In re Reginald W.
Filed 11/6/13 In re Reginald W. CA2/3
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
In re REGINALD W., a Person
Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
B245094
(Los Angeles
County
Super. Ct.
No. JJ18504)
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
REGINALD W.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Steven R. Klaif, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Remanded, otherwise affirmed.
Laini Millar Melnick, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette,
Chief Assistant Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General,
Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Minor and appellant Reginald W. appeals from a
judgment sustaining a petition alleging he received stolen property. He contends that there is insufficient
evidence he knew the property was stolen and that the trial court failed to
make the requisite findings for its order removing him from
because the juvenile court failed to declare the offense a misdemeanor or a
felony. We otherwise affirm the
judgment.
I. Factual background.
Reginald W. and Adrian Ceja were neighbors. During the afternoon of March 28, 2012, Ceja was at home when he heard an unusual sound. He went to the living room and noticed that
the front door, which had a deadbolt that could only be unlocked from the
inside, was open. A screen was missing
from the bathroom window, which also was open.
Although Ceja didn’t notice anything missing, the Los Angeles Police
Department later told him they had boxes belonging to him. The boxes, which contained cables and
antennae, belonged to Ceja’s cousin who worked for a cable network. The boxes had been on Ceja’s front porch.
That same day, March 28,
2012,
police officers went to Reginald’s home and spoke to his mother. She asked Reginald whether he had any
boxes. He said that boxes had been left
on their front porch, and he picked them up and put them in his closet. He never went outside the house that day.
II. Procedural background.
A petition filed under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 602 on September 20, 2012 alleged count 1, burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459) and count 2, receiving stolen property (Pen. Code, § 496,
subd. (a)). On October 16, 2012, the
juvenile court granted the minor’s motion to dismiss count 1 due to
insufficient evidence but sustained the petition as to count 2. The court, on October
25, 2012, ordered Reginald to remain a ward of the court, removed custody from
his parents, and placed him in community camp for six months. The court set his maximum term of confinement
at four years.
I. Sufficiency of the evidence.
The minor
contends that there was insufficient
evidence he knowingly received the stolen box or boxes containing cables
and antennae.
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The same standard of appellate
review applicable to reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction applies to considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a
juvenile proceeding. (
Cal.App.4th 601, 605; In re Ryan N.
(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) “Under
this standard, the critical inquiry is ‘whether, after reviewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] An appellate court ‘must review the whole
record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]†(In re
Ryan N., at p. 1371.)
A defendant
is guilty of receiving stolen property if (1) the property was stolen; (2) the
defendant knew the property was stolen; and (3) the defendant was in
possession of the stolen property. (
414, 420-421; People v. Reyes (1997)
52 Cal.App.4th 975, 984-985; § 496, subd. (a).) The knowledge element is usually established
by an inference from circumstantial evidence rather than by direct
evidence. (People v. Alvarado (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 1003, 1019.) “In routine circumstances, the knowledge [requirement]
is inferred from the defendant’s failure to explain how he came to possess a
stolen item or his offer of an unsatisfactory explanation or from suspicious
circumstances attendant upon his possession of the item.†(Id. at
pp. 1019-1020.) Corroborating
circumstances may include the attributes of possession, including time, place
or manner. (Reyes, at p. 985; People v.
McFarland (1962) 58 Cal.2d 748, 754.)
A defendant’s possession of recently stolen property is so incriminating
that there need be, in addition to possession, only “slight corroboration in
the form of statements or conduct of the defendant tending to show his
guilt.†(McFarland, at p. 754.)
The minor
argues that there was insufficient evidence he knew the boxes were stolen. But, as the juvenile court found, it was
reasonable to infer his knowledge from the circumstances. The same day the boxes were stolen they were
found in Reginald’s closet. Putting a box
of cables and antennae—items generally not found on one’s porch—in his closet
was a sufficiently suspicious circumstance to establish his consciousness of
guilt.
