In re S.C.

Filed 11/12/08 In re S.C. CA2/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Jacqueline H. Lewis, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Diana W. Prince, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______

C.C. (Mother) appeals from a February 13, 2008 order terminating parental rights to S.C. (Child), born in July 2007, and freeing him for adoption. Mother challenges the order denying placement of Child with the paternal relatives. We affirm the order because the juvenile court properly applied the relative placement provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3, any error in failing to evaluate the paternal relatives home was harmless error, and the courts placement decision was not an abuse of discretion.^[1]

BACKGROUND

The record on appeal is the same as that in a prior writ proceeding involving Child, so we restate the background facts set out in the nonpublished decision in Michael V. v. Superior Court (May 22, 2008, B206327).

When Child was born in July 2007, Mother, who has a long criminal record, was incarcerated on burglary charges. Until she was arrested and incarcerated in November 2006, Mother used methamphetamine. Child tested negative for drugs at his birth. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) detained Child when he was one day old and placed him with foster parents (and prospective adoptive parents) A.M. and M.M. Child remained with his foster parents throughout the seven months of proceedings.

At the detention hearing on July 30, 2007, Mother, who was not married, said that two men (both then incarcerated), including M.V. (Father), could possibly be Childs biological father. At the pretrial resolution conference in September 2007, the juvenile court ordered genetic paternity testing and set a jurisdiction and dispositional hearing for October 16, 2007. Father told DCFS in August 2007 that he would like to take a paternity test and if he is Childs biological father, his parents may be willing to care for him. Father also said that he and Mother were trying to work things out to be together and that he wanted to be part of Childs life no matter who the father is.

At the October 16 hearing, Fathers attorney objected to proceeding with the jurisdiction and dispositional hearing because the genetic testing had not yet been performed. The court stated, Once we find out who the father is, if theres a relative, the court will continue to honor that in regards to a relative preference. The court proceeded to declare Child a dependent of the juvenile court pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) (failure to protect) based on Mothers history of substance abuse and based on current dependency court jurisdiction over Mothers child J.L. (born in 2005). The court removed Child from Mothers custody and denied Mother and Father reunification services. Mother and Father were afforded monitored visitation after their release from custody. A permanent plan for adoption was approved. A hearing was set for February 11, 2008, and the court ordered an adoption assessment.

DCFS was informed on November 26, 2007, that the tests indicated that Father was Childs biological father. That same day, DCFS informed Mother of the test results, Mother gave DCFS the telephone number for the paternal grandparents, and a social worker talked with the paternal grandfather. The paternal grandfather said that he was shocked to hear the paternity test results, the family needed to have a meeting about the matter, and the grandfather would contact DCFS about the familys decision. When DCFS did not hear from the paternal relatives, a social worker called the paternal grandparents home but was unable to speak to the grandfather. The paternal grandmother called the social worker and said that she was shocked and surprised to hear that she was a grandmother, that she was too young and did not expect to become a grandmother so soon. The social worker explained that Child was bonded to the foster family and asked why the paternal relatives did not contact DCFS earlier, and the paternal grandmother said that Father had not told them anything, but that she wanted to have a visit with Child before the December 10, 2007 court date. The social worker explained that anyone visiting Child had to be Live Scanned and that the social worker would check with the foster parents about arranging visitation.

A progress hearing was held on November 27, 2007, when the juvenile court found Father to be the biological father and ordered DCFS to assess the paternal grandmother for possible placement of Child. The paternal grandmother and paternal aunt appeared in the courtroom on the morning of December 10, 2007, but left before the case was called in the afternoon. Fathers attorney informed the court that after they learned the paternity test result, the paternal aunt and grandmother attempted to contact DCFS on almost a daily basis, that they believed that they were first in line for placement of Child, and that they were interested in adopting him. The court asked why the paternal relatives were not present, and Fathers attorney explained that the paternal aunt had to go to work and the grandmother did not drive and came to court and left with the aunt. The court set another progress hearing for January 15, 2008.

