In re Tiffany M.

Filed 8/8/07 In re Tiffany M. CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Affirmed.

Christopher Blake, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Diane K.

Michael A. Salazar, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant James M., Sr.

M. Elizabeth Handy, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objectors and Appellants.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and Owen L. Gallagher, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

* * * * * *

Appellants Diane K. (mother) and James M., Sr., (father) are the parents of co-appellants, James, Jr., (James) age 17, and Stacey, age 16. They are also the parents of Tiffany, age 13, and B., age 7. Although Tiffany and B. are the subjects of this appeal, they are not appellants.

Mother, father and the siblings (James and Stacey) appeal from an order of the juvenile court terminating parental rights for Tiffany and B. following hearings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.^[1] Collectively, appellants contend there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the parental relationship exception of subdivision (c)(1)(A), the child veto exception of subdivision (c)(1)(B) and the sibling relationship exception of subdivision (c)(1)(E) did not apply to the facts of this case. Mother separately argues that if a child over 12 is ambivalent about being adopted, the court must find that the child is presently not adoptable and refuse to terminate parental rights.

Finding no error, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In January 2001, James, Stacey, Tiffany and B. were declared dependents of the juvenile court under section 300, subdivision (b), on allegations of unsafe, filthy and unsanitary living conditions in the home. The minors ultimately returned to their parents custody, but they remained dependents until the courts jurisdiction was terminated in May 2002.

A second petition for the minors was filed by the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in June 2004. At that time, James was 14, Stacey was 13, Tiffany was 11 and B. was 5 years old. The petition again alleged filthy and unsanitary living conditions in the home, as well as physical abuse and chronic truancy. The minors were taken into protective custody once more, and the juvenile court ordered Stacey, Tiffany and B. to be placed together as a sibling group absent an emergency.

Mother and father submitted on an amended petition in July 2004, and the minors were once again declared dependents of the juvenile court. The court provided for sibling and parent visits at least once a week with discretion to liberalize visitation. The DCFS was ordered to attempt to place the minors together, particularly the three girls.

In October 2004, the DCFS reported to the juvenile court that the parents initially had visited the minors weekly. As time went on, the parents began to feel the financial effect of not receiving AFDC^[2]benefits. They no longer were able to afford a hotel room and started living on the streets. By August 2004, parent visitation had tapered off significantly. The parents previously had picked up their bus passes from the DCFS at the beginning of each month in order to visit the minors. They gradually came in later each month and then not at all. In September, mother informed the DCFS the parents had used their last $50.00 to purchase a tent to live on the streets. The parents initially had made an attempt to comply with court ordered programs but by this time had ceased participating at all.

Initially, all three girls were placed together and James was placed in a separate home. The girls foster family later found they could also care for James, and he too was placed in that home. The arrangement worked well until the home was decertified and another foster home had to be found for the minors. At that point, all three girls could have been placed in the same home, but Stacey instead opted for a separate foster home where there were other teenagers. Stacey had behavioral problems at her chosen placement, and the DCFS then considered placing Stacey with her two sisters. Tiffany and B.s foster mother declined to take Stacey having observed Stacey with her younger sisters and having noticed B. became very upset after being around Stacey for any length of time. Tiffany and B. were therefore placed in one home, Stacey in another and James in a third. Tiffany and B. were thriving in their foster home and James also was doing well. Stacey, however, had problems adjusting to her placements.

In October 2004, the juvenile court ordered that Tiffany and B. were not to be separated absent an emergency.

As of the six-month review hearing in January 2005, all of the minors were thriving in their placements. The parents were still homeless but hopeful of obtaining housing and reuniting the family. Although the parents had access to transportation funds monthly, they visited their children only infrequently. The DCFS recommended continued reunification services but noted the parents likely would be unable to better their situation by obtaining work or housing. Father had a disfiguring benign tumor that needed removal and suffered from congestive heart failure, which had required hospitalization. Mother appeared to be borderline functioning. The minors had a visitation with their parents at a Christmas party in December 2004, during which they were engaged with each other and father, with whom they appeared very bonded. Mother did not appear bonded with her children. During visits she sat quietly to the side, alone, and the minors interacted with her only when encouraged to do so. The minors at this time were having frequent and regular weekly visits with each other and were speaking to each other over the telephone.

