In re Teresa M.

Filed 7/12/07 In re Teresa M. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County.

David S. Milton, Judge. Affirmed.

Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Stephanie T.

Ernesto Paz Ray, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Cecilio R.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Corry Assistant County Counsel and O. Raquel Ramirez, Deputy County Counsel for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Cecilio R. (Father) and Stephanie T. (Mother) appeal from the order terminating their parental rights as to Teresa and Martha, who were three and two years old at the time of the order. Appellants argue that the order is not supported by substantial evidence in that the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), exception applies.[1] Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts determination, and the orders terminating parental rights shall be affirmed.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

The children were declared adoptable by the court. The prospective adoptive parents are a maternal great-aunt and uncle (Maria B. [twin sister of maternal grandmother] and Greg B.) who had been caring for the children on weekends while their paternal aunt Cristina R. cared for them during the weeks until August 15, 2006, when the maternal great-aunt became their caretaker.

The proceedings ending in termination of parental rights began when the spiral fracture of Marthas right femur was reported and additional fractures were then discovered.[2] Both Martha, then two months old, and her sister Teresa, then 14 months old, were placed in protective custody in October 2004. Martha was detained in a hospital and Teresa was placed in a licensed foster home, with Martha later joining her in that home. With no initial indication who had injured Martha, the court ordered monitored visits for parents and relatives with no discretion to liberalize without prior court order.

Parents at first denied knowing how Martha was injured and blamed a babysitter whose name, address and phone they purportedly did not know. Because of the number of family members who had watched the children preceding Marthas injuries, the children could be placed with none of them. In January 2005, Mother confessed to an investigating police officer that she had picked up Martha hard by the arms, pulled her by the leg and shook the baby.

On January 27, 2005, Mother and Father both waived their rights and entered pleas to the charges in this proceeding. The court ordered the disposition report to address section 361.5 and whether reunification with Mother would be beneficial for the minors. Reunification services were ordered for Father.

As of February 2005, the parents weekly visits with the children had been increased and were going well. Both parents had enrolled in various classes but had not been consistent in attendance.[3] The Department recommended no reunification services for Mother (section 361.5, subd. (b)(5)) and that there be no contact between Mother and the children. The court ordered two-hour visits three times a week for Mother. Father was ordered to complete programs in domestic violence and parent education for infants, as well as to complete individual counseling.

The court ordered investigation of relatives regarding placement of the children. Maternal great-aunt Maria B and her husband retained an attorney to request that they be evaluated as possible suitable placement for the children. The letter from counsel sought a decision against placing the children with Fathers sister, Cristina R, alleging hearsay about previous physical abuse by Cristina R against Teresa; Ms. R.s operating an illegal taxi service from her home; and the likelihood Father would not leave his sisters house if so ordered.[4]

The children were placed with their paternal Aunt, Cristina R., in March 2005. The Department investigated the maternal relatives allegations of neglect against Christine R. in April 2005 and found the referral unfounded. Many relatives from both sides of the family visited with the children.

By April 15, 2005, a court-appointed doctor opined that Marthas injuries were consistent with the history of the infant being picked up by her arms and her legs being pulled and/or twisted. Mother was missing parenting classes, including those on anger management and child development. Beginning March 11, Mother attended five counseling sessions.

Following the issuance of a bench warrant, Mother turned herself in on May 2, 2005, and was booked for Penal Code section 273a, subdivision (a), cruelty to a child with great bodily injury, based on Marthas injuries in the case at bench.[5] Mother asked the court to order classes for her in custody. On May 9, the juvenile court removed the girls from Mothers custody and ordered no family reunification services for Mother because she was incarcerated and therefore not in a position to reunify with the children within the statutory six-month time frame.

The court warned Father how important the next few months were to his effort to reunify with the girls. Father continued with his domestic violence program and was in compliance with the program and counseling components of the case treatment plan. His domestic violence program opined he was in condition to live with and educate his children. However, he also tested positive for drugs and was a no show for other drug tests in the quarter from March to June 2005.[6] Mother remained incarcerated, but many members of the maternal family enjoyed monitored visits at the Department office and in May 2005, the maternal great-aunt and grandmother were approved for day visits. The Department recommended weekend overnight visits for them.

The court gave the Department discretion to allow such overnight visits; ordered the Department to coordinate so Mother could have visits at her place of incarceration;[7] and gave the Department discretion to investigate Fathers residence for possible weekend visits. Father had completed his required 52 sessions of the domestic violence program and was ordered to complete six more clean tests before weekend visits could begin. The court increased his visits to three times a week.

