In re Ti. C.

Filed 6/21/07 In re Ti. C. CA2/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Debra L. Losnick, Commissioner. Affirmed.

Kate M. Chandler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and Lisa Proft, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

INTRODUCTION

Volare P., mother of Ti.C. and Ty.P., appeals from the juvenile courts order granting legal guardianship of the girls to Ti.s paternal grandmother. She contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying her counsels oral request for a continuance of the Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26[1]hearing at which the guardianship order was entered. Finding no abuse of discretion, and also finding that ample evidence supported the courts order granting guardianship to the grandmother, we affirm.

factual and procedural background

Volare P. (Mother) has five children, only two of whom are involved in the present appeal: Ti. (born in Nov. 1999) and Ty. (born in July 2004). Their three older siblings, Andrew P. (born in Dec. 1992), DeAndre P. (born in March 1994), and Champaigne W. (born in Dec. 1995), are also dependents of the juvenile court but have been returned to Mothers custody.[2] Although this appeal involves only Ti. and Ty., we discuss the factual background regarding the other three children in order to address Mothers contention on appeal that there was no reason why the younger girls, Ti. and Ty., should not have been returned to her care, as the three older children were.

1. Initiation ofSection 300 Proceedings

In November 2004, while investigating a referral regarding a woman who shared an apartment with Mother and her children, a social worker from the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) observed that Mothers five children and the other womans three children were home unsupervised. Andrew, then 11 years old, was the oldest child there; Ty. was four months old. When Mother and her housemate returned home, the social worker spoke with them at some length and admonished them not to leave the children unsupervised. The social worker returned to the home the next evening and saw eight-year-old Champaigne and four-year-old Ti. running down the street by themselves.

Andrew and Champaigne told the social worker that Mother disciplined the children by hitting them with a belt and other objects. Although Ti. denied it, she had previously said that her brothers sometimes took her into their room and humped on her. Champaigne confirmed that this had occurred and that Mother knew about it.[3] Ti. and DeAndre told the social worker that everything was fine at home, and denied any abuse, although DeAndre expressed fear that he would get into trouble with Mother if he admitted that they had been left home alone. Mother told the social worker that she used a belt to whoop her kids.

DCFS filed a section 300 petition on November 17, 2004, alleging physical abuse and lack of supervision by Mother. The court found a prima facie case for detaining the children, ordered them suitably placed, and granted Mother monitored visits.

On November 30, 2004, the three girls (Champaigne, Ti., and Ty.) were placed with Ti.s paternal grandmother, Joy P. The two boys (Andrew and DeAndre) were placed in a different foster home, based on the allegations that they had behaved in a sexually inappropriate manner with Ti.

On December 15, 2004, the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition, finding the children to be described under subdivisions (a) and (b) of section 300 based on Mothers inappropriate physical discipline of Andrew and DeAndre. The court granted Mother overnight monitored visits in the paternal grandmothers home.

A contested disposition hearing was held in early February 2005. Mother was ordered to participate in individual counseling to address anger management, and in parenting education classes. Visitation remained monitored, although the court granted DCFS the discretion to liberalize visits.

2. TheSix-Month Review Hearing

For the six-month review hearing ( 366.21, subd. (e)) held in August 2005, DCFS reported that the children (with the exception of DeAndre) were making progress in their placements. Champaigne had made major improvements in her behavior at home and school. She told the social worker she did not want to return to her Mothers care because Mother always yelled at them. Ti. was thriving in the grandmothers home. She told the social worker that she did not want to return to Mothers home because of the rats and roaches. Ty. was too young to make a statement.

DeAndre had been placed in a foster home separate from Andrew because the boys were not getting along. Andrew was doing well in school and, although he had vacillated in the past about wanting to return to his Mother, he had begun to consistently say he did not want to return home. DeAndre was having behavioral problems and difficulty controlling his anger. He said he wanted to return home because it was a familiar environment and he had friends that lived near Mother.

Regarding Mother, in May 2005 DCFS had reported that Mothers overnight visits with the girls (Champaigne, Ti., and Ty.) were not going well. The paternal grandmother told the social worker that during an overnight visit in mid-April, Mother caused considerable chaos and tension in the home. Mother told Champaigne that she only has to listen to Mother. The grandmother said she had to work twice as hard to stabilize the children after visits with Mother. Mother would spend more time on the telephone than with the children, yell at the children, and criticize their clothing. The grandmother was willing to transport the children from her home in Riverside County to Los Angeles for day visits, but wanted the overnight visits to stop.

