In re Stewart M.
Filed 4/21/06 In re Stewart M. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
| In re STEWART M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B177984 |
| THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. STEWART M., Defendant and Appellant. | (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. MJ11297) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Richard E. Naranjo, Judge. Affirmed.
Gerald Peters, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Marc E. Turchin, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Analee J. Brodie, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
SUMMARY
Appellant challenges the decision of the juvenile court sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition against him on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence, evidentiary error, and failure to exercise discretion in setting the maximum confinement term. We conclude sufficient evidence supported the court's finding that appellant committed robbery, as he used force against a store security guard during the asportation of shoplifted merchandise. The court erred by admitting testimony regarding a statement appellant's companion made to a sheriff's deputy, but the error was harmless. Additionally, the court had no authority to exercise discretion under Welfare & Institutions Code section 731, subdivision (b), as that section applies only where a minor is committed to the Department of Youth Authority.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant and his companion Shelton B. stuffed candy and other Valentine's merchandise from a Rite-Aid store into Shelton B.'s backpack, and then left the store without paying for the merchandise. Shelton B., who was wearing the backpack as the young men left the store, temporarily escaped. A loss prevention agent detained appellant.
The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition alleging second degree burglary and second degree robbery. Appellant was already a ward of the court based on a prior sustained Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. As a result of the second petition, the court extended appellant's maximum confinement term and continued him home on probation.
DISCUSSION
1. Sufficient evidence supported the robbery charge.
Appellant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the robbery charge the juvenile court found true, in that there was insufficient evidence of force or fear. He argues the evidence failed to show the loss prevention officer was afraid, Shelton B. used force to take the merchandise, or appellant's use of force against the loss prevention officer was intended to help Shelton B. escape with the merchandise.
The same standard governs review of the sufficiency of evidence in adult criminal cases and juvenile cases. The record as a whole is reviewed in the light most favorable to the judgment to decide whether substantial evidence supports the conviction, so that a reasonable fact finder could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Ceja (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1134, 1138; In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.)
Robbery is defined as the taking of personal property of some value, however slight, from a person or the person's immediate presence by means of force or fear, with the intent to permanently deprive the person of the property. (Pen. Code, § 211; People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 34.) Either the gaining of possession or the carrying away must be accomplished by force or fear. (People v. Pham (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 61, 65.) Theft becomes robbery if force or fear is used during asportation, e.g., to prevent the owner from regaining his property, even though the original taking is accomplished without force or fear. (People v. Estes (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 23, 28.)
Rite-Aid loss prevention agent James Logoy testified that he watched appellant and Shelton B. load the merchandise into the backpack worn and carried by Shelton B. The young men walked out of the store without paying for the merchandise. Logoy followed them, identified himself as a Rite-Aid loss prevention officer, and asked them to return to the store. Appellant turned, elbowed Logoy in the stomach, and told Shelton B. to run. Appellant then struck Logoy in the head with his fist. Logoy attempted to grab Shelton B.'s backpack, but the young man ran out of reach, boarded a scooter, and fled. Logoy grabbed appellant and wrestled him back into the store and onto the floor. Appellant struggled and attempted to strike Logoy's face and bite his arms.
Deputy Sheriff Christopher McMaster testified appellant waived his Miranda rights and made a statement in which he initially denied involvement and blamed Shelton B., but ultimately admitted he and Shelton B. planned to take the items from Rite-Aid.
Appellant testified Shelton B. alone took the merchandise. He denied striking Logoy or attempting to block or strike him. He also denied knowing that Logoy â€
