In re Sean G.

Filed 9/29/06 In re Sean G. CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from orders of the Superior Court of Orange County, Gary L. Vincent, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.

Jennifer Mack, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Benjamin P. de Mayo, County Counsel, Dana J. Stits and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

No appearance for the Minors.

* * *

This dependency case began many years ago as a child custody dispute. Ronald G. and Katalina B. were never married and have been living apart for approximately five years. In 2004, a family law court ordered joint legal custody and awarded Ronald physical custody of the children, with Katalina having unmonitored visitation rights. Katalina appeals from the trial court’s exit order modifying the family law custody order by granting Ronald sole legal and physical custody of 12-year-old Sean G. and 10-year-old Brianna G. She also challenges the court’s order requiring her to pay for a professional visitation monitor. We affirm the orders.

I

In May 2005, Sean and Brianna were placed in protective custody based on allegations of abuse and general neglect by Ronald and his live-in girlfriend, Michelle. The school’s crossing guard said she saw Michelle pick up the children from school and hit Sean as he sat in their truck. When the social worker interviewed the children at the Orangewood Children’s Home, they both recounted incidents of abuse and said they feared Ronald and Michelle. Crying throughout the interview, Brianna begged to live with her mother and said she was afraid of her father. She reported Michelle often hit her and said mean things about her mother. Sean also expressed he did not want to live with Ronald and Michelle because of physical abuse. He said Michelle was often verbally abusive and has told him, “You will grow up to be [a] stupid psycho-path liar like your mother.”

Ronald told the social worker Katalina had a history of coaching the children to make false statements of abuse. He claimed that after making over 30 unsubstantiated child abuse reports, Katalina was ordered to stop by a Los Angeles family law court. Ronald said he had not hit the children in four months (after being told by a social worker to stop) and the abuse allegations made against Michelle did not appear to be “life threatening.” He noted Michelle’s statements about Katalina were true, and “telling the truth is important.” Ronald opined the children said they did not want to live with him because they knew he would be upset with them for lying, and children “need to know that they can not [sic] tell lies.”

Katalina told the social worker she believed the allegations were true because Ronald is a violent man. She described her history with Ronald, alleging he physically abused her when they were together. She stated a jury found Ronald not guilty of domestic violence in 2000, despite his children’s testimony they had witnessed the abuse. In 2004, a family law court in Los Angeles granted Ronald sole physical custody of the children. Independently, the social worker located approximately 10 unfounded/unsubstantiated child abuse reports made between April 2001 and February 6, 2005.

At the detention hearing, the court returned the children to Ronald’s care under a Conditional Release to Intensive Supervision Program (CRISP) agreement. Before the jurisdictional hearing, the social worker contacted a therapist, Colleen Lynn, who had treated both children for approximately one year, pursuant to a family court’s order. She said their case had been closed three months earlier. She verified Ronald’s story that Katalina coached the children to make allegations of abuse. She recalled Brianna once admitted she had lied about her father hitting her and leaving a mark on her hip. “[S]he diagnosed Brianna to have adjustment disorder with mixed mood and conduct. . . . Sean has ADHD and depression.”

The social worker also investigated the structure and home life offered by each parent. Ronald works long hours as a contractor and his girlfriend provides daycare for the children. He is 34 years old and states he is in “good” health, but suffers from high blood pressure and chronic back pain. “[He] believes he is a good father who loves his children and will do whatever is in the best interest of the children. He believes that the mother has successfully undermined the previous court orders by making additional false allegations involving the father. The allegations and subsequent investigation and court affects the children, their schoolwork[,] and the father[,] and his relationship with his girlfriend.” He admitted he sometimes yells at his children out of frustration, but adamantly denied physically abusing them or Katalina. He acknowledged Michelle often made negative statements about Katalina.

Katalina works occasionally as a movie extra and is enrolled in a

Cal-Works program. She is otherwise unemployed and lives with her mother. She described her health as “good,” and has obtained treatment in the past for bulimia. She has never learned to drive, and is afraid to drive, because she was in a car accident with her mother. She started dating Ronald when she was 15 years old. Seven years later, Sean was born and Katalina claims Ronald became more aggressive and would “beat” her on a regular basis. She believes the children are physically abused, and Brianna was sexually abused by Ronald.

