In re RONALD SINGLER on Habeas Corpus.

Filed 3/26/08

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

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ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS. Petition granted.

Michael Satris, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Petitioner.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Jennifer A. Neill, Heather M. Heckler and Andrew R. Woodrow, Deputy Attorneys General, for Respondent.

In September 1982, Ronald Singler murdered his wife with a shotgun during a heated domestic argument. He was convicted of second degree murder and was sentenced to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison.

In 2006, the Board of Parole Hearings (the Board) found that Singler was not suitable for parole. Members of the Board acknowledged that what Singler has been doing while . . . in prison is very impressive, i.e., his conduct as a prisoner has been extremely positive both for self-enhancement and for the enhancement of other peoples lives in that Singler has benefited, as have others, from all the things that [he has] done while incarcerated. Nevertheless, because of the terrible manner in which he murdered his wife (after arguing with her, he went into the garage, loaded a shotgun, and fatally shot her in the living room while their two young children were in the house) and then disposed of the body (by dumping it in a rural area), Board members concluded Singler had not persuaded them that he has demonstrated sufficient insight regarding what caused him to deal with his anger in such a violent way to convince them that, if released on parole, he would not react in a violent manner if future events cause him to become angry. In other words, the Board found that Singler would pose a danger to public safety if released on parole at that time.

On February 1, 2007, Singlers petition for writ of habeas corpus was summarily denied by this court. In concluding Singler did not make a prima facie showing for relief, we strictly construed the California Supreme Courts holding in In re Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616 as compelling us to deny the petition. This was so, we believed, because the Supreme Court said in no uncertain terms that (1) the Board may deny parole to an inmate with an indeterminate prison term who has reached the minimum eligible parole release date if it determines that public safety requires a lengthier period of incarceration, (2) in making this determination, the Board has great, indeed almost unlimited, discretion based on its attempt to predict by subjective analysis whether the inmate will be able to live in society without committing additional antisocial acts (id. at pp. 654, 655), (3) judicial review of the denial of parole is extremely deferential to the Boards decision (id. at p. 665), (4) a court does not independently assess the merits of the Boards analysis (ibid.), (5) a court engages only in limited judicial review (id. at pp. 625, 657, 658) to determine whether the Boards decision was based upon an individualized consideration of all relevant factors (id. at p. 655) and is supported by some evidence (id. at pp. 625, 658, 677), such that the decision is not arbitrary and capricious (id. at pp. 626, 657, 677), (6) [o]nly a modicum of evidence is required (id. at pp. 626, 677) and the weight to be given the evidence is a matter within the Boards discretion (id. at p. 677), (7) consequently, [i]t is irrelevant that a court might determine that evidence in the record tending to establish suitability for parole far outweighs evidence demonstrating unsuitability for parole (id. at p. 677), (8) as long as the Boards decision reflects due consideration of all the factors bearing on parole suitability and is supported by some evidence, the decision must be upheld (id. at p. 677), (9) the manner in which the crime was committed is one of the factors bearing on parole suitability (id. at p. 653), (10) the nature of the [inmates] offense, alone, can constitute a sufficient basis for denying parole if certain circumstances of the offense involve particularly egregious acts beyond the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction (id. at pp. 682, 683), (11) although the fact that the inmates emotional stress and motivation for the crime might be viewed as reducing his or her culpability, the importance attached to this circumstance is left to the judgment of the [Board] (id. at p. 679), (12) accordingly, judicial review strictly is limited to whether some evidence supports the [Boards] assessment of the circumstances of [the] crime--not whether the weight of the evidence conflicts with that assessment or demonstrates that [the inmate] committed the offense because of extreme stress (id. at p. 679).

Our review of the record and application of legal principles that were articulated by the California Supreme Court prior to our initial review of Singlers petition for writ of habeas corpus led us to conclude the Board undertook an individualized assessment of all the factors bearing upon suitability for parole and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in finding that, despite his conduct while incarcerated, his crime involved egregious acts beyond the minimum acts necessary to support his conviction and demonstrated he remained a danger to the public (the Board viewed the crime as a calculated shooting in the living room of the couples home while their young children were present in the house, followed by a callous disposal of the body). Hence, we summarily denied the petition on the merits.

