Filed 4/17/18 In re T.M. CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.


IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
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In re T.M. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. C084790


SACRAMENTO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILD, FAMILY AND ADULT SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

R.R. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

(Super. Ct. Nos. JD235557, JD235558, JD235559, JD235560, JD235561, JD236430)




S.M. (mother) and R.R. (father), parents of the minors, appeal from the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 366.26 & 395; unless otherwise set forth, statutory section references that follow are to this code.)
The parents collectively contend (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that M.M. would likely be adopted; (2) the court erred in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply; (3) the court erred in finding the sibling bond exception to adoption did not apply; (4) the court abused its discretion in granting the motion to quash subpoenas for two of the minors, M.M. and A.M.; and (5) the court erred in denying mother’s request for a bonding study. Mother further asserts that if this court finds her request for a bonding study was untimely, then we should find her attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. Both parents contend that, if the judgment terminating parental rights as to one parent is reversed, the judgment terminating parental rights as to the other parent must also be reversed.
Finding none of the parents’ claims have merit, we will affirm the juvenile court’s orders.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
This appeal involves six of the parents’ children, M.M. (born January 2006), A.M. (born May 2009), Y.M. (born December 2010), D.M. (born April 2013), T.M. (born August 2014), and C.M. (born September 2015) (collectively, the minors).
The five oldest minors (C.M. had not yet been born) came to the attention of the Sacramento County Department of Child, Family and Adult Services (Department) in December 2014 when it was reported that the minors’ half sibling, E.M. (whose biological father was P.C. and who is not a subject of these appellate proceedings), feared for his safety and ran away from home after father punched, slapped, and whipped him with a belt. E.M. reported that father had been abusive to him for the past two years but did not physically discipline his five sisters.
E.M. also reported a prior domestic violence incident in May 2014 when father punched mother in the face, fracturing her jaw. Mother initially told emergency room staff she was injured playing football, but later testified that father hit her in the face with his fist. Father testified at that same hearing that he broke mother’s jaw because mother lied to him. Mother was pregnant at the time.
On January 5, 2015, the Department filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b) as to the five minors alleging mother failed to protect the minors from father’s use of excessive corporal punishment on the minors and their half sibling, E.M. It was alleged that father had an anger management problem, a history of domestic violence, a criminal history involving multiple convictions for violent crimes, and a history of physical abuse of E.M. Father’s conduct and mother’s inability to protect the minors placed the minors at substantial risk of physical abuse, harm, and neglect.
The petition further alleged that, pursuant to section 300, subdivision (j) the minors’ two older siblings, J.M. and P.M. (who are also not parties to this appeal), were adjudged dependents of the Santa Clara County Juvenile Court in 2007 due to medical neglect by the parents, father’s extensive criminal history, and the parents’ failure to follow the medical staff’s directives. Parental rights over J.M. and P.M. were terminated in 2009.
On January 8, 2015, the juvenile court released the minors to the parents’ custody under the Department’s intensive supervision and ordered that E.M. remain in out-of-home placement. The court ordered that reunification services be provided to father, and that he participate in an anger management program.
According to the jurisdiction/disposition report, mother denied seeing father physically abuse E.M. or that the scars on E.M.’s body were the result of abuse by father, claiming they were from flea bites. She thought father’s discipline of E.M. was “appropriate” and “not excessive.” She acknowledged father did have “problems with his anger” but denied she was afraid for her safety or the safety of the minors. She also denied she or father did anything to cause the removal and ultimate termination of parental rights over J.M. and P.M. Mother was reluctant to discuss whether she had been the victim of father’s domestic violence in the past.
Father admitted having an anger management problem since childhood and having engaged in domestic violence with mother “over trust, infidelity, and lies.” Father also admitted hitting E.M. with a belt and slapping E.M. and hitting him in the face with a closed fist as a form of discipline, something he estimated doing “[m]aybe a couple times a month.” Father admitted he “went too far and took [his] anger and frustration out on [E.M.]”
Father’s criminal history included prior convictions for corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant (February 2001 and March 2001); battery on a noncohabitant former spouse (January 2003), battery (April 2003); violating a court order to prevent domestic violence (April 2003); and corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant with priors (February 2004).