After the court hearing of June 22, 2005, in front of the children, Father and his sister, Cristina R., got in an argument that became physical. The CSW saw the sisters injuries during what was to be a monitored visit with Father. Cristina R. applied for a temporary restraining order to keep Father, her brother, away from her. The court so ordered. The superior court granted a restraining order on June 29, 2005, based on Fathers punching his sister in the forehead and left eye.[8]

Months later, in October 2005, the Department filed an ex parte application to liberalize Fathers visits to unmonitored. Father had been testing negative, re-enrolled in an anger management program, and had been consistently visiting the girls 2-3 times a week for 1-2 hours. The Department reported During such visits the children appear comfortable in the presence of the father. The father appropriately cares for the childrens needs and ensures the childrens needs are met. The girls run to greet their father and cry at the end of the visit when he leaves. The court granted the Department discretion to liberalize his visits to unmonitored day visits after Father had been attending domestic violence counseling for 30 days.

There was a physical altercation between Fathers former employer and Father in November 2005; Fathers jaw was fractured.[9] By the December 2005 hearing, he was still employed and Mother was still incarcerated. The children were taken to visit Mother at Twin Towers Correctional Facility, which Mother enjoyed and wanted to continue. Mother stated she loves her children and wants to maintain contact.

The Department reported that the children started licensed day care in November 2005 after request of the caregiver, Cristina R. Moreover, the Department investigated and verified an allegation that the paternal aunts live-in boyfriend had not been live-scanned.

Conference notes of November 2, 2005, stated the children have many relatives who care about them and appear to be happy around their relatives. The notes stated Fathers visits have been consistent with visits, visits have gone well and Father has been compliant with case plan. Mother was incarcerated at the time.

In its report for December 16, 2005, the Department opined that adoptability is very high and several family members have come forward. In light of Fathers failure to complete and/or attend various programs, the Department believed the children could not safely return home to him and recommended the court terminate family reunification services and schedule a section 366.26 hearing.

Father reported he was working hard to get his children back. Indeed, he was making very good progress in his programs for drugs and alcohol, with the Department stating he has demonstrated that he lead a clean sober living and no longer required to drug and alcohol test.[10] On January 11, 2006, his compliance with the program lead to unmonitored visits with his daughters, with the initial visit scheduled on January 13. Unfortunately, Father along with maternal grandmother were arrested based for commercial burglary, shoplifting childrens clothes, on January 11 following a visit with the CSW. Both gave conflicting stories and denied the charges.[11] Father pleaded no contest and was placed on probation for three years.

The Department recommended termination of family reunification services for Father and the scheduling of a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan of adoption. The interim report prepared for January 23, 2006, stated: Based[d] on the above information it would appear that fathers behavior and lack of judgement place the children at risk. Therefore, the children can not safely return home to the father. The CSW reported that the prospective adoptive mother, then paternal aunt Cristina R., was reportedly allowing the children to stay overnight with non-approved relatives and was not following up with health care; the CSW found Cristina R. was meeting their health needs and the other issue was addressed by a conference to deal with visitation issues.

A contested .21 hearing was held January 23, 2006. Over the Departments objections and noting Father was clearly involved in the burglary and was on overlapping probations for various offenses, the juvenile court ordered further family reunification services for Father and ordered him to continue in anger management and comply with the terms of his probation.[12] The court admonished Father that the additional 90 days would be the absolute end of it. The Department was given discretion to allow Father unmonitored visits.

By the time of the April 19, 2006, hearing, Mother was serving her sentence at Chowchilla Correctional Facility and had not visited with the children since her transfer to that facility. Released pending his court hearing, Father had again been incarcerated in Twin Towers. He had been arrested on April 4, 2006, for hit and run with property damage, driving without a license and possession of a deceptive government ID/drivers license.[13] The Department recommended termination of Fathers reunification services and scheduling a section 366.26 hearing to select and implement a permanent plan of adoption. Fathers own counsel recognized that Father appears to do everything the Department wants and then shoots himself in the foot every time.

A contested section .22 hearing was held May 4, 2006. The court took judicial notice of the file, terminated family reunification services for Father, and continued for a section 366.26 hearing.

On August 15, 2006, a new social worker removed the children from the home of Fathers sister, Cristina R.[14] In September 2006, Fathers sister sought an order returning the girls to her care.[15] She asked to adopt the girls or be their legal guardian, alleging they were closely bonded and viewed her as their mommy. Moreover, she declared that maternal relatives made false accusations, shown by the Department to be unfounded, in their effort to get the girls removed from her home and placed with them. In turn, she made accusations regarding how the maternal relatives interacted with the girls.

