Filed 10/18/17 In re P.M. CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In this appeal from jurisdictional and dispositional orders in dependency proceedings, Melinda M. (Mother), who resides in Nevada and left her children in California without providing for their support, argues that that the juvenile court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) (Fam. Code, § 3400 et seq.). We conclude that the juvenile court had temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when the children were abandoned, and that after a court hearing at which counsel, a Nevada state court magistrate, and child welfare agencies from California and Nevada were present in person or by telephone, the juvenile court properly assumed permanent jurisdiction under the UCCJEA.

Mother further argues that even if the juvenile court had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA, its findings pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 that she had a substance abuse problem and abandoned the children are not supported by substantial evidence. Finally, Mother argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in approving a case plan that failed to address the issues that brought the children to the court’s attention. We will affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

We draw our summary of the facts from the detention/jurisdiction and disposition reports prepared by the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau). Mother challenges some of the recommendations in the disposition reports, but she does not otherwise dispute the contents of the reports, and she did not question any witnesses or offer any evidence below.

A. Mother Leaves Her Children in California

In late February 2016, Mother, then 35 years old, brought her children P.M., age 12, and S.M., age 3, from Las Vegas, Nevada to Richmond, California, where she left them with her friend Jonathan A. (Jonathan). Jonathan was 26 years old and lived in rented space in a house in Richmond that was also occupied by another man about his age and that man’s girlfriend. Starting in 2010, Jonathan had lived in Los Angeles with Mother and P.M. on and off for about three years. He believed he was S.M.’s father, although he was not listed on her birth certificate.[1] When Mother left the children with him in late February, she told him she would not have anywhere to stay for about 15 days, and he understood that she would pick up the children within two weeks. She left no papers or other documentation to allow him to get medical care for the children if they needed it.

At some point after the children were left with him, Jonathan contacted Mother, who told him it was taking longer than she thought to get a place in Las Vegas to take the children, that she was never coming back to California, and that if he sent the children to her in Las Vegas, she could take care of them. He told Mother he had no money to send them anywhere, and that he had to work. Eventually, Mother contacted a school in the Richmond area, told the school he was the girls’ stepfather, and sent the school papers so that he could enroll the children, which he did. Jonathan asked Mother when she would come for the girls, and she said again that she was never coming back, and that he would have to send the girls to her. Jonathan told Mother he could care for S.M., who was very young and his child, but he could not care for P.M. He asked again when Mother would come to get the girls, and she said yet again that she was never coming back to California.

B. The Bureau Becomes Involved

On April 25, 2016, after the children had been with Jonathan for about two months, he contacted the Bureau to report that he could not provide long-term care for them. He lived in shared housing, could not find suitable child care to accommodate his work schedule, and he had no control over P.M., who would leave the house at night. He was concerned about P.M.’s mental health and behavior. He had a photograph of something she made from garbage bags, which he thought looked like a noose. He said P.M. had not expressed or exhibited any suicidality, but that she had friends who were cutting, and he was concerned she might mimic them to be more included in their group. He was also concerned that given P.M.’s age and entry into puberty, he would have difficulty defending any allegations she might make against him if he tried to restrict her or control her movements. And he acknowledged that P.M. was at risk of being sexually exploited in the area of Richmond where they lived.

Later that day, the Bureau made telephone contact with Mother, who said she was living in Las Vegas and working as a telemarketer. She said she had lost her apartment and could not care for her children, so she brought them to Jonathan “for a couple of weeks.” She said she had told him on numerous occasions that she could not get to Richmond to pick them up, so he would have to send them to her in Las Vegas. She said he refused, and she had no money to send him for their transportation. Mother provided her address as an apartment in Las Vegas, and said she could be reached at her 213 area-code phone number, which was her cell phone that she had “had forever.” She also gave the number of a person she identified as a friend in Los Angeles who was “like family” and could get the children. The Bureau called the friend, who said she was not related to the children and could not come to get them. The Bureau then informed Mother that the friend could not retrieve the children, and told Mother she would have to pick up the children or a court case would begin. Mother said she would pick up the children by Sunday, May 1.