E.M. reported that father was mentally and physically abusive towards him and hit him with a fist or a belt or “whatever he wanted to hit me with,” and choked him. Although E.M. told mother about the abuse, mother could not protect him because “she’s scared of [father].” E.M. stated father never really physically abused his half sisters (the minors), but would “hit them on the hand” from time to time. E.M. stated he worried “a little bit” about his siblings living in the home with his parents, but thought they were “okay.”
The minors were reportedly doing well in the parents’ home. E.M. was adjusting well in foster placement and wanted to stay there. He stated he wanted visits with father only if they were supervised.
The first addendum report stated father completed online domestic violence and anger management courses instead of the classes offered and approved by the Department. The Department noted that, due to the severity of the physical abuse inflicted by father on E.M., as well as father’s extensive criminal history related to domestic violence and battery, in-person domestic violence and anger management classes would be most beneficial.
A subsequent addendum report stated father was scheduled for anger management counseling intake and both parents were scheduled for domestic violence counseling intake. It was reported that, despite the parents’ initial reluctance to participate, both became agreeable to weekly in-home services to discuss appropriate parenting techniques, alternate forms of discipline, and protective capabilities.
Father was not present at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on March 20, 2015. Mother submitted on the basis of the social study report. The juvenile court found the allegations in the petitions true by a preponderance of evidence, adjudged the minors dependents of the juvenile court, and ordered that the minors remain in the parents’ custody, and E.M. remain in foster care. The court further ordered the parents to comply with their respective case plans, including participation in counseling to address issues including domestic violence and anger management.
The review report filed September 4, 2015, stated the minors were healthy and developmentally on track and continued confidential placement of the five female minors with mother was appropriate. T.M. appeared to be “very bonded” to father, mother, and her siblings, and the social worker observed a “beneficial relationship” between T.M., her sisters, and mother. D.M. was observed hitting her baby sister repeatedly and throwing crayons at father. Mother appeared to be overwhelmed by D.M.’s behavior. However, D.M. appeared to be “very bonded” to mother and her siblings, and the social worker observed a “beneficial” relationship between D.M. and mother. Y.M. exhibited some behavioral issues, such as telling mother to “shut up,” having sudden outbursts of anger and abrupt crying episodes, throwing things at her siblings, eluding mother’s discipline, and standing on furniture and throwing objects at others. A.M. was reported to be “generally sad.” However, the social worker observed a “beneficial relationship” between A.M. and mother. M.M. appeared to be doing well with the parents, and the social worker observed a “beneficial relationship” between M.M. and mother.
E.M. was doing well in his out-of-home placement and did not wish to return home because father made him feel unsafe. The social worker opined that continued out-of-home placement was appropriate for E.M.
The report set forth a number of incidents that occurred following the court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the minors and return of the minors to the parents’ custody. For example, on March 24, 2015, father became angry at a social worker over a missed visit with E.M. and yelled at the social worker and accused her of colluding with the Foster Family Agency (FFA) social worker. On May 11, 2015, father became short-tempered and yelled at the social worker during a discussion about how father was doing. On July 6, 2015, while the social worker was trying to talk with mother on the phone about mother’s concerns regarding visits with E.M., father could be heard yelling in the background in “a violent and aggressive tone.” Father’s behavior caused the social worker to fear for her safety. She declined to attend a face-to-face visit with the parents when father continued to berate and threaten her.
A particularly troubling incident occurred on August 8, 2015, when father shoved mother into a bedroom wall and strangled her. Mother was 32- to 36-weeks pregnant with C.M. at the time. Mother arrived at the hospital with bruises all over her body. She told sheriff’s deputies she was willing to testify against father and wanted him to go to jail, and she felt like she needed a restraining order against father because, even though this was the first incident of domestic violence, she was afraid there would be more. Deputies accompanied mother when she returned home to retrieve her personal items. Father was arrested and charged with domestic battery.
Another troubling incident occurred on August 14, 2015, when law enforcement was called regarding a report that mother had bruises all over her body and father had spit in her face. Mother denied being afraid of father.
The Department determined there was a high risk of returning E.M. to the parents’ custody based, among other things, on mother’s codependency on father, mother’s lack of control of the five youngest minors, the parents’ reluctance to complete court-ordered services, the lack of progression in visitation, the lack of progress on solving the issues that led to the removal of E.M., the inability of mother to articulate what she learned from services, E.M.’s desire to remain out of home, the “protracted and objectionable” manner in which the parents followed the court’s orders, the broken relationship between mother, father, and E.M., father’s inability to restrain his anger and his emotional instability, the caretakers’ present inability to assume guardianship, the continued domestic violence between father and mother, and the addition of C.M., born September 2015. Despite these barriers, mother stated she wanted E.M. to return home.