The social worker who removed the children to the home of their maternal great-aunt, Maria B., in mid-August reported on September 7, 2006, that the girls are thriving in their home and they are all very bonded to each other. The caregivers are very clear of their commitment to adopt the children. It is in all likelihood that adoption will occur once parental rights have been terminated. The ease in transition was ascribed to the frequent visits with the prospective adoptive family during the previous two years. The court ordered six hour visitation every Saturday with paternal aunt Cristina R., who had had weekday care of the girls until mid-August.

Mother filed a section 388 petition on September 8, 2006. She asked for a change in the courts order of May 9, 2005, that there be no family reunification services provided to Mother. Part of her supporting declaration was that Once convicted [and] incarcerated, she completed parenting [and] continued to visit and/or call children regularly. She is set to re-enroll in counseling now that she is released. Moreover, answering the question of whether the requested change would be better for the children, Mother replied The children know their mother. She has maintained a relationship with her children throughout a difficult period of separation. Even while in custody she had relatives bring the children for visits, and then when she was moved to a facility further away, she kept in phone contact with the children. They recognize [and] know their mother and express joy when they see her, [and] affection. The juvenile court denied the request, stating the request does not show how it will be in the best interest of the child.

On September 18, 2006, the prospective adoptive parents filed a de facto parent request. The declarations stated that the prospective adoptive mother had watched the girls every weekend for two years; had had both children in her care since August 15, 2006; and that she had been approved for adoption.

A report filed October 13, 2006, stated the progress of the two girls and their bonding to their prospective adoptive mother, maternal great aunt Maria B. The prospective adoptive mother told the CSW that the visits with the paternal aunt and parents are going well. The report noted the great aunts involvement with the girls from their baby shower, through birth and since, including taking Martha to the emergency room with multiple fractures, the event precipitating Department involvement.[16] Moreover, the children are loved very much by both sides of the family. The prospective adoptive parents have a good relationship with both parents and would continue to allow post-adoption visits with the paternal aunt and parents.

A contested hearing was held on October 13, 2006, culminating in termination of parental rights. The court took judicial notice of the entire file. The social worker testified that the girls are bonded to Father and have a good time during his visits. She did not know if anybody had observed visits with Mother, who had been in jail.

Mother and Father both testified. Mother described her interaction with the girls during her visits and, once in prison, her telephone calls. Father stated he ended up having to pay for the hit and run arrest in April 2006.[17] First stating he had never lived with the girls, and then seemingly saying and then retracting that he lived with them at the time of Marthas injury, Father said his relationship with his daughters is very, very special, a very special relationship because I think that they really love me a lot.

Maria B., the prospective adoptive mother and great-aunt who had been Mothers foster parent when she was 14 or 15 years old, agreed that the girls absolutely seemed to enjoy their three visits with Father since August 15, and she felt they would continue to benefit with contact from Father and Mother. She would continue to allow both parents to have monitored visits even if their parental rights were terminated. Maria B. did not know if the children would suffer if they did not see their parents again. She wanted to adopt them and have them maintain a healthy relationship with everyone in the family.

The court found Father was evasive and flat out dishonest to this court in many material ways and that Mother lied to the court. Moreover, the court found no bond between these parents and this child . . .  Virtually none. At least not to the level where it would be detrimental to these two children to terminate parents parental rights. And the court does so. Instead, it would be detrimental to return the children and to maintain the relationship with the parents. The court denied motions for de facto parent status by both movants.[18] Both Mother and Father appeal from the order terminating their parental rights.

DISCUSSION

1. The section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) exception.

Where the juvenile court finds that the child is likely to be adopted, it must select adoption as the permanent plan unless it finds that termination of parental rights would be detrimental under one of six specified exceptions. (In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826.) Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), provides an exception to the relatively automatic decision to terminate parental rights at this point in the dependency proceedings stage (see In re Cynthia D. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 242, 259-250; accord In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435, 447) where the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [] (A) The parents or guardians have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. (Italics added.)^[19]

The burden is on the parent to prove that the exception applies. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449; In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350; In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108; In re Derek W., supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 826-827; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343-1345; In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164.) If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575 [].) (In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 773.)[20]

A juvenile court order declining to apply the statutory exception is reviewed for substantial evidence (In re Derek W. supra, 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827) or abuse of discretion (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1351.) The practical distinction between the two standards of review is insignificant in this context. (Ibid.)

2. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts order, and the order terminating parental rights was not an abuse of discretion.