When Mother did not pick up the children, the Bureau brought them into protective custody on May 2, 2016. The Bureau tried to make telephone contact with Mother that day, without success, and left voicemail messages for her.

On May 2, 2016, the Bureau contacted Jonathan, who said he had last spoken with Mother the day before. He said she had left him many voicemail messages and text messages that were rude and that she cursed at him. He said that while he and Mother were living together she abused alcohol.

Once in protective custody on May 2, 2016, P.M., who had presented as depressed and was not forthcoming during an interview at Jonathan’s residence, became very social and visibly at ease. She said she did not want to return to her mother’s care. She appeared to be well-bonded with her younger sister, and reported that when Mother left them with Jonathan, she gave no indication of when she was coming back. For six weeks before Mother brought them to California, they had been living in a storage unit. Before that, they lived in an apartment in Las Vegas, where they moved from Los Angeles sometime in 2014. She said Jonathan lived with them sometimes in Los Angeles; before that, she and Mother had lived in Maui. She said that on two occasions she saw Mother smoking something in a glass pipe, most recently while they were living in the storage unit, and before that in the Las Vegas apartment. P.M. said that shortly after Jonathan made contact with the Bureau in late April, Mother called her and said she would come to get her and her sister on May 1, 2016. Mother called again on May 1, saying she was in Marin, but that something had happened, and a friend would have to pick the girls up. Mother called later that same day to see if the girls were inside or outside the house.

Later on May 2, 2016, Mother contacted the Bureau at an after-hours phone number, having just learned from Jonathan that the children were in protective custody. An assigned social worker contacted Mother on May 3. Mother said she had arrived in Marin County on April 30, but did not have the Richmond address or the after-hours number that had been provided to her. She said she had tried calling and texting Jonathan, but he did not respond. She admitting using abusive language in her text messages to him. She also said that earlier in the week she called Jonathan when she learned that her tax refund check had been rejected by the bank, and that she would have to drive to California to pick the children up. She said Jonathan told her that he would be paid on April 27, and would send the children to Las Vegas by air regardless of the cost, and that she was therefore confused when he did not pick up her calls or return her texts. Mother later admitted using methamphetamines on May 1, the day she was supposed to pick up the children.

On May 4, 2016, the Bureau filed petitions on behalf of P.M. and S.M., alleging that Mother had a substance abuse problem and abandoned P.M. with a caregiver who was unable and unwilling to provide her with long term care, and abandoned S.M. with her alleged father, who had no custody paperwork or ability to prove his paternity.

The next day, the Bureau filed a detention/jurisdiction report that summarized contacts with the children, Mother, and Jonathan. The report also reflected contact between the Bureau and its Clark County, Nevada, counterpart, and outlined a plan to ask the juvenile court to take emergency jurisdiction. The Bureau expected that the juvenile court would contact a judge in Clark County and that the matter would eventually be transferred to Nevada. The report summarized Mother’s history of arrests and convictions from 1991 through 2009, which included convictions for prostitution, obstruction of a police officer, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The report also summarized referrals to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services in 2003 and 2012. In 2003, when P.M. was an infant, after a referral for general neglect, Mother agreed to a voluntary family maintenance plan for substance abuse treatment and parenting, which ended successfully in 2004. In 2012, P.M. reported that while she was naked in the shower, Mother hit her with a hanger, and that she had previously been hit with a belt. Mother admitted doing so, and disclosed an extensive drug history which including using methamphetamines from the time she was 16, and crack at the age of 21. She said she began prostituting at 18 to support her drug habit, but had been free from drugs since 2003, when she was 23. Mother also disclosed that she had lost custody of her oldest child to her parents in Hawaii, largely because of her problems with substance abuse. Although Mother denied using alcohol, the social worker expressed concern about her drinking in view of the fact that Mother was then pregnant (with S.M.). The Los Angeles social worker reported that mother was open to receiving services, and agreed to participate in a voluntary family maintenance services case plan.