On September 24, 2015, the Department filed supplemental dependency petitions pursuant to section 387 as to T.M., D.M., Y.M., A.M., and M.M., based on father’s August 8, 2015, attack on mother, mother’s failure to obtain a restraining order, and both parents’ failure to fully comply with their case plan.
On September 29, 2015, the Department filed an original dependency petition pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j) as to the newborn minor, C.M., alleging the minor was at substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness due to mother’s failure to protect the minor and his siblings from father’s ongoing anger management issues and the parents’ ongoing domestic violence, including the most recent event that occurred on August 8, 2015, when mother was still pregnant with C.M. The petition further alleged the minor was at substantial risk of abuse or neglect based on the prior removal of half siblings J.M. and P.M. and termination of parental rights; the dependency proceedings as to half sibling E.M.; and the dependency proceedings as to siblings, T.M., D.M., Y.M., A.M., and M.M.
On September 25, 2015, the juvenile court ordered that E.M. continue as a dependent child of the juvenile court and continued his out-of-home placement.
The detention report filed September 29, 2015, stated T.M. and D.M. were placed together in one foster home and Y.M., A.M., and M.M. were placed together in a different foster home. The Department recommended that the minors be detained in out-of-home placement due to the domestic violence incident on August 8, 2015. The foster parents reported that the minors were doing well in foster care with no concerns. However, M.M. “snuck on the phone” with her parents and, when the foster mother inquired about who was on the phone, father verbally attacked her. After the call, M.M. refused to eat and instructed her two younger sisters, Y.M. and A.M., not to eat or play.
The following day, M.M. asked several strangers to use their cell phones. When the minors returned to their foster home, they were allowed to play with the neighbor children. However, the neighbors later contacted the police to report that M.M., A.M., and Y.M. reported they were touched inappropriately by one of the foster parents. Law enforcement officers questioned all three minors and discovered that M.M. had instructed A.M. and Y.M. to make the false accusation. M.M. was scheduled to be moved to another placement as she presented as “extremely parentified” over Y.M. and A.M.
A second detention report was filed on September 30, 2015, regarding the youngest minor, C.M. The Department recommended that C.M. be detained out-of-home due to safety concerns resulting from ongoing domestic violence issues between mother and father, including the most recent occurrence on August 8, 2015.
Father denied knowing why the minors were at risk and accused the social worker of removing the children as an act of retaliation. Mother denied any physical violence by father, stating she and father merely argued over jealousy. Mother claimed she went to the hospital after the August 8, 2015, incident because she was cramping.
When the parents were notified of the protective custody hold on C.M., father became angry and accused the Department of violating his rights and lying to him. Father also told mother she did not need to submit to drug or alcohol testing despite having been instructed to do so. Father continued to be argumentative in conversations with the social worker, and mother often allowed father to speak on her behalf.
On September 29, 2015, the juvenile court ordered that the five minors be removed from the parents’ care and placed in protective custody. The minors were formally detained on September 29, 2015, and C.M. was detained the following day.
The parents were interviewed separately on October 5, 2015. Mother continued to deny the allegations in the dependency petitions, claiming there was no long-term domestic violence, the minors were not in danger, and father would not harm the minors. She denied that father strangled her during the August 8, 2015, incident and claimed she never intended to obtain a restraining order. She refused to talk about her relationship with father, stating that, “[e]very relationship has their ups and downs.” Mother stated she wanted the minors to stay with her and E.M. to return home “but he needs help . . . [he] needs counseling.” She stated she was a good parent and would do what was necessary to get her children back. Mother stated she had learned from her classes and claimed her children were never hurt. She was willing to participate in services and thought counseling would be helpful.
Father also denied a history of domestic violence and claimed the minors were not in any danger. He denied most of the allegations in the dependency petitions, and claimed the August 8, 2015, incident was the first and last incident of domestic violence between him and mother. He stated the incident was the result of jealousy and infidelity and that he was “wrong and he shouldn’t of put his hands on the mother.” Father admitted making threats against mother and having a prior criminal history related to domestic violence. When asked what techniques he used to discipline his children, father stated he yelled at them and had “spanked them on the butt in the past but only if one of them hurts another one.”
