
admitted the receiving stolen property allegation, and the escape allegation
was dismissed. In August 2012, appellant
was ordered to serve 180 to 300 days in juvenile hall, the “exact time to be
determined by [the] Juvenile Hall Director.â€
This appeal followed.
Discussion
I. Standard
of Review
“The
appellate court reviews a commitment decision for abuse of discretion
. . . .
[Citations.]†(
1392, 1396.) “An appellate court will
not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile
court. We must indulge all reasonable
inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb
its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. [Citations.]â€
(In re Michael D. (1987) 188
Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395.) However,
questions of statutory interpretation are reviewed de novo. (In re
M.C. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 784, 804-805.)
II. The
Commitment to Juvenile Hall Was Not Improper
Appellant
contends (1) the juvenile court lacked authority to make an extended commitment
to juvenile hall; (2) the juvenile hall commitment lacked a rehabilitative
purpose; and (3) the juvenile court improperly delegated its sentencing
discretion.
A.
Propriety of Extended Commitment
to Juvenile Hall
Appellant
contends, as a matter of law, the
juvenile court lacked authority to impose an extended commitment to juvenile
hall.
Appellant
relies on Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (a),
which authorizes a juvenile court to commit a minor adjudged a ward of the
court under section 602 “to a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry
camp. If there is no county juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp
within the county, the court may commit the minor to the county juvenile hall.†(Italics added.) “In construing a statute, our role is to
ascertain the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the
law. [Citation.] In determining intent, we must look first to
the words of the statute because they are the most reliable indicator of
legislative intent. [Citation.] If the statutory language is clear and
unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute governs. [Citation.]â€
(People v. Lopez (2003) 31
Cal.4th 1051, 1056.) Appellant reads
section 730, subdivision (a) as precluding a juvenile hall commitment where, as
here, a camp is available in the county.
However, the literal language of the statute merely authorizes commitments to juvenile hall where the other types of
listed facilities are not available in the county. The statute appears to address a situation
where a placement at one of the listed types of facilities would be more
appropriate, but the placement is not available. Appellant’s construction assumes the Legislature
also intended to restrict juvenile hall placements by implication—that a court
may not commit a minor to juvenile
hall if one of the listed placements is available, even if the juvenile hall
commitment is the most appropriate placement for the minor.
Appellant’s
reading of section 730, subdivision (a) as sharply restricting juvenile hall
commitments would be in conflict with section 202, subdivision (e)(4), which
expressly and broadly authorizes the juvenile courts to impose sanctions,
including “[c]ommitment of the minor to a local detention or treatment
facility, such as a juvenile hall, camp, or ranch.†(See Los
Angeles County Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Alameda Produce Market,
LLC (2011) 52 Cal.4th 1100, 1106-1107 [“We do not . . . consider
the statutory language in isolation; rather, we look to the statute’s entire
substance in order to determine its scope and
purposes. . . . We must
harmonize the statute’s various parts by considering it in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole.
[Citation.]â€].) Moreover,
appellant’s construction of the statute is inconsistent with the rule that
“juvenile placements need not follow any particular order . . . ,
including from the least to the most restrictive.†(In re
Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 507 [most restrictive alternative may be
ordered before other options are tried].)
330 (Debra A.), arguably construed
section 730, subdivision (a) as limiting the juvenile court’s discretion to
commit a minor to juvenile hall where other facilities are available. There, the juvenile court imposed weekend
commitments “ ‘in the Juvenile Home, Ranch, Forestry Camp or County
Juvenile Hall, as determined by the probation officer.’ †(Debra
A., at p. 329.) The Court of Appeal
appeared to conclude that section 730, subdivision (a) precluded commitment of
the minor to juvenile hall where the other facilities were available. (Debra
A., at p. 330.) However, we do not
read Debra A. as construing section
730, subdivision (a) to preclude a juvenile hall commitment where the juvenile
court has, as in this case, deemed the other available placements
inappropriate. In any event,
interpretation of section 730, subdivision (a) with the language of section
202, subdivision (e)(4).