C. Detention and Jurisdiction

At a hearing on May 5, 2016, the juvenile court appointed counsel for the children and ordered them detained. Mother was not present, though she had notice of the proceedings. The judge, the Honorable Rebecca Hardie, expressed concern “that the [Bureau] was even considering simply returning the girls to the mother without filing petitions,” and noted that the Bureau “made extraordinary efforts to contact the mother and [have] her pick up the girls,” and that Mother “has not come forward to even express interest in gaining custody of her girls.” A further hearing was scheduled for May 27.

Mother was not present at the May 27, 2016 hearing, held before the Honorable Thomas Maddock, but had made telephone contact with the court saying she was out of state and hoped to have counsel appointed for her. Counsel for the children reported that they were happy with their foster caretaker; that P.M. “hated it” when she was sent to live with Jonathan, and didn’t want to visit him; and that P.M. did not want to go back to Mother. P.M. was present in court, and through counsel informed the court that her own father was dead and that she had a stepfather who had been deported to El Salvador. She asked her counsel to say “that she would like the social worker and the Court to just really look into her mother’s history because she thinks that’s very important. And that her mother has informed her to tell that she really doesn’t want the [Bureau] to look into her history.” Arrangements were made to inform Mother to contact legal aid, and the court set a hearing date in June for acceptance of counsel and jurisdiction setting.

Counsel was appointed for Mother. At a hearing on July 15, 2016, Judge Maddock explained that he would contact the court in Clark County, Nevada, to determine in which state the case should proceed. At a hearing two weeks later, Judge Maddock reported that he had spoken to Magistrate Jon Norheim in Nevada, to set up a conference as required by law for interstate matters, and was informed that no court case had been initiated there. Judge Maddock explained that the California court had taken emergency jurisdiction to protect the welfare of the children, but had not made a final determination as to which state was the proper venue, and that Magistrate Norheim would review the detention/jurisdiction report and decide whether the case should proceed in Nevada.

On August 5, 2016, the juvenile court held a reported conference call in chambers with the Clark County, Nevada court to “have a discussion on which state should assume jurisdiction of this.” All counsel for all parties were present, and Magistrate Norheim was on the telephone along with Deputy District Attorney Tanner Sharp, who represented the Clark County family services agency. Judge Maddock said, “I detained both children from the parents. We’re awaiting this decision as to what we’re going to do. [¶] What is your position?” Magistrate Norheim asked Mr. Sharp to provide Clark County’s position. Mr. Sharp then argued that the children and the case should remain in California. He reported that Mother first came in contact with the Clark County agency in 2014, and the agency attempted to engage in services with her, but she went back to California. Clark County understood she had some cases in California and had participated in drug court there. The Clark County agency had contact with Mother in February 2016 and tried to engage with her on the basis of “issues of educational neglect and some worries about drug usage.” Mother “disappeared again,” and the Clark County agency, believing her to be in California, attempted to track her down there, but without success. Clark County also had contact with Mother about two months before the August 5 hearing, when Mother called one of the social workers and said she was in California. It was Clark County’s understanding that Mother was “sporadically” in Las Vegas. Thus, Clark County’s position was that the case should be in California because of Mother’s minimal contact with the Clark County agency, her trips to California, and her previous contact with California courts.

Counsel for the Bureau expressed concerns about providing services to Mother in Nevada if the case remained in California, and opined that reunification services were better provided in Nevada. The children’s counsel reported that the girls wanted to remain in California, and argued that the case should be in California in view of the facts that the Clark County agency had no open case for Mother and that both alleged fathers for S.M. (one of whom was Jonathan, who was having a paternity test) were in California. Jonathan’s counsel asked for the children and the case to remain in California. Mother’s counsel argued that the case should proceed in Nevada, stating that Mother had given a Nevada address and had represented to him that she lived in Nevada, and he expressed concern about Mother receiving services in Nevada if the case remained in California. After counsel had presented their views, Judge Maddock said, “Let me share with everyone. My inclination is as long as Nevada is agreeable, I think the best interests of the children outweigh the inconvenience to mother. And the children are very safe and happy here. And if Nevada agrees, I would be happy to take jurisdiction here. I guess that’s my question to you.”