At the 12-month status review hearing in July 2005, the DCFS reported that mother and father would come into the office nearly every month to obtain their bus passes. Although the social worker had reiterated to the parents the importance of visiting their children, as of May 2005 no parent visitation had occurred in the last reporting period. The DCFS concluded that mother and father had transportation funds but visited the minors only after the social worker made repeated requests and only when the worker made the arrangements.

James and Stacey each had to be removed twice from their foster homes during the last period, but Tiffany and B. remained in a stable placement. Mother and father were living in a downtown hotel but were often homeless towards the end of each month. The DCFS reported that they had not participated in court ordered counseling but had indicated they recently resumed parenting classes. The social worker believed the minors were adoptable. However, James indicated he did not want to be adopted because he would be leaving his sisters and it would hurt his parents feelings; Stacey stated she did not want to be adopted and wanted to be reunited with her parents; Tiffany and B. also stated they did not want to be adopted, but the worker thought it was unlikely they fully comprehended what adoption meant and believed they were echoing their big sister Stacey, whom they adore. The court ordered continued reunification services and directed the DCFS to explore placing all four minors together.

For the review hearing in September 2005, the DCFS reported that James and Stacey both had expressed a wish to be placed with their siblings. However, none of the foster care families was willing to take all four minors. The DCFS reported that James had been in six placements, Stacey in five and Tiffany and B. in three since their detention in June 2004. The juvenile court ordered the DCFS to continue its efforts to locate a prospective adoptive home for all four minors together.

In October 2005, the DCFS reported that Jamess foster mother had moved to Moreno Valley, a long distance from his sisters. James was given an option at that time of moving to a local home to remain near his family, but he opted to move with his foster mother and the rest of her household. The DCFS had located a prospective foster couple who were willing to take all four of the minors. After meeting the couple, the minors had mixed reactions. When asked about moving into a home with his sisters, James said he was in a home with boys whom he considered his friends and he preferred staying in his current placement, describing it as a good home, in a good neighborhood. When told she could live with her brother and both her sisters in a new foster home, Tiffany said she liked where she and B. were currently placed; Tiffany did not want to move, even if moving meant she could live with James and Stacey. B. also said she did not want to move into a home with her brother and other sister, saying her new foster mother was nice. Only Stacey did not mind moving. The DCFS therefore placed only Stacey in the couples home.

In November 2005, Tiffany and B.s foster mother declared she was in love with the girls and would like to adopt them if they do not reunite with their parents. She indicated she was willing to pursue an open adoption and allow the girls to continue visiting with their parents and siblings.

For the 18-month review hearing in December 2005, the DCFS reported the parents had made little progress in their service plans. Visits were occurring, but only inconsistently. The minors were visiting each other on Saturdays and still expressed a wish to live with their parents.

In January 2006, the DCFS reported that the parents had been given a schedule of visitation dates with the minors, including explicit instructions on which bus to take from their hotel, the time of departure and the time of arrival at the visitation site. Nevertheless, mother and father only appeared for one visit, and they failed to call their children over the holidays. Sibling visits were not occurring regularly due to the elder siblings being teens with different priorities. The foster mother for Tiffany and B. was no longer transporting them after no one showed up for the visits.

The DCFS also reported that Tiffany and B., although they missed their siblings and parents, were happy and did not want to leave their foster home. Their foster mother again expressed a wish to adopt the girls and a willingness to consider an open adoption.

In January 2006, the juvenile court found the parents had not demonstrated the minors could be returned into their care. The court therefore terminated reunification services for the parents and set the matter for a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing.

In April 2006, the DCFS reported that parental visits had reverted back to supervised status after mother was arrested for offering to pay a parent for adopting one of her children.

