Filed 1/17/18 In re S.J. CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
| In re S.J., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. |
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| CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. K.H., Defendant and Appellant.
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A151051
(Contra Costa County Super. Ct. Nos. J16-00851 & J16-00852)
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The juvenile court removed two brothers from their mother’s custody, awarded sole custody to their previously noncustodial father and terminated dependency jurisdiction. Mother argues the court failed to properly assess whether the case required ongoing supervision. As we will explain, in light of the lack of evidence in the record concerning the father’s circumstances, the court’s failure to explain its decision to immediately terminate jurisdiction requires us to reverse and remand the matter for further proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
In September 2016, the Contra Costa County Children and Family Services Bureau (Bureau) was contacted after mother was observed repeatedly hitting and punching her 12-year-old daughter, K.H., in a car in front of a middle school. K.H. reported feeling unsafe at home and being “ ‘terrified’ ” of her mother, and said her mother had been angry the night before because K.H. was unable to spell a word and had slapped her, then hit her with a belt. K.H. was worried about her mother’s treatment of her brothers, S.J. and N.J., who were then two years old and four months old respectively, although she said her mother did not hit S.J. other than to slap his hand and did not punish N.J.
Mother had moved from New York to California in October 2015 to begin a job as a case manager with the Social Security Administration. She told the social worker that she had been very depressed for two years and was sleep-deprived, worried, and anxious; she had a negative checking balance, her rent was unpaid, and she did not have friends or family in the area. The father of S.J. and N.J. (father) lived in Brooklyn, New York. Mother told the social worker “something to the effect that he is not a good father and if he was a good father, she would let the boys go with him and kill herself.”[1] According to the detention report, child welfare records showed a November 29, 2015 complaint of emotional abuse by father to K.H. and one-year-old S.J. involving a domestic violence referral in New York that was not resolved because mother moved out of state, and a complaint of general neglect and emotional abuse of K.H. and S.J. on January 29, 2016, involving mother allowing father to have contact with her and the children in violation of a New York court order.
The Bureau filed juvenile dependency petitions on September 9, 2016, alleging that S.J., then two years old, and N.J., then four months old, were at substantial risk of serious physical harm due to mother’s physical abuse of a sibling (Welf. & Inst. Code,[2] § 300, subds. (a), (j)) and serious untreated depression impairing her ability to parent the child (§ 300, subd. (b)). A separate petition concerning K.H. is not at issue on this appeal.
At a detention hearing on September 12, the court ordered the children removed from mother’s custody with no visitation or contact pending a de novo hearing the next day. The court found that continuing the children in the mother’s home would be contrary to their welfare, and that it was likely mother would flee the jurisdiction “given they have already moved one state, according to the oldest child, while there was an investigation under way.” The court noted that mother was “very emotional” and “out of control” after the detention hearing, to which she brought the children, and that “contact would be highly detrimental [and] upsetting to the child.” At the de novo hearing on September 13, the Bureau’s attorney asked that visitation be supervised “carefully” due to concern about flight risk as mother did not have family or friends in the area and left New York with an investigation pending, then later violated a domestic violence restraining order. Mother informed the court that she did not flee New York, explaining that Child Protective Services (CPS) had become involved because of a domestic violence incident in the presence of the children, and she told them about her job offer and that she wanted them to monitor father, with whom she initially left S.J. while she looked for a place to live in California. The court ordered visitation for a minimum of one hour, once a week; a handwritten note on the court’s order after hearing states, “close supervision because of flight risk.”
On September 29, 2016, the Bureau informed the court that father acknowledged being the father of S.J. and N.J. and wished to have his status raised to presumed father, expressed interest in the proceedings and requested legal representation. He had provided letters “explaining the reported Child Welfare intervention in New York and the stay away order granted by the court in New York.” The boys were in a separate foster home from K.H. and the Bureau was continuing efforts to find a placement for the three children together. Mother was cooperating with the Bureau and participating in services. The initial supervised visit for mother had not taken place because of a last-minute cancellation by the transportation agency the Bureau had arranged, and mother declined the second visit because she “felt unable to deal emotionally with the impact of being separated from [the boys] at the end of the visit.”
Father appeared at the initial jurisdiction hearing on October 3, 2016, and was accorded presumed father status. The court ordered visitation for him for one hour, twice per month, when he was in Contra Costa County.
