In re Sammy H.

Filed 8/28/07 In re Sammy H. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE COURT^*

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Valeriano Saucedo, Judge.

Stephen M. Hinkle, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell and John G. McLean, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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After admitting to residential burglary (Pen. Code, 459), appellant Sammy H., age 16 at the time of the offense, was committed to the Tulare County Probation Youth Facility, a local boot camp, for 365 days. Five months prior, appellant admitted to arson (Pen. Code, 451, subd. (d)) and was placed on the Deferred Entry of Judgment Program, subject to standard probationary terms. Appellant now claims that the juvenile court abused its discretion by placing him at a boot camp without finding that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective. For the following reasons, we affirm.

STATEMENT OF FACTS^[1]

On April 19, 2006, the Tulare County Fire Department extinguished a residential fire in Earlimart, California. Witnesses reported seeing two Hispanic males enter the house and then flee in a maroon Ford Expedition with euro style taillights once the house caught fire. Witnesses also reported seeing the same vehicle leave the area when the house last burned.

After searching the immediate area, police located the Expedition and made contact with appellant and Ivan G. When questioned, they admitted to having a part in setting the fire, and Ivan stated, Okay, we burned the stupid house.

Five months later, on September 12, a Tulare County Sheriffs officer responded to a reported residential burglary. The victim claimed that four unknown individuals were in his residence when he returned from school. He reported seeing one subject walk past his bedroom door into his parents bedroom and three others emerge from his brothers room carrying an X-Box, X-Box games, and DVDs. The intruders fled once they saw the victim and stole property valued at approximately $675.

When questioned, nearby residents said that four young Hispanic males exited a burgundy SUV near the victims house around the time of the burglary. They further reported that those four individuals met with a fifth young male, identified as Ivan, who returned to his residence as the four others walked through the victims front yard. When Ivan was questioned, he said that his friend, appellant, drives a burgundy SUV and that appellant and others visited him around the time of the burglary. When the officer located appellant at his residence, he admitted to the burglary.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

An appellate court may reverse a juvenile courts commitment order only upon a showing that the juvenile court abused its discretion. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329-1330.) As long as the evidence demonstrates that the minor will benefit from the commitment and that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective, a particular commitment order does not constitute an abuse of discretion. (See In re Pedro M. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 550, 555-556.) Moreover, the juvenile court has full discretion in evaluating the credibility of the minor, probation officer recommendations, and other information presented during the proceedings. (In re Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) Thus, while the juvenile court law contemplates a progressively restrictive and punitive series of dispositions, no absolute rule requires that the juvenile court attempt a less restrictive placement before ordering a particular commitment. (Welf. & Inst. Code,^[2] 202, subd. (e); In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 577.)

When reviewing the record, the appellate court grants all reasonable inferences in support of the juvenile courts decision and does not disturb findings supported by substantial evidence. (In re Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1330.) To determine if substantial evidence exists, the appellate court examines the record in light of the purposes of the juvenile court law, which include protecting the public and minor, preserving the minors family ties, and removing the minor from his family only when necessary for his welfare or the publics safety. ( 202, subd. (a); In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 53.) In addition, section 202 provides that minors in delinquency proceedings shall receive care, treatment, and guidance that is consistent with their best interests, holds them accountable for their behavior, and is appropriate given the circumstances. ( 202, subd. (b).) Thus, the statute recognizes both punishment and rehabilitation as important tools and objectives. (In re Teofilio A., supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 576.)

Lastly, in ordering disposition, the juvenile court must broadly consider the minors age, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, the minors delinquent history, and any other relevant information. ( 725.5; In re Robert H., supra, 96 Cal.App.4th at p. 1329.) The juvenile court need not specifically discuss each factor during the proceedings, and a record that indicates that the court merely considered each factor is sufficient. (In re John H. (1983) 150 Cal.App.3d 182, 185.)

ANALYSIS

Appellant contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering commitment to a boot camp without finding that less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate. In addition, appellant claims that the juvenile court erred by not explaining its reasons for not following the probation officers recommendation of electronically monitored home confinement.

In arguing against placement at a boot camp, appellant notes that he lives in a stable family environment, follows his parents rules, recently improved his school grades, has no proven history of gang involvement or substance abuse, committed both offenses with other youths, and, as ordered after his first offense, completed 80 hours of community service and wrote an apology letter.

