Filed 5/31/22 In re Timothy L. CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Hernan D. Vera, Judge. Affirmed.

Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, and Brian Mahler, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_________________________

Following the termination of parental rights to his son, Timothy L. (Timothy, born June 2018), Aldo L. (father) filed the instant appeal, assigning three errors: (1) the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to comply with its initial inquiry duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law; (2) the juvenile court erred in denying his Welfare and Institutions Code section 388[1] petition in which he requested that the juvenile court place Timothy in his custody or grant him reunification services; and (3) the juvenile court erred in not applying the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).

Because the juvenile court did not commit reversible error, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Section 300 Petition; Detention Hearing

In June 2018, DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of five-day-old Timothy. The petition alleged that Timothy was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm due to his mother’s, Heather H. (mother),[2] substance abuse, which led to Timothy having a positive toxicology screen for amphetamine and methamphetamine at time of his birth, and previously resulted in the child’s siblings receiving permanent placement services. DCFS filed an “Indian Child Inquiry Attachment” (ICWA-010) form with the petition, which provided that mother denied that the family had any Indian ancestry.

Also in June 2018, the juvenile court held a detention hearing, and mother made her first appearance in the proceedings. Mother completed a “Parental Notification of Indian Status” (ICWA-020) form, in which she checked a box indicating that she had no Indian ancestry as far as she knew. The juvenile court questioned mother about Timothy’s possible Indian status, and mother said that she had no Indian ancestry and did not believe that father did either. The juvenile court found that there was “no reason to believe that this [was] an [ICWA] case or that [the ICWA] applie[d].”

The juvenile court ordered Timothy detained from parental custody. He was ultimately detained with a maternal aunt, Ms. M., and her husband, Mr. P., who remained his caretakers throughout these proceedings.

Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing

In August 2018, father made his first appearance in the proceedings. Father was in custody at the time, serving a three-year prison sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm. He completed an ICWA-020 form, in which he checked a box indicating that he had no Indian ancestry as far as he knew. The juvenile court confirmed this assertion with father before finding that the ICWA did not apply in this case.

The juvenile court ordered Timothy to remain detained from parental custody.

Adjudication Hearing

In November 2018, the juvenile court held an adjudication hearing, at which father was present and still in custody. Based on social worker testimony, the juvenile court learned that father would be incarcerated through September 2019.

Following testimony and argument, the juvenile court assumed jurisdiction over Timothy based on mother’s substance abuse issues, ordered Timothy removed from parental custody, and denied both parents family reunification services. Father was denied services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1).[3] The juvenile court also denied father’s request for telephone calls with Timothy; instead, father could be provided with photographs of the child.

The juvenile court informed father that he could file a section 388 petition following his release from incarceration if he wanted to request family reunification services.

The matter was set for a section 366.26 hearing in March 2019.[4]

Last Minute Information for the Court; Permanency Planning Hearing

In May 2019, father notified DCFS that he was being released from incarceration on June 21, 2019. In July 2019, the juvenile court granted father monitored visits with Timothy (once a week/two hours per visit), which were to be monitored by DCFS. DCFS was ordered to meet with father and establish a written visitation schedule.

Status Review Report; Last Minute Information for the Court

In October 2019 and January 2020, DCFS reported that Timothy continued to reside with relative caretakers, Ms. M. and Mr. P., who had been caring for him since his detention in June 2018. In addition to Timothy, the caretakers were also caring for some of Timothy’s older siblings who had been removed from mother before their adoption by the caretakers. The caretakers were providing Timothy with a safe and loving home, and Timothy was receiving regional center services while in their care.

Father had had five visits with Timothy between November 2019 and January 2020. The visits were appropriate, and father interacted and supervised the child.

Last Minute Information for the Court

In March 2020, DCFS reported that the parents had had eight monitored visits with Timothy between mid-January and mid-March 2020. During visits, the parents played with Timothy, took pictures, brought toys, changed his diaper, and showed affection towards him. DCFS also reported that on March 20, 2020, the juvenile court issued a temporary order that suspended in-person visitation due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Section 366.26 Report

In July 2020, DCFS reported that Timothy continued to reside with Ms. M. and Mr. P., who sought to adopt the child if parental rights were terminated. Timothy was attached to the caregivers, who ensured that he received necessary development services, and thriving in their care.