For a permanency planning hearing in May 2006, the DCFS reported the minors had random weekly telephone contact with their parents, and that James maintained random weekly telephone contact with his three sisters. However, Stacey did not call her siblings as she did not care to talk on the phone and was too busy to contact her family. During the last period of DCFS supervision, only two sibling visits occurred. The first visit was in February, and the parents appeared for that visit. The second visit was in April to celebrate Tiffanys birthday. Though expected to attend, the parents missed that visit. The parents had an additional visit with Tiffany and B., but they spent the visit asking for the older siblings and were upset they were not present. Tiffany and B. were upset because of the parents preoccupation with the older siblings absence.

The DCFS reported that both Tiffany and B. had stated they wanted to be adopted by their foster mother but also wished to maintain contact with their family. Tiffany at first was reluctant to be adopted because she thought it meant she would lose all contact with her older siblings and parents. When Tiffany was informed her foster mother wanted an open adoption and she could maintain family ties, she said she wanted to be adopted. The foster mother expressed an interest in adopting both Tiffany and B. James did not want to be adopted by his foster family but indicated he might be interested in being placed with Stacey. His foster mother was willing to provide a long-term placement for him. Stacey also did not want to be adopted, and her foster parents were willing to provide a long-term placement for her.

In May 2006, the juvenile court found James and Stacey were not adoptable and guardianship was inappropriate. Long-term foster care was chosen as their permanent plan. Both James and Stacey were secure in their placements, and the court ordered them permanently placed with their caretakers until emancipation.

In September 2006, the DCFS reported that the older siblings were very busy and it was difficult to arrange visitations. The caretakers for the minors had agreed to arrange sibling visits for the first and third Saturdays of every month at a neutral location. However, Stacey was involved in church activities and was taking dance classes on Saturday mornings. She could not schedule visits until the afternoon or evening. The other caretakers could not accommodate that schedule. James had a busy football schedule and found it difficult to schedule sibling visits or to maintain telephone contact with his siblings. He managed one visit with Tiffany and B. in August 2006 and told the social worker once his football practices lessened he would make efforts to attend more visits. Stacey had expressed little interest in pursuing an ongoing relationship with her siblings. Although Staceys social worker spoke to Stacey several times about maintaining contact with her siblings, Stacey showed little interest in doing so. Stacey had written on a piece of paper that she did not want to contact her siblings. Her social worker believed Stacey was focusing on her personal needs and was stressed by interacting with family members.

The DCFSs assessment was that both Tiffany and B. were doing well in their foster home and were attached to their foster mother. An adoptive home study had been approved, and the DCFS was recommending adoption. B. continued to express a desire to be adopted, and Tiffany was reportedly content with the adoption under the condition that she has contact with her biological family. The foster mother stated she was not interested in legal guardianship as B. needed more security and a permanent living situation.

A contested permanency planning hearing was scheduled to take place in September 2006. At the hearing, however, Tiffanys counsel informed the court that Tiffany now did not want to be adopted. The court consequently rescheduled the hearing.

The juvenile court held a contested permanency planning hearing on October 17 and 18, 2006. The court considered reports submitted by the DCFS and heard testimony from mother, father, James, Stacey and Tiffany. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court ordered parental rights terminated. The court concluded the parents had not maintained regular visitation with the minors and had assumed no parental role or relationship with them while they were in care. The court found that Tiffany and B. had shared significant common experiences with their siblings and in their upbringing, and they had close and strong bonds with the older siblings even if they had not seen them often during the past year. Nevertheless, the court concluded the ongoing relationship and ongoing contact did not outweigh the benefit of permanence through adoption. The court stated: I think that all of these children love each other very much. They like to be together, but cant be. Its not their fault. The reality is that their parents messed up and ended up with them in the system and havent done what they needed to do to reunify, and havent done what they needed to do to maintain this family. And in the end, the best thing for these children is to be able to move on and have permanence. The court granted the caretaker discretion to allow monitored contact for the parents and to permit sibling visits with the biological siblings.

Mother, father, James and Stacey timely appealed the courts order. Tiffany and B. did not appeal.

DISCUSSION

When reunification efforts have failed, adoption, when possible, is the permanent plan preferred by the Legislature. (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.) Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1), once a court determines that a child is likely to be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption . . . unless the court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of six enumerated exceptions. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(A)-(F).)