Magistrate Norheim then spoke: “Nevada is in agreement. We think that the case is and the children are best served in California.” Judge Maddock said, “And I concur. And I balance all of the issues that are being raised, and I come down on balance that each of the children’s interests are tantamount in this case.” Magistrate Norheim said that his court would produce a minute order and have it faxed to the juvenile court. Judge Maddock said that California would move forward on jurisdiction, and expressed his hope that the Clark County agency would cooperate with the Bureau “in terms of reunification with mother and dealing with mother across state lines.” Magistrate Norheim replied, “Of course. Absolutely.”

On October 17, 2016, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdiction hearing. Mother was not present. Her counsel reported that he had been in touch with her, that she was aware of the hearing, and that she resided in Las Vegas and said she did not have funds to travel to California for the hearing. Her counsel objected to sustaining the petitions, asserting lack of evidence. The court found the allegations in the petitions to be true. For both girls, the court found that Mother has a substance abuse problem that interferes in her ability to provide safe and adequate care of the children (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)) and that Mother resides in another state and has not provided adequate provision for the children (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (g).) As to P.M., the court found that Mother abandoned her with a caregiver who is unable and unwilling to provide for her long-term care; as to S.M., the court found that Mother abandoned her with her biological father, who had no custody paperwork or ability to prove paternity. A disposition hearing was set for November 14, 2016.

D. Disposition

The disposition hearing was continued several times, first for two weeks at the request of the Bureau to allow time to prepare and distribute disposition reports, and then for a week at the request of Mother’s counsel, who said he had sent Mother the reports by email but had not yet discussed them with her.

According to the disposition reports, Mother had no in-person contact with the children since they had entered foster care in May, and for several weeks before that. She attended a court hearing in California on July 15, 2016, but said her travel plans prevented her from visiting with the children. Mother had some “sporadic” telephone contact with the children, which “d[id] not appear conducive to strengthening her bond with them or progressing toward reunification.” Mother did not maintain contact with the Bureau, even to arrange visits. P.M. was clear that she did not want to be returned to her mother’s care, and contended that Jonathan was not an appropriate caregiver for her and S.M. Interviews with P.M. and Jonathan suggested that “[M]other’s living circumstances were quite tenuous and she was clearly unable to provide the children with a safe and stable environment”; and Mother herself “readily conceded that her current circumstances are very unstable and she is not able to provide for the children’s basic needs.” The Bureau recommended adjudging the children dependents of the court and providing reunification services to Mother, including mental health counseling, parenting education, and substance abuse testing and treatment.

Mother was not present at the rescheduled disposition hearing on December 5, 2016. The court had earlier stated that Mother could appear by telephone, and her counsel reported he had left messages for her, but she did not return his calls, and that he had no instructions from her and would therefore set the matter for contest on disposition. The contested hearing was set for December 16, 2016.

Mother was not present for the December 16 contested hearing. The court had again allowed her to appear by telephone, and her counsel reported at the hearing that he had spoken with Mother that morning and asked her to be on phone standby during the afternoon, but that he was not able to reach her in the afternoon. The court’s bailiff tried to call Mother twice and got no answer. The hearing went forward. Mother’s counsel submitted on the report, objecting to the children being adjudged dependents of the court, and objecting that there was not clear and convincing evidence to sustain findings pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c)(1) that there would be substantial danger to the children in returning them to Mother and that there were no reasonable means by which the children’s physical health can be protected without removing them from Mother’s physical custody.