An addendum report for the January 15, 2008 hearing contained DCFSs assessment of the paternal relatives for placement of Child. DCFS recommended that the paternal family be ruled out for placement for two reasons: (1) only the paternal aunt had completed the Live Scan and had visited Child once; and (2) Child is very attached to the foster parents, who have cared for him all his life and whose faces Child recognizes. According to DCFS, the paternal grandmother told DCFS that the paternal grandfather is against the idea of keeping Child and that the grandfather told the grandmother not to visit the baby because she would want to keep him. At the hearing on January 15, 2008, the paternal aunt appeared and told the court that the grandmother was ill and could not attend, but that the family decided that they wanted Child placed with them. The aunt stated that the paternal grandparents were in discussions about Child, and the grandmother was willing to choose Child over the grandfather. The aunt also stated that the grandmothers Live Scan results had not been received yet, and she was anxious to see Child.

The juvenile court ordered visits for the paternal grandmother notwithstanding the lack of the Live Scan results. But the court also told the aunt, Look. Let me be really straightforward with you. I understand this is a real shock for your family. But every day that [Child] spends someplace else, he gets more and more bonded, and I get less and less inclined to move him from that placement. [] So your family needs to sit down and figure out what theyre asking. Because youre coming in today, and frankly, youre saying, I want him placed with my family, me and my mom, [and] my dad would move out. The aunt stated that she understood and respected what the court had explained; she also admitted that the grandfather was not in a hundred percent agreement with my mom. The court responded, Im not intending to put a child into a home if theres someone there that doesnt want him. The court then ordered DCFS to hold a family group decision-making meeting and to report the results on January 29, 2008.

A family decision-making meeting was held at the DCFS office on January 23, 2008. According to its report, DCFS explained to the paternal relatives the home assessment process and the possible barriers for the paternal relatives, including the lack of an approved home study and the failure of all family members to submit to Live Scan. The paternal grandfather expressed uncertainty about whether he wanted to adopt Child and concern about Mother possibly stalking the child in the future. The family, unable to agree on a plan for Child, asked for more time and stepped outside for some fresh air. When the family returned to the meeting room, the grandfather stated that he was still undecided and wanted time to meet with a spiritual advisor before making any further decisions. The aunt and the grandfather told DCFS that Father told the family that he intended to reestablish his relationship with Mother when they are both released and they wanted to reestablish a relationship with Child and parent him together.

On January 24, 2008, the paternal aunt called the social worker to state that the family had decided to proceed with adoption of Child. The social worker wanted the grandfather to contact DCFS because he was the one who was indecisive. Later that day, the grandfather contacted the social worker to state that he had decided in favor of adoption. DCFSs January 29, 2008 interim review report recommended against permanent placement with the paternal relatives. At the hearing on January 29, the court set a contested placement hearing for February 11, 2008, the same date set for the section 366.26 hearing. The court also ordered monitored visits for the paternal relatives.

The section 366.26 report stated that the foster family is highly committed to [Child], and has cared for him in an exemplary manner. He is flourishing in their home and gives behavioral evidence of being well bonded to them. They have never faltered in their desire to adopt him, and are highly motivated to complete the process. The foster parents changed their work schedules to care for Child so that they would not have to leave him in the care of anyone else; Child would become anxious when the foster parents were gone for any length of time. DCFS also recommended against permanent placement with the paternal relatives and believed that it would be extremely detrimental to [Child] if he were to be removed from the nurturing caregivers he has come to know as family. DCFS noted, The paternal family is frightened of the birth mother, and state they do not wish to have any contact with her. The paternal grandfather and grandmother report they are extremely loyal to their adult son, [Childs] father. The paternal relatives describe their family as extremely close knit. Of concern to the Department is how committed they would be to placing [Childs] needs above the needs of their adult son if/when he is released from prison. Paternal grandfather stated in the recent decision-making meeting that he was conflicted with regards to the childs best interests and how he would reconcile that with his adult sons wishes to form an attachment to [Child] when he is released from custody. Paternal grandfather also reported that [Childs] father has stated that he intends to stay in [a] relationship with [Mother] and that the two of them intend to parent [Child] together.