Similarly, DCFS reported that Mother had overnight visits with the boys (Andrew and DeAndre) in their placement (the maternal great-grandmothers home), but Mother was inconsistent in her visits, and was sometimes uncooperative and argumentative with the great-grandmother. Mother would often call to cancel visits, saying she had things to do.

For the August 2005 six-month review hearing, the social worker reported that although Mother was actively involved in the reunification process, she had a very angry, aggressive, and volatile personality. Mother became very angry and agitated if there was any change in services or questions regarding the programs and services in which she participated. When the social worker spoke with her about her inappropriate behavior with her children, Mother said that it was better than putting my hands on em.

Mother was enrolled in individual counseling and an anger management program, and had completed a 10-week parenting course. She did not, however, demonstrate any understanding that her manner of speaking to the children constituted emotional abuse and caused them harm. She appeared unwilling and unable to change this behavior, and to understand that it impeded her reunification with her children.

Mother had expressed concern that Ty.s hair had begun to fall out. A public health nurse examined the child and found no reason to suspect any abuse or any medical cause for the hair loss. The grandmother took Ty. for a medical checkup, and the doctor also did not express any concerns.

The juvenile court continued the six-month review hearing, ordering DCFS to investigate placing the boys with Andrews paternal aunt, Michelle T.

DCFS reported in September 2005 that, according to Mothers therapist, Mother continued to exhibit angry, explosive behavior and difficulty calming herself. The counseling program in which Mother was enrolled was a short, 15 session program, and the therapist opined that the nature of Mothers challenges required long-term therapy.

Mothers visits and contact with the Andrew and DeAndre continued to be very inconsistent. The boys felt disappointed and resentful, and they no longer wanted to interact with her. DeAndres caregiver reported that Mother said she could not visit the boys in the maternal great-grandmothers neighborhood because she might kill somebody.

Sibling visits were supposed to take place during Mothers monitored visits at the maternal great-grandmothers home, Andrews current placement. However, the visits had not occurred as ordered because the girls resided some distance away in Riverside County, and because Mother was inconsistent in making herself available for visits.

At the continued six-month review hearing in early September 2005, the court ordered DCFS to ensure sibling visits took place, with or without Mother. Mothers counsel expressed to the court Mothers view that there had been an absolute breakdown in communication between Mother and the social worker, and asked that Mothers therapist address whether unmonitored visits should be permitted. The court ordered that the issue should be addressed at the next hearing, and set a progress hearing date for a few weeks later. The court also set a date in March 2006 for a combined 12- and 18-month review hearing ( 366.21, subd. (f), 366.22).

3. The September 2005 Progress Hearing Regarding Visitation

The court held a progress hearing on September 21, 2005. DCFS reported that sibling visits had occurred twice during July, once in August, and once in September. The social worker had made arrangements with the childrens caregivers to transport the children for sibling visits at least once per month. Mother canceled her weekend visit with the children scheduled for mid-September.

Mothers therapist told the social worker that Mother stopped attending therapy in late July, and had missed three sessions. Mother told the therapist she was seeing another psychologist. The therapist told Mother that their sessions did not adequately address the case plan because they dealt solely with domestic violence. The therapist found it difficult to make recommendations regarding whether Mothers visits with the children could be unmonitored because the therapist had not addressed these issues with Mother.

At the September 2005 progress hearing, Mothers counsel disputed the information in the DCFS report that indicated Mother had not been visiting the children. The court ordered that sibling visitation would remain monitored.

4. The March 2006 Review Hearing

For the combined 12- and 18-month review hearing held in March 2006, DCFS reported that Mother refused to attend counseling, saying she did not need it. Mother continued to lack the ability to control her anger, but had not enrolled in an anger management program; the one she completed in 2004 did not help her. Mother was no longer visiting the children. The children wanted to see her during the Christmas holiday, but Mother stated, If they think that theyre gonna see me they have another thing coming. Im [going to] be out of town! In February 2006, her bus pass privileges were discontinued because of her failure to comply with the case plan.

The girls remained with Joy P. Champaigne continued to do well. She was repeatedly disappointed by Mothers failure to keep her promises about visiting and calling, but still wanted to visit with her. Although she missed Mother, she felt her current placement was better for her.