Reginald, however, responds that
there was no consciousness of guilt because when his mother asked whether he
had the boxes he did not try to hide that they were in his closet. (Cf. People
v. Juehling (1935) 10 Cal.App.2d 527, 531 [the defendant’s evasive answers
to questions about how she came to possess the stolen property raised an
inference of guilt].) His
forthrightness, he argues, showed he had nothing to hide and negates
knowledge. That might be one
interpretation of the evidence. But an
equally reasonable inference from the evidence is Reginald put the boxes in his
closet to hide them, knowing they were stolen.
II. The trial court failed to declare the
offense a misdemeanor or a felony.
Welfare and
Institutions Code section 702 states in part that if “the minor is found to
have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable
alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense
to be a misdemeanor or felony.†Where
such a “ ‘wobbler’ †offense is at issue, the juvenile court must explicitly
declare whether it is a felony or misdemeanor. (In re
Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1204.) Receiving stolen property is punishable either
as a felony or as a misdemeanor. (Pen.
Code, §§ 17, subd. (b), 496, subd. (a).)
Because the juvenile court did not make the necessary declaration, the
parties agree that remand is proper on this issue.
III. Welfare and Institutions Code section
726.
The minor’s
final contention is the juvenile court failed to make the requisite findings of
fact under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726.
A ward or a
dependent child may not be removed from a parent’s custody unless the court
finds one of the following facts: “(1) That
the parent or guardian is incapable of providing or has failed or neglected to
provide proper maintenance, training, and education for the minor. [¶] (2) That
the minor has been tried on probation while in custody and has failed to
reform. [¶] (3) That the welfare of the minor
requires that custody be taken from the minor’s parent or guardian.†(Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd.
(a)(1)-(3).) The juvenile court’s
finding may be explicit or implicit, but it must be on the record. (In re
Michael W. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 946, 953, fn. 4 [“A finding of one of the
conditions expressed in section 726 must be expressly or impliedly stated in
the recordâ€].)
At the
disposition hearing, the juvenile court here had probation reports. The reports and record showed that Reginald
had a sustained petition from November 2010 for trespass for which he was
placed on probation for six months. He
had another petition sustained in March 2012 for possessing a firearm. He was again placed home on probation. The reports noted that Reginald had been
ordered to a community detention program in August 2012 and then placed in
juvenile hall, where he showed “ ‘zero respect for authority’ †and
where he “proudly†proclaimed membership in a gang. His “well-meaning family seem helpless to
assist him to re-direct his life.†Also
included in the probation report was a reference to the letter of a high school
public safety officer, who wrote that Reginald was antagonizing students at
Locke High School by going there with gang members and provoking
placement.
The
juvenile court said it had read the reports. In connection with the current petition, defense
counsel requested that Reginald be placed on house arrest. The court said: “Started out at age 13, trespass. What it looks like is this is not the first
496. He has had multiple theft-related
petitions and his general behavior in the hall indicates that it does not seem
appropriate for him to be home.†When
Reginald’s grandfather asked for one more chance to have the minor at home, the
court answered that he “just had a chance to show it in a setting like the
hall, and this is one of the wors[t] reports from the hall that I have
seen.†Then, after the court was made
aware that Reginald had an additional petition for carrying a firearm, it said:
“No.
He’ll get a chance when he comes back home, Sir. I can’t in good consci[ence] send him back
home.â€
Implied in the juvenile court’s
statements, made after reviewing Reginald’s record, were findings that Reginald
failed to reform and that his welfare required that custody be taken from his
parents. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726,
subd. (a)(2), (3).) The multiple
petitions and Reginald’s failure in juvenile hall and gang-related behavior
supported these findings. Probation had
been tried with Reginald, and it had failed.
The juvenile court therefore could not “in good conscience†try that
remedy again, because there was no evidence Reginald had reformed, despite his
family’s attempts to help him. We
therefore conclude that the court complied with section 726.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded so that the juvenile court can
comply with Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. The judgment is otherwise affirmed.
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
ALDRICH,
J.
We concur:
CROSKEY,
Acting P. J.
KITCHING,
J.
record is unclear whether there was one or more boxes. Defendant’s guilt, however, hinged on his
knowledge and not on the number of boxes he received.
juvenile court failed to check any box relating to the removal.