Fathers visits in the case at bench were very regular, although as respondent notes, Fathers version of their frequency is somewhat contradicted by other testimony. Father had worked hard and had substantially complied with requirements of his family reunification plan. Mothers visits were interrupted first by her incarceration in county jail and then by her move to state prison. Even if both parents visitation were to qualify for the first prong of the exception, as we next explain, substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts decision not to apply the exception in the case at bench.

Assuming regular visitation, the question facing the juvenile court is whether the children would benefit from continuing the relationship and whether termination would be detrimental to the children. While the Autumn H. language cited above is seen as setting the hurdle high, it does not set an impossible standard nor mandate day-to-day contact.[[21]] Rather, the decision attempts to describe the nature of the beneficial parent-child exception to the general rule that adoption should be ordered when the child is likely to be adopted. . . . . The Autumn H. standard reflects the legislative intent that adoption should be ordered unless exceptional circumstances exist, one of those exceptional circumstances being the existence of such a strong and beneficial parent-child relationship that terminating parental rights would be detrimental to the child and outweighs the childs need for a stable and permanent home that would come with adoption. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 51 [a caretaker or friendly visitor relationship is not sufficient].)

The courts balancing of competing considerations must be performed on a case-by-case basis, taking into account variables such as the childs age, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and child and the childs individualized needs. (In reJasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1349-1350, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 644; Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at pp. 575-576, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 535.) In re Aaliyah R., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 450.)

The two children were very young when detained. Teresa was 14 months old, and Martha was only two months old. Martha had been very seriously physically abused as an infant, resulting in broken bones. Mother was never given family reunification services and pleaded to the criminal offense stemming from Marthas physical abuse. Despite Mothers plea and incarceration, at the .26 hearing she denied injuring Martha. The juvenile court found her to be a liar. Given her conduct, the paucity of her visitation, and her lack of any real maternal role with the children, the juvenile court did not err in deciding not to apply the exception.

Fathers story is more problematic, but we reach the same conclusion. He clearly relished his relationship with his daughters and was highly motivated to maintain that relationship. Father did an admirable job in substantially completing the many requirements for family reunification. The girls very much enjoyed their time with him. Despite his repeated shooting himself in the foot, Fathers progress was such that the juvenile court extended family reunification for him in the hope that Father could progress from his regular monitored visitation to unmonitored weekend visitation and eventually to custody of the girls. Fathers own erratic conduct prevented that from happening. The court questioned Fathers credibility. A decision that continuing the relationship did not meet the Autumn H. test and it was not beneficial enough to outweigh adoption is supported by the record. (See In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 424, a very close case where the child had spent far more time living with his father than the children in the case at bench and the court found substantial evidence supported not applying the (c)(1)(A) exception.)

The girls looked to their paternal aunt and then their maternal great-aunt to perform parental duties. The up and down trajectory of parents involvement with the children deprived them of the day-to-day parental relationship envisioned by Autumn H., supra, and a reasonable trier of fact could find that the nature of the girls relationship with either Mother or Father does not outweigh the stability adoption would give them.The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances (In re Jasmine D., supra, at pp. 1348-1349, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 644), to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53; accord In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 674 [reiterating state interest in expeditious resolution of dependency matters].)
These children deserve permanence and stability. (In re Josiah Z., supra, 36 Cal.4th 664,674, [importance of permanent, stable homes if minors cannot be returned to their parents].) A child who has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree, but that does not meet the child's need for a parent. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466.)

DISPOSITION

The orders terminating parental rights are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

COOPER, P.J.

We concur:

RUBIN, J.

BOLAND, J.

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[1] Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] There had been a previous referral in which Mother and Father admitted he hit her while she was holding one daughter and pregnant with the other. When she was a child, Mother was removed from her mother by Childrens Services.

[3] Father had completed his parenting classes and had completed 34 of 52 domestic violence sessions.

[4] They hired a private investigator and renewed their pleas to become the full-time care providers in April 2005, again alleging the illegal taxi service and other misconduct by Cristina R. and Father. Maria B. did very well in child development classes she took voluntarily. Their request for de facto parent status was denied.

[5] Mother pleaded guilty to inflicting the injury and received a two year prison sentence for the crime. Nevertheless, she denied inflicting the injury when she testified at the hearing on termination of parental rights and contended she did not have a clue as to who did it. She suspected the paternal aunt might have done it.

[6] The Department therefore requested six more months of family reunification services for Father to comply with his substance abuse treatment and rehabilitation program.

[7] Mothers counsel noted that Mother did not know anything about her rights and, even though she does not have family reunification services, would like visitation with her older daughter.

[8] In late May 2005, Father had been arrested on a traffic warrant and served three days in jail.