When the social worker met with Brianna, she noticed the child looked very sad when she talked about wanting to spend a lot of time with Katalina. Brianna explained her mother secretly told her last year (October 2005) she had stomach cancer. Brianna stated she does not want her mother to die, and wants to be able to care for her. Brianna admitted she liked being with her father. When asked why she made up allegations of abuse, Brianna became tearful and said, “[s]he missed her mother and that she want[ed] to take care of her.” She denied ever being sexually abused.

Brianna told the social worker she wanted to live with her mother, but have “considerable visitation with her father. The child is of the opinion that life at her mother’s home is free of consequences where all of her wants are met without questions.” Brianna recognized she might not get everything she wants, “but overall she would be happy because her mother is ‘cool.’”

Sean believed living with his mother “would be a calmer life. The child would have more freedom and would not get into trouble if he did not complete his homework. The child believes his father’s rules are oppressive and too strict.” Sean admitted he wanted visits with Ronald on a regular basis.

The social worker also obtained a copy of the Los Angeles County family law case and learned “the parents have joint legal custody and are able to share responsibility to make decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of each minor child . . . .” In addition, the documents contain a “personal protection order for both parents to refrain from making disparaging remarks against one another and referring them to ‘minor’s counsel’ should any questionable conduct appear that cannot be resolved by the parents.” And finally, the family court order states, “‘Neither party shall take the minor children . . . to the emergency room, doctor’s, therapist’s/counselor’s office, [or] attorney’s offices (except minor’s counsel), or contact social services or police with regard to any allegations of abuse, mistreatment, [or] neglect, unless there is a life threatening emergency.’”

In light of the above, and after speaking with the children and their parents, the social worker opined, “The biggest complication in this case is who to believe.” She surmised, “The previous and current allegations are endless. It appear[s] that when the current allegations are not enough to activate social services, police, or other mandated reporters, previous allegations are brought up.”

The social worker added, “What is especially troubling . . . is the extent to which the children have gone to leave their father’s custody. The child, Brianna, admitted to exaggerating or out right fabricating what occurred between she and her father. The child reported that she would [be] playing outside and fall, causing a minor abrasion or bruise. Later she would tell others that her father grabbed or hit her, causing the bruise. The child is acutely aware of what her allegations would bring since she is aware of the on-going conflict between the parents. The child, Sean[,] denies fabricating any incident or injuries, however, he acknowledges that he may have exaggerated his prior claims. Sean is also aware of what his allegations against his father would bring.

Both children separately said they believed that the end result of their allegations would be placement with the mother.” She noted each child believed they would have more freedom and less discipline and rules if they lived with their mother.

The social worker stated there was sufficient evidence to support the allegation Michelle hit Sean after school, but she did not believe it was abusive as described in the petition. She also believed the claim Michelle and Ronald referred to Katalina in derogatory terms in front of the children. However, she noted Ronald and Michelle had been very cooperative with the CRISP agreement and court process. They had made the children a high priority and had agreed to begin seeing a therapist with the children. Ronald agreed to stop referring to his children in negative terms and said he would talk to Michelle about the derogatory language and monitor the children more closely.

As for Katalina, the social worker concluded she “is acutely aware of how ‘the system’ operates and will continu[e] exploiting the system until the children are placed in her custody. [Katalina] appears to be identifying herself as a ‘victim’ in order to gain sympathy from others, especially [the] children.” She believed Katalina had “subjected her children to on-going investigations by police, social services, hospital worker[s,] and other[s] . . . without regard [for] the children’s welfare.” The social worker was convinced “mother has continued making allegations and [has] encouraged the children to do the same.” She opined, “[T]his behavior has created considerable stress on the children and the father and has created a hostile home environment. . . .

The undersigned is of the opinion that the children are best served remaining in their father’s home. The mother’s visits should be monitored and the children should continue to engage in counseling to address the issues stated in the petition, namely the lying and deception.”

In an addendum report before the jurisdictional hearing, the social worker noted the children were doing well with Ronald and Michelle. No further allegations of abuse had been made by either the children or Katalina. The visitation monitor and the social worker expressed concern about Katalina’s behavior and interaction with the children. The social worker opined Katalina should not be allowed unmonitored visits and should be admonished to stop all false and exaggerated claims against Ronald and Michelle.