The minors each appeared healthy and happy and were doing well in their current placement. Once M.M. was moved to a new placement after instigating problems with Y.M. and A.M., her behaviors improved and she appeared happy as well. M.M. expressed that she missed her siblings and her mother but was enjoying making friends at school.
Counselor Nancy Sullivan reported she provided services to the parents and the minors from January 2015 through August 2015. Sullivan accompanied mother to the courthouse to help mother obtain a restraining order against father, but mother claimed she forgot her paperwork. Mother also reported she felt safe at home. Sullivan reported she feared for her own safety when she was in the family’s home with mother. Once the family moved to Elk Grove, mother never called to continue services or provide a new address.
Permanency social worker Ebony Sylvester reported having received troubling messages from the parents in September and October 2015, including texts containing profanity and threats. With regard to services, Sylvester reported that the family had “really been open to learning and meeting,” but Sylvester was trying to work through “the resistance and some excuses for not doing things.” Mother reportedly enjoyed domestic violence classes but her attendance was sporadic. However, as of July 2015, mother was unable to explain what she had learned in counseling, parenting class, or domestic violence class. Father reportedly attended all 12 anger management classes but had yet to complete his post-class test or turn in his progress notes or anger control plan. During a home visit on March 24, 2015, in front of the minors, father began yelling at Michelle Fitzgerald-Panella and accusing her of lying and being in collusion with other social workers. Father also yelled that mother would not attend visits if they were moved to a different location.
The Department concluded neither parent was capable of providing adequate care and supervision of the minors and recommended the court intervene to protect the children by continuing them as dependents of the court in out-of-home placement. The Department further concluded the parents had not made significant progress toward reunification with E.M., and were not entitled to reunification services with regard to the minors pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11) due to their continued denial of the facts leading to the prior termination of services and parental rights over the minors’ older siblings, P.M. and J.M., and their subsequent failure to make reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of P.M. and J.M.
The Department also concluded that, pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (c), there was not clear and convincing evidence that continued services would be in the minors’ best interests given the parents’ continued unstable lifestyle, the recent incident of severe domestic violence, father’s inability to control his anger, and mother’s denial of the severity of the domestic violence and its impact on the minors. Given the parents’ failure to demonstrate the tools and skills necessary to protect the minors from exposure to domestic violence and father’s untreated anger management issues, in conjunction with the fact that the parents were “uncooperative, hostile, and intimidating to the Department,” the Department recommended that services to both parents be terminated. However, the Department later reversed itself and recommended that the parents be offered reunification services as to the minors.
On December 11, 2015, the juvenile court sustained the allegations in all petitions, adjudged the minors dependents of the juvenile court, ordered the minors removed from the parents’ care and custody, and ordered that the parents be provided with reunification services and that they participate in psychological evaluations to tailor those services.
Both parents’ psychological examinations were completed by Brandi Hawk, Ph.D. As relevant here, mother appeared open and willing to answer questions about her history but became “highly defensive” when asked about her mental health symptoms and Child Protective Services (CPS) involvement. She initially denied any domestic violence, but then reluctantly agreed that the August 8, 2015, domestic violence incident occurred. However, she minimized the severity of the domestic violence events, explaining that father only pushed her after they had a disagreement and claiming the facts in the report were “false allegations.” She continued to deny any other history of violence and stated she avoided thinking about the August 8, 2015, incident because she did not like to remember and needed to move on. Mother also denied any history of physical abuse of E.M. stating father disciplined E.M. by giving him “a spank on the thigh, over clothes.” However, she admitted father never hit E.M. in front of her and no one would tell her if he had. Mother claimed treatment made her a better mom. She was participating in individual counseling, domestic violence group therapy, and parenting class.
Dr. Hawk concluded that, based on the symptoms mother demonstrated during the evaluation, mother suffered from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Dr. Hawk noted that, while mother participated in all required classes as part of her case plan, mother’s extreme defensiveness during the evaluation called into question whether mother internalized any of the information in a meaningful way. Dr. Hawk was particularly concerned about mother’s continued minimization of domestic violence and child physical abuse incidents despite being confronted with reported facts, suggesting mother might be unwilling to recognize danger and protect herself and her children in the future. However, Dr. Hawk surmised that, if mother actively engaged in an effective treatment for her PTSD, mother had the ability to benefit from continued mental health services and the potential to be a safe parent within the next eight months. Dr. Hawk noted that mother was at high risk of not engaging in or terminating treatment due to her severe and persistent avoidance of thoughts, feeling, and conversations about her history of trauma, thus possibly placing into question mother’s ability to benefit from continued services. It was also noted that mother had no concrete plan for how to respond if father became aggressive toward her or the minors. Dr. Hawk recommended that mother participate in individual therapy “that directly targets her trauma symptoms and maladaptive coping strategies,” couples therapy with father, and Birth and Beyond services upon successful reunification with the minors.