Ti. had begun having tantrums at home, perhaps related to the fact that her father had had another child. She was, however, doing very well in school. Ti. rarely discussed Mother, but did say to the social worker during a visit in January that Mother made her sad when she failed to call. Ty. was developing well and appeared very happy and well-adjusted in her placement.

Joy P., with whom the girls had been placed since November 30, 2004, stated she wanted to become the girls legal guardian. DCFS recommended termination of family reunification services as to all of the children.

As for the boys, Andrew had begun having behavioral problems at home, and was performing poorly in school. He had given up on the idea of being returned to Mothers care, as he had not seen her in months and he knew that she was not complying with the case plan. DeAndre was also having behavioral problems, and no longer appeared hopeful that he could return to Mothers care.

At the hearing in March 2006, DeAndres counsel stated that DeAndre very much wished to return to Mother, and in fact had expected to be able to return home that day. Counsel also stated that sibling visits had not been taking place.

The court continued the matter until the following month for a contested review hearing. That hearing date was later continued until May 31, 2006.

5. Developments Leading Up To the Combined 12- and 18-

Month Review Hearing

In the meantime, before the combined 12- and 18-month review hearing in May 2006, the social worker reported that sibling visits had stopped taking place at the maternal great-grandmothers home because there was some conflict between Mother and people who lived in the grandmothers neighborhood, and Mother said there would be problems if she continued to visit there. Andrews paternal aunt, Michelle T., agreed to have weekly overnight sibling visits at her house. After visits commenced, however, Michelle then had an open case with DCFS involving her own children. Later, Michelle no longer wanted DeAndre in her home because she said he had stolen from her. In addition, Michelle had not completed the required Live Scan clearance. Visits resumed at the maternal great-grandmothers house, but were inconsistent due to lack of cooperation on the part of the caregivers, and lack of predictability with Mother. The social worker was seeking a neutral location where sibling visits could be held regardless of issues regarding Michelle and Mother. DCFS had been evaluating Michelles home for possible placement of the boys, but the process was delayed by her failure to complete the Live Scan, and by the fact that she had moved.

The court ordered DCFS to provide Mother with a bus pass on condition that she use it to visit the children and to attend individual counseling. Mother was in the process of getting a new home, and hoped to be able to have the boys returned to her care. The court ordered the parties to look into arranging for conjoint counseling for Mother and the boys.

On April 6, 2006, Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking return of the children. She alleged that Ti. had a burn on her leg that the social worker did not know about, and that Ty.s hair was not growing. She attached certificates of completion of a parenting course in February 2005, and of anger management programs in August 2004 and August 2005. The petition was denied for failure to show any change in circumstances, or to show how the requested modification would promote the best interest of the children.

6. The May 2006 12- and 18-Month Review Hearing

The combined 12- and 18-month review hearing was ultimately held on May 31, 2006. ( 366.21, subd. (f).) Counsel for the boys stated that the boys had wanted to be returned to Mother since the beginning of the case, and argued that the boys, particularly DeAndre, were not doing well in foster care. In counsels opinion, Mother had complied with the case plan to some extent, and unless we are prepared to simply warehouse these boys in whatever foster placement group home situation is available there for the next five or six years, . . . we need to make a move here. Counsel did not feel there was a substantial risk that would dictate not returning the boys to Mothers custody, and felt Mother should be given a chance to care for them.

Over DCFSs objections, the court ordered Andrew and DeAndre returned to Mothers custody, and ordered DCFS to provide a family preservation referral. The court found that Mother was pretty substantially complying with the court-ordered case plan. With respect to the girls, however, the court noted that the situation was different because they were younger than the boys, and were placed with a relative (paternal grandmother Joy P.). The court found that conditions continued to exist that justified juvenile court jurisdiction, found no substantial likelihood that the girls would be returned to Mothers care in the next six months, and terminated family reunification services as to the girls.

The court set a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing as to the girls for September 26, 2006. At the same time, the court set a hearing date in November 2006 to consider termination of jurisdiction as to the boys.

7. Initial Section 366.26 Proceedings Regarding the Girls

DCFS reported for the section 366.26 hearing that paternal grandmother Joy P. wished to become the legal guardian of Ti. and Ty., but because of ongoing behavioral problems with Champaigne, she did not want to become her legal guardian. Ti. stated that she wanted to live with her grandmother, and did not wish to return to Mother. Ti.s behavior at home had improved dramatically, and she was doing well in school. Ty. was too young to state her placement preference. However, the social worker observed that she was closely bonded to the grandmother.