We
also note that appellant fails to cite any authority that a juvenile court may
not order an extended juvenile hall
commitment such as the one imposed here.
Appellant cites language in In re
Gerald B. (1980) 105 Cal.App.3d 119, 125, that “it is generally recognized
that there is no legal impediment to the imposition of brief periods of juvenile hall detention as a condition of probation in section 602 proceedings.†(First italics added.) However, neither In Gerald B. nor any cases cited therein hold or cite any authority
for the proposition that juvenile courts are prohibited from imposing lengthier
juvenile hall commitments. As noted
previously, section 202, subdivision (e)(4) allows commitment to juvenile hall
as a sanction and imposes no limitation on the length of the commitment. We decline to impose any such rigid
limitation, which is not present in the statute. (See In
re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 411 [“The statutory scheme governing
juvenile delinquency is designed to give the court ‘maximum flexibility to
craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward before
it.’ [Citation.] Flexibility is the hallmark of juvenile court
law, in both delinquency and dependency interventions. [Citation.]â€].)
B.
Rehabilitative Purpose
As
to appellant’s contention that the juvenile hall commitment lacked a
rehabilitative purpose, we review the juvenile court’s disposition order in
light of the purpose of the juvenile delinquency laws, which “is twofold: (1) to serve the ‘best interests’ of the
delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the
ward and ‘enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or
her family and the community,’ and (2) to ‘provide for the protection and
safety of the public . . . .’
[Citations.]†(
608, 614-615; see also, § 202, subd. (a).)
“[T]he 1984 amendments to the juvenile court law reflected an increased
emphasis on punishment as a tool of rehabilitation, and a concern for the
safety of the public. [Citation.]†(In re
Asean D. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 467, 473.)
Accordingly, “[m]inors under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court as a
consequence of delinquent conduct shall, in conformity with the interests of
public safety and protection, receive care, treatment, and guidance that is
consistent with their best interest, that holds them accountable for their
behavior, and that is appropriate for their circumstances. This guidance may include punishment that is
consistent with the rehabilitative objectives of this chapter.†(§ 202, subd. (b).) Commitment to juvenile hall is a permissible
“punishment.†(§ 202, subd.
(e)(4).)
In
the present case, the juvenile court tried community programs as well as a camp
placement, and appellant’s performance was dismal. There is no dispute that one of appellant’s
main problems is his apparent inability to abstain from alcohol and marijuana,
and the commitment to juvenile hall was calculated to address that
obstacle. Thus, the probation officer’s
supplemental disposition report stated that appellant “has told the [c]ourt
over and over again that he wants treatment for his substance abuse issues, but
he has not demonstrated any commitment to sobriety no matter what the
intervention for the greater part of three years. Instead, his substance use has continued
unabated and the minor seems to be well on the road to becoming criminally
sophisticated, making him a danger to both himself and the community,
especially when he is under the influence.
This department is well aware that incarceration in Juvenile Hall is not
treatment, but serving time is what the Screening Committee felt was the only
appropriate recommendation at this point.
Remaining in custody will give the minor an enforced period of sobriety
during which it is hoped he will reconsider his priorities and what he wants to
do with his life. He can also work
toward graduation or his GED, and he can participate in an independent living
program that can help him transition back to the community when he is
released.†In adopting the probation
officer’s recommendation, the juvenile court echoed the report’s reasoning,
stating, “[m]aybe the best thing we can do for you now, Pedro, is give you a
period of time where you have to be sober and clean so you can actually think
about what kind of life you can lead.
We’ve done all kinds of things to help, and none of it worked.â€
At
the time of the court’s challenged order, appellant was four months short of
his 18th birthday. As he faced the
imminent prospect of receiving far harsher consequences for criminal conduct as
an adult, the juvenile court order sought “to avoid the unkind leniency†that
may lead a minor to further violations of law.
(In re Ricardo M. (1975) 52
Cal.App.3d 744, 749 (Ricardo M.).)
Appellant
does not dispute that a period of enforced sobriety is in his best interest,
and he does not dispute that the educational opportunities identified by the
probation officer are available at juvenile hall. Appellant’s contention that the disposition
lacked a rehabilitative purpose is without merit.
