Filed 10/17/17 In re P.P. CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re P.P., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.H., Defendant and Appellant.	A151005 (San Francisco County Super. Ct. No. JD17-3002

K.H. appeals from the juvenile court’s orders (1) denying his request for presumed father status with respect to his girlfriend’s daughter, P.P., who is not his biological child, and (2) granting biological father X.P.’s request for presumed father status.[1] K.H. argues he qualifies as a presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d) and X.P. does not.[2] We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

P.P. was born in St. Joseph County, Indiana, in July 2015 to A.J. (mother) and X.P. X.P. and his mother were present at the birth. He signed a valid paternity affidavit executed by both A.J. and X.P. At the time of P.P.’s birth, mother was living in a home for pregnant mothers, but after the birth, mother and P.P. went to live in X.P.’s parents’ house for a few weeks to a month. In August 2015, when P.P. was about a month old, mother moved to Indianapolis with P.P. to live with K.H., with whom she had had an on‑and-off dating relationship since 2014.

On October 15, 2015, the St. Joseph, Indiana probate court confirmed X.P.’s paternity, ordered him to pay child support through court services, and granted mother temporary custody and X.P. “parenting time” on both weekend days from noon to 6:00 p.m. Further, pursuant to Indiana Code section 31-14-13-10, the court ordered that if either parent intended to move residence, the parent was to file a notice of that intent with the court and send a copy to the nonrelocating parent. The court also ordered the parties “to notify the Prosecutor’s IV-D Office within 48 hours of any change to his or her address, employment, or income.” K.H. and mother then moved to South Bend to be closer to family and “help make the visits between [P.P.] and [X.P.] easier.”

According to X.P., mother brought P.P. to his house for Thanksgiving and then left Indiana. Mother cut off contact with him. According to mother, she did not leave Indiana until February 2016, when she came to San Francisco to help care for her ailing birth mother. She called X.P. to let him know she was leaving. He had both her telephone number and her Facebook connection. Mother also contacted the local St. Joseph Child Support Agency as soon as she arrived in California and gave them her address.

In August of 2016, mother gave birth to Z.H. in San Francisco. K.H. is her biological father and, as of January 11, 2017, her presumed father as well. The family began residing at the Hamilton Family Shelter on August 15, 2016. On October 6, 2016, someone at the shelter contacted Child Protective Services to report concerns about the Z.H.’s health and safety. The two-month-old baby was being left to feed herself with an unattended bottle, was severely underweight, and had a red diaper rash from the waist down. Z.H. was hospitalized at San Francisco General Hospital as a failure to thrive baby. The investigator also noted concerns about P.P.’s hygiene. The allegation of general neglect was substantiated and the family agreed to receive services.

P.P. and Z.H. Are Detained.

On January 2, 2017 paramedics were called to the homeless shelter on mother’s report that four-month-old Z.H. “was not acting right.” The child was not breathing, had abrasions and bruising to the neck and face, a rash on her chest, and scabs and scarring on her abdomen and back. Her clothing was completely soiled with dirt and urine. Z.H. was rushed to the hospital where it was later determined that she had suffered nonaccidental, life-threatening, and permanently disabling head trauma. Z.H. was permanently blinded in the left eye and might require surgery on the right eye.

Seventeen-month-old P.P. was also examined at the hospital, where it was determined she had an infected cut on her left index finger, scratches on her left arm and abdomen, and diaper rash. She was nonverbal during the medical exam. She was hospitalized for two days and treated for the infected finger and diaper rash.

The police report reflects that the room at the shelter in which the children and adults were staying smelled foul and was filthy with soiled clothing, dirty diapers, and miscellaneous clutter. As of January 6, 2017, K.H. was not working and the family was subsisting financially on mother’s disability, the children’s Supplemental Security Income (SSI), child support payments for P.P. from X.P., and food stamps. Mother refused to provide social services with any information about P.P.’s father.

Dependency and Criminal Charges Are Filed.