After continuances of the jurisdiction hearing, on December 9, 2016, mother entered a plea of no contest to the petitions, which were amended to state one count under section 300, subdivision (j), that the child was “at substantial risk of physical and emotional harm due to the mother’s repeated use of excessive physical discipline” of the child’s sibling and the mother’s “untreated mental health condition.” The remaining counts were dismissed, and the court sustained the amended petition.
On January 30, 2017, upon being informed by counsel for the Bureau that mother was “having difficulty controlling herself during visits” and “constantly berating the visit supervisor,” the court ordered that “f Mother’s inappropriate behavior during visits persists, visits are to be suspended pending return to court.” On February 6, 2017, the court ordered that visits be “therapeutic” and ordered the Bureau to make referrals for therapeutic visitation.
In a disposition report dated January 30, 2017, the Bureau recommended that the court adjudge the children dependents of the juvenile court, order reunification services for the parents and set a review hearing. The social worker was “gravely concerned” that the children would be at significant physical and emotional risk if returned to mother, but noted that additional investigation was needed, including “out-of-state criminal history searches and assessing for additional child welfare involvement” to determine whether father could provide appropriate care for the children.
The Bureau reported that mother had made “notable progress” (including completing a parenting class, attending weekly therapy and attending anger management classes, but had “an extensive history of volatile relationships, as well as manipulative and violent behaviors with her children, the fathers of her children, and other service providers,” and a “pervasive pattern of abandonment” evidenced in her relationship with K.H.[3] Records in New York showed that mother had six CPS referrals between April 1, 2005, and May 6, 2015, three of which were found substantiated. One substantiated case involved mother beating her son with a belt in 2005; that child was in the custody of his biological father. The second involved mother assaulting K.H.’s father in the presence of the child in 2009. The third, dated May 6, 2015, involved two incidents. In the first, father dropped S.J. on the floor, then picked him up to comfort him; mother screamed at father; he slapped and punched her; then she called the police and he was arrested. In the second, father reportedly took S.J. from daycare and would not return him, and was arrested for violating a restraining order after calling mother and insulting her. Additionally, there were reports that father lived in a condemned building infested with bedbugs, with sporadic access to water and electricity. The disposition report did not mention the two incidents noted in the detention report (Nov. 29, 2015, and Jan. 29, 2016).
Records from New York reflected 12 police reports filed by mother, two of which concerned father: On September 15, 2014, father was arrested and charged with assaulting mother and three related charges, and on March 27, 2015, father was arrested for verbal abuse of mother. A restraining order effective from March 27 to July 1, 2015, prohibited father from having contact with mother or the boys except for court-ordered visitation. Mother had obtained a temporary restraining order against father that was effective from July 13, 2015, to January 29, 2016, and the Bureau did not know whether it had been renewed.
Mother told the social worker that she initially came to California by herself to look for housing, leaving S.J. in the care of father, and when she returned to New York to get him, father would not disclose the child’s whereabouts until she called the police and had them contact father.
The maternal grandmother told the social worker that she could not “make sense of mother’s poor decision making and erratic behavior” and believed mother had a severe mental illness. The grandmother said mother “ ‘needs a lot of help’ ” and observed, “ ‘She keeps running these guys from their kids . . . . She called the cops on [father] eight times! . . . These fathers deserve a chance to be with their kids. [Father] is following her around the country so he can be with his kids.’ ”[4]
Father told the social worker that when he was growing up, his mother hit his sister, who was removed from the home and sent to live with their father. His mother physically disciplined him with a belt “ ‘the old fashioned way,’ ” slapped him and used “ ‘psychological warfare’ against him”; she had an “overall crude parenting style” that he said was similar to mother’s parenting style, of which he did not approve. He said that when S.J. was born, mother felt he was not well equipped to be a father and took control, not allowing him “ ‘complete freedom to enjoy being a father.’ ” He did not want to be a strict disciplinarian, which clashed with mother’s parenting approach. After he and mother broke up, he visited S.J. every day and took him for outings and to visit friends and family. Father said that he signed paperwork saying he would allow mother to move out of state, and that as mother was leaving for California she “got him arrested” because he would not pay for her luggage. Mother came back to New York to give birth to N.J., but father was only able to see the baby a few times before mother returned to California. Father was in the Air Force Reserves and stationed at McGuire Air Force base in New Jersey, but said he planned to transfer to Travis Air Force Base in Fairfield, California between April 2017 and June 2017, to be closer to the children. He was “adamant” that he “is making every intention to receive custody of the children.” Father acknowledged that he witnessed mother treating K.H. unfairly, being aggressive, screaming at and hitting her but never called [CPS] despite knowing it was physical abuse. Asked about his criminal history, father said he had citations for urinating in public, some “moving violations” and a DUI from 2004, but did not disclose his domestic violence incidents with mother.