A party claiming an exception to adoption under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A) through (F) has the burden of proof of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the exception applies. (In re Aaliyah R. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 437, 449; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.725(e)(3).) Appellate courts are split as to whether a substantial evidence standard or an abuse of discretion standard governs this courts review of the parental rights termination order. In addressing this issue, appellate courts have applied both the substantial evidence standard (see In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823, 827) or the abuse of discretion standard (see In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339); the practical distinction between the standards of review is insignificant in this context. (Id. at p. 1351.)

Under either standard, the juvenile court did not err in terminating parental rights.

1. The Juvenile Court Properly Found the Parental Relationship Exception of Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(A) Did Not Apply

Under section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the court may forego adoption and refrain from terminating parental rights only if a parent establishes he or she has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. Thus the parental relationship exception is two-pronged, focusing on visitation and contact with the minor and benefit to the minor of continuing the relationship. (In re Aaliyah R., supra, 136 Cal.App.4th at p. 450.)

[T]o establish the exception in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(A), the parents must do more than demonstrate frequent and loving contact [citation], an emotional bond with the child, or that the parents and child find their visits pleasant. [Citation.] (In re Andrea R. (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1108.) Interaction between a natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. Even so, the parental relationship exception requires that the parent-child relationship promote the well-being of the child to such a degree that it outweighs the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1342.) To trigger the parental relationship exception, the parent must show the parent-child relationship is sufficiently strong that the child would be greatly harmed by its severance. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The court must take into account the many variables affecting a parent-child bond, including the age of the child, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and child, and the childs particular needs. (Id. at p. 576.)

Mother and father failed to provide evidence sufficient to invoke the parental relationship exception.

As the court found, and the record shows, mother and father failed to meet the first prong of the parental relationship exception, regular visitation. The documented history indicates that, at best, the parents had only sporadic and infrequent visits with Tiffany and B. once they were in care.

The minors were taken into custody in June 2004. The DCFS reported in October 2004 that the parents initially visited the minors weekly but their visits had tapered off significantly by August 2004. At the time of the six-month review hearing in January 2005, mother and father were visiting the minors only infrequently even though the parents were receiving transportation funds. By May 2005, the parents had not visited the minors even after the social worker had reiterated the importance of visitation when the parents had come into the office to pick up their monthly bus passes. At the time of the 12-month status review hearing in July 2005, the parents were visiting the minors, but only because of repeated requests from the social worker and only when the worker made the arrangements.

The parents visited consistently between July and September 2005 because the social worker transported them. Subsequently, the social worker provided the parents with the visitation schedule, location of the visits and specific directions as to which bus to take and when. Mother and father appeared for the first visitation, but then missed the next three visits. In the quarter of October through December 2005, the parents visited three times and missed several visits. As of January 2006, the parents reportedly had visited the minors only once in the reporting period and had failed to call them over the holidays. In the quarter of January through March 2006, the parents visited twice and were 45 minutes late both times. The parents visits were required to be monitored by a DCFS approved monitor after mother was arrested in February 2006 for offering to pay a person to adopt one of her children. From May 2006 to September 2006, the parents had one visit with Tiffany and B., and the children were visibly upset during the visit because the parents were preoccupied by their older childrens absence. During the visit, the parents had only minimal interaction with the two children. The parents sat on a park bench for most of the visit, hardly talked to the children and mainly observed them playing.

At the permanency planning hearings in October 2006, the court was informed the parents had visited Tiffany and B. once in September and once in October 2006, during which the parents again had only minimal interaction with the girls. Although mother and father testified they had regular weekly visitations with Tiffany and B., their testimony was riddled with self-contradiction and inconsistencies and the juvenile court found them not credible.

Even if the parents were visiting as they claimed, the court found they had no parental role or relationship with Tiffany or B. Mother admitted she had little involvement with them except for watching television. Father interacted with them at the beginning of visits and then was at a loss for what to do. In the period since the minors were detained, neither parent had provided any day-to-day care for the minors or taken any parental role.

There was therefore substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts determination that the parental relationship exception did not apply, and the court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling.

2. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Ruling the Child Veto Exception of Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(B) Was Inapplicable

Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B) provides a further exception to the legislative preference for adoption, permitting the juvenile court to find termination of parental rights detrimental to a child if [a] child 12 years of age or older objects to termination of parental rights. Mother contends that 13-year-old Tiffany was ambiguous regarding her preference on adoption. We disagree.

Before terminating parental rights, the juvenile court must consider the childs wishes, to the extent ascertainable. ( 366.26, subd. (h); In re Leo M. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 1583, 1591.) The juvenile court should explore a childs feelings toward his or her parents, foster parents and prospective adoptive family. (In re Amanda D. (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 813, 820.) In making this determination, the court may consider the childs direct testimony and court reports prepared for the hearing. (Ibid.)

In this case, Tiffany demonstrated some conflict regarding adoption. In July 2005, the social worker reported that Tiffany, along with B., had stated she did not want to be adopted, but the worker felt they were echoing the views of Stacey, whom they adore. In September 2006, the DCFS reported that B. had an ongoing desire to be adopted, but Tiffany had expressed some reluctance to be adopted out of fear that she would never see her older siblings again. The social worker reported that Tiffany, when told her foster mother wanted to maintain a relationship with Tiffanys biological family, said she was happy with being adopted as long as she could have contact with them. At the scheduled contested permanency planning hearing in September 2006, however, Tiffanys counsel informed the juvenile court she did not want to be adopted. The court continued the hearing, allowing an opportunity to further explore Tiffanys views on this issue.

At the continued hearing a month later, Tiffany testified in chambers that she wanted to be adopted and wanted the foster mother to be her mother for the rest of [her] life. After Tiffany testified on direct examination, the juvenile court asked her, Now, do you understand that, if [the foster mother and prospective adoptive parent] adopts you and becomes your mother, that means [mother] will not be your mother anymore? Do you understand that? Tiffany answered, Yes. The court further asked, And do you still want to be adopted even though you know that? Tiffany again answered, Yes.

Tiffany was then cross-examined by three separate attorneys. Mothers counsel asked, What is your understanding of what adoption means, Tiffany? What do you think it means? Tiffany replied, That you cant go back with your family. Mothers counsel continued, And if it means that you will never see your mother again, do you still want to be adopted? After sustaining an objection, the court rephrased the question, asking, If it meant that, until 18, it would be up to [the adoptive mother] if you would ever see your parents, that you dont get to decide until after youre 18, would you still want to be adopted? Tiffany answered, Yes. Tiffany then further testified in cross-examination to the same effect.

Tiffanys direct examination by her own counsel and the followup questioning by the court take up a little over one page of the reporters transcript. Tiffanys cross-examination by the attorneys for mother, for father and for James and Stacey went on for over 11 more pages of transcript, interspersed with objections and evidentiary rulings from the court. Counsel cross-examined Tiffany extensively regarding why she wanted to be adopted, whether anyone talked to her about adoption, whether she realized once the court terminated parental rights she could not change her mind about being adopted, and whether she understood that after being adopted James and Stacey will never be your brother and sister anymore. At the beginning of cross-examination, Tiffany began crying, but she declined a break. Later in her cross-examination, when the juvenile court inquired the reason for her tears, she responded, No reason. However, at the hearing she did not waver on her answer that she wished to be adopted despite vigorous cross-examination.

Mother contends Tiffanys purported ambivalence about being adopted requires reversal of the order terminating parental rights. Mother argues that a childs objections are absolute and, once a child makes his or her objections clear, the court lacks no authority to override it. We need not decide whether this contention is correct, because the juvenile court found on all of the evidence before it that Tiffany did not object to adoption and to the termination of parental rights. The court observed, In fact, [Tiffany] stated she does want to be adopted, even with the understanding that it would mean not having any decision-making over seeing her parents or siblings until shes 18. The court was well aware that Tiffany had gone [b]ack and forth on the question of adoption in the past, and it took that into consideration in reaching its decision.^[3]

