NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
| In re P.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. |
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TUOLUMNE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
DANIEL F.,
Defendant and Appellant.
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F075374
(Super. Ct. No. JV7454)
OPINION |
THE COURT*
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Tuolumne County. Donald I. Segerstrom, Jr., Judge.
Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Appellant Daniel F. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders denying his modification petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] and selecting legal guardianship as the permanent plan (§ 366.26) for his now eight-year-old daughter, P.W. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf. This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835, 844 (Phoenix H.).)
Father filed a letter but failed to establish a good cause showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists on the record. (Phoenix H., supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the appeal.
PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL SUMMARY
Father’s two daughters, P.W. and D.F., became juvenile court dependents in March 2014 at the ages of five and three years, respectively, after the juvenile court sustained allegations the children’s mother disciplined P.W. by using excessive physical force and that father was aware of the mother’s conduct but did not intervene. The parents’ mental health problems and the children’s special needs were evident from the inception of the case and became a focal point for reunification efforts. The Tuolumne County Department of Social Services (department) placed the girls together in foster care.
The juvenile court provided the parents reunification services up to the 18-month review hearing in September 2015. During that time, they participated in their services, however, made minimal progress. The mother was unable to complete her case plan or understand how her behavior was detrimental to the children. Father participated in the majority of his case plan but blamed others for the children’s removal and saw no deficits in his functioning and behavior. He consistently engaged in conflict with people and was unable to recognize how his actions and behaviors contributed to the conflict.
In September 2015, the juvenile court terminated reunification services at the 18‑month review hearing and set a section 366.26 hearing. Father filed an extraordinary writ petition challenging the juvenile court’s orders terminating his services and setting a section 366.26 hearing. (Daniel F. v. Superior Court (Jan. 5, 2016, F072437) [nonpub. opn.].) We denied the petition.
In February 2016, following a contested 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found the children were adoptable and terminated parental rights. The court set a post permanency plan review hearing (§ 366.3) (review hearing) for August 16, 2016. Father appealed from the termination order, challenging the juvenile court’s adoptability finding. (Tuolumne County Department of Social Services v. D.F. (Aug. 19, 2016, F073283) [nonpub. opn.] (D.F.).)
The department informed the juvenile court in its report for the review hearing that it moved the children to a prospective adoptive home in April 2016, and that D.F. was thriving and expressed a strong desire to remain there. P.W., however, regressed behaviorally and was not doing well in the prospective adoptive home. In addition, the adoptive family decided they could not meet P.W.’s extensive special needs long term. Consequently, the department returned P.W. to her former foster family and she was thrilled to be there. The two families planned to maintain sibling contact by arranging day and overnight visits, telephone calls, and joint play sessions.
On August 16, 2016, at the review hearing, the juvenile court found the children’s placements were appropriate and continued adoption as their permanent plan.
On August 19, 2016, we filed our opinion on father’s appeal. We concluded the juvenile court erred in finding the children were adoptable and reversed its order terminating parental rights. We ordered the court to conduct a new section 366.26 hearing. (D.F., supra, F073283, at p. 11.)
On October 25, 2016, the juvenile court set a section 366.26 hearing for February 21, 2017, which the court continued and set as a contested hearing.
On March 7, 2017, father filed a modification petition under section 388 (section 388 petition) asking the juvenile court to return the children to his custody or reinstate reunification services rather than implement a new permanent plan. He believed either order would serve the children’s best interest in light of efforts he made to improve his parenting, including participating in recovery from substance abuse and in behavioral services.
The department recommended in its report for the section 366.26 hearing that the juvenile court select adoption as the permanent plan for D.F. and legal guardianship for P.W.
On March 23, 2017, at a combined contested hearing, the juvenile court denied father’s section 388 petition, found by clear and convincing evidence that D.F. was likely to be adopted, and terminated parental rights as to her.[2] The court also ordered a plan of legal guardianship for P.W.
DISCUSSION
An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is appellant’s burden to raise claims of reversible error or other defect, and present argument and authority on each point made. If appellant fails to do so, the appeal may be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.)
Here, the juvenile court conducted a combined hearing under sections 388 and 366.26. The court first issued its ruling on father’s section 388 petition and denied it. The court proceeded to hear evidence and rule on the permanent plans for father’s children, selecting legal guardianship for P.W.
Father does not argue the juvenile court erred in denying his section 388 petition and selecting legal guardianship as P.W.’s permanent plan. Instead, he discusses a land dispute with his neighbor, his prior drug activity and current recovery, and his desire to reunify with his daughters.
We conclude, based on the letter father filed, that he failed to raise any arguable issues from the termination hearing that merit briefing and dismiss the appeal.
DISPOSITION
This appeal is dismissed.
* Before Peña, Acting P.J., Smith, J. and Meehan, J.
[1] Statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
[2] Father appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights as to D.F. and appellate counsel filed a “no issues” letter pursuant to Phoenix H. (Tuolumne County Department of Social Services v. D.F., case No. 5F075388.) We granted father leave to file a letter and he did.