At the jurisdictional hearing held on July 6, 2006, the court sustained an amended petition made under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (c).^[1] It admonished Katalina “to support the children and the relationship with the father.” The six-month review hearing was set for January 4, 2006.

A few months later, a new social worker assigned to the case prepared an interim review report. She noted, “Katalina chose not to visit the children for two months due to a conflict with the previous social worker.” Visits resumed in early September. The social worker noted the visits went well, but also recommended that visitation continue to be monitored.

In a report prepared for the six-month review hearing, the social worker recommended termination of the dependency jurisdiction. Ronald and the children had benefited from family therapy. The therapist observed, “‘Despite some difficulties last month, Ron[ald] has moved past old behaviors and methods of discipline as well as developed improved tolerance for his son’s (at times) regressive behaviors and academic difficulties. He appears also to have now really moved past his feelings of hurt and anger towards his children’s false allegations. His strength[s] are that he is loving and hard working.’” The social worker reported she noticed Ronald “appears to have developed a more positive relationship with his children. In addition, [he] seems to be exercising greater patience and understanding of his children.” The social worker highly recommended that Michelle begin attending family therapy, but this was not a sufficient reason to keep the case open.

At the hearing, the parties agreed termination of the dependency proceedings was appropriate and presented argument on who should have legal custody and who should pay for the visitation monitor. The Orange County Social Services Agency’s (SSA’s) counsel stated, “The agency is at this time recommending joint legal [custody]. They previously recommended sole legal [custody] to father. We actually don’t have a strong position on the matter. I can see an argument for both sides. As far as who pays for the monitor, I believe that should be mother’s responsibility.” He added Katalina is not working as a movie extra, and if paying for a monitor is a problem, she should find a more stable job.

Katalina’s counsel requested joint legal custody. She stated this was the prior custody award in the family law court and there was no legal basis for denying joint legal custody. Counsel suggested the court order the parents to split the cost of a monitor if they cannot otherwise agree on a monitor. She opined this arrangement would encourage the parties to agree and work together. She noted it would be a financial hardship for Katalina to pay for a monitor on a weekly basis and “the children shouldn’t be denied the opportunity to visit with their mother because of a financial roadblock

. . . .”

Minors’ counsel disagreed and recommended sole custody to the father. She noted it was unclear if Katalina had made any progress or gained insight about the harm she caused the children by repeatedly creating false abuse charges and coaching the children to fabricate stories of abuse. Counsel also noted the children want to see their mother and have a bond with her. She opined, “The mother has a history that makes it difficult to monitor her.” “My fear is that if the court gives her joint legal custody, we’re going to get this case right back in here. I would like the kids, though, to see their mother, and I am concerned if she doesn’t have the money to pay for it[.]” However, Minors’ counsel also acknowledged it did not seem fair to make Ronald pay for a monitor when Katalina is the main reason the case is in the dependency system.

Ronald’s counsel agreed that given the history of the case, sole legal custody would be best. He noted Ronald would like Katalina to continue seeing the children if the visits were professionally monitored. Counsel opined it was unlikely Ronald and Katalina would agree upon a neutral person. However, Ronald objected to sharing the monitor’s costs. He argued Ronald was solely supporting the children and the need for a monitor was Katalina’s own creation.

The court ordered Ronald would have sole legal and physical custody. It added Katalina would have the responsibility of paying for a professional visitation monitor unless the parties could agree on someone to monitor her visits.

II

The permanent family law custody orders in effect when these dependency proceedings began are undisputed. The parents shared joint legal custody. Ronald was awarded sole physical custody, and Katalina had liberal visitation rights. In addition, there were court orders specifically prohibiting Katalina from making false abuse accusations, as well as orders designed to keep both parents from expressing their personal conflicts in front of the children. Katalina claims it was an abuse of discretion for the court to modify these orders and award Ronald sole legal custody of the children. She asserts the dependency proceedings did not concern her, and there has been no other change of circumstances warranting further restriction of her parenting rights and responsibilities. We conclude the juvenile court was not required to consider the changed circumstances rule before modifying the family court’s order and there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the court’s ruling.