The caregiver stated that Champaigne behaved in an adult-like and inappropriate manner with boys, cursed, and refused to follow instructions. Her behavior would deteriorate drastically after visits with Mother. Champaignes behavior was adversely affecting the two younger girls, and the grandmother did not feel she was able to continue to care for her.

At the hearing on September 26, 2006, the court ordered Champaigne returned to Mothers care, pending the next hearing date of November 1, 2006, set for a contested section 366.26 hearing. The court ordered Mother to return on that date, and reminded her that the court could proceed in her absence and decide issues against her.

8. The Contested Section 366.26 Hearing

On November 1, 2006, the contested section 366.26 hearing regarding the girls was held. When the matter was called at 1:46 p.m., Mothers counsel informed the court that Mother had been present in court that morning. Counsel had told her she needed to be back at 1:30, but she was not there. Counsel requested a continuance. The court noted the matter had been paged in the hallway, and that Mother had been to court numerous times over the years. The court did not know why Mother had not returned, and apparently counsel could offer no explanation for her absence. The court declined to continue the matter.

By way of an offer of proof, Mothers counsel stated, my client had wanted to testify to indicate to the court that she does not understand, frankly, why she cannot have her two children that are with the caretaker that was present back in her care. She is mindful of the six year olds statements in the report that she does not wish to return to her mother. However, she . . . does not understand why she cant have her two year old home with her. The two year old does have a relationship with her mother. She has been with her mother outside all morning. In fact, when I was speaking to my client, the two year old was clinging to my clients leg, calling her mommy, et cetera. Frankly, my client has difficulty with the fact that this court has returned two [sic] of her children to her, found that she was in compliance with the case plan and did allow two [sic] of her children to return to her care. Specifically one of the children that were returned at the last hearing was with this caretaker as well with these other two siblings. So her question, if you will, was why is she not suitable enough for these other two children? . . . She doesnt think that the caretaker is qualified to be their legal guardian. She believes that she has been thwarted in maintaining contact with her children, that the caretaker does not make the children accessible to her despite the fact that the caretaker has indicated that she has no objection to the mother visiting, but obviously, they live some distance from one another. My client does have some economic restraints that prohibit her from traveling to Perris, California to visit these two children on a regular basis and is asking that this court return the two year old to her care today.

The court responded: Most of your offer of proof is the mother is not understanding how things work here and certainly not a legal basis for me not to grant the guardianship. In fact, looking at the .26 report, should the mother have read it, she would have seen that Champaigne was having great difficulty in the home that she was in, and, if you will, the court had to make a placement for her, and the lesser of evils as I like to say was to return her to her mother. I am happy to see that that appears to be going well, but that does not mean that she is capable of caring for the two younger children, and there is nothing that has been presented to me to tell me that [the paternal grandmother Joy P.] would not be anything but a perfect person to be the guardian of these two children.

Counsel for Ti. and Ty. stated that none of the girls had a problem with Champaigne being separated from the younger two girls. Counsel further noted that Ti. wanted counsel to tell the court that she wanted to stay with her grandmother until she is a grownup. Further, DCFS reported that Ti. said that although she did not want the fact revealed to Mother, she did not want to leave her grandmother. Indeed, she stated that she loved her grandmother, and that even if Mother lived next door she would still live with her grandmother and just visit with Mother.

Accordingly, the court named paternal grandmother Joy P. as the legal guardian for Ti. and Ty.

This appeal followed.

discussion

I. Denial of a Continuance of the Contested Section 366.26 Hearing

Mother contends that the juvenile courts denial of her attorneys oral motion for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing constituted a violation of due process, because it deprived her of a meaningful opportunity to be heard. Further, she argues that she was prejudiced by the courts ruling, in that had she been able to testify regarding her concerns about Joy P., who became Ti. and Ty.s guardian, and regarding her own relationship with the two girls, the court might not have split apart her family. We conclude that the court properly denied a continuance, and that in any event Mother suffered no prejudice.

