In re Precious C.
Filed 10/2/07 In re Precious C. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
In re PRECIOUS C., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | |
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ROCHELLE R., Defendant and Appellant. | D050647 (Super. Ct. No. J506666E) |
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Harry M. Elias, Judge. Affirmed.
Rochelle R. appeals an order of the juvenile court denying reunification services for her in the dependency case involving her minor daughter Precious C. Rochelle contends: (1) the court failed to consider whether she made reasonable efforts to address her substance abuse problem; and (2) no substantial evidence supports the court's denial of services. We affirm the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In January 2007 the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition in the juvenile court on behalf of newborn Precious under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a), alleging Rochelle had a 16-year history of cocaine use, she admitted using drugs while pregnant with Precious and her parental rights to three other children had been terminated due to her drug abuse. (All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.) The petition also alleged Precious was at risk in her father's care because he is a registered sex offender and had sexually abused two boys under the age of 14. ( 300, subd. (d).)
Rochelle had eight other children. Four of Precious's siblings tested positive for cocaine at birth. One sibling was stillborn due to maternal cocaine and alcohol intoxication. Agency previously offered Rochelle voluntary services to help her overcome problems of severe neglect with respect to her three oldest children. Rochelle had not participated in drug abuse treatment after her parental rights to four of her children were terminated.
In Precious's case, Agency provided Rochelle with referrals for parenting classes, individual therapy and the Substance Abuse Recovery Management System (SARMS) program. However, she was slow to begin services, had two positive drug tests and failed to attend 12-step meetings. Her progress was described as "poor."
The court declared Precious a dependent, removed her from parental custody and placed her with a non-relative extended family member. The court ordered services for the father but denied services for Rochelle under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11) and (13).
DISCUSSION
I
Rochelle contends the court erroneously denied reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11) and (13). She asserts the court failed to consider that she made reasonable efforts to treat her substance abuse problem and she did not resist court-ordered treatment during the three years before Precious's dependency petition was filed.
A
When a minor is removed from parental custody, the court must provide services designed to reunify the family unless one of several statutory exceptions applies. (Tyrone W. v. Superior Court (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 839, 845.) Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), services may be denied if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification services for a sibling were terminated because the parent failed to reunify with that sibling and the parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the sibling's removal. Similarly, section 361.5, subdivision (b)(11), provides for denial of services when parental rights to a sibling have been terminated and the parent has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the sibling's removal.
We review an order denying reunification services for substantial evidence. (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) If, on the entire record, there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. We do not consider the credibility of witnesses, attempt to resolve conflicts in the evidence or evaluate the weight of the evidence. Instead, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, view the record favorably to the juvenile court's order, and affirm the order even if there is substantial evidence supporting a contrary finding. (In re Baby Boy L. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 596, 610.) The parent has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B
Rochelle had a lengthy history of referrals for child neglect. She received six months of voluntary services in 1990 for her three oldest children. Rochelle received reunification services for her fourth child from May 1991 to February 1994 but was unable to reunify. Another child was stillborn due to maternal cocaine and alcohol intoxication. Rochelle's cocaine abuse continued and she lost custody of her fifth child in 1993 and, after failing to complete reunification requirements, her parental rights to that child were terminated. Rochelle's sixth and seventh children were declared dependents in 2004 because she was unable to provide them with regular care due to her ongoing cocaine abuse. She was denied services and her parental rights to those children were terminated in January 2006.
Rochelle asserts the court did not make an express finding that she failed to make a reasonable effort to treat the problem that led to the removal of the siblings. However, to the extent express findings were not made, they may be implied if substantial evidence supports them. (In re Elijah S. (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1545; In re S.G. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 1254, 1260.) The evidence showed Rochelle made no reasonable effort to treat her drug problem. Even after losing custody of her other children she continued to abuse cocaine and admitted using drugs during her pregnancy with Precious. After Precious was removed from Rochelle's custody, the social worker provided Rochelle with referrals for services but she was slow to begin participating, missed two SARMS appointments, had two positive drug tests and failed to attend 12-step meetings. The social worker described Rochelle's progress as "poor." Substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Rochelle made no reasonable effort to treat her drug problem. (Francisco G. v. Superior Court (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 586, 601; cf. Cheryl P. v. Superior Court, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 98 [although parents resisted services at times, they complied with case plans and showed progress].) The court properly denied Rochelle services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (11).
C
Under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), the court may deny services if it finds the parent has a history of extensive, abusive and chronic use of drugs or alcohol and has resisted court-ordered treatment for this problem during a three-year period immediately before the petition was filed. This limit on the provision of services reflects the Legislature's determination that reunification services are not in a minor's best interests when a parent is a chronic drug abuser who has resisted treatment. (See In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 200.)
Rochelle had a 16-year drug abuse history at the time Precious was removed from her custody in January 2007. Despite court-ordered treatment in the siblings' cases, Rochelle continued to abuse drugs during the three years immediately before the petition on Precious was filed, resulting in the birth of a stillborn child and the termination of her parental rights to two other children. Rochelle used cocaine while pregnant with Precious and had two positive drug tests after enrolling in SARMS. Her continued drug use meets the "resistance to treatment" requirement of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13). (Karen S. v. Superior Court (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 1006, 1010.) Rochelle has shown "reunification services would be a fruitless attempt" to protect Precious because Rochelle's "past failure to benefit from treatment indicates that future treatment also would fail to change [her] destructive behavior." (Ibid.) Substantial evidence supports the court's denial of services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13).
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
McINTYRE, J.
WE CONCUR:
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
AARON, J.
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