Dr. Hawk reported that father was initially agitated, but eventually calmed down and “showed insight into the motivations and feelings behind his actions.” Father revealed he first “put hands on women” when he was 19 years old, he was arrested 10 times for domestic violence against his girlfriend, and he was imprisoned in 2004 after he hit his partner with a CD player because he thought she had taken his money. Father stated his relationship with mother was marked by “infidelity, lies, and domestic violence.” He stated he initially treated E.M. like his own son but then over time his attitude changed when E.M. began lying like mother. Father admitted taking his anger out on E.M., which included hitting E.M. “with a belt, my hand, and a closed fist.” When E.M. was three years old and vomited on himself, father “whooped” E.M. because father “didn’t want to clean it up.” As E.M. got older, father began punching him “to make him tougher.”
Father admitted choking mother on August 8, 2015, after hacking her Facebook account and finding a message to another man. He stated he “wanted to hurt her because I was hurt.” During the incident, mother passed out and father shook her to try to wake her up. Father stated he continued to think about mother cheating “every day” despite evidence to the contrary, and was often triggered by the name of a character in a movie or watching people on a bus.
Dr. Hawk noted father felt his relationship with mother had improved because he was working on his anger and not putting his hands on her, but he continued to have a hard time not accusing her of cheating because he did not believe her. Dr. Hawk concluded that, based on father’s long-standing and pervasive distrust and suspiciousness of others, he suffered from paranoid personality disorder (PPD). Father demonstrated an ability to benefit from anger management and domestic violence classes. Therefore, father had the ability to benefit from continued mental health services, and had the potential to be a safe parent, within the next eight months. However, Dr. Hawk opined that father required intensive and long-term treatment to address his mental health needs, and that father’s ability to benefit from those services was dependent upon his ongoing willingness to participate in treatment even after reunification. Dr. Hawk recommended that father participate in individual therapy and couples therapy with mother.
The permanency review report filed May 20, 2016, recommended continued out-of-home placement of the minors and termination of reunification services to both parents. The minors were reportedly doing well. However, M.M. was having difficulty adjusting to her placement because she was bored and did not have anyone to play with and she wanted to be with her sisters. Nonetheless, M.M. was adjusting to her caregiver and her caregiver’s home. T.M. and D.M. were placed together in a different foster home and were adjusting well. However, the Department continued to look for a placement that could accommodate M.M., T.M., and D.M. A.M., Y.M., and C.M. were placed together in a foster home and were adjusting well to their placement, although they wanted to go home as well.
Father completed eight out of his 10 authorized individual counseling sessions. The therapist reported seeing progress in father within the past year and opined that further therapy would continue to benefit him. Father was participating in parenting classes and had completed 12 sessions of his domestic violence program. He was also participating in a 52-week batterer’s treatment program as a condition of his probation. The facilitator reported that father admitted being inappropriate with E.M., that his behavior toward mother was also inappropriate, and was able to articulate his role in domestic violence situations. While father completed nine of his 12 anger management sessions, the facilitator noted father had deep-rooted anger management issues and would require “far more than twelve sessions” of anger management.
It was reported that, on May 16, 2016, a Team Decision Making (TDM) meeting was held to address an incident that occurred during visitation on May 4, 2016, during which father became visibly upset, slammed his closed fists on the table, and lunged at the FFA social worker. When the TDM facilitator asked father whether he needed to take a break, father stated he did not and the social worker needed to stop lying and putting words in his mouth. Among other things, father told the social worker, “[I]f you think this is aggressive, you have not see[n] the worst of me yet.” The meeting was stopped and father was escorted out of the facility due to his escalating and aggressive behaviors. However, father continued to posture and threaten the social worker while being escorted out. The facilitator stated he was concerned for the social worker’s safety and advised the social worker not to go to father’s home.