The same day the children were detained, mother and K.H. were arrested and charged with violations of Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a), willful harm to a child likely to produce bodily harm or death. On January 6, 2017, the San Francisco Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a dependency petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), (g), and (j), alleging that P.P. was at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to (1) the serious, nonaccidental harm inflicted on Z.H., P.P.’s half sibling, by mother and/or K.H., (2) the parents’ failure to adequately care for P.P.’s injuries, and (3) the filthy condition of the shelter room. The petition also alleged that the whereabouts of P.P.’s “alleged father” and his ability to care for her were unknown.

On January 9, 2017, mother signed a dependency declaration under penalty of perjury stating that a judgment of paternity existed as to P.P., that mother had received or been promised child support for P.P., and that P.P.’s biological father, X.P., had signed a voluntary declaration of paternity at the hospital after P.P.’s birth. She also averred that no “parenting adult [had] received [P.P.] into his or her home and openly held [P.P.] out as his or her natural [child],” and that P.P. had been raised jointly in a coparenting arrangement with K.H. At a detention hearing held the same day, P.P. was ordered detained and placed in foster care. Two days later, the court ordered K.H. elevated to presumed father status as to Z.H. only.

The Jurisdiction/Disposition Report

On January 18, 2017, X.P. contacted the Agency to inquire about P.P.’s well-being. He said he was listed on the child’s birth certificate and had been paying child support. An Indiana court had ordered visitation, but he had not been able to visit P.P. because mother absconded with her to California without notifying the probate court, in violation of the visitation order. The social worker obtained official documents from the Indiana court, backing up his claims. X.P. explained he learned that P.P. was in foster care about one week after the detention when a relative informed him that mother had posted about the detention on social media. He said he had not seen P.P. since Christmas 2015, before mother abruptly left for California. Before then, he had weekend visitation with P.P. X.P. worked full time at a convenience store, was a member of the National Guard, and stated he was able to provide food, clothing, and shelter for his daughter.

Mother and K.H. told the Agency social worker that Z.H. was injured when the maternal grandmother fell against her stroller, knocking it over. Mother denied that Z.H. was blinded while in her or K.H.’s care. With respect to P.P.’s injured and infected finger, mother claimed the grandmother stepped on P.P.’s hand. K.H. said he did not know how she injured her finger. Both mother and K.H. attributed P.P.’s diaper rash and scratches to eczema and wearing a too-small diaper. K.H. also told social workers he learned about parenting “after becoming a father when [Z.H.] was born” and in being the “secondary caregiver” for P.P. He said that before Z.H. was born, he did not know much about feeding or changing his daughter, but he had learned to do these things since becoming a parent. He made sacrifices for his daughter, including selling his Xbox in order to feed her.

On February 1, 2017, P.P. underwent a comprehensive intake exam conducted by a nurse practitioner, which revealed that P.P. suffered motor development, speech, and global delays. She was referred to the Golden Gate Regional Center for services.

The Agency’s disposition report was filed on February 3, 2017. The Agency recommended that P.P. reside with X.P., that he be granted legal and physical custody, and that the petition as to P.P. be dismissed. In the opinion of the Agency social worker, the return of P.P. to mother and K.H. was not in her best interest and would be detrimental to her well-being because mother had not demonstrated she acted in P.P.’s best interest, neither mother nor K.H. appreciated the seriousness of Z.H.’s devastating and nearly fatal injuries, and the pair had provided inconsistent statements about how the injuries occurred.

X.P. Is Elevated to Presumed Father and Granted Visitation.

The jurisdiction/disposition hearing was called on February 9, 2017. At that hearing the court ordered X.P. elevated to presumed father status and granted him supervised visitation with P.P. At the Agency’s discretion, unsupervised visits were to be allowed upon notice to P.P.’s attorney.[3] X.P. filed a JV‑505 Statement Regarding Parentage to which he appended P.P.’s birth certificate and the Indiana court order described above.

At the further jurisdiction/disposition hearing held March 17, 2017, X.P.’s counsel requested, with the concurrence of county counsel and minors’ counsel, that P.P. be moved from foster care to X.P.’s care pending trial. Mother’s counsel and K.H.’s counsel objected to the move mainly on mother’s account, and announced an intent to seek presumed father status for K.H. Mother’s counsel conceded, however, that mother “has been the primary parent for these children.” The court granted the request to allow P.P. to be released to X.P. for an extended visit pending trial.