A February 11, 2008 additional information for court officer form reported on the paternal relatives visits with Child and contacts with DCFS after preparation of the section 366.26 report. On January 31, 2008, the paternal relatives had a monitored visit with Child in which Child maintained eye contact with his foster family for reassurance when he was held by the paternal relatives. On February 1, the paternal aunt contacted DCFS and took issue with DCFSs progress report of January 29, 2008, which described the family decision-making meeting. On February 6, 2008, Mother contacted DCFS and requested a copy of the paternity test results. According to Mother, the maternal grandmother reported that Child had blue eyes but neither parent had blue eyes and Mother wanted to make sure the report named Father as the biological father. On February 7, 2008, during a visit between Child and the paternal relatives, the paternal grandfather asked the paternal aunt the color of Childs eyes. The social worker monitoring the visit mentioned Mothers conversation about the paternity tests, and the paternal grandfather asked the social worker if the paternal relatives could get a copy of the paternity test results, but the social worker refused on grounds of confidentiality.

At the outset of the hearing on February 11, 2008, before Juvenile Court Referee Jacqueline Lewis, the court granted the foster parents application for de facto parent status. At the contested placement hearing, the paternal grandfather testified that his first visit with Child was about two or three weeks ago and he has had two visits with him. As to why he waited until recently to begin visits with Child even though he found out the paternity results in late November 2007, the paternal grandfather explained, First of all I had to break the news to my family; second of all it was something that we needed to discuss . . . . As to why it took the family two months to make the decision they wanted to adopt Child, the paternal grandfather stated that he was unfamiliar with the system, he did not know what the familys rights were, and he had concerns about the drama associated with Mother. When asked about how he would respond if Father was released and wanted to live in his home, the paternal grandfather testified that there are a lot of issues that would have to be addressed. I dont think it would be something that would be that easy. [] . . . [] But [Childs] safety and well-being would be my first priority. The paternal grandfather also stated that he felt that he was duped at the family meeting with DCFS on January 23 and that the statements he made at that time were not actually reported.

Mother admitted at the hearing that she told DCFS that she wanted Child moved from the foster family home because they were a gay couple. Mother testified that she wanted Child placed with the paternal relatives because they are his righteous family.

Both Childs attorney and the attorney for DCFS argued against permanent placement with the paternal grandparents as not in Childs best interest. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court trailed the matter to February 13, 2008.

On February 13, 2008, the juvenile court issued its ruling denying permanent placement with the paternal relatives and delivered a detailed explanation. The court acknowledged that it was torn between two preferences. [] Preference number 1 is 361.3, which deals with relative preference; and the other preference at this point in time is 366.26(k), which indicates that by the time we get to adoption  which is where were at, a contested .26  that the foster parents, who have cared for the child, shall be given preference with respect to that child over all other applications for adoptive placement if the agency makes a determination that the child has substantial emotional ties to the relative caretaker or foster caretaker and removal would be detrimental to the childs emotional well-being.

The court explained that the case presented a very difficult decision, that there were no bad guys, and that the paternal relatives have dealt with a difficult situation, not caused by them, in what is a very human way. Although the court recognized that there were delays in the case not caused by the paternal grandparents and that the paternal relatives conduct was appropriate, the reality is that the people talking about adopting, which is the paternal grandparents, the paternal grandfather didnt even have a visit until a couple of weeks ago. [] And now [Child is] seven months old instead of four months old  and Im not blaming anybody, Im simply saying that in the end, with all the adult stuff going on, this babys now seven months old and bonded. Could he re-bond? Yes, he could. But why should he? [] These caretakers stepped up from day one. And the foster father put it very succinctly . . . they never doubted that they wanted this baby and they have loved him. They are the voices he recognizes. [] A seven-month-old bonds. Thank goodness. Thats what creates their bond for the rest of their life. . . . [] Were in a permanent plan at this point, when I look at that then what I realize is why should he have to re-bond. Hes never known anybody else other than these two gentlemen as his fathers. And thats who his family is. The court acknowledged that no matter what decision this court reached I was going to break somebodys heart, but the one heart that I dont want to break is [Childs].

