Filed 5/31/17 In re S.H. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.



IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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In re S.H., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C082579


SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

STEPHANIE H.,

Defendant and Appellant.

(Super. Ct. No. JD237103)




Stephanie H. (mother) appeals from the findings and orders made by the juvenile court at the combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing concerning her son, S.H. Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that S.H. was at risk of serious physical harm. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b)(1).) Mother further contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing S.H. from her custody. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) We find no error and shall affirm the juvenile court’s findings and orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In April 2016, the Sacramento County Department of Health and Human Services (the Department) filed a petition alleging that 12-year-old S.H. was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm and/or abuse and neglect (§ 300, subd. (b)) and serious emotional damage (§ 300, subd. (c)) due to mother’s untreated mental health issues, which impaired her judgment and ability to adequately care and supervise S.H. The petition alleged that mother was diagnosed with depression, posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and depersonalization disorder, and was not participating in mental health treatment or taking her prescribed medication. The petition further alleged that mother presented with erratic behaviors, delusions, and paranoia, and had approximately 20 documented contacts with law enforcement related to her mental health. In addition, the petition alleged that mother had told S.H.’s pediatrician that a “criminal drug king” was abusing S.H., and had projected her fears onto S.H., causing him to believe that people from a crime ring had come into his house while he was asleep and harmed him.
At the conclusion of the detention hearing, S.H. was ordered detained and temporary placement and care of S.H. was vested with the Department. The juvenile court scheduled a combined jurisdictional/dispositional hearing for May 10, 2016.
The jurisdiction/disposition report filed by the Department recommended the juvenile court modify the petition to indicate that mother was diagnosed with delusional disorder, not depersonalization disorder, sustain the petition as modified, adjudge S.H. a dependent of the juvenile court, and place S.H. with his adult half brother, while mother participates in reunification services. In support of these recommendations, the Department explained that mother had been diagnosed with delusional disorder and PTSD, was not taking her prescribed medication, was unwilling to seek mental health services to mitigate her symptoms because she believed she was “ ‘fully functional.’ ”
The Department reported that mother’s psychiatrist had opined that “ ‘even with the mother taking her medication on a regular basis, the probability of the delusions subsiding completely is limited or not likely to happen at all.’ ” Mother’s psychiatrist also reported that he had concerns with mother’s ability to properly parent due to her delusions, and that mother’s discontinuation of medication is a safety concern for S.H. The Department noted that it was concerned about the progressive decline in mother’s mental health as reported by those who have had continuous contact with her, including her psychiatrist.
When interviewed by the social worker, mother appeared to be in a continuous delusional state; she repeatedly spoke about the trafficking of her adult daughter, provided pictures she believed showed that her daughter was injured, and claimed her dog was taken by “the ‘harassers.’ ” The social worker, however, noted that she could not identify any harm to the daughter in the pictures, and learned from mother’s adult son that mother’s dogs were euthanized and his sister was doing well and was not in danger.
The social worker reported that mother had informed the vice principal of S.H.’s school that people are constantly after her family, and that the intention of the “ ‘harassers’ ” is to “get” S.H. and harvest his organs. The social worker further reported that mother had been seen driving dangerously with S.H., and had gone to S.H.’s school and frantically demanded that he be brought to the front office because people were after them. In addition, the social worker reported that mother had brought S.H. to his pediatrician in January 2016 with concerns that S.H. was being abused by a “ ‘crime ring.’ ” During the visit, mother presented a letter she wrote indicating that S.H. had been beaten, sodomized, and given date-rape drugs and benzodiazepine injections to cause amnesia. The letter also indicated that mother had told S.H. to take her Lorazepam to hide the fact that he had been injected. According to mother, S.H. did not “ ‘access[ ] much of the medications.’ ”
In concluding that mother’s beliefs were affecting S.H., the social worker explained that S.H. woke up one morning with a cut on his finger and believed someone had come into his house while he was asleep and caused him harm. The social worker noted that mother had shared her beliefs about a “ ‘crime ring’ ” and the trafficking of her daughter with S.H. because “ ‘he needs to know what is happening to his family.’ ” The social worker further noted that S.H. cried at the thought of his mother not getting better, and attempted to suppress his emotions while discussing mother’s mental condition. S.H. told the social worker that he felt the safest staying with his half brother until his mother received help, and that he had never seen anyone connected to a “ ‘crime ring.’ ”
