In re Stephany A.

Filed 6/23/06 In re Stephany A. CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Yolo)

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Kimberly A., mother of the minor, appeals from orders of the juvenile court terminating her parental rights and selecting a permanent plan of adoption for the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26, 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to this code].) Appellant contends (1) substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding the minor was likely to be adopted, and (2) termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor because the minor would benefit from continued contact with appellant and there would be a substantial interference with a sibling relationship. We affirm.

FACTS

The Department of Employment and Social Services (DESS) removed the 10-year-old minor from appellant's custody in October 2004 due to appellant's failure to provide for the minor by leaving her with relatives without support. Because appellant had a history of substance abuse, DESS promptly recommended a residential treatment program for her. Appellant entered but failed to participate in the program. DESS recommended denial of reunification services. In April 2005, after a contested hearing, the court denied services to appellant and set a section 366.26 hearing.

The minor has two half-siblings who were detained with her in a prior proceeding in Oregon. Her half-sister previously was adopted by the minor's current caretakers and continues to live with them; her half-brother has lived with his father for many years. The minor has regular contact with her half-brother.

DESS filed a report for the hearing which recommended a permanent plan for the minor of adoption by the current caretakers with whom she had lived for almost a year. The report stated the minor had no health problems, was developmentally on track and working at grade level in school. The minor had some emotional difficulties due to her conflicted feelings about her ties to appellant and the growing bond with her caretakers, however she was happy living in her current home with her older sibling. The minor was in therapy to deal with various issues. According to the report, appellant maintained weekly supervised visits. The minor had episodes of nocturnal enuresis following visits with appellant. Although initially ambivalent on the issue of adoption, the minor had recently expressed a preference for adoption by her current caretakers.

An assessment by the Department of Social Services was attached to the DESS report. The assessment stated there were some concerns about the minor's mental and emotional status. According to the assessment, the minor was willing to accept the permanency of adoption if recommended but did not want to make the decision herself due to her conflicting loyalties. The minor was reportedly relieved when told the recommendation would be for adoption. The assessment stated the current caretakers were committed to the adoption. The assessment concluded the minor had substantial emotional ties to, and a positive relationship with, the current caretakers and would benefit from adoption.

Prior to the section 366.26 hearing, the court ordered a bonding assessment. The assessment stated that the minor showed role reversal, i.e., taking a parental role with respect to appellant by comforting her and worrying about her. The minor was unable to express independent views and the relationship between appellant and the minor was described as that of two teenaged friends. The assessment suggested that because of the minor's history of abandonment by appellant, she would be unable to say no to appellant and had to be protected from abandonment in the future to develop her individual potential. According to the assessment, appellant had no permanent residence or source of income, took little responsibility for her life and was not a good role model for the minor. Contact with appellant was seen to be stressful for the minor and there was no indication appellant was able to be a parent to the minor. Although the assessment recommended guardianship because the minor did not want to be adopted, it also recommended limited visitation which would cease if appellant did not conform to specific visitation rules.

At the contested hearing in October 2005, the court first addressed appellant's petition for modification which sought an order for services. The court accepted the findings in the bonding study but rejected the conclusions as inconsistent and denied the petition for modification.

Regarding the permanent plan, the social worker testified that he had discussed adoption with the minor several times and the minor stated she wanted to be adopted but have ongoing contact with her grandmother and half-brother. The minor did not mention appellant in this discussion. The social worker described the minor as distressed and worried about appellant and that she had difficulty saying or doing anything to upset appellant.

The juvenile court found the minor was likely to be adopted and that appellant had not shown termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minor. The court terminated parental rights selecting adoption as the permanent plan.

DISCUSSION

I

Appellant argues substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court's finding that the minor is likely to be adopted because the minor has made statements in the past that she did not want to be adopted and she has emotional problems.

When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)

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