The court also remarked that even if it wanted to place Child with the paternal relatives, it could not do so at that time because not all family members living in the grandparents home had undergone Live Scans and the home had not been ASFA approved (Adoptions and Safe Family Act).

The court denied placement with the paternal relatives and ordered that Child was to remain in his current foster care placement pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (k). The court then found that Child was adoptable and terminated parental rights.

Mother appealed from the order, challenging only the denial of placement with the paternal relatives.^[2] In propria persona, Mother also filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition and a petition for an extraordinary writ challenging the February 13, 2008 order. But Mothers attorney requested dismissal of her petition as moot due to an adequate appellate remedy, and on that basis we dismissed Mothers petition for an extraordinary writ. (Michael V. v. Superior Court, supra, B206327, pp. 2, fn. 2, 14.)

DISCUSSION

A. DCFSs Motion to Dismiss Appeal

DCFS contends that the appeal should be dismissed because (1) Mother lacks standing to challenge the relative placement preference issue and (2) her claims are barred under the res judicata doctrine by virtue of the prior opinion in the writ matter. We reject both arguments.

In juvenile dependency proceedings, we liberally construe the issue of standing and resolve doubts in favor of the right to appeal. (In re H.G. (2006) 146 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 (H.G.).) A parent has standing to appeal if he or she is aggrieved; to be aggrieved, the parent must have a legally cognizable interest that is injuriously affected by the courts decision. (Ibid.)

In H.G., the juvenile court sustained a supplemental petition under section 387 and removed the child from the paternal grandparents; after a short break, the court proceeded with a contested section 366.26 hearing and terminated parental rights. On an appeal by the parents from both orders, the court held that the parents had standing to appeal the order removing the child from the paternal grandparents for two reasons: (1) Even though reunification was no longer a goal of the proceedings, at the time of the section 387 hearing, their parental rights had not been terminated and the parents retained a fundamental interest in H.G.s companionship, custody, management and care, as reflected in the language of section 361.3, subdivision (a)(2), which obligates the juvenile court to consider the wishes of the parent in considering the relative placement preference. (H.G., supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 910.) (2) Also, a placement decision under section 387 has the potential to alter the courts determination of the childs best interests and the appropriate permanency plan for that child, and thus may affect a parents interest in his or her legal status with respect to the child. (H.G., at p. 10.) The court then reversed the order removing the child from the paternal grandparents and concluded that such reversal required that the court necessarily reverse the judgment terminating parental rights, so the parents challenges to the findings of adoptability and the inapplicability of the beneficial relationship exception were moot. (Id. at p. 18.)

Here, as in H.G., Mother seeks reversal of a placement order and the order terminating parental rights. Accordingly, the relative placement issue and decision here, as in H.G., has the potential to alter the courts determination of Childs best interests, the appropriate permanency plan, and thus Mothers legal status with respect to Child. [W]hile an alternative permanency plan to adoption may be unlikely on this record, it remains a statutory option for the juvenile court. We resolve doubts in favor of [the parents] right to appeal. (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1054.) Mother thus has standing to challenge the order denying placement of Child with the paternal relatives.

We also agree with Mother that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply here. Under the doctrine of res judicata, conclusive effect is given to a previous judgment in subsequent litigation involving the same claim or controversy. (In re Anthony H. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 495, 503.) Res judicata applies when (1) the claim raised in the prior adjudication is identical to the claim presented in the later action; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. (Ibid.)