The juvenile court followed the Bureau’s recommendations, declaring the children dependents of the court, ordering reunification services, and ordering the Bureau to arrange supervised visitation between Mother and the girls. Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

The UCCJEA is the exclusive method in California for determining subject matter jurisdiction for child custody actions, which include dependency actions. (In re A.C. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 661, 668 (A.C.), citing Fam. Code §§ 3421, subd. (b), 3402, subd. (d).[2]) “Subject matter jurisdiction over a dependency action . . . either exists or does not exist at the time the petition is filed, and jurisdiction under the UCCJEA may not be conferred by mere presence of the parties or by stipulation, consent, waiver, or estoppel.” (Id. at p. 668.)

Under the UCCJEA, priority for jurisdiction rests with a child’s “home state” (§ 3421, subd. (a)), defined as “the state in which a child lived with a parent or a person acting as a parent for at least six consecutive months immediately before the commencement of a child custody proceeding. . . . A period of temporary absence of any of the mentioned persons is part of the period.” (§ 3402, subd. (g).) The parties agree that Nevada is P.M.’s and S.M.’s home state.

Even if California is not a child’s home state, a California court has “temporary emergency jurisdiction” pursuant to section 3424, subdivision (a) when a “child is present in this state and the child has been abandoned.” An “abandoned” child has been “left without provision for reasonable and necessary care or supervision.” (§ 3402, subd. (a).) “ ‘Although emergency jurisdiction is generally intended to be short term and limited, the juvenile court may continue to exercise its authority as long as the reasons underlying the dependency exist.’ ” (In re Cristian I. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1097, quoting In re Jaheim B. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1349-1350.) A California court exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA is required to contact and provide notice to a court in the child’s home state to determine whether that state wishes to assert jurisdiction. (In re A.M. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 593, 598 (A.M.); see also § 3410 [authorizing a California court to communicate with another state’s court concerning proceedings under the UCCJEA].) Mother does not contend that the juvenile court improperly exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction here.

Section 3421, subdivision (a) sets forth the non-emergency circumstances under which a California court has jurisdiction to make an “initial child custody determination,” which is “the first child custody determination concerning a particular child.”[3] (§ 3402, subd. (h).) Section 3421, subdivision (a) provides as follows:

“Except as otherwise provided in Section 3424, a court of this state has jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination only if any of the following are true:

“(1) This state is the home state of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or was the home state of the child within six months before the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from this state but a parent or person acting as a parent continues to live in this state.

“(2) A court of another state does not have jurisdiction under paragraph (1), or a court of the home state of the child has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the grounds that this state is the more appropriate forum under Section 3427 or 3428,^[[4]] and both of the following are true:

“(A) The child and the child’s parents, or the child and at least one parent or a person acting as a parent, have a significant connection with this state other than mere physical presence.

“(B) Substantial evidence is available in this state concerning the child’s care, protection, training, and personal relationships.

“(3) All courts having jurisdiction under paragraph (1) or (2) have declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that a court of this state is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child under Section 3427 or 3428.

“(4) No court of any other state would have jurisdiction under the criteria specified in paragraph (1), (2), or (3).” (§ 3427, subd. (a), italics added.)

California courts interpret the UCCJEA as allowing great latitude to home states in declining to exercise jurisdiction, which is not surprising, in view of the fact that a foreign country can be a child’s home state under the UCCJEA. (§ 3405; In re Marriage of Richardson (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 1240, 1242-1243.) As long as the California court has contacted the home state, “when a home state declines jurisdiction in any manner that conveys its intent not to exercise jurisdiction over a child in connection with a child custody proceeding” the California court may infer that the home state declined jurisdiction on the grounds that California is the more appropriate forum. (In re M.M. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 703, 717; see also A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 675; § 3421, subds.(a)(2) and (a)(3).) Thus, under the UCCJEA, the temporary emergency jurisdiction authorized by section 3424 “ ‘can ripen into continuing jurisdiction only if no other state with grounds for continuing jurisdiction can be found or, if one is found, that state declines to take jurisdiction.’ ” (In re Gino C. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 959, 967 (Gino C.), quoting Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Sen. Bill No. 668 (1999-2000 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Apr. 6, 1999, and adding italics; see also § 3421, subd. (a)(3).)[5]

We review a trial court’s jurisdictional finding under the UCCJEA under the deferential substantial evidence standard when facts are contested. (A.C., supra, 13 Cal.App.5th at p. 669.) When a jurisdictional finding is based on undisputed evidence and the interpretation of statutes, as is the case here, we review the trial court’s jurisdictional determination de novo. (Id. at p. 670.)