The California Supreme Court granted Singlers petition for review and transferred the matter to this court, with directions to vacate our denial of the petition and to order the Board to show cause why it did not abuse its discretion and violate due process in finding petitioner unsuitable for parole in June 2006, and why petitioner remains a danger to public safety. (See, Pen. Code,  3041; In re Rosenkrantz[,supra,] 29 Cal.4th [at p.] 683; In re Elkins (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 475, 496-498; In re Lee (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1400, 1408; In re Scott (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 573, 594-595.) (Order granting petn. review, Apr. 25, 2007.) This court issued the order to show cause, as directed, and the Board has filed its return.

The Supreme Courts order--signed by the author of In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th 616 and five other members of the court (only Justice Baxter did not endorse the order)--indicates to us the Supreme Court has endorsed subsequent Court of Appeal decisions that give courts greater leeway in reviewing the Boards determination that an inmate remains a danger to public safety.

No longer giving the Board the deference to which we thought it was entitled (In re Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 655, 665, 677, 679), we must now conclude that its decision finding Singler unsuitable for parole is not supported by the evidence presented at the time of the hearing.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On the night of September 3, 1982, during an argument with his wife, Gayle, Singler got a shotgun from the garage, loaded it, and fatally shot Gayle in the living room while their children were asleep in the house.^[1] According to Debbie G., who was Gayles friend and a neighbor, Singler and Gayle had been having marital difficulties for months, Singler had been mentally and physically abusive, and he had previously threatened Gayle with a shotgun. The two women planned to leave their husbands and live together.

According to Singlers statement in the probation report prepared for the sentencing hearing, the couple had been having marital difficulties due to Gayles compulsive spending and her unusual attachment to Debbie G. On the night of the murder, Gayle and Debbie G. returned from Sacramento about 9:00 p.m. An argument ensued, and Gayle told Singler about a recent sexual affair and her plans to divorce him, take the children, and leave Singler destitute. All of the emotions and anxieties that had been building just went to a point of no control, and he shot Gayle. When their daughter awakened upon hearing the gunshot, Singler told her he had shot a skunk. Singler then drove the children to a friends house, returned home for Gayles body, and dumped it in a rural area.

On the night of the murder, Debbie G. attempted to telephone Gayle, who did not answer the call. Debbie G. later saw Singlers truck backed up against the front steps of the residence. When she telephoned again, Singler answered the phone but would not let her speak to Gayle, stating they had worked everything out and she was asleep and could not be awakened. When Debbie G. went to the house, Singlers truck was gone, the children were missing, and the front porch appeared wet. Debbie G. returned home and telephoned the police.

The responding officers found bloodstains on the deck and in the house. While they were examining the residence, Singler arrived and explained that his wife was spending a week in Lake Tahoe. He stated he had left the children with friends because his wife and he had been arguing. After being informed of his Miranda rights (Mirandav.Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]), Singler initially denied any wrongdoing but eventually admitted shooting Gayle and dumping her body in a rural area. He showed the officers where he left Gayle, and they recovered her body.

Singler entered a slow plea to an unlawful killing using a firearm, with the trial court determining whether the killing was second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter. The court found Singler guilty of second degree murder. At sentencing, the court struck the firearm use enhancement, observing: [T]here are different kinds of second degree murder. There are those that arise out of more deliberate action in the course of the crimes that are totally without justification. . . . In this particular case, I recognize that--although I disagreed with the defense over the term of voluntary manslaughter--I do find second degree murder. I never the less recognize it did revolve out of a family dispute for which Mr. Singler will pay dearly for quite a while . . . .

After Singler was sentenced to a prison term of 15 years to life, the Board set January 30, 1991, as his minimum parole eligibility date.

Singler has no juvenile record or other criminal arrests or convictions. While in prison, he has participated in numerous programs concerning anger management and impulse control. He has completed more than 100 college credits and become active in the Buddhist religion, which has further taught him how to control irritation and anger and not act [i]n anger. He has engaged in volunteer activities, receiving numerous laudatory chronos, and has worked consistently as a plumber or furniture refinisher. His work supervisors reports indicate Singler has exceptional work habits and skill levels. He is described as a model prisoner who has an exemplary disciplinary history, other than the destruction of a blanket in 1983.

According to various psychological evaluations, Singler is sincerely ashamed of what he did and remorseful for the pain he caused others. He has reconciled with his children, who write to him and want him to become a part of their lives. His daughter has written several letters asking that he be paroled. In addition, Gayles mother had no objections to Singler being paroled.