DCFS recommended that adoption be the child’s appropriate permanent plan.

Status Review Report

In January 2021, DCFS reported that Timothy continued to reside with Ms. M. and Mr. P., receive regional services, and have monitored visits with mother and father. Mother and father acted appropriately during these visits, which included playing in the shopping mall’s play area or at a park, changing Timothy’s diaper, and taking pictures of him, and the parents and child hugged at the end of the visits.

Interim Review Report

In early February 2021, DCFS reported that Timothy continued to reside with Ms. M. and Mr. P., who had “worked diligently to ensure that Timothy’s unique needs” were being met, and were committed to providing the child with permanency through adoption if parental rights were terminated. Although mother and father had regular monitored visits with Timothy and acted appropriately during those visits, Timothy was “easily distracted by other adults who may be in the area during a visit and display[ed] an interest in interacting with them,” and “appear[ed] to be indifferent and [did] not display any reaction” when the parents left at the end of visits. DCFS believed that while Timothy had fun during these visits, he did not “demonstrate behaviors which suggest having a strong attachment with the biological parents.”

Father’s Section 388 Petition

On February 16, 2021, father filed a section 388 petition, in which he requested that the juvenile court place Timothy in his custody or grant him family reunification services. Father stated that he had regularly visited Timothy since his release from incarceration in June 2019, he was complying with his probation terms, he completed 11 parenting classes in late 2019, and he attended a residential drug treatment program in late 2019. He also averred that his requested relief was in Timothy’s best interests because he had a bond with the child, he was appropriate and engaged during his monitored visits, and the caretakers had been calling Timothy by the name “‘Noah.’”

Hearing on Father’s Section 388 Petition and Section 366.26 Proceedings

On February 16 and 17, 2021, the juvenile court denied father’s section 388 petition after argument and then proceeded to the section 366.26 hearing.

DCFS and Timothy asked the juvenile court to find that the child was adoptable and no exception to adoption applied, and to terminate parental rights based on these findings. In turn, both parents argued that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to adoption applied based on the “bond” that each of them had with Timothy, with father also blaming the caretakers for “thwart[ing]” his ability to bond with the child.

Following argument, the juvenile court found that the parents had maintained regular visitation and contact with Timothy but had failed to establish a “sufficient bond” with the child, and that “any benefit accruing to the child from his relationship with the parents [was] outweighed by the physical and emotional benefit [that Timothy would] receive through the permanency and stability [provided] through adoption.” It ordered parental rights terminated and selected adoption as Timothy’s permanent plan.

Notice of Appeal

Father’s timely appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

I. ICWA

A. Relevant law

“[The] ICWA reflects a congressional determination to protect Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by establishing minimum federal standards that a state court, except in emergencies, must follow before removing an Indian child from his or her family.” (In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881–882; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1902.)

Under California law, DCFS and the juvenile court “have an affirmative and continuing duty to inquire” into whether a dependent child “is or may be an Indian child.” (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see also In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 741–742.) This duty includes DCFS asking the parents and extended family members whether the child is or may be an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (b); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(1)), and the juvenile court inquiring at each party’s first appearance in the proceedings whether he or she knows or has reason to know that the child is an Indian child (§ 224.2, subd. (c); see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(2)). Further inquiry and notice to the tribes may be required only if there is “reason to believe” or “reason to know” that the child is an Indian child based upon this initial inquiry. (§ 224.2, subds. (d), (e), & (f); 25 C.F.R. § 23.107(c) (2019).)

A spate of appellate courts has recently weighed in on the consequence of a social services agency’s failure to conduct the required ICWA inquiry, resulting in “a continuum of tests for prejudice stemming from error in following California statutes implementing ICWA.” (In re A.C. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1011.) On one end of this continuum, some courts appear to have concluded that an ICWA inquiry error is per se prejudicial, holding that an appealing parent need not demonstrate that the error prejudiced the proceeding. (See, e.g., In re H.V. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 433, 438; In re Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 556; In re K.R. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 701, 708.) A second group of courts holds that a parent appealing from an ICWA inquiry violation does need to demonstrate prejudicial error, but places the bar for prejudice so low that an inquiry error will, “in most circumstances,” be deemed “prejudicial and reversible.” (In re Antonio R. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 421, 435; see also In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744.) However, this approach admits that “[t]here are cases where . . . it s obvious that additional information would not [be] meaningful to the inquiry,” including, for example, when “the evidence already uncovered in the initial inquiry [i]s sufficient for a reliable determination.” ([i]Id. at p. 743.)