However, the disposition hearing record plainly indicates that the juvenile court considered the factors required by the Welfare and Institutions Code in committing appellant to boot camp. The juvenile court explained to appellant:

THE COURT: There are certain things that we must all as a civilized society understand and its very important that we all understand this and that we reach agreement. I have no right to go into your house without your permission. No one here in this room has the right to go into your house without permission. Because in your house, thats where you live, thats where you keep your most private possessions. And in the old way of saying it, its like your castle. Thats where you live, thats where we must respect that area. Thats where you keep your property, you keep things that are very important to you, and no one should come into your house and take things that belong to you. No one should trespass into your house because its so important to us as human beings to have a place where we feel safe. All right?

So the law recognizes that certain things are serious and violent offenses simply by the fact that people do these things. What you did was that you committed a burglary. You went into someones home without a good reason, without permission, and you took property belonging to other people as part of a group of kids. While you should have been at school. [] []

And that is a very scary thought for all of us because we all want to be safe and secure in our own homes and you violated that.

You may not have fully thought about it at the time, but nevertheless thats what you did. Thats what you did.

And you explain to your parents that you did not do anything wrong. Well, it is wrong as a matter of law. The moment you walk into somebody elses home without their permission and you take something from there, and you participate in a group of people that are taking other peoples property, it is wrong. It is wrong. Thats what you did.

Most importantly, you had already been placed on notice because you were on Deferred Entry of Judgment, meaning that you had come before the Court and the Court had said, Look, Sammy were concerned about you and this is what you need to do to improve your behavior. And instead of kind of getting the message and saying I need to improve my behavior because Im on this path thats not good for me, what you did is you ran right through the stop sign, if you will, and you continued to have a to have a relationship with Ivan [G.] even though you were told not to, and then you got information from Ivan that the house next door was unoccupied and that that was a good time to go and take peoples property. So that is a problem. That is a very serious problem, and thats essentially what you did.

And so you were on notice that you were to do certain things and you didnt do them. So my responsibility is to make sure that you understand those things and that I select a program that will help you understand that so that you do not do this again, you will be rehabilitated, and, most importantly, that I will protect society. Because I have to wonder what could have happened to that young man who came home at that time and found all of you inside that house. It could have very easily escalated out of control and someone could have been seriously hurt or killed.

Thats why Im going to commit you to the Boot Camp. I want [you] to go there and learn as much as you can so you truly understand your behavior and stop engaging in that behavior. [] []

Welfare of the minor requires that custody be removed from the parents or guardians.

Continuance in the home of the parents or guardians would be detrimental to the minors welfare.

Reasonable efforts have been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the minor from his home and to make it possible for the minor to remain in or return to his home.

Thus, in committing appellant to boot camp, the juvenile court discussed several factors in support of its decision.

First, at great length, the juvenile court discussed the gravity of the offense and appellants failure to take responsibility for his actions. Specifically, the juvenile court noted the importance of respecting individuals private property, the intrusiveness of residential burglary, and the potential for its deadly escalation. Following the juvenile court law, the court expressly stated that societys protection and the nature of the offense were key considerations in determining appellants placement. ( 202, subd. (a), 725.5.)

Second, the juvenile court explained why a less restrictive placement would be ineffective, noting that appellant committed a second offense, violated probation by associating with a co-offender, failed to understand or take responsibility for his crime, and skipped school. Quite reasonably, given appellants burgeoning recidivism, the juvenile court determined that further placement at home, even if restricted by monitoring, would be ineffective.

Third, the juvenile court noted that boot camp would be an opportunity for learning and rehabilitation, as opposed to home confinement, which might involve more family but does not guarantee education, especially considering appellants absenteeism. The court also expressly stated that appellants welfare required removal from his parents custody since reasonable efforts had failed to prevent the circumstances that now warranted removal.

Lastly, though the juvenile court did not expressly mention or refute the probation officers recommendation, the court clearly indicated that any placement less restrictive than boot camp would be ineffective for the reasons stated above. As long as the record shows that less restrictive placements were considered, the fact that the court does not expressly state reasons for rejecting those alternatives does not warrant reversal. (In re Teofilio, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 577.)

Therefore, we find that the juvenile court closely followed the requirements of the Welfare and Institutions Code in committing appellant to boot camp and did not abuse its discretion.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

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^* Before Ardaiz, P.J., Cornell, J. and Hill, J.

^[1] In light of appellants admissions, the facts are taken from the probation officers summary of the offenses.

^[2] All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.