This appeal is not a separate proceeding, but part of the same proceeding which culminated in our prior dismissal of Mothers writ petition; we granted Mothers request to dismiss her writ petition as moot because of an adequate appellate remedy, impliedly guaranteeing her an appellate remedy. As to Mother, the prior opinion in the writ matter was not a final judgment on the merits and this case does not meet the requirements for application of the res judicata doctrine. (See Hoversten v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 636, 640 [in case involving challenge to custody and visitation orders, summary denial of previous writ petition was not a decision on the merits and did not operate as res judicata]; see also Long Beach Grand Prix Assn. v. Hunt (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1195, 1199 [due process forbids application of res judicata to deprive party of fair adversary proceeding to fully present case].) DCFSs motion to dismiss is denied.

B. Denial of Relative Placement Preference

Section 361.3, subdivision (a) states in relevant part: In any case in which a child is removed from the physical custody of his or her parents pursuant to Section 361, preferential consideration shall be given to a request by a relative of the child for placement of the child with the relative. Preferential consideration means that the relative seeking placement shall be the first placement to be considered and investigated. ( 361.3, subd. (c)(1).) . . . Those relatives desiring placement shall be assessed according to the factors enumerated in [subdivision (a)] and [t]he county social worker shall document these efforts in the social study prepared pursuant to section 358.1. The relatives entitled to preferential consideration for placement are an adult who is a grandparent, aunt, uncle, or sibling. ( 361.3, subd. (c)(2).) (In re Joseph T. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 787, 793794 (Joseph T.).)

To determine whether placement with a relative is appropriate, the county social worker and court shall consider, but shall not be limited to, consideration of eight listed factors. ( 361.3, subd. (a).)^[3]

But section 361.3 does not create an evidentiary presumption: The overriding concern of dependency proceedings, however, is not the interest of extended family members but the interest of the child. [R]egardless of the relative placement preference, the fundamental duty of the court is to assure the best interests of the child, whose bond with a foster parent may require that placement with a relative be rejected. [Citation.] Section 361.3 does not create an evidentiary presumption that relative placement is in a childs best interests. [Citation.] The passage of time is a significant factor in a childs life; the longer a successful placement continues, the more important the childs need for continuity and stability becomes in the evaluation of [the childs] best interests. (In re Lauren R. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 841, 855.)

Mother contends that the juvenile court made errors of law in failing to honor the relative placement preference after it had promised the parties that it would preserve the preference beyond the dispositional hearing and in failing to apply the criteria in section 361.3, subdivision (a). In her reply brief, Mother asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying placement with the paternal relatives and that DCFS failed to assess the paternal grandmothers home after being ordered to do so by the juvenile court.

By failing to raise below the issue of the sufficiency of DCFSs assessment of the paternal relatives home, Mother has forfeited this issue on appeal. (In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 742, 754.) The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the juvenile court so that they may be corrected. (Ibid.) No party brought to the attention of the juvenile court any alleged deficiencies in DCFSs assessment or evaluation of the home of the paternal relatives.

Further, DCFSs reports of December 10, 2007, January 15, 2008, January 29, 2008, and February 11, 2008, contained detailed information about the paternal relatives contacts with Child as well as Childs relationship with his foster parents. The paternal grandfather testified extensively at the hearing on February 11, 2008. Mother fails to explain what missing information about the paternal relatives or their home would have resulted in a decision placing Child with the paternal relatives. Thus, any alleged defect in DCFSs home assessment was harmless error. (See Joseph T., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 798 [where record contained ample evidence that the relative preference was overridden, courts failure to afford the preference and to state on the record the reasons for denying relative placement were harmless errors].)

We reject Mothers arguments that the juvenile court failed to consider the relative placement preference and failed to consider the criteria governing relative placement set out in section 361.3. The juvenile courts judgment is presumed to be correct, and it is appellants burden to affirmatively show error. [Citation.] To demonstrate error, appellant must present meaningful legal analysis supported by citations to authority and citations to facts in the record that support the claim of error. (In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)

The record reveals that the juvenile court was aware that the relative placement preference issue was before it, as the juvenile court expressly cited section 361.3 as Preference number 1. And in its explanation of its ruling, the juvenile court addressed the issues of the best interest of Child ( 361.3, subd. (a)(1)), the wishes of the relatives and parents ( 361.3, subd. (a)(2)), the good moral character of the paternal relatives ( 361.3, subd. (a)(5)), the nature and duration of the relationship between Child and the paternal relatives ( 361.3, subd. (a)(6)), and the ability of the paternal relatives to care for, protect, and provide a stable home for Child ( 361.3, subd. (a)(7)(A), (B), (C)). Mother fails to establish that the juvenile court did not consider all pertinent criteria set out in section 361.3.