An evaluation prepared by Dr. R. OBrien, a psychotherapist, in 2002, noted the following: Singlers loss of impulse control rose to the level of violence at the time of the offense. Multiple factors contributed to this result, including (1) tensions mounted in the marriage over a long period of time, with Singler holding onto the idea that his marriage could work again, (2) Singler experienced a sudden and dramatic escalation in his baseline level of stress and conflict and feelings of betrayal by a person for whom he had trusted and cared, and (3) the circumstances . . . did not allow him to process what was happening or cool off before reacting.

In Dr. OBriens view, Singler had taken steps in order to decrease his risk factors for future violent behavior, including learning and practicing stress management and relaxation techniques such as mediation, and completing numerous self-help programs. And his behavior and record since incarceration reflect[ed] an ability to manage his emotions and avoid conflicts appropriately. In addition, psychological testing indicated that Singler had emotional and behavioral stability. Concluding that Singler posed a moderate to mild risk of violent behavior, OBrien stated: Factors that may worsen Mr. Singlers mental state and relative risk of violence include his experiencing the acute loss of significant relationships or feelings of sudden betrayal in [a] relationship in which he is emotionally invested.

In May 2005, at Singlers eighth parole hearing, the Board found that he was suitable for parole after he had served 22 years of his 15-years-to-life prison term. In reaching this conclusion, the Board took into consideration the gravity of the crime; the circumstances that led to it (Singler was experiencing marital difficulties, was in the heat of an argument with the victim, and was under significant stress); his remorse and acceptance of responsibility; his reasonably stable relationships with other people, apart from the difficulty that he had in his marriage; his lack of other criminal history; his participation in numerous self-help programs; his positive institutional behavior; the favorable psychological evaluations of Singler; his realistic parole plans; and the support he had from his family, including his and the victims daughter who urged that Singler be paroled. The Board concluded that because of his maturation since the killing of his wife, Singler had a better understanding of himself and how he should have handled the situation; had developed the ability to maintain self-control; and would not pose an unreasonable risk of danger to society or a threat to public safety if released from prison.

The Governor, in reversing the Boards decision, made the following findings: Singler committed an atrocious crime . . . with a level of premeditation, while his two small children slept nearby. His actions [were] more than the minimum necessary to sustain a conviction for second degree murder, and [t]his factor alone demonstrated that Singler would pose an unreasonable public safety risk. Furthermore, his risk to public safely was shown by the fact that he dumped his wifes body in a rural area, defiling her in the process, which was akin to dumping garbage in the wild to be ravaged by animals.

Another parole hearing was conducted in June 2006, which is the subject of the present petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Life Prisoner Evaluation Report prepared for the hearing stated Singler has exceptional work habits and employable skills, and has maintained an exemplary disciplinary history. The report noted among other things that Singlers crime was committed during a time of duress; Singler was remorseful and ashamed of the unhappiness he caused [his wifes] family, his children, and his [other] family members; he received laudatory chronos for his participation in therapy, self-help and educational activities; and he had a complete and well thought out parole plan with an excellent source of support through the Veterans Administration along with the support of his family and friends. The report concluded: Considering the prolonged circumstances that [led] up to the commitment offense, the absence of a prior criminal record, his prison adjustment, and psychiatric reports, . . . Singler will re-integrate back into society without incident.

An evaluation prepared in April 2005 by a clinical psychologist at San Quentin Prison observed that the then 60-year-old Singler had accepted full responsibility for the crime and expressed a level of remorse that reflected a genuine understanding of the harm [he caused] and a sincere regret for having committed the crime. Noting that loss of impulse control was a causative factor for the murder, the psychologist pointed out that a person can change over time. The evaluation summarized Singlers experiences in many programs during his incarceration, Singlers belief he had learned to walk away from situations that are not fixable, and his comment, You can control what you do next, you can let it go, you dont have to act on it. The psychologist opined that Singler posed a low substantial risk for dangerousness if released to the outside community, given his lengthy period of disciplinary free behavior in prison, his prosocial activities, the absence of violent behavior since his arrest, his higher level of emotional maturity, the support of his children, his acceptance into a transitional program that will provide continued supervision in a structured setting, his good prospects for a job in a marketable field from the Plumbers Union, and his continued support from the Buddhist community.

At the parole hearing, Singler testified as follows:

He and Gayle had been having marital difficulties for months. Sometimes their fights became pretty bad. Gayle would shove him, and he would slap her on the arm or on the face. They separated after their daughter was born, at which time their debts were through the roof. He sold some real property and was able to put [their] finances back to zero. He and Gayle reunited, began seeing a marriage counselor, and had their second child. Singler purchased another property on which to build a home, but Gayle kept wanting to spend, which led to trouble with finances.