K.H.’s Requests for Elevation to Presumed Father Status, and to Stop P.P. From Visiting X.P. in Indiana, Are Denied.

On March 24, 2017, K.H. filed a motion for elevation to presumed father status pursuant to Family Code sections 7611, subdivision (d), 7612, and 7601. The motion was supported by declarations from K.H. and mother. K.H. averred he began living with mother and P.P. when P.P. was three weeks old; he worked to support them financially; he fed P.P., changed her diapers, and took her to medical appointments as if she were his own child; he moved with them to California in 2016, and lived with them at the Hamilton Family Shelter from August 2016 to January 2017, when the children were detained; he tells his friends and family P.P. is his daughter and treats her as such; she calls him daddy and is very close to him; he has provided income for the children’s support with three or four jobs in San Francisco; and he had visited with the children twice a week since detention, except for several weeks in February and March when he was in San Diego, which is why he was unable to submit a signed declaration regarding his presumed father status sooner. Mother’s declaration in support of K.H.’s request corroborated K.H.’s declaration.

X.P.’s opposition to K.H.’s motion for elevation to presumed father status was supported by a declaration from his counsel, based on her conversations with X.P., to which K.H. did not object. In it, counsel avers that according to X.P., mother never told him he she had moved to Indianapolis to live with K.H.; mother failed to accommodate X.P.’s court-ordered visitation; failed to tell X.P. that she was taking P.P. to live in California; that he thought she was going for a short time, and became concerned and reached out to her when she failed to return after a few months; and that he paid child support and was ready, willing, and able to care for P.P. Appended to the declaration were screenshots of Facebook conversations between mother and X.P., which tended to support his version of events, as well as screenshots of a GoFundMe webpage entitled [K.H.] Foundation, which asked for $5,000 to “get my life together so I can be able to have a place to stay and food to eat for me and my family.”

On April 3, 2017, K.H. and mother filed a joint application for an ex parte hearing on their request to block P.P. from traveling to Indiana to visit X.P. The matter was put over to be heard with K.H.’s presumed father motion on April 4, 2017. Following argument, the court denied the motion for elevation to presumed father status. The court stated it acknowledged that Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c), enabled the court to find two presumed fathers, but there was no evidence of detriment to P.P. if K.H. were not elevated to presumed father status. Specifically, the court found that mother’s argument there would be emotional detriment to P.P. from having the emotional bond broken between K.H. and P.P. was insufficient. The court reaffirmed its order permitting P.P. to travel to Indiana to visit presumed father X.P. and continued the matter for a trial on jurisdiction/disposition.

DISCUSSION

K.H. argues he is entitled to “presumed father” status with respect to P.P. and that X.P. is not. In dependency proceedings, “fathers” are divided into several different categories. “ ‘The extent to which a father may participate in dependency proceedings and his rights in those proceedings are dependent on his paternal status.’ ” (In re Christopher M. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 155, 159.) An alleged father is not entitled to appointed counsel or reunification services, and due process requires only that he “ ‘be given notice and “an opportunity to appear and assert a position and attempt to change his paternity status.” ’ ” (Id. at pp. 159–160.) A presumed father is eligible to have custody of his children, appointed counsel, and reunification services. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 448–449; In re O.S. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1410; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 317, 361.2, subd. (a), 361.5, subd. (a).)

A man who claims he is entitled to presumed father status bears the burden of establishing the facts supporting his claim by a preponderance of the evidence. (See In re T.R. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1202, 1210.) We review the juvenile court’s determination of parentage for substantial evidence. (In re M.C. (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 197, 213.) We indulge all reasonable inferences in favor of the juvenile court’s decision. (Garrett v. Duncan (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 296, 298–299.)

Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that X.P. Qualifies as a Presumed Father.

K.H. argues the juvenile court’s finding that X.P. is P.P.’s presumed father is wrong because X.P. does not qualify as a presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d).