At the disposition hearing on March 13, 2017, the court described discussions it had had with counsel about its inclination to not follow the Bureau’s recommendation and instead declare the boys dependents, then issue orders giving father sole legal and physical custody, with the mother to have supervised visitation if she was in the state where the boys were located. Visits “would have to be supervised by a paid professional paid for by mother in light of her behavior and what brings her children before this court, as well as, quite frankly, her history of absconding with the children. [¶] I’m very concerned about the way that she has attempted to prevent the fathers of these children from participating in a meaningful way and their children’s lives.” The court stated that mother “has been incredibly volatile at court appearances and also with the Department during the course of visitation.” While mother’s attorney was in the hall discussing the court’s intentions with her, mother “became enraged and was screaming in the hallway,” then left the courthouse. The court then asked counsel for the Bureau whether it was correct in understanding that the Bureau “is not objecting to the court’s stated kind of tentative ruling and that they would support actually placement of the two boys with their father and vacating and dismissing.” Counsel replied, “That’s correct.” Counsel for the minors submitted. Mother’s counsel objected to the court’s rulings.
The court stated that the evidence would not support finding clear and convincing evidence that returning the children to the father would be detrimental to them, as would be required to deny his request to have the children placed with him. “To the contrary,” the court stated, “I think it would really be a miscarriage of justice to put these boys through foster care and deny them this chance to live with their father in a safe, loving, appropriate home where they deserve to be.”
The court adjudged the boys dependent children of the juvenile court and found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial danger to their physical and emotional health and well-being if they were returned to mother’s home, that reasonable efforts had been made to prevent or eliminate the need for removal, and that mother had demonstrated a “clear pattern of mental instability and physical aggression and violence towards the oldest child and others with whom she has contact.” The court was “very concerned about children being subjected to mother’s outburst, her behavior, her level of violence,” noting that K.H. showed “the effects that that has had,” and thought the boys were “young enough that . . . they could do very well with their father.” Addressing father, the court said, “I really do believe that mother poses a risk of abducting the children and fleeing the jurisdiction where you live. So you’re going to have to be very, very vigilant about your boys and where they are, even when they’re in your mother’s care, that your mother takes precautions to protect the boys.” The court directed that father’s address be kept confidential. A handwritten note on the court’s minute order states, “ ‘Court believes Mother is a flight risk [with] minor.’ ”
The final judgment and custody order, filed on March 13, 2017, awarded sole legal and physical custody of both boys to father. Mother was permitted only supervised visitation, because she “presents a flight risk” and “has difficulty complying with court-ordered visitation requirements and behaving appropriately at visits”; the order requires that visits be “supervised by a professional supervisor, paid for by mother . . . , a minimum of two hours per month, in the state where the children are residing.” The court found the children were no longer persons described by section 300, vacated the dependency and dismissed the petitions.
Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on April 11, 2017.
DISCUSSION
Section 361.2, subdivision (a), directs: “When a court orders removal of a child pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
If the court places the child with the previously noncustodial parent, it has three options: It may order that the parent become the legal and physical custodian of the child and terminate jurisdiction; it may order that the parent assume custody subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and require a home visit within three months; or it may order that the parent assume custody subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and order reunification services for the parent from whom the child is removed, or solely for the parent taking custody, to allow that parent to later retain custody without court supervision, or for both parents, with a determination at future review hearings as to which parent shall retain custody. (§ 361.2, subd. (b).)[5] The court must make a finding in writing or on the record as to the “basis for its determination under subdivisions (a) and (b).” (§ 361.2, subd. (c).)
Appellant does not challenge the court’s determination that there was no clear and convincing evidence of detriment in placing the children with father. She argues, however, that the court did not explain why continuing juvenile court jurisdiction was unnecessary and that the evidence showed continuing supervision was required. We review the court’s decision to terminate jurisdiction for abuse of discretion. ([i]In re A.J. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 525, 535, fn. 7; Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 300.) The court’s factual findings are reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re Austin P. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1134; In re A.J., at p. 535, fn. 7.)
The trial court here proceeded under section 361.2, subdivision (a). Section 361.2, subdivision (a), “requires that the court place the child in the temporary physical custody of the nonoffending noncustodial parent if doing so will not be detrimental to the child,” but “the court may not terminate jurisdiction until it analyzes whether ongoing supervision of the child is necessary.” (In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1128-1129; In re Janee W. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451; In re Sarah M. (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1496, 1498, disapproved on other grounds in In re Chantal S. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 196, 204.)