Finally, we conclude that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Childs placement with the paternal relatives. Mother argues that the juvenile court acknowledged that Child was young enough to be able to re-bond with the paternal relatives, but did not take into consideration the ability of a young child to re-bond with the paternal relatives as part of the best interest analysis. In other words, Mother faults the juvenile court for concluding that it was not in Childs best interest to force him to make the adjustment to a new home with the paternal relatives after Child had already bonded with the foster parents. Mother maintains that the courts analysis was flawed because [t]he juvenile courts determination it is in [Childs] best interests to remain in his placement was made under section 366.26, and absent consideration of the relative placement preference factors set forth in section 361.3. Had the court properly applied the relative placement preference, the outcome may have been different.

The record belies Mothers arguments. As stated, the record shows that the juvenile court considered the pertinent criteria under section 361.3. The juvenile court agonized over this case and refrained from making a ruling at the end of the hearing on February 11, 2008, stating, I want an opportunity to look at everything and think about it and contemplate, and to not make a fast decision. . . . I know that the next couple days [are] not going to be easy. When the court delivered its ruling on February 13, 2008, the court discussed many of the factors in section 361.3, subdivision (a), including Childs best interest. The court explained in detail why it believed that Childs best interest was promoted more by continued placement with the foster parents than by a new placement with the paternal relatives. Mother cites no authority for her implied assertion that the benefits of relative placement will outweigh any potential damage to Child that would be caused by uprooting him from his foster home. Such assertion also runs counter to the statutory definition of preferential consideration, which does not mean that there is an evidentiary presumption that placement with a relative is in a childs best interest. Thus, we are not persuaded that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the paternal relatives request for placement of Child.

DISPOSITION

The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services motion to dismiss the appeal is denied. The February 13, 2008 order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

MALLANO, P. J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, J.

WEISBERG, J.^*

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^[1]Unspecified statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

^[2]Father also filed a notice of appeal, but after failing to file an opening brief, his appeal was dismissed in July 2008.

^[3]The factors listed in subdivision (a) of section 361.3 are: (1) The best interest of the child, including special physical, psychological, educational, medical, or emotional needs. [] (2) The wishes of the parent, the relative, and child, if appropriate. [] (3) The provisions of Part 6 (commencing with Section 7950) of Division 12 of the Family Code regarding relative placement. [] (4) Placement of siblings and half siblings in the same home . . . . [] (5) The good moral character of the relative and any other adult living in the home, including whether any individual residing in the home has a prior history of violent criminal acts or has been responsible for acts of child abuse or neglect. [] (6) The nature and duration of the relationship between the child and the relative, and the relatives desire to care for, and to provide legal permanency for, the child if reunification is unsuccessful. [] (7) The ability of the relative to do the following: [] (A) Provide a safe, secure, and stable environment for the child. [] (B) Exercise proper and effective care and control of the child. [] (C) Provide a home and the necessities of life for the child. [] (D) Protect the child from his or her parents. [] (E) Facilitate court-ordered reunification efforts with the parents. [] (F) Facilitate visitation with the childs other relatives. [] (G) Facilitate implementation of all elements of the case plan. [] (H) Provide legal permanence for the child if reunification fails. [] . . . [] (I) Arrange for appropriate and safe child care, as necessary. [] (8) The safety of the relatives home. For a relative to be considered appropriate to receive placement of a child under this section, the relatives home shall first be approved pursuant to the process and standards described in subdivision (d) of Section 309. [] . . . .

^*Retired Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.