The factual circumstances here are similar to In re Christopher L., a case in which the minor, who was over 12 years old, testified he wished to be adopted but also replied no when asked, Would you want to be adopted if . . . you couldnt ever see your mom again? (In re Chrisotpher L. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1335.) The appellate court held that the minors statements should not be considered in a vacuum. It was the juvenile courts task to determine the testimony that accurately represented [the minors] state of mind with respect to adoption. (Ibid.) Applying a deferential standard of review, the appellate court found substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the minors statements did not constitute objections, but instead amounted to statements of preference. (Ibid.) The evidence in this case is stronger than in Christopher L. When Tiffany was asked, [D]o you want to be adopted by [the foster mother]? she replied, Yes. Its okay. She also answered Yes when asked if she want[ed] to have [the foster mother] be [her] mother . . . for the rest of [her] life. Under cross-examination, Tiffany consistently reiterated her preference for adoption, even if it meant she could not see her biological parents or older siblings until after she was 18. Tiffany may have been tearful and sad during her cross-examination, but it was for the juvenile court to observe her demeanor and ascertain her wishes. Her testimony indicated that though she loved her older siblings, she realized adoption would be the best outcome. It was not unnatural for Tiffany to be upset during her testimony. To ask a child in Tiffanys position whether she chose to never see her natural parents or older siblings until after she was grown understandably might have generated anguish. We must have regard for the possible and readily conceivable anguish that such confrontational choices could create in a short lifetime already filled with trauma. (In re Leo M., supra, 19 Cal.App.4th to p. 1593.)

We conclude there was substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that Tiffany did not object to adoption and the court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the child veto exception did not apply.

Mother requests this court to devise guidelines for trial courts and direct them in cases when the child appears conflicted to: (1) provide the child independent counseling to make an unambiguous decision; (2) order the social worker to inform the child that not only is it okay to be adopted, but it is equally okay not to want to be adopted; and (3) forego any decision on permanency and stability for the child by providing the child with whatever time the child may need to reach a firm decision one way or the other. Mother cites no authority to support such modifications to the statutory scheme. Whether the child has made an unambiguous and independent decision regarding adoption is a question of fact to be explored by the childs independent counsel and to be determined by the juvenile court. We have no occasion to dictate what course the juvenile court must follow in cases of ambiguity since in this case the childs wishes were clear.

3. There Was No Error in Finding the Sibling Relationship Exception of Section 366.26, Subdivision (c)(1)(E) Inapplicable

Appellants contend that the court erred by not applying the sibling relationship exception to the termination of parental rights ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E)), because there was a strong relationship between all four siblings that was a key to their long-term security.

To determine the significance of the sibling relationship, the court considers the nonexclusive list of factors set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(E). (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 952.) The court must evaluate whether termination of parental rights would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of that relationship, including whether the child and sibling were raised in the same home, shared significant common experiences or have existing close and strong bonds. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(E); see In re L. Y. L., supra, at p. 951.) If the court determines termination of parental rights will substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, then the court must weigh the childs best interest in continuing that sibling relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the permanency of adoption. (In re L. Y. L., supra, at p. 951.)

The mere existence of a friendly sibling relationship does not trigger the sibling relationship exception. To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference with that relationship. (In re L. Y. L., supra, 101 Cal.App.4th at p. 952, fn. omitted.) Even if a sibling relationship exists that is so strong that severance would result in the childs detriment, the court must still weigh the benefit to the child of continuing the relationship against the benefit to the child adoption would provide. (Id. at pp. 952-953.) The sibling relationship exception must be considered in view of the legislative preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed. [Citation.] At this stage of the dependency proceedings, it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home. [Citation.] The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) Only in rare instances will the sibling relationship be sufficiently strong to outweigh the benefit of adoption. (See In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287, 293.)

In this case, appellants did not establish, under the first prong, a causal connection between the termination of parental rights and a substantial interference with the sibling relationship, nor did appellants establish, under the second prong, the existence of a sibling relationship so strong as to override the benefits to Tiffany and B. of adoption.