In granting or denying a request for continuance, juvenile courts are guided by the requirements of section 352. It provides in relevant part: (a) Upon request of counsel for the parent . . . , the court may continue any hearing under this chapter beyond the time limit within which the hearing is otherwise required to be held, provided that no continuance shall be granted that is contrary to the interest of the minor. In considering the minors interests, the court shall give substantial weight to a minors need for prompt resolution of his or her custody status, the need to provide children with stable environments, and the damage to a minor of prolonged temporary placements. [] Continuances shall be granted only upon a showing of good cause and only for that period of time shown to be necessary by the evidence presented at the hearing on the motion for the continuance. Neither a stipulation between counsel nor the convenience of the parties is in and of itself a good cause. . . . [] In order to obtain a motion for a continuance of the hearing, written notice shall be filed . . . unless the court for good cause entertains an oral motion for continuance. (See also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.550(a).)

We review a denial of a request for a continuance of a section 366.26 hearing for abuse of discretion. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 299-300, fn. 3; see also In re Gerald J. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1180, 1187.) The denial of a motion for continuance for absence of a party may constitute an abuse of discretion by the trial court sufficient to justify reversal only where there is an affirmative showing of good cause, such as serious illness or unforeseen circumstances which prevented a party from appearing at trial. [Citations.] (Young v. Redman (1976) 55 Cal.App.3d 827, 831.)

In the instant case, Mother did not demonstrate good cause for a continuance of the section 366.26 hearing. Indeed, there was no explanation for her absence. She had been present in court in the morning, and had been told by her attorney to return for the afternoon calendar. Thereafter, she made no effort to contact the court or her counsel to explain her absence. She had been informed repeatedly by the court that if she was not present the court could proceed without her and could decide issues adversely to her. Under these circumstances, the court clearly did not abuse its discretion by denying her counsels request for a continuance. Further, the courts ruling did not constitute a denial of due process: there was no good cause to continue the hearing, and Mother was afforded a hearing but absented herself for unknown reasons.

In any event, we conclude that Mother was not prejudiced by her inability to testify at the hearing, regardless of the standard of review. Her counsel made a full offer of proof regarding what Mother would have said had she testified. This included: (1) questioning why Ti. and Ty. could not be returned to her when she was found suitable to care for her three older children; (2) demonstrating that she has a close relationship, at least with Ty.; and (3) asserting that Joy P. was not taking adequate care of the children and was thwarting Mothers ability to visit the children.

As to the first topic, Mothers questioning why Ti. and Ty. could not be returned to her like the three older children was answered by the courts express recognition that Ti. and Ty. were in a different situation. They were the youngest children, were placed with a relative (paternal grandmother Joy P.), and were happy and thriving in the care that Joy P. provided them. There is no indication that Mothers testimony could have changed these facts. Further, the record makes clear that Champaigne and the boys were returned to Mothers care not because Mother had conducted herself in exemplary fashion, but rather because the children had longstanding behavioral problems that were causing them to flounder in foster care. The children were continually saddened and disappointed by their lack of contact with Mother. As the court bluntly stated with regard to Champaigne, returning her to Mothers care was the lesser of evils. This by no means constituted an endorsement of Mothers efforts and achievements. The disposition reached as to the three older children certainly did not dictate the proper course of action for Ti. and Ty.

Similarly, regarding Mothers relationship with Ty., anything Mother might have said could not have changed the result. The court was not considering terminating Mothers parental rights; therefore, the closeness of the relationship was not an immediately vital consideration. Rather, the key issue was Mothers ability to adequately care for Ty. In addition, the immutable fact was that Ty. had not been in Mothers custody since she was four months old, and Mother had not visited her frequently since Ty. had been placed with Joy P. Though the child called her mommy, the relationship simply was not so close as to militate in favor of returning the child to Mothers custody.

Finally, as to the suitability of Joy P. to serve as the childrens legal guardian, Mother had already asserted at length in her April 2006 section 388 petition that Ti. had a burn on her leg which she said Joy P. failed to properly address, and that Ty.s hair was not growing. Similarly, the issue of who was to blame for Mothers lack of visitation with the girls had been debated throughout the proceedings. Nothing indicates that Mothers testimony on these subjects at the section 366.26 hearing would have provided anything new. Moreover, the evidence affirmatively demonstrated Joy P.s suitability. Ti. and Ty. were progressing well in her care. Ti. loved Joy P., wanted to live with her until adulthood, and wanted only to visit Mother. We therefore conclude that regardless of the standard of review, Mothers inability to testify did not result in prejudice.