Joint legal custody means both parents share the right and responsibility to make decisions regarding the children’s health, education, and welfare. (Fam. Code, § 3003; In re Marriage of Burgess (1996) 13 Cal.4th 25, 29, fn. 2 (Burgess).) When there is joint legal, but not joint physical custody, the parents share decision-making responsibility, but the children are under the physical supervision of only one parent. (Fam. Code, §§ 3007 & 3085; Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 29, fn. 2.)

Under the family law statutory scheme, “In an initial custody determination, the trial court has ‘the widest discretion to choose a parenting plan that is in the best interest of the child.’ (Fam. Code, § 3040, subd. (b).) It must look to all the circumstances bearing on the best interest of the minor child. [Citations.]” (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 31-32.)

However, “[T]he best interest standard has an added twist once a ‘final’ judicial custody determination is in place[.]” (Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2006)

17:295, pp. 17-69 to 17-70.) “Under the

so-called changed circumstance rule, a party seeking to modify a permanent custody order can do so only if he or she demonstrates a significant change of circumstances justifying a modification. [Citation.] ‘The changed-circumstance rule is not a different test, devised to supplant the statutory test, but an adjunct to the best-interest test. It provides, in essence, that once it has been established that a particular custodial arrangement is in the best interests of the child, the court need not reexamine that question. Instead, it should preserve the established mode of custody unless some significant change in circumstances indicates that a different arrangement would be in the child’s best interest. The rule thus fosters the dual goals of judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements.’ [Citation.]” (Montenegro v. Diaz (2001) 26 Cal.4th 249, 256 (Montenegro).)

Of course in this case, we are not reviewing a modification ruling arising from a parent seeking a change in the custody arrangement. Here, modification resulted from orders arising out of dependency proceedings. Neither party provides any authority, and we found none, holding the “added twist” to the best interest test routinely applied in family law courts should (or should not) also apply to final custody orders being evaluated by juvenile courts.

We recognize there is much authority to support the conclusion juvenile court custody orders are the functional equivalent of family law permanent custody orders. (See In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 210-211 (Chantal S.).) A copy of the juvenile court custody order must be filed in any existing superior court nullity, dissolution, legal separation, or paternity proceeding. (§ 362.4.) Moreover, section 302, subdivision (d), specifies the order “shall not be modified” in a family law proceeding “unless the court finds that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the juvenile court issued the order and modification of the order is in the best interests of the child.”

We also found several cases and statutory authority which describe the broad discretion a juvenile court has in making custody orders. For example, “A juvenile court may assume jurisdiction . . . regardless of whether the child was in the physical custody of both parents or was in the sole legal or physical custody of only one parent at the time that the events or conditions occurred that brought the child within the jurisdiction of the court.” (§ 302, subd. (a).) The juvenile court is not bound by prior family court custody orders when it assumes jurisdiction and “any issues regarding custodial rights between [the minors’] parents shall be determined solely by the juvenile court . . . .” (§ 302, subd. (c).) “Juvenile court custody orders may be made at the disposition hearing, any subsequent review hearing, or upon the granting of a petition” under section 388. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 1429.1(c); Seiser & Kumli, Cal. Juvenile Courts, Practice and Procedure (2006) § 2-127[1][a], p. 2-238.)

Moreover, the juvenile court is not bound by the one year counseling restrictions imposed by Family Code section 3190, and may make open-ended orders conditioning custody or visitation on a parent’s participation in counseling. (Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 205-206.) In addition, a juvenile court is controlled by the family law presumption in favor of joint legal custody between parents as being in the best interests of the child. (Ibid.; see also In re Jennifer R. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 704,

711-713; Fam. Code, § 3080.)

These rules and exceptions to family law presumptions are based on the recognition the purpose of juvenile court law is different from family law. “Although both the family court and the juvenile court focus on the best interests of the child, the juvenile court has a special responsibility to the child as parens patriae and must look at the totality of the child’s circumstances. ‘It is one thing for a family law court to determine the best interests of the child as between two parents under title 4 of the Family Law Act (Civ. Code, § 4600 et seq.). It is quite another for a juvenile court to determine the best interests of the child in a proceeding where there is the possibility both parents could lose custody or visitation rights.’ [Citation.]” (In re Roger S. (1992)

4 Cal.App.4th 25, 30-31 (Roger S.); Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206.)

The application of family law preferences and presumptions designed for theoretically fit parents would be inconsistent with “the purpose of juvenile court proceedings . . . to protect children who have been seriously abused, neglected or abandoned by their parents.” (Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 207.) But, as noted by the Supreme Court in Chantal S., “It does not follow, however, that no family law statutory provisions can ever apply in the dependency context. Indeed, the Legislature has expressly provided that specific parts of the Family Code apply to orders issued by the juvenile court. (See, e.g., §§ 304, 362.4, par. 1, incorporating Fam. Code, § 6218 [relating to protective orders].)” (Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206.)