As a preliminary matter, we question whether K.H. has the right to challenge the correctness of the trial court’s order regarding X.P.’s presumed fatherhood. At this juncture, K.H. is an alleged father only. An alleged father does not have a current interest in a child because his paternity has not yet been established.[4] (In re Christopher M., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 159.) An alleged father is not a party to the dependency proceedings. (In re Joseph G. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 712, 714–715.) “[T]he only issues on which [an alleged father] was entitled to assert a position concerned his paternal status and his intent and desires regarding the minor if his paternal status became more than just a potentiality.” (In re Christopher M., at p. 160; see Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts Practice and Procedure (2017), Parties and Participants, § 2.60[4], pp. 2-128 to 2‑129.)

In any event, on the merits, K.H.’s position is not correct. “Family Code section 7611 generally sets forth the exclusive means for an unwed father to establish presumed fatherhood. [Citation.] Under subdivision (d) of Family Code section 7611, a man is a presumed father if ‘[h]e receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.’ ‘The law gives presumed father status to those who have taken an active role in their children’s lives . . . .’ [Citation.] [¶] Further, in 1994 the Legislature amended Family Code section 7611 to provide that alternatively, a man is a presumed father ‘if he meets the conditions provided in . . . Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 7570) of Part 2,’ which pertains to the establishment of paternity by voluntary declaration. Family Code section 7573 provides that with exceptions not relevant here, ‘a completed voluntary declaration of paternity [VDOP], as described in Section 7574, that has been filed with the Department of Child Support Services shall establish the paternity of a child and shall have the same force and effect as a judgment for paternity issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The voluntary declaration shall be recognized as a basis for the establishment of an order for child custody, visitation, or child support.’ ” (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 197–198; In re Liam L. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 739, 743.) As a matter of equal protection of the laws, an out-of-state voluntary acknowledgment of paternity is entitled to the same full faith and credit as a voluntary declaration of paternity executed in California, as long as it fulfills the requirements of that state’s laws. (In re Mary G., at pp. 198–203.) In addition, Family Code section 5604, which “broadly states an out-of-state paternity declaration is entitled to full faith and credit and ‘shall have the same effect as a paternity determination made in this state’ . . . qualifies [a man] for presumed father status and reunification services as a matter of right.” (In re Mary G., at p. 203.) In other words, it applies to dependency proceedings.

K.H. further argues that since the actual VDOP executed in Indiana is not in the appellate record, substantial evidence does not support the court’s finding it exists. We disagree. When, as here, there has been no prior determination of parentage by a California court, and the VDOP itself is not in evidence, California Rules of Court, rule 5.635(e) requires an alleged father and his counsel to complete the form JV-505. The court then “may make its determination of parentage or nonparentage based on the testimony, declarations, or statements of the alleged parents.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.635(e)(3).) In this case, X.P. filed the required JV-505.

Thus, the record in this case includes not only mother’s declaration of dependency parentage, under penalty of perjury, stating that X.P. signed a VDOP when she was at the hospital or sometime after the birth, but also X.P.’s statement regarding parentage (JV‑505) that he signed a VDOP on July 10, 2015 in St. Joseph, Indiana. Attached to the J.V. 505 declaration are (1) a birth certificate for P.P., filed in July 2015, showing she was born that month to X.P. and A.J. and (2) a certified copy of a court order from the St. Joseph Probate Court in St. Joseph, Indiana. The court order shows that on October 15, 2015, a hearing was held in the matter of P.P., a child born out of wedlock. The order confirmed X.P.’s paternity, finding that “[p]aternity was previously established by the signing of a valid paternity affidavit executed by [A.J.] and [X.P.] as to . . . [P.P.]” (italics added); that 60 days had elapsed and neither party had sought to rescind the affidavit; and that mother and father reaffirmed the establishment of paternity.

“Indiana Code Section 31-14-2-1 provides that the exclusive methods of establishing a man’s paternity of a child born out-of-wedlock are (1) an action under Article 31-14 or (2) the execution of a paternity affidavit in accordance with Indiana Code Section 16-37-2-2.1. Once a man has executed a paternity affidavit in accordance with Indiana Code Section 16-37-2-2.1, he is the child’s legal father unless the affidavit is rescinded pursuant to the same statute. See Ind.Code § 31-14-7-3.” (In re Paternity of M.M. (Ind.Ct.App. 2008) 889 N.E.2d 846, 847.) Pursuant to Family Code section 5604, Indiana’s previous determination of paternity, “whether established through voluntary acknowledgement procedures in effect in that state or through an administrative or judicial process shall be given full faith and credit by the courts in this state and shall have the same effect as a paternity determination made in this state, and may be enforced and satisfied in a like manner.” Mother’s declaration, X.P.’s statement, the birth certificate, and the certified court order constitute more than substantial evidence to support the finding that X.P.’s paternity was established through both voluntary acknowledgement procedures in effect in Indiana and the judicial process in that state.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that K.H. Does Not Qualify as P.P.’s Presumed Father.