At the opposite end of the continuum, a third group of courts “concludes that [an ICWA inquiry] error does not warrant reversal unless a ‘miscarriage of justice’ is demonstrated to have occurred as a consequence of the failure to inquire about Native American heritage. [Citation.] These cases would allow a parent to make an offer of proof on appeal, showing there is reason to believe Native American heritage exists. [Citations.] In the absence of such an affirmative showing, this line of cases concludes the judgment should be affirmed.” (In re A.R. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 197, 205; In re A.C. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1060, 1069 [In order to demonstrate prejudice, “a parent asserting failure to inquire must show—at a minimum—that if asked, he or she would, in good faith have claimed some kind of Indian ancestry. ‘Where the record below fails to demonstrate and the parents have made no offer of proof or other affirmative assertion of Indian heritage on appeal, a miscarriage of justice has not been established and reversal is not required. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]”]; but see In re S.S. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 575, 582 [no offer of proof on appeal is required]; In re Darian R. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 502, 509–510 [failure to inquire of extended family members was harmless based upon readily obtainable information].) This approach recognizes the “limited utility” of remanding dependency cases for further ICWA inquiry without some assertion that a remand will produce a different result, particularly when the child’s parents have already denied that they and their children are current members of an Indian tribe and where no party raised any ICWA concerns in the juvenile court. (In re A.C., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1023 (dis. opn. of Crandall, J.).)

“We review claims of inadequate inquiry into a child’s Indian ancestry for substantial evidence. [Citation.]” (In re H.V., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 438.) Where the facts are undisputed, we must independently determine whether ICWA’s requirements have been satisfied. (In re D.S. (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 1041, 1051.)

B. Analysis

Although we do not adopt a rule of per se prejudice, we conclude that there was no reversible error under either of the other two standards. Based upon mother’s and father’s statements and representations to the juvenile court early in these proceedings, the juvenile court had sufficient evidence to find that the ICWA does not apply to Timothy.

Urging reversal, father asserts that the juvenile court erred because DCFS did not ask him if he had “contact information for extended family members so that a proper inquiry could be made under state law.” This argument fails. Both mother and father denied any Indian ancestry when they made their first appearances before the juvenile court and on their ICWA-020 forms. Although the forms admonished the parents to provide any new information on the topic to the juvenile court, they remained silent. (In re A.C., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021 (dis. opn. of Crandall, J.).) Thus, there was no reason for DCFS to conduct any further inquiry of extended family. (In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 744 [continued inquiry is required “where the probability of obtaining meaningful information is reasonable in the context of ICWA”].) And father never informed either the juvenile court or DCFS that any of the unidentified extended family members would have had any meaningful information.

Furthermore, father makes no offer of proof or affirmative assertion on appeal that any extended family members would have meaningful information to help determine if Timothy has Indian ancestry. (In re A.C., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 1021 (dis. opn. of Crandall, J.); see also In re H.V., supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 439–442 (dis. opn. of Baker, Acting P. J.]; In re A.C., supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071.) Thus, any error in failing to conduct further inquiry was harmless.

II. Father’s Section 388 Petition

A. Relevant law

“Section 388 provides for modification of juvenile court orders when the moving party presents new evidence or a change of circumstances and demonstrates modification of the previous order is in the child’s best interests. [Citations.] To obtain a hearing on a section 388 petition, the parent must make a prima facie showing as to both elements. [Citations.] [¶] The petition should be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing, but ‘[t]he prima facie requirement is not met unless the facts alleged, if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing, would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.’ [Citations.] The petition may not consist of ‘general, conclusory allegations.’ [Citation.] ‘Successful petitions have included declarations or other attachments which demonstrate the showing the petitioner will make at [the] hearing . . . .’ [Citation.] When determining whether the petition makes the necessary showing, ‘the court may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case.’ [Citations.]” (In re Samuel A. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 1, 6–7.)