We found the family law concept of “significant changed circumstances” has been incorporated into some juvenile law issues. A showing of new evidence or “change of circumstances” is explicitly required before a juvenile court will consider a petition filed by any interested party to “change, modify, or set aside” any prior order of the juvenile court, including custody orders. (§ 388.) Similarly, a parent in family law court must show changed circumstances when challenging custody orders issued previously by a juvenile court. (§ 302, subd. (d).)

Section 362.4 authorizes a juvenile court, when terminating its jurisdiction, to modify existing family court generated custody orders. Under section 362.4, when the juvenile court terminates jurisdiction of a dependent minor, and proceedings for the dissolution of the marriage or for legal separation of the minor’s parents are pending in the superior court, or “an order has been entered with regard to the custody of that minor, the juvenile court on its own motion, may issue . . . an order determining the custody of, or visitation with, the child.” The Legislature did not make any reference to the changed circumstance rule.

Rather, the juvenile court may on its own motion determine de novo a new custody order. The only presumption to automatically apply is that the court’s primary consideration is the best interests of the child. (See Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206; Jennifer R., supra, 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 712; In re John W. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 961, 973-974; Roger S., supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at pp. 30-31.) We find no reason to burden the court with the same “added twist” to the best interest test, ordinarily reserved for parents wishing to disturb the status quo by challenging final custody orders.

We review custody and visitation orders for an abuse of discretion. (Burgess, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 32.) “‘[T]he juvenile court, which has been intimately involved in the protection of the child, is best situated to make custody determinations based on the best interests of the child without any preferences or presumptions.’ [Citation.]” (Chantal S., supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 206.)

This case involved abuse allegations against both parents, but only the custodial parent (Ronald) was offered reunification services. Katalina participated in monitored visitation, but was not offered any counseling or parenting classes. Accordingly, the record is somewhat skewed concerning the information about each parent. As Katalina points out, the social workers were not focused on her, and there is no other evidence suggesting she is incapable of making legal decisions about her children’s medical treatment, education, or welfare. She argues it is undisputed the children are strongly bonded to her and she was not the cause of the dependency proceedings.

We agree the social workers focused primarily on Katalina’s past misconduct. However, there was also some discussion about her current situation and her ongoing efforts to thwart Ronald’s parenting. For example, early in the proceedings, the social worker stated she was convinced Katalina had continued to encourage the children to make false abuse accusations, despite the stress and harm it caused them. And, it was later discovered there was a family court order forbidding such misconduct. Although the allegations of abuse stopped during the dependency proceedings, the social workers, nevertheless, recommended visits with Katalina remain monitored.

SSA asserts there are two grounds to support the court’s order awarding Ronald sole legal custody. First, there was a concern held by Ronald’s and minors’ counsel that Katalina would revert back to her old habit of making false allegations of abuse. Second, there was Katalina’s and Ronald’s seemingly endless bickering, and feelings of hostility and antagonism.

As for the first contention, we find it difficult to find any direct correlation between a parent’s legal custody rights and the ability to make abuse allegations. As aptly noted by Katalina’s counsel during the hearing, giving Ronald sole legal custody will have no practical effect on Katalina’s ability to make allegations of abuse. There was no evidence indicating Katalina had misused her legal custody rights in the past by selecting particular doctors or schools biased in her favor.