[9] Aside from absences for surgery in early December 2005, Father was participating in his programs and had tested negative for drugs and alcohol until November 28, when he tested positive for codeine and morphine, which he stated were from the treatment for his fractured jaw. He missed three anger management classes in November.

[10] He was less consistent with his anger management classes, missing three meetings, and was advised to continue attending the anger management program.

[11] Subsequent review of a videotape apparently showed both had been shoplifting.

[12] By February 13, 2006, Father had completed 12 sessions of anger management. The group facilitator stated Mr. R.s participation was helpful, well motivated by personal factors being the most predominant his daughters well being.

[13] Fathers counsel stated all charges were dropped regarding the hit and run and shoplifting.

[14] The social worker found paternal aunt to be negligent about the girls health and safety. In addition, she was not forthcoming about her employment and marital status.

[15] Paternal aunt Cristina R. also requested status as a de facto parent, and over the opposition of childrens counsel, the court granted her request. A department report filed September 19, 2006, recommended denying the paternal aunts home study for inter alia lack of communication with the Department; lack of proper identification; the married status of her live-in boyfriend, whose wife would not sign a spousal waiver needed to proceed with the adoption; her giving the girls bedroom to her boyfriends son when the girls were away; and her physical altercation with Father in July 2005.

[16] Cristina R., the paternal aunt who previously had been watching the girls during the week, filed a response that contradicted various representations about the maternal great aunt/prospective adoptive mother and asserted Teresa was once bitten by that persons dog and Maria B. did not know what to do, returning the children to the paternal aunt.

[17] He forgot being arrested for the burglary. He pleaded guilty to the burglary, spent a couple of weeks in jail, and was placed on probation for three years on condition he would not go near the store. He also pleaded guilty to the hit and run, saying it was to avoid 18 months. Moreover, he had been on three years probation starting in January 2004 for an assault on Mother. He was also on misdemeanor probation for copying a provisional permit. The girls were never with him when he was arrested.

[18] The paternal aunt withdrew her section 388 motion at the beginning of the hearing because the home study was not approved but submitted the de facto motion.

[19] Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. . . . The court need not continue to consider the issue of reunification at the section 366.26 hearing. The burden thereafter is on the parent to prove changed circumstances pursuant to section 388 to revive the reunification issue. . . .  [] . . . The parents interest in having an opportunity to reunify with the child is balanced against the childs need for a stable, permanent home. The parent is given a reasonable period of time to reunify and, if unsuccessful, the childs interest in permanency and stability takes priority. Even after the focus has shifted from reunification, the scheme provides a means for the court to address a legitimate change of circumstances while protecting the child's need for prompt resolution of his custody status. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309, italics added; accord In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1344 [when reunification efforts cease, the scale tips away from the parents interest in maintaining family ties and towards the childs interest in permanence and stability].)

[20] Father correctly notes that Dependency proceedings are not simply a conveyor belt leading to the termination of parental rights. (In re Daijah T. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 666, 676.) Daijah T., id. at page 675, involved a section 388 petition where no evidentiary hearing had been allowed; the Court of Appeal decried what it saw as the disturbing trend whereby referees of the Sacramento County Juvenile Court have been erroneously denying parents their rights to evidentiary hearings in dependency cases. In the case at bench, Mother and Father were afforded an evidentiary hearing before their parental rights were terminated.

[21] See, e.g., In re Brandon C. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1530, 1537-1538, where the juvenile courts decision ordering legal guardianship for the minors with their paternal grandmother without terminating parental rights was affirmed on appeal. Mothers relationship with her twin sons in that case involved weekly visits; the paternal grandmother, who was the prospective adoptive parent, testified as to the strong parental bond in Brandon C. Father asks this court to decide that legal guardianship would be the proper placement in the case at bench.

In In re Amber M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 690-691, the Court of Appeal reversed for a new section 366.26 hearing. In Amber M., Mother was not ready for the childrens return to her custody. The court nevertheless disapproved termination of Mothers parental rights even though the grandparents home would be suitable, stating If the proposed adoptions proceed, the three children will be adopted in two separate groups, and the maintenance of mother-child and sibling relationships will depend solely on both grandparents' continued goodwill. (Id. at pp. 690-691.) All experts except the social worker in Amber M. found a strong mother-child bond. (Id. at p. 690.) Mother in Amber M. had had far more of a parental role with her children than either parent in the case at bench: Amber [5 years old at detention] had been in Mothers care for most of her life, Samuel [2 1/2 years old] had been in her care for more than half of his life, and Destiny had been in her care for the first seven months of her life. (Id. at p. 689.) The juvenile court upon remand was to conduct a permanency hearing as to guardianship or long-term foster care, but not terminate Mothers parental rights.