In re Steven N.
Filed 1/29/07 In re Steven N. CA2/2
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for
publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
TWO
In re STEVEN N., a Person | B188353 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. PJ33345)
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THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and
v.
STEVEN N.,
Defendant and
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APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.
Robert J. Totten, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal.
Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Mary Jo
Graves, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, G.
Tracey Letteau, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
___________________________________________________
Appellant, Steven
N., admitted the allegations in a juvenile
delinquency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602)[1] that
when he was 12 years old he committed a lewd act upon a child (Pen.
Code, § 288, subd. (a); count 1) and orally copulated a person under
the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)(c)(1); count 2). The
juvenile court found count 1 of the petition true, held count 2 in
abeyance, and placed appellant home on probation.
We hold as follows: (1) since appellant did not
appeal from the dispositional order,
he cannot complain about that underlying order placing him home on probation
rather than granting a deferred entry of judgment (§ 790), or about the
court's statement of the theoretical maximum period of confinement; and (2) the
court had no statutory authority to grant a postjudgment motion seeking to
vacate the home on probation order and grant a belated deferred entry of
judgment.
FACTUAL AND
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY[2]
On the afternoon of October 6, 2003, Los Angeles police officers went to a home in response to a radio call about
child sexual abuse. The officers interviewed the victim's mother. The mother
indicated that approximately two weeks previously when their family was having
dinner with other family members, she noticed that appellant and the victim,
who are cousins, were no longer present with the rest of the family. The
mother searched the house and discovered the two of them inside a locked
bathroom. She unlocked the bathroom door and found appellant pulling up his
pants and the victim standing frightened against the bathroom door. When the
mother asked appellant what had happened, appellant stated that he touched the
victim's vagina, kissed her tongue to tongue, and had her kiss his penis.
One of the officers also interviewed the
victim. She told the officer that appellant made her lick his penis, that he
licked her vagina, and that he put his tongue into her mouth. At the time of
the incident, appellant was 12 years old and in seventh grade; the victim was 4
years old.
In a written statement to the officers,
appellant acknowledged the details of the incident. He also acknowledged that
he â€
Description | Appellant, Steven N., admitted the allegations in a juvenile delinquency petition (Welf. and Inst. Code, S 602) that when he was 12 years old he committed a lewd act upon a child (Pen. Code, S 288, subd. (a); count 1) and orally copulated a person under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, S 288, subd. (a)(c)(1); count 2). The juvenile court found count 1 of the petition true, held count 2 in abeyance, and placed appellant home on probation. Court hold as follows: (1) since appellant did not appeal from the dispositional order, he cannot complain about that underlying order placing him home on probation rather than granting a deferred entry of judgment (S 790), or about the court's statement of the theoretical maximum period of confinement; and (2) the court had no statutory authority to grant a postjudgment motion seeking to vacate the home on probation order and grant a belated deferred entry of judgment. |
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