In In re Sarah M., the child was removed from the mother’s custody and placed with the father when she was about a year old, with visitation and certain services for the mother. (In re Sarah M., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1489-1491.) Almost two years later, the juvenile court granted the father’s motion to terminate jurisdiction. (Id. at p. 1491.) In re Sarah M. upheld this order because the evidence showed the child was no longer at risk and therefore no longer needed the juvenile court’s protection. (Id. at p. 1500.) The court noted that by the time of the hearing at which jurisdiction was terminated, the concern expressed by the mother was not the well-being of the child but who would pay for continued conjoint therapy for the parents if jurisdiction was terminated, and observed that parents’ poor communication skills and distrust did not establish a need for juvenile court jurisdiction. (Ibid.)
In In re Austin P., by contrast, the juvenile court declined to terminate jurisdiction after the nine-year-old child was removed from the mother’s custody and placed with the father. (In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 1128.) In finding that substantial evidence showed a need for continuing supervision, the Austin P. court noted that the social services agency believed it should monitor the child’s transition because he had had only sporadic contact with the father, the juvenile court wanted to monitor the conflict among the adults, and the social worker had a number of concerns that could only be addressed if the dependency remained open, including that the child needed therapy, the father and his wife had not taken steps to protect the child despite being aware that the mother had physically abused and neglected him, and although the child was happy living with the father, the mother was “the only parental figure he had ever known,” he was more bonded with her and wanted to reunify with her, and she was making good progress with her reunification plan. (Id. at p. 1134.)
Respondent argues that the juvenile court in the present case assessed the need for ongoing supervision and stated its findings on the record, but the only specific comments to which it points are the court’s statements at the outset of the disposition hearing that it had reread the disposition report and “underlying reports” and discussed with counsel the fact that it was not inclined to follow the Bureau’s recommendations; father’s attorney’s statements that father was “ready, willing and able” and lived with his mother, who was retired and ready to be a “full-time grandmother”; and the court’s reference to the children’s chance to live with father in a “safe, loving, appropriate home.” Respondent does not identify any specific finding regarding the need for continued supervision or lack thereof, nor any evidence supporting the comments just noted. Instead, respondent argues that if the court failed to make express findings, its error was harmless because there is no reasonable probability a result more favorable to mother would have been reached if the court had “applied section 361.2, subdivision (c), more expressly or with greater specificity.”
According to respondent, the court’s determination that ongoing supervision was not necessary was supported by the facts that the children were very young, father had cared for S.J. when mother left the child with him while she looked for housing in California, father sent money to mother even though she did not ask for child support and father persistently pursued custody of the boys. These factors, in our view, say little about whether there was a need for continued juvenile court supervision. That father demonstrated a serious desire to assume custody of the children is undisputed. But, considering the record as a whole, we fail to see how that desire, the children’s young ages, or the fact that father cared for S.J. on his own for a period of perhaps two months[6] provide evidence that continued supervision was unnecessary.
To the contrary, as mother argues, several factors suggest at least some reason for concern, and the record contains virtually no evidence to either support or allay concern. Father’s only experience caring for S.J. on his own was of limited duration, and he had never been responsible for N.J.’s care or for the care of both children together. Father acknowledged that mother had controlled the parenting arena after S.J. was born, although he described having daily visits and outings with the child after the parents broke up. The Bureau’s reports contain no information about whatever visits father had with the boys during the pendency of these proceedings; the disposition report refers only to father having “his regular phone calls with the boys” and the foster parenting noting no concerns. Thus, while father presented himself as willing and able to care for the children, the court had no information allowing it to evaluate father’s representations.