However, we conclude the evidence of a habitual resentment, hostility, and antagonism existing between the parents is sufficient to support the court’s order. Katalina has refused to take responsibility for her past behavior, or the emotional distress she has caused her children, or the damage she caused to their relationships with Ronald. She still steadfastly maintains Ronald is a violent man. Understandably, Ronald loathes Katalina for the role she has played in interrupting his life with the countless investigations, the many harassing court proceedings, and emotionally charged false allegations of abuse. Their hatred for one another is undeniable. The parties apparently agree they will not be able to even agree on a visitation monitor. Thus, while in most circumstances “the children’s best interests would be served by having a full and involved relationship with each parent, [here] the reality of their parent’s conflicts unavoidably hampers the realization of that goal. (In re Marriage of McLoren (1988) 202 Cal.App.3d 108, 115-116 (McLoren).)

To be workable, joint legal custody requires parents who are willing to cooperate “in making medical, educational, and psychological decisions.” (McLoren, supra, 202 Cal.App.3d at pp. 114-115.) “As all too often happens in such distressing situations, ‘[t]he parents’ conflicts have resulted in extreme suffering for the children[.]’” (Id. at p. 114.) In this case, all the evidence points to the conclusion the parents are not yet “ready, willing, or able to engage in such a cooperative effort.” (Id. at p. 116.) It is reasonable to conclude that continued joint legal custody decisionmaking will likely cause more strife and psychological difficulties for the children.

Katalina’s accusations against Ronald have been unrelenting, yet Ronald has acknowledged the children’s well-being would be promoted by visits with Katalina (albeit monitored visits). Having to choose between these bickering parents, it cannot be

said the court abused its discretion in awarding sole legal custody to the parent who appeared to be more cooperative. The order awarding Ronald sole legal custody is affirmed.

III

Katalina also contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in ordering her to pay for the professional monitor she is required to have for weekly visits with her children. She faults the court for failing to inquire into the costs of a professional monitor or ask about her ability to pay. She suggests the court desired to punish her past behavior and “used paying for a professional monitor as leverage to try to teach [her] to cooperate with [Ronald] and mutually agree on a monitor at no cost . . . .” She states the evidence shows she cannot afford to pay for a monitor, the parties cannot agree on one, and therefore, the court’s order violates her fundamental right to visit her children.

It would be speculation for this court to conclude, based on this record, that Katalina does not have the means to pay for a monitor. We have no evidence as to the costs of such monitors, or whether Katalina has obtained additional income in the interm. That is not to say, we are not troubled by the prospect Katalina has been unable to arrange visits while this matter has been pending on appeal. The record clearly shows, and counsel agree, it is in these children’s best interests to maintain weekly contact with Katalina. We agree Ronald should not be saddled with this additional expense, but an order that effectively deprives the children from visiting with their mother cannot stand.

Given the inadequate record, and inability to consider new evidence, we cannot determine the real life effect of the court’s order. It cannot be said the order must be reversed if Katalina and Ronald have either managed to agree on a suitable monitor, or if Katalina has found the funds to pay for a professional monitor. Therefore, we must affirm the order, which is subject to modification by a request of either party based on the children’s best interests.

IV

The orders are affirmed.

O’LEARY, J.

I CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J., concurring:

I completely agree with the conclusion my colleagues have reached in this case. But I got there via a different route. I therefore concur in their opinion, rather than joining it outright.

My colleagues conclude there is “no reason to burden the [juvenile] court with the same ‘added twist’ to the best interest test, ordinarily reserved for parents wishing to disturb the status quo by challenging final custody orders.” (Maj. opn., p. 13.) I am not sure I agree with that statement. I am inclined to agree with them instead that “there is much authority to support the conclusion juvenile court custody orders are the functional equivalent of family law permanent custody orders.” (Maj. opn., p. 11.) I think section 302’s requirement of “significant change of circumstances“ may mean just that.

But I see no reason to reach that issue because in this case it would not matter. After the family law court issued its judgment setting out custody arrangements in this case, SSA had to step in and place Sean and Brianna in protective custody. The children made allegations of physical and psychological abuse. The mother purported to be dying of stomach cancer. These are changed circumstances.

It makes no difference whether the allegations were true or false. Once they have been made, the entire family dynamic has changed. Either abuse and life-threatening disease processes are present, or parents and/or children are lying about such things. Either way, the circumstances have sufficiently changed to justify a complete re-evaluation of the custody arrangements.

I find nothing to quarrel with in the trial court’s conduct of that re-evaluation. I therefore concur in the judgment.

BEDSWORTH, ACTING P. J.

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^[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code, unless otherwise indicated.