2. Analysis

We start with the undisputed premise that at the time the Bureau filed the petitions, Nevada was the children’s home state under section 3402, subdivision (g). Mother argues that California did not meet any of the requirements for jurisdiction established in section 3421, subdivision (a) and that therefore we should remand the matter to the juvenile court “with instructions that Nevada should assume jurisdiction over this matter.” We disagree.

The juvenile court here appropriately exercised temporary emergency jurisdiction in detaining P.M. and S.M., as they had been abandoned by Mother in California. (§ 3424, subd. (a).) The juvenile court found that a prima facie case had been made that the children came within the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and that the “initial detention was justified as mother left the girls without any provision of support with an individual who alerted the [Bureau].”

The juvenile court then contacted the court in Nevada, the children’s home state, as the juvenile court was required to do under the UCCJEA (A.M., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 598), and scheduled a telephonic hearing before the two courts. All parties were present at the hearing, as was the Clark County family services agency, which had previously been contacted by the Bureau. After all parties stated their positions, and the California juvenile court judge expressed California’s willingness to take jurisdiction, the Nevada court declined to take jurisdiction, thus leaving California with jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. (§ 3421, subd. (a)(3); Gino C., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at pp. 965-966.)

Mother’s argument that jurisdiction in California is improper rests on two incorrect assumptions: first, that “Nevada deferred to California’s decision to exercise jurisdiction in this case,” and second, that the California juvenile court erred in failing to apply the statutory factors of section 3427, subdivision (b), to determine whether California or Nevada was the more appropriate forum. As to the first assumption, the California juvenile court did not “decide” to exercise jurisdiction here: as the children’s home state, it was up to Nevada to decide whether it would exercise jurisdiction, and Nevada decided that it would not do so. We presume that is why the Nevada court said it would produce an appropriate minute order. We do not regard the California court’s expression of its views on jurisdiction and its expression of willingness to take jurisdiction as tantamount to a decision to exercise jurisdiction when the law gives priority in jurisdiction to the children’s home state. (§ 3421, subd. (a).)

As to the second assumption, Mother cites no authority that suggests the juvenile court in California was required to conduct an analysis under section 3427 at the August 5, 2016 hearing once the Nevada court declined jurisdiction.

We conclude that once the Nevada court declined to exercise home-state jurisdiction over P.M. and S.M., the California court had permanent jurisdiction under section 3421, subdivision (a)(3).[6] (Gino C., supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 967.)

B. Jurisdictional Findings Under Section 300

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 provides, in relevant part: “A child who comes within any of the following descriptions is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may adjudge that person to be a dependent of the court: [¶] . . . [¶] (b)(1) The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child, . . . or by the inability of the parent or guardian to provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness, developmental disability, or substance abuse. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] (g) The child has been left without any provision for support . . . .”

The Bureau has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the children are dependents of the court under section 300. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 355, subd. (a); In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773 (I.J.).) We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings for substantial evidence, which requires us to “ ‘determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them. “In making this determination, we draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the findings and orders of the dependency court; we review the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations; and we note that issues of fact and credibility are the province of the trial court.” (In re Heather A. (1996) 52 Cal.App.4th 183, 193.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. [Citations.] ‘ “[T]he [appellate] court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence . . . such that a reasonable trier of fact could find [that the order is appropriate].” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.)’ (See also In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.)” (I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)

2. Analysis

Mother challenges the juvenile court’s findings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) that Mother had a substance abuse problem that caused a serious risk of harm to the children, and that she abandoned the children, causing a risk of serious harm. She also challenges the juvenile court’s findings under section 300, subdivision (g) that she left the children without any provision for support. We have no difficulty concluding that substantial evidence supports the court’s findings.