With respect to the first element, “the petitioner must show changed, not changing circumstances.” (In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.) This requirement that the circumstances have changed, and are not merely a transitional phase, is critical. After all, the focus of dependency proceedings after the juvenile court has terminated reunification services is on the child’s need for a “‘stable [and] permanent’” home. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 419–420; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317.) The parent’s interests in the care, custody, and companionship of the child are no longer paramount; the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 527; see also In re Anthony W. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 246, 251–252 [when evaluating a section 388 petition “on the eve of the selection and implementation hearing, the children’s interest in stability was the court’s foremost concern, outweighing any interest mother may have in reunification”].) If the circumstances are “merely changing,” “the selection of a permanent home for a child” is being “delay[ed]” just “to see if a parent, who has repeatedly failed to reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47, overruled in part on other grounds in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 636, fn. 5.) But this delay “does not promote stability for the child.” (Ibid.)

With respect to the second, best-interests-of-the-child element, the juvenile court should consider the petitioner’s showing regarding the following factors: “(1) the seriousness of the problem which led to the dependency, and the reason for any continuation of that problem; (2) the strength of [the] relative bonds between the dependent children to both parent and caretakers; and (3) the degree to which the problem may be easily removed or ameliorated, and the degree to which it actually has been. While this list is not meant to be exhaustive, it does provide a reasoned and principled basis on which to evaluate a section 388 motion.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 532.) “In assessing the best interests of the child, ‘a primary consideration . . . is the goal of assuring stability and continuity.’ [Citation.]” (In re Mickel O., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 616.)

The decision of whether to modify an existing order is “committed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and [its] ruling should not be disturbed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is clearly established.” (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 315.) “An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court has exceeded the bounds of reason by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.” (In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 642, disapproved in part on other grounds in In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 637, fn. 6.)

A lower court order is presumed correct, and the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating reversible error. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13 Cal.4th 952, 994.) For these reasons, it is “rare that the denial of a section 388 [petition] merits reversal as an abuse of discretion.” (In re Kimberly F., supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 522.)

B. Analysis

Regardless of whether father demonstrated changed circumstances, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding that returning Timothy to father’s custody or granting father reunification services was not in Timothy’s best interests. Timothy had lived with his relative caretakers, Ms. M. and Mr. P., since he was one week old following his detention from mother’s custody in June 2018. Father was incarcerated at the time of the adjudication hearing in November 2018, at which the juvenile court ordered Timothy removed from parental custody and denied father family reunification services on the grounds that such services would be detrimental to the child given father’s incarceration. When making these orders, Timothy was only five months old and father did not have an anticipated release date until September 2019.

Father was actually released from incarceration in June 2019, but he did not file a section 388 petition until February 16, 2021, which was only one day before the continued section 366.26 hearing. By that time, Timothy had resided with his caretakers for approximately two and one-half years—essentially the entirety of his young life. During this time, the caretakers had provided Timothy with a safe and loving home and had “worked diligently to ensure that [his] unique needs” were being met, which included Timothy receiving occupational and speech therapy as part of his regional center services. Timothy was attached to the caregivers and thriving in their care, and in turn, the caretakers were committed to providing the child with permanency through adoption if parental rights were terminated.

In his section 388 petition, father stated that placing Timothy in his custody or granting him family reunification services was in Timothy’s best interests because father and the child had a bond, father was appropriate and engaged during his monitored visits with the child, and Ms. M. and Mr. P. had reportedly been calling Timothy by the name “‘Noah.’” Although father and Timothy may have shared a bond due to their positive interactions over the 18 months of monitored visits, this statement did not establish how father’s requested relief would “advance the child’s need for permanency and stability” at this stage in the proceedings. (In re J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 527; see also In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 225 [“a section 388 order for reunification services at this late date would deprive [the child] of a permanent, stable home in exchange for an uncertain future”].)

III. Parent-Child Beneficial Relationship Exception to Adoption

A. Relevant law

At a section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court is required to select and implement a permanent plan for the dependent child. (In re J.D. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 833, 851.) The stated purpose of a section 366.26 hearing is “to provide stable, permanent homes” for dependent children. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).) If the child is likely to be adopted, which is undisputed here, adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (In re Tabatha G. (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1164; In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 573.)