K.H. argues that he qualifies as a presumed father under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), and that, under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c), it would be detrimental to P.P. if he were not also accorded presumed father status, because he enjoys an emotional bond with P.P. based on his established parental relationship with her.

Under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), a man is presumed to be the father of a child if he “receives the child into his . . . home and openly holds out the child as his . . . natural child.” A man seeking the benefit of the presumption has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the foundational facts supporting his claim of entitlement to the presumption. (In re Spencer W. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1647, 1653.) Here, the juvenile court denied K.H.’s request to be elevated to presumed father status. We review the court’s ruling for substantial evidence. (Ibid.) That is, “we review the facts most favorably to the judgment, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all conflicts in favor of the order. [Citation.] We do not reweigh the evidence but instead examine the whole record to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found” as decided. (Id. at p. 1650.)

“In determining whether a man has ‘receiv[ed a] child into his home and openly h[eld] out the child’ as his own [citation], courts have looked to such factors as whether the man actively helped the mother in prenatal care; whether he paid pregnancy and birth expenses commensurate with his ability to do so; whether he promptly took legal action to obtain custody of the child; whether he sought to have his name placed on the birth certificate; whether and how long he cared for the child; whether there is unequivocal evidence that he had acknowledged the child; the number of people to whom he had acknowledged the child; whether he provided for the child after it no longer resided with him; whether, if the child needed public benefits, he had pursued completion of the requisite paperwork; and whether his care was merely incidental.” (In re T.R., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 1211.) Ultimately, the question is whether the man demonstrated a “ ‘ “full commitment to . . . paternal responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise.” ’ ” (In re A.A. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 771, 779.)

It is undisputed that K.H. lived with mother and P.P. from the time P.P was one month old to the time she was detained at the age of 17 months and that for some part of that time he supported the family unit by working. However, the trial court’s conclusion that K.H.’s overall conduct during those 16 months did not meet the relevant factors identified in In re T.R. is supported by substantial evidence. K.H. did not help with mother’s prenatal care. He did not pay for any of her prenatal or birth expenses. He is not on the birth certificate. He apparently did not attend to P.P.’s medical needs, as a cut on her finger became infected, for which she had to be hospitalized for two days, and she exhibited a number of developmental delays which were not addressed until the Agency intervened.

It appears P.P. lived with mother and K.H. in Indianapolis for two months and, by his and mother’s report, K.H. worked to support them there. It further appears that after the October 2015 court hearing in St. Joseph, Indiana, at which X.P. was ordered to pay child support and was awarded visitation rights, K.H., mother and P.P. moved to South Bend, Indiana. But the record is silent as to how they supported themselves in South Bend. Sometime between Thanksgiving 2015 and February or March of 2016, they moved to San Francisco. It is unknown where the family lived or how they supported themselves after the move, except that as of August 15, 2016, they were living in a homeless shelter. K.H. averred he worked at several jobs for some unstated period of time, but as of January 6, 2017, he was unemployed and the family were subsisting on mother’s disability, the children’s SSI, X.P.’s child support, and food stamps. There is some evidence he sold his Xbox to support Z.H. and also attempted begging on the Internet to support himself and the family. There is also evidence, contained in a police report, that the family’s room in the shelter was maintained in a slovenly fashion, that P.P.’s hygiene was subpar, and that, as noted, her medical needs were unattended. By his own report, K.H. did not begin to assume his parental responsibilities until after his biological child was born, and admitted he was a secondary caregiver for P.P. By mother’s report, she was the children’s primary caregiver. Thus, there was scant evidence K.H. had demonstrated a “ ‘ “full commitment to . . . paternal responsibilities—emotional, financial, and otherwise.” ’ ” (In re A.A., supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at p. 779.) Instead, it appears K.H.’s care for P.P. was incidental, at best.