II. Substantial Evidence to Order Guardianship

Mother contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion by establishing guardianship as the permanent plan for Ti. and Ty., rather than long-term foster care. Mother contends Joy had done nothing to address Ty.s lack of hair growth, and also failed to take Ti. for treatment of a burn on her leg and failed to inform the social worker about it. She further contends that Joy thwarted Mothers visitation. Mother also expressed concern that if a child presented problems or challenges, as did Champaigne, Joy would simply give up on her.

In fact, a public health nurse and Ty.s pediatrician had examined Ty.s scalp and found no cause for concern. The social worker found Mothers allegations of caregiver negligence to be unsupported. Mother points to nothing in the record to establish that the girls were being neglected or mistreated, other than her own assertions to that effect. In fact, all indications were to the contrary, and Ti. and Ty. were both thriving in Joys care. On that basis, the court stated, there is nothing that has been presented to me to tell me that Ms. [P.] would not be anything but a perfect person to be the guardian of these two children.

It is true that the court was continually dissatisfied with the lack of sibling visitation in this case. However, the court did not validate Mothers contention that Joy P. was to blame for the lack of visitation, among the siblings or with Mother alone. Several factors conspired to limit the visitation: the distance between the various homes, the lack of transportation, and inconsistency on the part of the caregivers and Mother. In short, there is no support in the record for Mothers assertion that Joy P. was an inappropriate guardian for the children based on her conduct in court-ordered visitation.

Finally, though Mother expressed concern that Joy P. might simply give up on a child who presented behavioral problems, as Joy P. purportedly did with Champaigne, the court did not share this concern. Champaigne presented behavioral challenges throughout the two years that Joy cared for her. This was not a case in which a caregiver readily gave up on a difficult child. In addition, while Ti. had some behavioral problems at times, she was very happy to be living with Joy P. Ty. was still quite young, and appeared to be healthy and developing normally. Their circumstances were entirely different from Champaignes situation.

The Legislature has stated a clear statutory preference in favor of guardianship over long-term foster care. ( 366.26.) Where, as here, someone is willing, able, and appropriate to act as legal guardian for a dependent child, the juvenile court must order guardianship as the childs permanent plan. The court acted in accordance with the statutory requirements in this case, and certainly did not abuse its discretion in doing so.

Finally, we note that Mother argues on appeal that DCFS was remiss in fulfilling its duties, as evidenced by the purported gap between what appears in the reports and what the court ordered. According to Mother, the reports made Mother appear to be a defiant troublemaker who was not complying with her service plan and was not visiting her children, and further made it appear that the boys did not want to return to her care. However, the court found her to be in substantial compliance, and the boys counsel told the court they wished to be returned to her care. Indeed, the court returned both of the boys and Champaigne to Mothers custody.

The record reveals, however, that the court found DCFS was not remiss. Over the objection of Mothers counsel, the court specifically found DCFS had made reasonable efforts to reunify the family. The court recognized that communication had broken down between the social worker and Mother, but at no time did the court question the veracity of the social workers reports. Mother has not directly challenged on appeal the finding that DCFS made reasonable efforts to reunify the family; indeed, the time to challenge that finding has long since passed. To the extent Mother seeks to generally undermine the reliability of the information contained in the social workers reports, we find no support in the record for wholesale rejection of that information. We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in ordering legal guardianship as the permanent plan for Ti. and Ty.

disposition

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

MANELLA, J.

Publication Courtesy of San Diego County Legal Resource Directory.

Analysis and review provided by San Diego County Property line attorney.

[1] All undesignated section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

[2] The children each have a different father, none of whom are parties to this appeal.

[3] This alleged conduct had been the subject of an August 2004 referral to the child abuse hotline, but an investigation concluded at that time that the allegation was unfounded. Dating back to March 1993, 20 referrals had been made to the child abuse hotline regarding Mothers children, 15 of which were found to be inconclusive or unfounded. The disposition of two referrals was stated to be unknown. An allegation made in April 2001 that Mother physically abused Champaigne, thereby putting the siblings at risk, was found to be substantiated. In April 2004, an allegation that the children were victims of substantial risk from Mother was found to be substantiated. Since April 2004, Mother had received voluntary family maintenance services, referrals for family preservation services, referrals to Wraparound/Systems of Care, parenting classes, and bus passes for transportation to the various services. She either refused these services outright, or failed to comply with the service plans.