Once a finding of adoptability is made, the juvenile court “shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption” unless one of the statutory exceptions to the preference for adoption is met. (§ 366.26, subds. (c)(1), (c)(1)(A) & (B)(i)-(vi).) At issue here is the parent-child beneficial relationship exception, which requires a parent to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she has “regularly visited with the child, that the child would benefit from continuing the relationship, and that terminating the relationship would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C. supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 629–630.) The parent must therefore prove three elements: “(1) regular visitation and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Caden C., supra, at p. 631; see also In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 852.) “n assessing whether termination would be [i]detrimental, the trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (In re Caden C., supra, at p. 632.) “By making this decision, the trial court determines whether terminating parental rights serves the child’s best interests.” (Ibid.)

The parent asserting the parent-child beneficial relationship exception bears the burden of establishing it. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636–637.)

B. Standards of review

The substantial evidence standard of review applies to the first two elements of the parent-child beneficial relationship exception—whether the parent has visited and maintained contact with the child consistently and whether the relationship is such that the child would benefit from continuing it. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–640.) In doing so, we resolve all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. (In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) If an appellate court concludes that the record contains substantial evidence—controverted or not—to support the order, it must affirm. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021.)

“The question whether termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child, however, is more nuanced.” (In re J.D., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th at p. 853.) While the juvenile court’s weighing of the relative harms and benefits of terminating parental rights reflects a balancing of certain factual determinations, its ultimate decision is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Ibid., citing In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 640–641.) In other words, our Supreme Court announced a “hybrid” standard of review, which “embodies the principle that ‘[t]he statutory scheme does not authorize a reviewing court to substitute its own judgment as to what is in the child’s best interests.” (In re Caden C., supra, at p. 641; see also In re J.D., supra, at p. 853.)

C. Analysis

Applying these legal principles, we readily conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that a beneficial parent-child relationship did not exist between father and Timothy. Timothy was two years and eight months old when the juvenile court held the section 366.26 hearing in February 2021, at which it terminated parental rights. Timothy had never lived with father at any time in his young life. Father was incarcerated at the time Timothy was removed from parental custody in November 2018, and father’s only request for custody of the child or family reunification services was made on the eve of the section 366.26 hearing when he filed a section 388 petition.

Additionally, Timothy received regional center services in the form of an infant development program, occupational therapy, and speech therapy, none of which father attended with the child. Rather, father’s interactions with Timothy were limited to weekly monitored visits, during which father was engaged and acted appropriately with the child when playing at a shopping mall or at a park. Although father asserts that these positive interactions and his enrollment in remedial programs in 2019 established the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship between him and Timothy, DCFS reported that the child “appear[ed] to be indifferent and [did] not display any reaction” when the parents left at the end of visits. Based on all the evidence, the juvenile court reasonably found that Timothy would not benefit from continuing a relationship with father at this point in the proceedings, where adoption was the preferred plan and father was essentially a friendly visitor in the child’s life. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)

Additionally, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to Timothy. Father presented no evidence that Timothy would be greatly harmed if their parent-child relationship was severed, or that continuing this relationship outweighed the benefit that Timothy would receive through the security of a new, adoptive home, particularly where the child’s caretakers had raised him since he was one week old, had diligently worked to meet his unique needs, and were committed to adopting him. (In re Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 633.)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order and judgment are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_____________________, J.

ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

_________________________, P. J.

LUI

_________________________, J.

HOFFSTADT

[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

[2] Mother is not a party to this appeal.

[3] Section 361.5, subdivision (e)(1), provides, in relevant part that the juvenile court must order that reasonable services be provided to a parent who is incarcerated unless it determines by clear and convincing evidence that those services would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment, the juvenile court must consider: (1) the age of the child; (2) the degree of parent-child bonding; (3) the length of the sentence; (4) the length and nature of the treatment; (5) the nature of the crime or illness; (6) the degree of detriment to the child if services are not offered; (7) the likelihood of the parent’s discharge from incarceration without the reunification time limitations set forth by statute; and (8) any other appropriate factors.

[4] The section 366.26 hearing was continued multiple times over the ensuing two years before finally being held in February 2021.