Around that time, Gayle became friends with Debbie G., with whom Gayle associated a lot; Gayle would be [g]one all day, gone all night. Singler had been working extra hours trying to get the home built, and he would often come home to discover that Gayle was not there, and had not taken care of the house or made dinner. Her relationship with Debbie G. caused stress in the marriage.

On the day of the murder, Singler went to the bank to roll over the $10,000 that he had saved for home construction, but the teller advised him the account was empty. Singler became very angry because things had been escalating over months and months. During a heated argument with Gayle that evening, she said she was having an affair, was divorcing him, and was taking the children. Singler went to the garage to get a shotgun with which to scare his wife, but he then loaded the gun, returned, and fatally shot her in a fit of rage.

Singler was in shock, but realized that he needed to remove his children from the situation; so he drove them to a friends house, taking care to leave the house via a path that would prevent them from viewing their mothers body. He then returned home, put Gayles body in the truck, drove to a rural road turnout, and dumped her body.

The Board asked Singler at what point he decided to kill Gayle. Singler replied that he did not remember the exact point because he was in a fit of rage. He explained that he didnt have any coping skills at that time, and the heartbreak of the loss of all his plans for the future just completely blew [him] away, [he] just couldnt handle it. He was in a rage and decided he had to end it all right there on that spot. According to Singler, he and Gayle had talked all we were going to talk. There was no more, nothing else to discuss. She had already made her statement . . . what she was going to do. And . . . the pure burst of heartbreak, it just ate me up. I just completely blew it.

When asked why he dumped her body like trash, rather than dealing with it in another manner that would be appropriate, Singler stated he was in shock and was not thinking rationally. It was not his intention for the animals to dispose of the body as the Board suggested. He simply was trying to get away with the crime and keep [his] children intact.

Singler explained that the crime occurred because of his anger and, as a result of that, he had been studying anger since day one. He had studied it extensively, through anger management classes and Buddhist teachings, and learned that anger stems from irritations that are allowed to build. He learned that the catalysts for anger may never change, but that a person can change how he reacts. Singler has learned not to act on his anger. Through Buddhism, he has learned to meditate and to let things go when situations arise that anger him.

Singler expressed remorse for murdering Gayle and, based on his own experience in losing a child during his first marriage, he stated he understood the pain he had caused others. The childs death when he was 36 hours old, and the resulting grief and stress, caused the demise of the marriage. According to Singler, he could only imagine the pain caused by losing a loved one to a violent crime.

Singler explained that if the Board paroled him, he had the total support of his friends and family, and that his children wanted him to be part of their lives. He had served in the National Guard from 1965 until his honorable discharge in 1971; thus, he had been accepted into three different programs sponsored by the Veterans Administration if he were paroled. Those programs involved placement in transitional housing, the provision of clothing and job opportunities, and access to counselors.

Prior to his incarceration, Singler worked as a journeyman plumber for several years. He planned to continue working in the plumbing trade and had the support of the Plumbers Union. He wanted to return to the workforce while he was still able to do so.

The Board found that Singler was not suitable for parole even though he had participated in a plethora of positive activities, his work performance was exceptional, he continued to participate in self-help programs, and he had a lengthy and continuous history of exemplary behavior. As explained by members of the Board, it had concerns about at what point you [Singler] decided you werent going to scare your wife you were going to kill her, how that breakdown happened, and whether or not the tools are in place that prevent you from going there again. The conscious loading [of] the gun and making the decision to go in and shoot her, led a Board member to feel that you [Singler] are young enough to go out there and develop a new relationship, thus a need existed to identif[y] the trigger point . . . so it never happens again. In this regard, a Board member emphasized that Singler decided to shoot his wife despite the fact their two children were in the house and could have walked into that room. The circumstances of Singlers disposal of [the] body, also raised some concerns . . . related to [his] insight. Hence, a Board member remarked that, in addition to the circumstances of the shooting, the blatant disregard of [the victims] remains demonstrated a massive system failure as to the human condition that prevent[s] people from doing this kind of thing. The Board member went on to say that Singler had failed to convince the panel that the potential for such a system failure to occur again is not still a part of your being . . . .

Story Continue As Part II ..

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^[1] Because Singler and the victim shared the same last name, we refer to the victim by her first name, Gayle, for simplicity and to avoid confusion.