In re R.C.

Filed 7/23/07 In re R.C. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Maureen Aplin, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, 21.) Affirmed.

Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsels, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Mateo C. appeals from the order made at the six‑month review hearing (Welf. & Inst. Code,  366.21)[1] concerning his children. At the hearing, the juvenile court returned the children to their mother under a plan of family maintenance, transferred the dependency cases to Alameda County where the mother resides, ordered no visitation for Mateo until a psychological evaluation of him was completed, and issued a restraining order prohibiting Mateo from contacting the mother or the children, except through their social workers. On appeal, Mateo contends: (1) he was denied reasonable services; (2) the children should have been placed in his custody; (3) transferring the dependency cases to Alameda County was improper; and (4) the visitation restrictions and restraining order were improper. We find no error and affirm the order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

In November 2005, 14‑year‑old R., seven‑year‑old G., five‑year‑old Bryan, and four‑year‑old Brandon were taken into protective custody due to allegations by R. Mateo had repeatedly sexually abused her. Rosa F., was the mother of all four children. Mateo claims to have adopted R. at age five after the couple married in Mexico. He was the biological father of the three younger children. The family had mostly lived in Mexico, but came to the United States to seek medical care for Bryan, who suffered from cerebral palsy and was confined to a wheelchair.

At some point, Rosa and Mateo separated. There are indications in the record they divorced in Mexico and had some shared custody arrangement for the children. But, at the time of the relevant events, they were living in California; Mateo in Anaheim near his family and Rosa in Oakland with the four children where some of her family members lived.

In late November 2005, Mateo brought the children to Anaheim because he had obtained temporary custody of them. The children were detained a few days later after R. alleged Mateo sexually abused her. Additionally, all the children reported instances of being hit by Mateo and witnessing acts of domestic violence by Mateo against Rosa. R. had previously told her mother about the sexual abuse, but Rosa did not report the allegations to authorities. (Apparently, Rosa was either skeptical of the girls claims, or believed she needed to actually witness the abuse before she should report it to police.) The petition alleged a b count as to both parents ( 300, subd. (b) [failure to protect]), and a d count as to Mateo ( 300, subd. (d) [sexual abuse]). The sexual abuse allegations (and count) were eventually dismissed, and for that reason we will not discuss the specific sexual abuse allegations in any detail.

Postdetention Reporting Period

Throughout the first reporting period, leading up to the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing, the children remained in protective custody, primarily at Orangewood Childrens Home (Orangewood). R. reported the details of domestic violence between Mateo and Rosa and was frustrated she could not protect Rosa from Mateo. In Mexico, the couple would frequently separate. Once, when the couple was separated, Mateo absconded with the three younger children and would not return them to Rosa. R. said Mateo was always angry at her and frequently hit her as well.

G. similarly reported Mateo was always hitting Rosa, but Rosa never hit him. The parents were always fighting. G. wanted to live with her mother, but Mateo told her she could not. G. said her father hit her with a belt lots of times and confirmed he hit R. too. Bryan reported the parents were always fighting and [Mateo] was always hitting [Rosa] which scared Bryan. Mateo would also hit wheelchair‑bound Bryan with his hands, his feet, and a belt. Brandon also said Mateo often hit Rosa and once broke her nose.

Mateo denied there were any problems at all in his and Rosas relationship, denied there was ever any domestic violence, and said [R.] was always the problem trying to break up his marriage. Rosa had taken the children to Oakland without his permission to obtain medical care for Bryan. Mateo believed that in Oakland, R. and Rosa had boyfriends. In November 2005, he obtained a court order for temporary custody of the children and brought them back to Anaheim. R. was a discipline problem because she wanted to be with her mother. Mateo believed the sexual abuse allegations were part of a conspiracy between R. and Rosa to allow Rosa to get custody of the children.

Rosa told the social worker about ongoing domestic violence. R. had told her about alleged sexual abuse by Mateo. Rosa tried to catch him doing something inappropriate, but had not. When she confronted Mateo with R.s allegations, he hit her and broke her lip. The social worker surmised given that Rosa did not explicitly support her daughters allegations, it was unlikely the sexual abuse allegations were being promoted by Rosa as a ploy to obtain custody of the children.