a. Substance Abuse

The record before the court at the jurisdiction hearing included evidence that Mother had a long history of abusing substances including alcohol, methamphetamines, and crack. Mother reported in 2012 that she had been free from drugs since 2003 and did not drink alcohol, but Jonathan observed her abusing alcohol when they lived together, from 2012 to 2013, and P.M. observed her mother smoking from a glass pipe on two occasions since they moved to Las Vegas, one of them within six weeks of Mother leaving the children with Jonathan. The Clark County Nevada family services agency made contact with Mother the same month she left the children with Jonathan, based in part on “worries about drug usage.”

On the day she was supposed to pick up the children and on the days immediately following, Mother’s statements to P.M., Jonathan and the Bureau were inconsistent to the point of incoherence, and highly suggestive of her being under the influence of drugs or alcohol. On May 1, Mother told P.M. that although she was in Marin County, a friend would pick the children up in Richmond that day because something had happened, and wanted to know whether the children were inside or outside the house. On May 3, Mother told the Bureau a different story: she said she did not have the Richmond address on May 1. On May 3 Mother also told the Bureau that before April 27 Jonathan promised to send the children to Las Vegas by air, yet she also said she had come to California to get them, and she left him abusive messages while she was there. The juvenile court could properly infer that substance abuse lay behind Mother’s inability to care for the children, which resulted in her leaving them with Jonathan and her failing to pick them up despite the deadline imposed by the Bureau.[7]

Mother suggests that the evidence at the jurisdictional hearing that could support allegations of substance abuse was limited to Mother’s admitted use of illegal substances more than 10 years before and P.M.’s statement that Mother recently smoked from a glass pipe. Mother claims there was not substantial evidence that she currently had a substance abuse problem, and insists that even if she did, there is no evidence that her substance use caused a substantial risk of harm to her children. We are not persuaded. The juvenile court had evidence of Mother’s inconsistent statements and behaviors on the weekend she was supposed to retrieve the children. The evidence supports the inferences that Mother currently had a substance abuse problem; that Mother’s substance use resulted in her leaving the children with Jonathan in a potentially dangerous situation in February 2016, with no arrangements for their medical care or for P.M.’s education, and where P.M. was wandering unsupervised at night; and that Mother’s substance abuse resulted in her failing to pick the children up even after she was contacted by the Bureau and informed that Jonathan could not care for them.

b. Abandonment

The record before the court at the jurisdiction hearing included evidence that Mother had abandoned her children and put them at risk of substantial harm. For purposes of this discussion we accept the definition of “abandon” offered by Mother: “to withdraw protection, support or help from.” Mother brought the children from Nevada to California and left them here without any paperwork or documentation to allow for medical care, while she presumably returned to Nevada. Although she suggested to Jonathan that she would be back within two weeks, she did not tell P.M, then 12 years old, when she would come back. After the two weeks had passed, Mother told Jonathan more than once that she was never coming back to get them, leaving it up to him to send them back to her if he chose, even though he told her he could not afford to do that. Having left her children in Jonathan’s care for two months, with no means of support, Mother then left Jonathan abusive phone and text messages. She missed the Bureau’s deadline to pick up the children and offered inconsistent stories to account for her failure to get them. This constitutes substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that Mother withdrew her protection, support and help from the children. As to a substantial risk of harm, Mother left the girls for two months without making any provisions for their medical care. And she left them with Jonathan even after he told her he could not supervise P.M.

Mother argues that she had provided for the children’s health and safety while they were in her care and custody, and contends that jurisdiction was asserted because she “lost her housing, had limited financial resources, and was unable to find acceptable housing for her children in a short period of time.” But the fact that Mother may have taken care of her children at one time does not change the fact that she later abandoned them. And contrary to Mother’s suggestion, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the court took jurisdiction simply because of Mother’s housing situation or her financial condition. The court took jurisdiction because Mother left her children in a dangerous situation in California, with no apparent plans or intent to rejoin or retrieve them. And after she was contacted by the Bureau and said she would pick the girls up by May 1, she did not do so, she did not contact the Bureau until after hours the next day, and when she did contact the Bureau, she offered no credible explanation for why she had not shown up.

