Filed 3/16/18 In re S.G. CA4/3






NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


In re S.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

ORANGE COUNTY SOCIAL SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

J.G., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

S.G.,

Minor and Appellant.



G055289

(Super. Ct. Nos. DP026419-001,
DP026419A)

O P I N I O N

Appeals from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Dennis J. Keough, Judge. Dismissed.

Leon J. Page, County Counsel, Karen L. Christensen and Aurelio Torre, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant, Orange County Social Services Agency.
Nicole Williams, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor and Appellant, S.G.
Jack A. Love, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent, D.B.
Julie E. Braden, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Respondent, J.G.

* * *

The minor, S.G., and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) appeal from a July 2017 juvenile court order extending reunification services to mother, J.G., at a hearing held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 387. The 24-month review hearing was scheduled for November 2017 but was continued into January 2018, and SSA was advocating before the juvenile court that the hearing be continued yet another 60 days to coincide with a period of trial custody for mother.
Appellants argue the juvenile court was statutorily barred from offering mother further reunification services at the section 387 hearing because mother had already been provided with 18 months of services, and she did not meet the criteria for more services under section 366.22, subdivision (b), therefore, the court should have scheduled a permanency plan hearing under section 366.26. They further argue the court lacked discretion to continue the hearing under section 352.
The additional reunification period has now passed. In December 2017 we issued an order requesting the parties to submit supplemental letter briefs addressing whether the expiration of the additional reunification period renders the appeal moot. In response to our request for briefing, mother filed a motion to dismiss. Father, filed a letter brief joining with mother’s position. SSA filed a letter brief opposing the motion to dismiss, and the minor filed a letter brief joining SSA’s position.
SSA concedes, “If this case is not yet factually moot, it nonetheless teeters on that precipice.” SSA acknowledges the “surface tension” in its advocating on appeal for termination of services as it contemporaneously recognizes mother has satisfied its reunification requirements sufficient to have earned overnight visits. Nevertheless, SSA argues the case is not moot, because the issue presented in the appeal is “capable of continually evading review due to the delineated review periods within the statutory dependency scheme, making it hard to receive guidance from this and other reviewing courts despite the expedited consideration given to dependency appeals.”
An appellate court’s jurisdiction extends only to actual controversies for which it can grant effective relief. (In re Christina A. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1158; In re Jessica K. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1313, 1315-1316.) If subsequent acts or events have rendered questions raised in the appeal moot, then the action no longer presents a justiciable controversy. (In re Christina A., at p. 1158; In re Dani R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 402, 404 [“‘[A]n action that originally was based on a justiciable controversy cannot be maintained on appeal if all the questions have become moot by subsequent acts or events. A reversal in such a case would be without practical effect, and the appeal will therefore be dismissed’”].) It is our duty to dismiss an appeal that has become moot. (In re Ruby T. (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 1201, 1204.) An exception has been made when the question presented is an issue of continuing public importance which is capable of repetition, yet evading review. (In re Christina A., supra, at p. 1158.)
We are not persuaded the question presented is an issue of continuing public importance which is capable of repetition yet evading review. Courts have applied the exception in cases where the challenged order infects the outcome of subsequent proceedings (In re E.T. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 426, 436); where there are substantial interests at stake (In re Esperanza C. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1042, 1055); where the court’s policies regarding scheduling of hearings will run afoul of statutory requirements and cause future delays (Renee S. v. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 187, 192); where the alleged defect undermines the juvenile court’s initial jurisdictional findings (In re Marquis D. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 718, 724); and where findings could have severe and unfair consequences in future family law or dependency proceedings (In re Daisy H. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 713, 716). None of these situations is present in this case.
In In re Pablo D. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 759, 760, the juvenile court ordered an additional six months of reunification services for the minor Pablo after terminating services for his siblings. Pablo appealed. (Ibid.) A different panel of this court found “we cannot rescind services that have already been received by the parents. Because we are unable to fashion an effective remedy, the appeal is moot.” (Id. at p. 761.) The same is true here. (See In re Brandon M. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1401 [90-day trial home visit discussed at hearing “patently moot” on subsequent appeal]; see also In re B.L. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1117 [juvenile court’s subsequent order granting liberal, supervised visits for parents mooted challenge to earlier order with more limitations on visits].)
Mother’s motion to dismiss is granted.

DISPOSITION

The appeals are dismissed.


IKOLA, J.

WE CONCUR:




MOORE, ACTING P. J.



FYBEL, J.