At the outset of the contested jurisdictional/dispositional hearing, the Department requested the juvenile court amend the petition to indicate that mother was diagnosed with delusional disorder, sustain the amended petition as to the allegations under section 300, subdivision (b), and dismiss the allegations under section 300, subdivision (c) for lack of evidence. The Department also requested the court place S.H. with his adult half brother. Without elaboration, mother’s counsel stated that mother denied the allegations in the petition and requested they be dismissed. As for disposition, mother’s counsel objected to out-of-home placement because S.H. and mother love each other very much and there is evidence in the report showing S.H. is well cared for by mother.
The juvenile court granted the Department’s request to dismiss the allegations under section 300, subdivision (c) and sustained the allegations under section 300, subdivision (b) with the amendment requested by the Department. The juvenile court adjudged S.H. a dependent child of the court, removed S.H. from mother’s custody, placed S.H. with his adult half brother, and ordered reunification services for mother.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1.0 Standard of Review
We review the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders for substantial evidence. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Under this standard, we review the record to determine whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support the juvenile court’s findings and conclusions, and we view the record in the light most favorable to the court’s determinations and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support the determinations. (Ibid.) We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court. (Ibid.) Thus, the pertinent inquiry is whether substantial evidence supports the finding, not whether a contrary finding might have been made. (In re Dakota H. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 212, 228.)
2.0 Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Jurisdictional Finding
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding that S.H. was at risk of serious physical harm. (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) We disagree.
The juvenile court may take dependency jurisdiction over a child only if the court finds the child to be a person described by one or more of the section 300 subdivisions. A child falls within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b)(1) if “[t]he child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to . . . provide regular care for the child due to the parent’s or guardian’s mental illness . . . .” “The statutory definition consists of three elements: (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) ‘serious physical harm or illness’ to the minor, or a ‘substantial risk’ of such harm or illness.” (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) “ ‘In determining whether the child is in present need of the juvenile court’s protection, the court may consider past events.’ ” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135, disapproved on another ground by Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
Section 300, subdivision (b) does not require that a child actually be abused or neglected before the juvenile court can assume jurisdiction. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) The provision requires only a “ ‘substantial risk’ ” that the child will be abused or neglected. (Ibid.) The legislatively declared purpose of the provision “ ‘is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.’ [Citation.] ‘The court need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.’ ” (Ibid.) Therefore, “[a]lthough section 300 generally requires proof the child is subject to the defined risk of harm at the time of the jurisdiction hearing” (In re Christopher R. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1215-1216), “proof of current risk of harm is not required to support the initial exercise of dependency jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b), which is satisfied by a showing the child has suffered or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or abuse” (In re Adam D. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1261).
We conclude there is substantial evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding. Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile’s court’s order, the evidence shows that mother’s mental illness placed S.H. at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm due to her inability to provide proper care and supervision. While harm to a child cannot be presumed from the mere fact of a parent’s mental illness, jurisdiction in this case rests on more than mother’s mental illness. (See In re Jamie M. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 530, 540.) Despite a history of suffering from mental illness and delusions, and a finding by a psychiatrist that she is mentally ill and needs medication to treat her symptoms, mother rejected that she is delusional or paranoid and in need of treatment. (See In re Esmeralda B. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1044 [“denial is a factor often relevant to determining whether persons are likely to modify their behavior in the future without court supervision”].) The record reflects that mother refused to take her prescribed medication or participate in mental health treatment. The record also reflects that mother’s unresolved mental illness and resulting delusions and paranoia render her unable to properly care for S.H. and jeopardized his safety and welfare. Mother has a history of paranoid delusions, including delusions that involve her children, such as the belief that her daughter was injured and being trafficked, and the belief that a “criminal drug king” was abusing S.H. Mother acted out on her delusions when she told the vice principal of S.H.’s school that people are continuously after her family, and that the intention of “the ‘harassers’ ” is to “get” S.H. and harvest his organs. Mother also drove dangerously with S.H., and went to S.H.’s school and frantically demanded he be brought to the office because people were after them. Mother shared her bizarre beliefs about a “crime ring” and the trafficking of her daughter with S.H. Mother’s delusions caused confusion and fear in S.H. and had already resulted in emotional harm to S.H. S.H. reported that he woke up one morning with a cut on his finger and believed that someone had come into his home at night while he was asleep and harmed him. Mother also reported that she told S.H. to take some of her prescribed medication to hide the fact he had been injected with drugs by the “crime ring.” According to mother, S.H. “accessed” some of her medications. Mother’s instruction to her 12-year old son to ingest some of her prescription medication surely had the potential to cause physical harm to S.H.
3.0 Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Dispositional Order
Mother contends there was insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing S.H. from her custody. We disagree.
Under section 361, a dependent child may not be taken from the physical custody of the parents with whom the child resides at the time the petition was initiated unless the juvenile court finds by clear and convincing evidence “[t]here is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the minor if the minor were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the minor’s physical health can be protected without removing the minor from the minor’s parent’s . . . physical custody.” (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) “A removal order is proper if it is based on proof of (1) parental inability to provide proper care for the minor and (2) potential detriment to the minor if he or she remains with the parent.” (In re T.W. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1163.) “The jurisdictional findings are prima facie evidence that the child cannot safely remain in the home. [Citation.] The parent need not be dangerous and the child need not have been actually harmed for removal to be appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child. [Citations.] In this regard, the court may consider the parent’s past conduct as well as present circumstances.” (In re Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 917.)
We conclude there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the juvenile court’s removal order. There was substantial evidence showing that mother’s mental health problems prevented her from providing proper care and supervision of S.H. and placed him at substantial risk of suffering physical and emotional harm. The record discloses that mother is mentally ill and refused to take medication for her symptoms or participate in mental health treatment. Nothing in the record reflects that mother had taken any steps to address her mental illness at the time of the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing. Mother’s history of experiencing delusions and expressing them to S.H., coupled with her denial she needed medication to treat her mental illness and failure to participate in treatment, is evidence she was not stable enough for S.H. to remain in her custody. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in removing S.H. from mother’s custody.
Mother argues that because neither the Department nor the juvenile court adequately addressed whether services could prevent removal, the dispositional order removing S.H. from mother’s custody must be reversed. According to mother, “in-home services could have gone a long way in preventing removal.”
California Rules of Court, rule 5.690(a)(1)(B)(i) requires the department to include in its report to the court a “discussion of the reasonable efforts made to prevent or eliminate removal . . . .” Section 361, subdivision (d) provides that “[t]he court shall make a determination as to whether reasonable efforts were made to prevent or to eliminate the need for removal of the minor from his or her home . . . . The court shall state the facts on which the decision to remove the minor is based.” In addition, “[b]efore the court removes a child from parental custody, it must find there are no reasonable means by which the child’s physical health can be protected without removal. (§ 361, subd. (c)(1).) Although the court must consider alternatives to removal, it has broad discretion in making a dispositional order.” (In re Cole C., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 918.)
Because mother failed to object in the juvenile court to the failure to state the facts on which it based its removal order, mother has forfeited that issue. (See In re Urayna L. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 883, 886.) But even if mother had not forfeited the issue, we would conclude that any error was harmless. “Before any judgment can be reversed for ordinary error, it must appear that the error complained of ‘has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.’ [Citation.] Reversal is justified ‘only when the court, “after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,” is of the “opinion” that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.’ ” (In re J.S. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1078.) Failure to comply with a statutory requirement is harmless where there is no reasonable probability that the error affected the outcome. (Id. at p. 1079.) On this record, there is no reasonable probability the juvenile court would have concluded that removal was not warranted had it inquired into the Department’s claim that there were no services available to ensure the safety of S.H. if he was returned to mother due to mother’s unstable mental health. Accordingly, any error from the juvenile court’s failure to comply with section 361 was harmless.

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders are affirmed.



BUTZ , Acting P. J.



We concur:



DUARTE , J.



RENNER , J.