Filed 1/30/18 In re Riley CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
| In re SHANNON RILEY
on
Habeas Corpus.
| D072210
(San Diego Co. Super. Ct. No. HSC11601) |
Because the record shows respondent has provided petitioner the relief to which he is entitled by way of his petition for habeas corpus, we discharge the order to show cause as improvidently granted and deny the petition.
Shannon Riley, in pro. per., for Petitioner.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Phillip J. Lindsay, Assistant Attorney General, Sara J. Romano and Amanda Lloyd, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.
BACKGROUND
In his initial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, Shannon Riley alleged that respondent, the warden of Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility (prison), failed to promptly process an administrative appeal by which Riley sought to be placed in a single cell. According to his petition, Riley was informed that his appeal had been delayed because of a backlog in the appeals office. In a supplemental petition, Riley alleged a package sent to him at the prison had been stolen by a prison guard.
We issued an order to show cause and directed the warden to respond to both the initial petition and the supplemental petition. By way of return, the warden presented documentary evidence that, while Riley's petition in this court has been pending, Riley's administrative appeal has been processed and denied on the merits and that Riley has not pursued any further administrative remedy. The warden also presented documentary evidence that the package, which was the subject of Riley's supplemental petition, has been located and delivered to Riley.
Riley filed a traverse to the warden's return in which he concedes that his administrative appeal has been processed and denied and that, although additional administrative remedies are available, he has not pursued the appeal any further. Riley also concedes that the package, which was the subject of his supplemental petition in this court, has been delivered to him; accordingly, by way of his traverse, Riley voluntarily dismissed his supplemental petition.
Although Riley concedes that his administrative appeal was eventually processed and denied on the merits, he points out his administrative appeal was not processed within the time limits contemplated in the regulations governing administrative appeals in correctional facilities, and he contends that this failure is ongoing and should be the subject of injunctive relief. As we explain, on this record, injunctive relief with respect to the prison's administrative appeal process is not available. Accordingly, we deny the petition.
DISCUSSION
As Riley points out, the regulations providing for internal prison grievances and appeals, contemplate that appeals such as the one he made, be processed within 30 days. (Cal. Code of Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.8, subd. (c)(2).) As the record shows, in his case, although Riley's appeal was eventually processed, it was not processed within 30 days. As we indicated, Riley now asks that, by way of mandate or other injunctive power, we compel the warden to comply with the regulations.
Where, as here, correctional facilities have adopted, by regulation, a grievance or administrative appeal process, we have compelled compliance with the regulations by way of a writ of habeas corpus. (See In re Andres (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 1383, 1394–1395 (Andres).) In Andres, the trial court, by way of a writ of habeas corpus, compelled a prison warden to process a prisoner's internal grievance after the trial court found that as a matter of fact the prisoner had submitted the grievance in a timely manner and finding that the trial court's order was supported by substantial evidence, we affirmed. (Ibid.)
Here, of course, it appears from the record that the prison has in fact provided Riley with the relief he seeks on his own behalf: the processing of his administrative appeal. Moreover, it is not by any means clear that in delaying resolution of his appeal the prison violated its regulations. The 30-day processing period contemplated by the appeals regulation is subject to extension by a prison when staff is not available (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.8 (d)(1)); thus, the 30-day period Riley relies upon is in no sense a limit on the prison's power or authority to act on an appeal.[1]
In any event, we do not have the power, either by way of writ of habeas corpus or mandate, to enjoin any future failure by the prison to meet the requirements of its own regulations. As the warden points out in his return, except in extraordinary cases, the adoption and function of internal grievance procedures are not matters which are compelled or protected by due process and habeas relief is not available as a means of challenging the result of such a process. (See In re Williams (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 738, 742–744.) Thus, our power to enforce constitutional rights are not directly implicated here, when Riley only asks for an injunction compelling the future observance of prisoners' administrative rights. Where, as here, we are only considering rights provided by administrative regulation, we must presume that the warden and correctional officials will obey the law, including regulations they have imposed on themselves and accordingly, we may not compel future compliance with those regulations. (Evid. Code, § 664; State Board of Education v. Honig (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 720, 748–749 [" '[T]he writ of mandamus is in no sense a preventative . . . remedy.' "].)[2]
DISPOSITION
We discharge the order to show cause as improvidently granted. The petition is denied.
BENKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
DATO, J.
[1] California Code of Regulations, title 15, section 3084.8 provides: "(a) Time limits for reviewing appeals shall commence upon the date of receipt of the appeal form by the appeals coordinator.
"(b) Except as described in subsection 3084.8(b)(4), an inmate or parolee must submit the appeal within 30 calendar days of:
"(1) The occurrence of the event or decision being appealed, or;
"(2) Upon first having knowledge of the action or decision being appealed, or;
"(3) Upon receiving an unsatisfactory departmental response to an appeal filed.
"(4) There shall be no time limits for allegations of sexual violence or staff sexual misconduct.
"(c) All appeals shall be responded to and returned to the inmate or parolee by staff within the following time limits, unless exempted pursuant to the provisions of subsections 3084.8(f) and (g):
"(1) First level responses shall be completed within 30 working days from date of receipt by the appeals coordinator.
"(2) Second level responses shall be completed within 30 working days from date of receipt by the appeals coordinator.
"(3) Third level responses shall be completed within 60 working days from date of receipt by the third level Appeals Chief.
"(d) Exception to the time limits provided in subsection 3084.8(c) is authorized only in the event of:
"(1) Unavailability of the inmate or parolee, or staff, or witnesses.
"(2) The complexity of the decision, action, or policy requiring additional research.
"(3) Necessary involvement of other agencies or jurisdictions.
"(4) State of emergency pursuant to subsection 3383(c) requiring the postponement of nonessential administrative decisions and actions, including normal time requirements for such decisions and actions.
"(e) Except for the third level, if an exceptional delay prevents completion of the review within specified time limits, the appellant, within the time limits provided in subsection 3084.8(c), shall be provided an explanation of the reasons for the delay and the estimated completion date.
"(f) An appeal accepted as an emergency appeal shall be processed within the time frames set forth in subsections 3084.9(a)(4) and (a)(5).
"(g) An appeal of the involuntary psychiatric transfer of an inmate or parolee shall be made directly to the third level pursuant to subsection 3084.9(b), within 30 calendar days of receipt of the hearing decision on the need for involuntary transfer."
[2] We must emphasize however that the limitation on our power to compel future compliance with regulations governing internal prison grievances does not in any sense give prison officials license to ignore those regulations. As our holding in Andres demonstrates, where an individual has been deprived of the benefits of prison regulations we will, by way of a writ of habeas corpus, enforce the individual's administrative rights. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, although such prison appeal and grievance processes are not themselves matters of direct constitutional import, they do have a very practical and salutary impact on the manner in which constitutional claims are resolved. It is axiomatic that when a prisoner or prisoners assert the denial of a constitutional right, the prisoner or prisoners must show that they have exhausted any available administrative remedies. (See In re Dexter (1979) 25 Cal.3d 921, 925; In re Muszalski (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 500, 503, 508.) As the warden points out, this requirement is imposed as a means of ensuring deference to the expertise and discretion of administrative agencies and forestalls unnecessary litigation in our courts. (McKart v. United States (1969) 395 U.S. 185, 193–195.) Significantly, the bar of exhaustion is subject to an exception which arises when a litigant is able to show that resort to an administrative remedy would be futile. (Coachella Valley Mosquito and Vector Control Dist. v. California Public Employment Relations Board (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1072, 1080.) Thus, a prison which does not provide prisoners with the administrative remedy set forth in its regulations might, in a particular case, be prevented from relying on the exhaustion doctrine. (See, e.g., In re Bender (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 380, 385.)