The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) had recommended drug testing for both parents; Rosa had requested her services be provided in Oakland, where she lived. But then Rosa had some Border Patrol problems that prevented her from completing the initial drug testing. In January 2006, Rosa was in Mexico and unable to get back to the United States. Rosa blamed her predicament on Mateo. She told the social worker that after the children had been detained, she went to Mateos house to get some of their belongings. Mateo asked Rosa to reunify with him, but she refused. He then said Rosas father was in the United States and offered to drive her to see him. Rosa was suspicious, but reluctantly agreed. Mateo then turned her over to immigration officials. (Mateo denied doing this.) SSA recommended reunification services for both parents, but noted had Rosa been able to complete her December 2005 drug tests, it would have recommended the children be released to her with family maintenance.

Mateo was having monitored weekly visits with the younger children, which generally went well. But by mid-January 2006, G. started to express[] a fear of visiting with [Mateo]. She related to social workers numerous instances of witnessing Mateo hitting Rosa and the other children. Once, he had threatened to kill R. She was also fearful of being placed with paternal relatives. She missed her mother. Brian said he wanted to live with Rosa, somewhere Mateo could not find them. Mateo was hostile with the medical unit staff at Orangewood. He refused to sign papers permitting Bryan to obtain physical therapy. Mateo had begun a parenting class.

By late January, Rosa had returned to the United States. She tried to arrange visits with the children when she could, but had to come from Alameda County to see them. She did not come to Orange County frequently because she was trying to limit her contact with Mateo. In late February, Rosa and the children had a very good, but very emotional, visit. At the end, Bryan was very emotional and did not want to let go of his mom.

Mateo continued to have visits, but was annoyed they were monitored. He was upset that everyone was focusing on [R.] He complained social workers verbally attacked [him]. He continued to insist R. was the problem and she was negatively influencing the other children. R. and/or the social workers were trying to break up Mateo and Rosa. He continued to deny having ever hit Rosa or any of the children. G. was refusing visits with Mateo; Mateo accused R. of influencing G. not to come. Brandon wanted to live with his mother, and did not want to see Mateo, but nonetheless, both boys had visits with Mateo that went reasonably well. Mateo was attending parenting classes and counseling.

In late February 2006, R. and G. were placed in a foster home. The boys remained at Orangewood (largely because of the difficulty in finding a foster home that could accept a child in a wheelchair). Rosa made inquiries about having the dependency cases transferred to Alameda County, where she lived. She did not intend to reunite with Mateo. She had begun parenting classes and admitted she had failed her children by not contacting authorities about the familys situation.

In March 2006, SSA reported Brandon and Bryan were still at Orangewood. Mateo completed a parenting class and attended therapy sessions, but in both, he continued to deny there were any problems at home and insisted everything was R.s fault. G. and Brandon had declined some visits with Mateo, but when they did visit, the visits went well. On March 13, Mateo called the social worker, complaining the children were hurting him by refusing visits. He complained that everyone was looking at him as the problem, when the problem was Rosa, who did not care about the children, and R. Mateo warned G. about the bad path her mother and sister had taken and talked with all the children about the dependency case despite having been told not to. Brandon had declined a visit with his mother because he did not want to have to say goodbye to her. Brian and G. asked if they could go home with their mother.

In May 2006, SSA reported Mateos visits with G., Bryan, and Brandon generally went well, but G. still refused to attend many visits. Brandon was starting to appear depressed. Brandon said he did not want to go home with Mateo because he feared Mateo would hit him.

At the conclusion of the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on May 11, 2006, the court dismissed the sexual abuse allegations, surmising that R. might have exaggerated her claims to protect Rosa from abuse. But, it also concluded the family was struggling with domestic violence, particularly directed at R. and Rosa. It sustained the petition on the b count.

Postjurisdictional Hearing Reporting Period

On May 19, 2006, R. and G. were moved to a new foster home. The boys remained at Orangewood. The court ordered Mateo have eight hours of visitation per week and the minors address their alienation from Mateo in therapy. Mateo continued to work on his case plan by completing parenting classes and attending anger management and domestic violence programs. He continued to deny there had ever been any domestic violence or abuse in the family. He continued to blame all problems on R., Rosa, and SSA. He accused the social workers of being biased in Rosas favor and lying to him about her whereabouts.