All four minors here shared the same parents and were raised in the same home until their detention. They shared significant common experiences of neglect by their parents. At first, after their detention, the minors visited with each other when possible even though James and Stacey were placed in separate homes apart from Tiffany and B. However, when given the opportunity to be placed in the same home as her younger sisters, Stacey chose a separate placement where there were other teenagers. When his foster mother relocated to a distant home, James chose to move with her although he was offered the option of moving to another foster home close to his sisters. After that, James was given the opportunity to live with his sisters, but he chose to stay in his placement, saying he had a good home, in a good neighborhood, where he had made friends. Tiffany and B. also indicated they preferred to remain in the home of the foster mother and prospective adoptive parent rather than move to another foster home where they could live with Stacey. After several unsuccessful placements, Stacey eventually found a compatible home located at a distance from her siblings where she was involved in church activities and dance. At the time of the permanency planning hearing, the siblings had only rare visits with each other. Stacey was focusing more on her personal growth and development. She stated she found it difficult to maintain visitation with her siblings due to her commitment to dance classes and did not like talking to them on the telephone. James was focused on his studies and football. Although he expressed a wish to maintain family ties with his sisters, he found it difficult to do so because of his very busy schedule.

James and Stacey, both of whom object to adoption, are in a permanent plan of long-term foster care. They are unlikely to move from their placements until emancipation. Tiffany and B. have expressed their desire to be adopted. Their prospective adoptive mother has stated she wants them to maintain a relationship with their biological family. Termination of parental rights as to Tiffany and B. therefore will not cause a substantial interference with the sibling relationship over and above that necessarily created by permanent placement of the older siblings in separate and distinct placements. The ultimate question for the court is whether adoption would be detrimental to the adoptive child, not someone else. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at pp. 54-55.) The juvenile court properly weighed the potential detriment and concluded that the best thing for [Tiffany and B.] is to be able to move on and have permanence.

James and Stacey argue that legal guardianship was a viable option and should have been fully explored with Tiffany, B. and their caretaker. However, under section 366.26, once the court determines a child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights unless it finds one of the section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) exceptions applies. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1070.) If no exception applies, it is in the childs best interests to terminate parental rights. (In re Carl R., supra, at p. 1070.) Only if the court finds adoption of the child or termination of parental rights is not in the best interest of the child does it then consider whether to order guardianship or long-term foster care. ( 366.26, subd. (c)(4)(A).) Appellants do not contend Tiffany and B. are not adoptable, as they clearly are. Because the court found no exception exists, the court was not required to consider guardianship. (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164-1165.)

In re Naomi P. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 808, upon which appellants rely, is inapposite. The juvenile court there selected a permanent plan of legal guardianship after finding the sibling relationship exception applied. (Id. at pp. 820-821.) Demeanor evidence played a large role in the juvenile courts decision. It observed that each of Naomis siblings while testifying had  a happy, joyful expression on their face when they talked about Naomi  and was persuaded Naomi herself enjoyed the visits since the siblings chose to spend their Saturdays with her even though they could have better things to do. (Id. at p. 821.) The juvenile court was not convinced by the prospective adoptive parents demeanor and had doubts about her intentions. (Ibid.) The appellate court affirmed the juvenile courts order selecting legal guardianship as the permanent plan. (Id. at p. 824.)

Here, we find sufficient evidence supports the juvenile courts decision that the sibling relationship exception does not apply. Indeed, since Tiffany and B.s foster mother has stated she is not interested in a legal guardianship, such a result would mean another displacement and detriment to these minors. It would have been preferable for all four minors in this case to have been placed together at the outset or, if that was not possible, for arrangements to have been made for regular and frequent sibling visitations to occur. Such an arrangement might have made a difference in maintaining a sibling bond. Since such did not occur, the court did the best it could under the circumstances.

DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

FLIER, J.

We concur:

COOPER, P. J.

BOLAND, J.

Publication Courtesy of California free legal resources.

Analysis and review provided by Spring Valley Property line attorney.

^[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

^[2] Aid to Families with Dependent Children.

^[3] At the end of Tiffanys testimony, the juvenile stated, Tiffany, youre pretty smart. I mean Im really impressed. Youre sitting here with all these adults all dressed in suits around you, and you took your time, and you listened to the questions. And you knew a lot more about adoption than what I was expecting, and I think you spoke pretty well for yourself. So, were done. You dont have to answer any more questions.