In a similar vein, Mother argues that because she provided shelter, clothing, food and medical care for the children before she left them with Jonathan, and because she left them with Jonathan while she looked for suitable housing, the juvenile court could not properly find under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g) that she left the children without any provision for support. She argues that she provided care and support for the children by leaving them with Jonathan, contending that she “created a temporary plan with [him] to care for the children while she sought new housing.” We disagree. The only “plan” for which there is any evidence in the record is the plan that Mother would leave the children with Jonathan for two weeks. Once that time passed, the only provision that Mother made for the care and support of her children was to arrange for them to go to school, sometime in March or April of 2016. Mother said she was never coming back to California, and she left it to Jonathan to send the children back to her, though he said he did not have the money to do that. On this record, the juvenile court could properly conclude at the October 2016 jurisdiction hearing that Mother had left the children without any provision for their care.

Mother’s attempt to rely on In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311 is unavailing. In that case, there was no evidence that the child was left without any provision for support, and although the mother’s resources were strained because of a recent job loss, she continued to support her children. (Id. at p. 1320.) Here, in contrast, there is evidence that Mother left the children with no provision for support: even though she had supported them in the past, the record shows that she stopped supporting them. Nor are we persuaded by Mother’s citation to cases in which Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g) jurisdiction is avoided when parents make arrangements for their children to be cared for by a relative or friend without financial recompense. That is not the situation for P.M. and S.M. Mother arranged for Jonathan to care for them for two weeks. She did nothing to arrange for their care or provide for them after that, apart from arranging for school enrollment.

C. Disposition and Case Plan

1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review

Under most circumstances, a juvenile court must order reunification services when a child is removed from a parent’s custody. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 361.5.) A reunification plan must be tailored to fit the family’s circumstances and “must be designed to eliminate those conditions which led to the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding.” (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.)

“ ‘The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interests and to fashion a dispositional order accordingly. On appeal, this determination cannot be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion.’ (In re Baby Boy H. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.)” (In re A.E. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1, 4.)

2. Analysis

Mother argues that the case plan here was inadequate because it left her to her own devices in the two areas where, she claims, she needed the most assistance: housing and “maintaining her relationship with her children.” Although she did not object to the case plan before the juvenile court, she argues on appeal that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering a plan that did not include any housing assistance, in view of the fact that Mother’s loss of her housing is what brought the family to the juvenile court’s attention. And she argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering supervised visitation when Mother was in the local area without providing guidance as to how Mother, who lived in Las Vegas, would participate in visitation in Contra Costa County. We disagree.

As to housing, the record shows that what brought this family to the juvenile court was Mother’s failure to retrieve her children after leaving them for two months with Jonathan. Although it may be that Mother’s loss of her housing in early 2016 led to her leaving the children with Jonathan in the first place, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Mother’s substance abuse problem interfered with her ability to provide adequate housing and care for the children, and with her ability to retrieve them when she said she would. In April 2016 Mother told the Bureau she had a job, and provided the Bureau with an updated address, for a Las Vegas Apartment. Yet at some point after that, and after telling Jonathan that she could take care of the children if he sent them to her, Mother conceded to the Bureau that her current circumstances were unstable and she could not provide for the children’s basic needs. The juvenile court could properly conclude that the fundamental reason that the family came to the attention of the Bureau was Mother’s substance abuse, which is addressed in the case plan.

As to visitation, Mother concedes that the case plan specified the duration and frequency of visits. She cites no authority to suggest that the plan was required to include anything more. The administration and implementation of the visitation order is properly delegated to the Bureau. (Seiser & Kumli on Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2017 ed.) Dependency Proceedings, § 2.129[7][a], p. 2-487.)[8]

DISPOSITION

The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.

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Miller, J.

We concur:

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Kline, P.J.

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Richman, J.

A150586, Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau v. Melinda M.