Rosa was working on her case plan, although as of late July 2006, her progress had been minimal due to the delay in her starting the services in Alameda County. Nonetheless, she was attending parenting classes and attending anger management and domestic violence programs.

As of June, both R. and G. were receiving individual counseling. Bryan and Brandon were seeing a court evaluation and guidance unit therapist, but both were reported to be having problems with depression and sadness.

In August 2006, SSA reported Mateo continued to visit the children consistently. Rosas visits were not as consistent because of the geographic distance. G.s foster mother did not want to monitor visits with Mateo because of his increasingly hostile behavior towards her. Mateo told her he would be getting the children one way or another. SSA considered Mateo a flight risk if left alone with the children and did not want the monitor to be removed.

G. and Brandon continued to resist visits with Mateo. G. was very upset because Mateo had told her that if she opposed being returned to him, she might never see her brothers again. He told G. the foster mother did not care about her and was being paid to take care of her. Mateo also continued to talk to G. about the dependency case, and said negative things to her about her mother and R. At one visit, Mateo called G. a liar and told the children he was going to stop seeing them. G. started displaying signs of anxiety; she was biting her nails and had begun wetting her bed. The foster mother reported G. became clingy, aggressive, and anxious prior to visits with Mateo. The social worker concluded the visits were detrimental to G. Mateo continued to participate in services; he continued to deny he had any issues or problems. The therapist described Mateo as having a defiant personality and being hostile and resistant to cooperating with services.

In September 2006, SSA reported Bryan and Brandon had finally been placed in a foster home. G. remained in the same foster home. R. had moved back to Alameda County and was placed with her maternal uncle. G., Bryan, and Brandon were all balking at visits with Mateo and repeatedly said they wanted to live with Rosa. G. had begun having hallucinations. Bryan reported that on one visit with Mateo, Mateo said he had bought a gun and intended to kill Rosa and R. Mateo called Bryan stupid and yelled at him. Mateo had called G. and warned she had better start coming to visits with him.

In mid‑September 2006, Bryan underwent foot surgery, aimed at allowing him to stand. Rosa was present and Bryan looked to her for comfort during the process. Mateo came to the hospital too. He was aggressive and argumentative with the hospital staff and became so involved in his conflict with the nurses and doctors that he never acknowledged Bryan as he was leaving the hospital. After the surgery, Mateo never made any inquiries about Bryans progress. Rosa called every day to see how Bryan was doing.

In November, a home evaluation of Rosa had been completed, and the home (a studio apartment) was deemed acceptable. G. continued to report that Mateo kept telling her that he would never allow her to live with her mother.

The Six‑Month Review Hearing

The contested six‑month review hearing began in September 2006 and after several recesses, finally concluded in late November 2006. SSA recommended the children remain out of parental custody, reunification services be continued, and a 12‑month review hearing be set.

SSA social worker Ann Salazar‑Robinson testified conjoint therapy between the children and Mateo had not begun because the boys had not yet begun individual counseling and G. had only been in individual counseling for a few months. Although Mateo participated in services, she believed he had not processed the information he learned from the parenting education program[.] She based her opinion on reports Mateo threatened G. about attending visits, made frequent inappropriate comments about Rosa, threatened the children he would not come visit them anymore, and made insulting comments to the children. The children had repeatedly indicated they feared Mateo and wanted to live with Rosa.

Salazar‑Robinson testified Rosa had fully participated in her services in Alameda County. R. was already placed there with a maternal uncle. Salazar‑Robinson believed it was in the childrens best interests to be together, the case should be transferred to Alameda County, and the children should be placed with the maternal uncle until they could be returned to Rosa. Rosa was visiting the children as frequently as possible given the geographical constraints, the visits went well, and the children did not want her to leave.

Bryan testified he did not like Mateo because Mateo hit Rosa and yelled at him. Bryan wanted to live with his mother. He insisted Mateo had told him he had bought a gun and would kill Rosa. Brandon testified he enjoyed visits with Mateo and wanted to live with Mateo because he had toys and movies.