C.
Delegation Regarding Length of
Commitment
Appellant
contends it was impermissible for the juvenile court to delegate responsibility
to the juvenile hall director to determine at what point appellant could be
released within the commitment range set by the court. However, none of appellant’s cases regarding
improper delegation involve the delegation of discretion to determine the exact
length of commitment within a range. For
example, in Debra A.,
Court of Appeal held the juvenile court impermissibly delegated to the
probation officer the determination of where
the minor would be committed during each of five weekends. In the present case, the juvenile court
determined the location of the commitment and specified minimum and maximum
number of days of commitment.
This
case is directly analogous to Ricardo M.,
supra, 52 Cal.App.3d 744. In that case,
the juvenile court imposed as a probation condition that the minor spend “not
less than 5 nor more than 20 days in juvenile hall, the exact amount of time to
be determined by juvenile hall staff based upon [the minor’s] attitude and
cooperation.†(Id. at p. 746.) The Court of
Appeal stated that the juvenile court’s order effectively vested the discretion
in the probation officer, “[s]ince the juvenile hall is under the management
and control of the probation officer.†(
delegation of authority was permissible.
(Ibid.) Appellant does not contend that
he does not explain why or present authority that the greater length of the
commitment at issue in the present case affects the propriety of the delegation
of authority.
title="">[5]
Appellant
also cites various cases and statutory
provisions regarding the authority of the Division of Juvenile Justice
and its procedures to determine the duration of confinement of minors committed
to the DJJ. (See, e.g.,
1529; §§ 1176, 1766.) As appellant
points out, there is no indication in the record there are any specific
procedures in place to guide the determination of when during the range set by
the juvenile court appellant should be released from juvenile hall. However, appellant fails to explain why or cite
any authority that the absence of express statutory authority and procedures
analogous to those applicable to the DJJ means it was impermissible for the
juvenile court to make the order it made.
Appellant
has not shown that the trial court’s delegation of discretion to release
appellant from juvenile hall after 180 days but before 300 days was
impermissible.
III. Maximum
Confinement Time and Predisposition Credits
Appellant
contends the trial court erred in failing to specify the maximum confinement
period for his various sustained offenses and in failing to grant him credit
toward that maximum for predisposition time spent in juvenile hall.
When
a juvenile is removed from his or her parent’s physical custody as the result
of a section 602 order of wardship, the juvenile court’s dispositional order
must specify the maximum term of physical confinement, not to exceed the
maximum term of imprisonment that could be imposed on an adult convicted of the
same offense or offenses. (§ 726,
subd. (d); see also In re Julian R.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 487, 497.)
name="_ftnref7" title="">[7] Physical confinement includes a juvenile hall
commitment. (§ 726, subd.
(d).) Moreover, appellant is “entitled
to credit against his or her maximum term of confinement for the time spent in
custody before the disposition hearing.
[Citations.]†(
1058, 1067; see also In re Eric J.
(1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 533-536.)
Respondent
does not dispute the juvenile court was required to specify the maximum
confinement time and credits to be applied toward that maximum. Instead, respondent argues the court was not
required to make an oral pronouncement of the maximum and asserts that the
court “incorporated into the court minutes the probation officer’s worksheet
for determining [the] maximum term of confinement†and appellant’s
credits. Respondent cites to the
worksheet, but fails to cite to anywhere in the record showing that the
juvenile court incorporated the worksheet into its order, and this court has
been unable to find any such reference in the record.
We
remand with directions that the juvenile court specify the maximum confinement
time and appellant’s credits to be applied toward that maximum. In making the specification, the court shall
comply with In re Julian R.,
Disposition
The
juvenile court’s order is affirmed. The
matter is remanded with directions that the juvenile court specify the maximum
confinement time and appellant’s custody credits to be applied toward that
maximum.
SIMONS,
Acting P.J.
We concur.
NEEDHAM, J.
BRUINIERS, J.
referred to as the “Wraparound†program.
references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