In addition, there is no evidence to support K.H.’s assertion that he held himself out to the world as P.P.’s father. He produced no witnesses or other evidence to verify his assertions, such as declarations from his relatives in San Diego, mother’s relatives in San Francisco, or his friends and acquaintances. Nor did anyone, other than mother, come forward to attest to seeing evidence of an emotional bond between P.P. and K.H. When the children were detained in early January 2017, K.H. was offered visitation, but he spent much of February and March in San Diego instead. And he did not promptly come forward to ask for presumed father status as to P.P., as he did with Z.H. Instead, he waited until after X.P. was granted presumed father status to file his request.

As the trier of fact, the juvenile court is the “exclusive judge of the credibility of the evidence and can reject evidence as unworthy of credence,” including the testimony of a witness. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528.) Consequently, the court was entitled to reject K.H.’s and mother’s declarations in whole or in part as lacking credibility. (Ibid.) On the totality of the record here, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s conclusion that the evidence of K.H.’s conduct during the first 16 months of P.P.’s life fell short of demonstrating that K.H. was fully committed to providing the emotional and financial support to P.P. that would qualify him as P.P.’s presumed father.

Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Finding that P.P. Would Not Suffer Detriment If K.H. Were Not Elevated to Presumed Father Status.

K.H. argues the juvenile court’s finding that no detriment would accrue to P.P. if K.H. were not also accorded presumed parent status is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. Reviewing the court’s finding under Family Code section 7612 for substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference, resolving all conflicts in support of the judgment and deferring to the trial court’s credibility determinations. (In re M.Z. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 53, 64.) “If there is substantial evidence to support the ruling, it will not be disturbed on appeal even if the record can also support a different ruling.” (In re M.Z., at p. 64, quoting R.M. v. T.A.(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 760, 780.)

“As a general rule, ‘ “there can be only one presumed father.” ’ ” (In re Donovan L. (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1086, quoting In re Jesusa V. (2004) 32 Cal.4th 588, 603.) However, “the Legislature enacted [Family Code] section 7612, subdivision (c) to allow courts to recognize that a child has more than two parents in certain limited contexts: ‘In an appropriate action, a court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only two parents would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment to the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable placement with a parent who has fulfilled the child’s physical needs and the child’s psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that role for a substantial period of time. A finding of detriment to the child does not require a finding of unfitness of any of the parents or persons with a claim to parentage.’ (§ 7612, subd. (c), . . . added by Stats. 2013, ch. 564, § 6.5.) . . . [S]ection 7612, subdivision (c) allows a court to recognize three parents only in ‘rare cases’ where a child truly has more than two parents.” (In re Donovan L., at pp. 1086–1087.) “The Legislature borrowed the ‘detriment to the child’ standard from [Family Code] section 3041, which governs custody awards to a nonparent over the objection of a parent. (See Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Rep. on Sen. Bill No. 274 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) as amended Apr. 1, 2013, p. 6.) Detriment under [Family Code] section 3041 considers ‘the prospect that a successful, established custodial arrangement would be disrupted’ [citation] or the harm in ‘removing a child from what has been a stable, continuous, and successful placement is detrimental to the child’ ” (In re Donovan L., at p. 1089, fn. omitted.)

Since K.H. did not meet his burden to prove his entitlement to presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (d), he cannot meet the burden of proving detriment to P.P. under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c). (In re M.Z., supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 66.) The factors which derail his attempt to achieve presumed fatherhood likewise derail his attempt to show that lack of recognition of K.H. as a third presumed parent would disrupt a stable, successful placement for the child. Continuity of placement, by itself, does not meet the threshold requirement of section 7612, subdivision (c). No evidence, save for K.H.’s and mother’s averments, was presented to show that K.H. had an emotional bond with P.P. The juvenile court’s statement that mother’s assertion that such a bond existed was insufficient, in its view, to establish detriment strongly suggests the court’s ruling was based on a credibility determination we are not at liberty to ignore. Substantial evidence supports the court’s ruling.

DISPOSITION

The orders appealed from are affirmed.

---