Mateo testified he had participated in services and completed all the classes SSA asked him to take. He had no problems with the minors, and they had never been at risk. The social worker had not given him any information about the children, particularly about G.s deteriorating emotional condition. He denied ever making inappropriate or derogatory comments to the children and believed they were being manipulated by the social worker and/or the foster parents. He testified the social workers were making everything up and keeping his children hidden from him. He believed the social workers were treating him differently than they treated Rosa.

Mateo was upset because he believed Rosa was sleeping around. He accused Rosa of living with a 17‑year‑old male and permitting R. to live with a 21‑year‑old man. But, Mateo testified counseling was helping him to forget all that. He wanted conjoint therapy with the children, but the social worker told him it was not the right time. Mateo claimed that in early 2006, he received threats from someone in Alameda County concerning his attempts to get the children back. He wanted the children placed with relatives in Mexico.

In closing arguments, counsel for SSA argued against returning the children to Mateo. Counsel argued the case should be transferred to Alameda County because of the strong likelihood the children would reunify with Rosa, but the children should be placed with the maternal uncle because Rosa had not yet established she could protect the children.

Minors counsel argued the boys should be returned to Rosas custody, R. and G. placed with the maternal uncle, and the matter transferred to Alameda County. Counsel argued return to Mateo would not be appropriate because despite the childrens frequently expressed fear of him, Mateo continued to deny any wrongdoing or risk to them.

Mateos counsel argued the children were not at risk of harm if returned to his custody. Counsel argued reasonable services had not been provided because the social worker did not keep Mateo fully informed about the children. Additionally, Mateo had completed the requisite programs and counseling and had not been asked to redo any of them. Had the social worker thought there were still problems, she should have ordered additional parenting or counseling or start[ed] conjoint counseling with the children to heal any damage thats been done . . . .

The juvenile court found the social worker and the children were credible witnesses and Mateo was not. The juvenile court found reasonable services had been provided to both parents, but Mateo had failed to gain from therapy or to implement what he had learned. He remained unable to control his temper and continued to make inappropriate remarks to the children. That Mateo did not benefit from the services did not render the services unreasonable.

The juvenile court found SSA had not sustained its burden of proving returning the children to Rosas custody would be detrimental. She had complied with her service plan and had acceptable housing for at least two of the children. It ordered the children be placed with Rosa under a plan of family maintenance and transferred the case to Alameda County. Rosa was given authorization to permit R. and G. to reside with the maternal uncle if she deemed it necessary. Mateos visits with the children were suspended pending completion of a psychological evaluation. It issued a restraining order precluding Mateo from contacting Rosa or the children except through the social worker and through court‑ordered visitation. The restraining order stated, Mateo has been making inappropriate remarks to the children that are detrimental to their well‑being, to the point that [they] have refused to attend visitation with him. [The c]ourt has found that returning the children to [Mateos] care would be detrimental due to [his] behavior.

DISCUSSION

1. Finding of Reasonable Services

If a child is removed from parental custody, in most cases, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide child welfare services to the child and the childs mother and statutorily presumed father or guardians. ( 361.5, subd. (a).) This statutory requirement fulfills the legislative goal of preserving the family whenever possible. [Citation.] (Melinda K. v. Superior Court (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1147, 1158 (Melinda K.).) If a dependent child is not returned to the custody of his or her parent at the six‑month review hearing, the court must make a finding as to whether reasonable services were provided or offered. ( 366.21, subd. (e).) Here, the juvenile court found reasonable services had been provided, but Mateo had not made substantial progress because he failed to gain from therapy or implement the information he was provided in counseling. Mateo contends there is no substantial evidence to support this finding. We disagree.