At the same time, the record reflects reports of domestic violence by father against mother and associated arrests and restraining orders against him, which orders both he and mother violated. Father was not forthcoming with the social worker about these issues. A memorandum from the social worker to the court about a month after the petitions were filed stated that father had provided “letters explaining the reported Child Welfare intervention in New York and the stay away order granted by the court in New York,” but the memorandum did not relate the source or substance of the letters or explanations. Father apparently intended his mother to play a significant role in the children’s care, as indicated by his report that he worked full time and his attorney’s statement that father was living with his mother, who was ready to be a “full-time grandmother.” But father had told the social worker that his mother’s parenting style when he was growing up was “similar” to mother’s style, of which he disapproved, and included using physical discipline in the form of a belt and slapping him, as well as “psychological warfare,” and that his sister had been removed from the grandmother’s home because the grandmother hit her. Two months before the disposition hearing, the father had told the social worker that he did not have regular contact with his mother, and no explanation was offered for the apparent inconsistency presented by counsel’s representation that father was now living with his mother and intended her to be involved with the children’s care. Also of concern, the father admitted that he had witnessed mother physically abuse K.H. but did not report it. And there was an unresolved issue about the boys’ future contact with their half sister: At the disposition hearing, K.H. asked the court about visiting with her brothers and the court told her she had a right to visits with them. All these issues suggest the need for at least some further investigation before termination of juvenile court jurisdiction—as the Bureau recommended in its report.
Mother suggests that the court placed the children with father and ignored the need for continued supervision because it erroneously believed mother had absconded with the children and “needed to pay for her actions.” As indicated above, the trial court repeatedly stated its concern that mother posed a flight risk, and expressly warned father that it believed mother posed a risk of “abducting the children and fleeing the jurisdiction where you live.” The court’s concern, which was expressed from the outset of the case, appears to have been based upon the child welfare history related in the detention report, which noted a November 20, 2015, complaint of emotional abuse to K.H. and S.J. “in that an open domestic violence referral from Brooklyn, New York was never resolved because mother moved out of state. Response: Closed as Inconclusive because family was not located.” At the detention hearing, counsel for the minors asked that mother’s visitation be “closely supervised” due to concern about flight risk, saying mother “does not have any family or friends in this area, and she left New York with an investigation pending, and then later violated a court order—a DV restraining order.”
The detention report does not necessarily support a conclusion that mother absconded; it simply states that mother moved before the complaint was resolved. Mother told the court that CPS had become involved because of a domestic violence incident in the presence of the children, and that she told CPS about her job offer and that she wanted them to monitor the father, with whom she was leaving S.J. while she looked for housing in California. Father told the social worker that he signed paperwork stating that he was allowing mother to move out of state. Further, the disposition report gives no indication that mother fled New York in the face of an on-going CPS investigation. The disposition report does not refer to the November 20, 2015, complaint described in the detention report. The only matter listed for 2015 in the “prior child welfare history” section of the disposition report is dated May 6, 2015, and describes the allegations as “[p]arent’s physical violence in the presen[ce] of a child,” involving mother calling the police and father being arrested after mother screamed at father for dropping S.J. and father slapped her face and punched her. The status of the allegations is listed as “Substantiated - Inadequate Guardianship” and the “conclusions” state, “[Father] arrested twice. Both parents violated the restraining orders against [father]. No information regarding criminal charges. Directive: [Mother] and [father] to receive referral for domestic violence consultations and services. Safety plan enacted for [mother]. Early intervention services for [S.J.].” The disposition report thus reflects only an incident in 2015 that was resolved.
In any event, we will not assume the court awarded custody to father and terminated jurisdiction in order to punish mother. The court was obviously distressed over the mother’s treatment of K.H. and volatile behavior at visits with the children and in court, and its orders were clearly intended to provide S.J. and N.J. with what the court believed would be a safe and stable home.
On this record, however, we find it impossible to say that the juvenile court assessed the need for continuing supervision or that its failure to do so was harmless. The court expressly found that there would be a substantial danger to the children’s physical and emotional health if they were returned to mother’s custody based on mother’s “pattern of mental instability and physical aggression and violence toward the oldest child and other’s with whom she has contact.” The court also expressly found there was not clear and convincing evidence that it would be detrimental to place the children with father, the determination that required the court to place the children with father. (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) But the court said nothing about the question of continuing supervision. It simply entered an order finding the children no longer came within the provisions of section 300, vacated the dependency and dismissed the petition. The Bureau, in its disposition report, had recommended that the court order reunification services for the parents and set a review hearing, stating that additional investigation was needed, including “out-of-state criminal history searches and assessing for additional child welfare involvement” to determine whether father could provide appropriate care for the children. At the outset of the disposition hearing, which was held about a month and a half after the date the disposition report was prepared, the Bureau acknowledged that it did not object to the court’s “tentative ruling” and supported placing the children with father, vacating the dependency and dismissing the petition, but no explanation was offered for the Bureau’s change of position.