Although the standard of proof for the reasonable services finding [at the six‑month review hearing] is expressly clear and convincing evidence[,] [citation] (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 594), on appeal, we review that finding using the substantial evidence test. In reviewing the reasonableness of the services provided, this court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent. We must indulge in all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the verdict. If there is substantial evidence supporting the judgment, our duty ends and the judgment must not be disturbed. [Citations.] (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)

Mateo contends the services provided were not reasonable. Specifically, he complains the juvenile court had ordered the children begin individual counseling and conjoint counseling with Mateo. But, by the conclusion of the extended six‑month review hearing, conjoint counseling had not yet begun. Brandon, Bryan, and G. were often resistant to visits with Mateo, and frequently indicated they desired to live with Rosa, not Mateo. Conjoint therapy was ordered to address the childrens alienation from Mateo. Mateo suggests conjoint therapy was critical to his regaining custody of the children, and in view of the fact he had otherwise fully complied with his case plan, the lack of timely provided conjoint therapy thwarted him from getting the children back.

Mateo was provided a full panoply of services, including counseling, an anger management course, domestic violence and parenting classes, and regular monitored visitation. To his credit, he participated in his services. But, the juvenile court concluded Mateo had failed to make progress with the services and substantial evidence supports that conclusion. Despite his participation in services, Mateo did not gain any meaningful insight about his parenting. He steadfastly denied any responsibility for the familys situation and continued to blame a 14‑year‑old child (R.), for all of their problems. He continued to engage in inappropriate conduct towards the children during visits and in telephone conversations. He called them names (stupid, liar), threatened G. about adverse consequences of not visiting with him (she would never see her brothers again), said bad things about Rosa and R. to the children, and discussed the case with them. When the children resisted visits with Mateo, he blamed it on influences of others, never recognizing his own behavior caused them distress.

The social worker explained conjoint counseling could not begin until the children had been in individual therapy, and even then would only start when the childrens therapist recommended. G. was receiving individual counseling. The boys counseling was delayed because of their lengthy stay at Orangewood. But, the delay in starting therapy for the children does not render the services inadequate. Clearly, the delay in the minors individual counseling rendered the services provided imperfect, but rarely will services be perfect. [Citation.] The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. [Citation.] (Melinda K., supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.)

2. Detriment Finding

Mateo challenges the courts detriment finding. At a six‑month review hearing, the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well‑being of the child. The social worker shall have the burden of establishing that detriment. ( 366.21, subd. (e).) A parents failure to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court‑ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental. In making its determination, the court shall review and consider the social workers report and recommendations . . . and shall consider the efforts or progress, or both, demonstrated by the parent . . . and the extent to which he or she availed himself or herself to services provided. [] Whether or not the child is returned to a parent or legal guardian, the court shall specify the factual basis for its conclusion that the return would be detrimental or would not be detrimental. (Ibid.) We must affirm the juvenile courts detriment finding if it is supported by substantial evidence. (In re Shaundra L. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 303, 316.) We are satisfied it is.

Mateo contends he fully performed all the components of his case plan and had regular visits with the children, and, therefore the finding there would be a substantial risk of detriment to the children if returned is unsupported. But, it is well‑established that completing the technical requirements of the reunification service plan does not guarantee return of the child; the juvenile court still must consider whether return would have a detrimental effect on the childs emotional well‑being. (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 901.) Substantial evidence supports the courts finding of a substantial risk of detriment to the children if returned to Mateos custody. Despite abundant evidence of domestic violence in the family home, Mateo denied any problems and continued to blame his stepdaughter for the familys woes. As the court noted, despite having attended anger management classes, he still lacked the ability to control his temper. The children often expressed fear of him. Mateo continued to insist everyone else was manipulating the children or biased against him. Despite knowing the children missed their mother and each other, when the children were resistant to seeing him Mateo threatened them with never seeing their mother or each other again.

Mateo also complains the social worker was biased against him, casting doubt on her opinion he continued to pose a risk of detriment to the children. He cites as evidence of bias the fact Rosa had much less frequent visitation with the children, and she started her case plan much later than he, yet the social worker wanted the children to be placed in Rosas custody. The social workers reports focus largely on Mateos interactions with the children and contain little discussion about Rosas contacts with them.

Mateos claim of social worker bias is without merit. The social worker testified she had no bias for or against one parent. It must be remembered the children were taken into protective custody not only because of the subsequently dismissed allegations of sexual abuse, but because of domestic violence by Mateo. Rosas failing was in not recognizing the significance and harmful effects of Mateos conduct. There was no evidence she had ever abused the children. Early on SSA noted the children would have been immediately released to Rosa, but for her initial inability to drug test and begin her service plan (due to immigration difficulties arising when Mateo turned her over to immigration authorities). Once Rosa got started with services, she complied with her plan. The social worker explained the lack of extensive discussion about Rosas contacts with the children was because there were no problems with her contacts. The record demonstrates Rosas limited visitation was due to her geographical distance from the children, not any lack of concern or caring as Mateo insinuates. The juvenile court specifically found the social worker to be very credible and deemed her testimony reliable, heartfelt, well thought out, based on fact, [and] unbiased. By contrast, the juvenile court found Mateo to be lacking in credibility.

3. Transfer Orders

Mateo contends the juvenile court erred by transferring the dependency cases to Alameda County. In view of the juvenile courts finding the children should be placed in Rosas custody, there was no error.

Section 375 gives the juvenile court discretion to transfer a dependency case to the county of a custodial parents residence if transfer is in the childs best interests. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.610(e); In re Christopher T. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1291.) We will not disturb the juvenile courts transfer order unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion, i.e., unless it exceed[s] the bounds of reason. . . . (In re J.C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 984, 993.)

Mateo does not challenge the order from a procedural standpoint. Rather, his argument is a backdoor attack on the juvenile courts decision to return the children to Rosas custody. He renews his argument the social worker was biased against him, which we have adequately addressed above.

Mateo vaguely suggests there is not enough information on which the court could conclude Rosa did not pose a risk of detriment to the children, and for this reason, the transfer order was improper. But, the law is that at the six‑month review hearing, the court must order the child returned to parental custody unless it finds return would create a substantial risk of detriment to the child. ( 366.21, subd. (e).) The social worker has the burden of establishing detriment. (Ibid.) Mateo points to no evidence suggesting there was a risk of detriment to the children if returned to Rosa. Rosa participated in services, took responsibility for having failed to protect the children from Mateo, had adequate housing, and the children wanted to live with her. Although SSA recommended the children remain out of Rosas custody for a while longer, the juvenile court found SSA failed to demonstrate there was any risk of detriment if they were returned to her custody immediately. Because no detriment was established, return to Rosas custody was required. And because Rosas residence (and now also the childrens) is in Alameda County, transferring the cases to Alameda County was appropriate.

4. Restraining Order

Mateo contends the juvenile court erred by (1) suspending his visitation with the children pending completion of a psychological evaluation, and (2) issuing a restraining order preventing him from contacting Rosa or the children other than through the social worker. We find no error.

We consider Mateos latter contention first. The juvenile court may issue a restraining order excluding any person from contacting, threatening, or disturbing the peace of the child or his or her caretaker. ( 213.5, subd. (a).) If there is substantial evidence supporting the order, the courts issuance of the restraining order may not be disturbed. [Citation.] (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 210-211.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts order. Mateo has a history of striking Rosa and the children, and he was becoming increasingly hostile with professionals associated with this case. There was evidence that when the family was in Mexico, he once absconded with the three younger children. Mateo warned G.s foster mother he would be getting the children one way or another, and SSA considered him to be a flight risk if left alone with the children. And Mateo told Bryan (whom the juvenile court specifically found to be a credible witness), he had bought a gun and would kill Rosa and R. Under the circumstances the restraining order was prudent.

As for suspending visitation pending the outcome of a psychological evaluation of Mateo, we cannot say the order was an abuse of the juvenile courts discretion. Visitation should be as frequent as possible, consistent with the well‑being of the child. ( 362.1, subd. (a), italics added), the court must consider the safety and well‑being of the child. The court was rightly concerned that Mateos increasingly angry and hostile behavior indicated a possible risk to their safety. Additionally, the court could consider the possibility of adverse psychological consequences of an unwanted visit between [parent] and child. [Citation.] (In re Julie M. (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 41, 50.) By and large, the children were resistant to visits with Mateo and expressed fear of him. G. was having increasing emotional difficulties that the social worker believed could be the result of contact with Mateo. We cannot say suspending visits until further psychological assessments were received was inappropriate.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

OLEARY, J.

WE CONCUR:

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

FYBEL, J.

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[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.