As we have said, the juvenile court “may not terminate jurisdiction until it analyzes whether ongoing supervision of the child is necessary.” (In re Austin P., supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1128-1129; In re Janee W., supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 1451; In re Sarah M., supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1496, 1498.) If the court engaged in this analysis, it is not apparent from the record. Nor does the record provide any basis for concluding that the concerning issues described above were in fact sufficiently explored and explained that the decision to terminate jurisdiction was appropriate. Perhaps, as respondent appears to suggest, matters were addressed in the discussion between court and counsel prior to the hearing that explain and affirm the court’s and the Bureau’s reasoning, but such discussions were not on the record and are not within our ability to review. Accordingly, we cannot find harmless the court’s error in failing to make a finding as to whether continued supervision was necessary and state on the record the basis of such finding. The matter must be remanded for the juvenile court to assess the need for continuing supervision and make appropriate further orders on disposition. To be clear: Mother has not challenged the court’s decisions to remove the children from her custody and to place them with father, and its findings on those matters are not affected by this opinion. We hold only that the juvenile court must review its decision to terminate jurisdiction and document the decision it reaches with appropriate findings.
DISPOSITION
The orders vacating the dependencies of S.J. and N.J. and terminating juvenile court jurisdiction are reversed. The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.
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Kline, P.J.
We concur:
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Stewart, J.
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Miller, J.
In re S.J. (A151051)
[1] Mother said she had no contact information for K.H.’s father and he was not involved in K.H.’s life.
[2] Further statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.
[3] Mother had left K.H. in the care of the maternal grandmother in Jamaica for the first four years of the child’s life, then took K.H. to live with her for several years, left her for another two years with the grandmother, and finally resumed care for her for approximately three years before K.H. was removed from her care in September 2016.
[4] K.H.’s father, B., told the social worker that when he tried to give mother a money order after K.H. was born, she became upset and called the police while they were driving, then told the police she did not know who he was and that he had jumped into her car. He tried to sue mother for custody but the case was dismissed because mother had taken K.H. to Jamaica to live with the maternal grandmother. In 2007, when K.H. was living with mother in New York, B. arranged with mother to visit the child, but when he arrived mother refused to let him see K.H. He sought custody again and the court “sided with” mother but gave B. supervised visits and later unsupervised visits. According to B., in August 2008, mother “disappeared” after sending K.H. to live in Jamaica, and K.H. did not return until 2013 or 2014. While K.H. was in Jamaica, B. said, he paid for her to come to stay with him in Georgia for a month and a half, and once she returned he would visit her in New York and she would visit him in Georgia. He and mother decided it would be best for K.H. to live with him when mother moved to California, but when he arrived in New York to pick up K.H., mother cancelled their agreement and left K.H. with a friend in New York for several months, then returned from California to retrieve her. Although the dates given by B. differ from those described by the social worker in discussing the K.H.’s history, the accounts are consistent in describing mother leaving the child with the grandmother in Jamaica for years at a time, alternating with years K.H. spent with mother in New York and then California.
[5] Section 361.2, subdivision (b), provides in full: “If the court places the child with [the previously noncustodial] parent it may do any of the following:
“(1) Order that the parent become legal and physical custodian of the child. The court may also provide reasonable visitation by the noncustodial parent. The court shall then terminate its jurisdiction over the child. The custody order shall continue unless modified by a subsequent order of the superior court. The order of the juvenile court shall be filed in any domestic relation proceeding between the parents.
“(2) Order that the parent assume custody subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and require that a home visit be conducted within three months. In determining whether to take the action described in this paragraph, the court shall consider any concerns that have been raised by the child’s current caregiver regarding the parent. After the social worker conducts the home visit and files his or her report with the court, the court may then take the action described in paragraph (1), (3), or this paragraph. However, nothing in this paragraph shall be interpreted to imply that the court is required to take the action described in this paragraph as a prerequisite to the court taking the action described in either paragraph (1) or (3).
“(3) Order that the parent assume custody subject to the supervision of the juvenile court. In that case the court may order that reunification services be provided to the parent or guardian from whom the child is being removed, or the court may order that services be provided solely to the parent who is assuming physical custody in order to allow that parent to retain later custody without court supervision, or that services be provided to both parents, in which case the court shall determine, at review hearings held pursuant to Section 366, which parent, if either, shall have custody of the child.”
[6] The record does not specify the length of time for which father cared for S.J. on his own while mother looked for a place to live in California, but according to mother’s description it would have been something less than two months. Father had never been responsible for the care of N.J., who was in New York for only a couple of weeks after his birth before mother returned to California with him.