Mother was participating regularly in parenting classes and individual counseling, and sporadically in the domestic violence program. When asked how she felt about father’s outburst during the TDM meeting, mother stated it did not affect her at all. The TDM facilitator explained that father’s outburst negatively affected the other people in the room. Mother stated she learned from the domestic violence program that father’s outburst was a red flag, but she knew father was not going to harm anyone.
According to the report, visitation between the parents and the minors had been suspended due to safety concerns as a result of father’s aggressive behaviors during visits, telephone calls, and while interacting with Department staff and other professionals associated with the case. For example, on January 25, 2016, during a supervised telephone call between M.M. and mother, father could be heard in the background yelling obscenities at the foster mother who he thought was coaching M.M. on the phone. When the foster mother ended the call, father continued to call the foster mother from a blocked number stating, “[W]ell, I’ll see you on Wednesday,” and “Bitch, you’re [sic] get paid to watch my children.” The caregivers for Y.M. and A.M. also reported that father used profanity during a telephone call with the minors.
During a visit on February 2, 2016, father became agitated, had an inappropriate conversation with M.M., and threatened the visitation monitor when she attempted to redirect the conversation and warned father the visit would be terminated if he continued to question the minor. The visit was terminated and father was again escorted out by security.
On March 10, 2016, father became upset when the social worker informed him she would not be able to supervise an upcoming visit with M.M. Several weeks later, when the social worker was again unable to supervise a planned visit with M.M., mother called the social worker and told her she “better find someone else to supervise the visit” while father could be heard in the background yelling obscenities.
The Department determined there was a high risk of returning the minors to the parents’ custody due to mother’s failure to complete or benefit from court-ordered services, mother’s inability to see the safety risks associated with father’s angry and threatening behaviors, father’s failure to complete or benefit from court-ordered services, father’s inability to express his anger appropriately, and the fact that father acted negatively on his impulses. It was also noted that father had several incidents during visits with the minors when he failed to control his anger, berated the social worker, and threatened and berated other professionals involved in his case. Finally, the Department noted that both parents failed to report an incident of domestic violence followed by father’s subsequent arrest in November 2015. The Department recommended termination of both parents’ reunification services.
However, in the addendum report filed May 25, 2016, the Department changed its position after learning the parents were no longer together, recommending instead that both parents be provided with an additional six months of services referred as part of Dr. Hawk’s psychological evaluation to allow more time to fully assess each parent’s progress and risk.
On May 27, 2016, the juvenile court issued a temporary restraining order against father as to E.M., temporarily suspended father’s visits with the minors, and ordered father to address his behavior at the May 4 and May 16, 2016 meetings.
According to the progress report filed June 22, 2016, father was reportedly making progress in therapy. His therapist recommended visits resume in a therapeutic environment to allow father to demonstrate he had the ability to have safe, positive interactions with the minors. Thereafter, the juvenile court granted father’s motion pursuant to section 388 to change the court’s prior order to allow therapeutic visits under the Department’s supervision.
On July 1, 2016, the juvenile court ordered that father’s visits be supervised, and that visits with the minors be split up such that father would visit with the three oldest minors for one hour and then have separate one-hour visits with the three youngest minors.
On September 22, 2016, minors’ counsel filed a request to change the court’s July 1, 2016, order to allow for therapeutic visits “out in the community, to allow for further progress toward reunification.” The requests stated that visits remained “very positive” and more liberal visitation would bring the minors closer to the goal of reunification with father.
On October 15, 2016, father went to mother’s place of employment and attacked her, hitting her in the head with his fist, picking her up and throwing her to the ground more than once, stomping and kicking her, and eventually knocking her unconscious. Father was arrested and charged with inflicting corporal injury on a spouse or cohabitant and violating a protective order in a pending domestic violence case.
The permanency review report filed October 27, 2016, stated Y.M. and A.M. were placed together in one foster home; M.M., T.M., and D.M. were placed together in another foster home; and C.M. was placed in a third foster home. The minors were adjusting well to their new placements. Supervised visitation with mother was ongoing; however, visitation with father had been suspended due to the October 15, 2016, domestic violence incident. As a result of father’s incarceration, M.M. had reportedly become defiant and had been shutting down, D.M. had also demonstrated increased adverse behaviors, and T.M. had recently begun biting, kicking, scratching herself, and crying more often. The three older minors, M.M., A.M., and Y.M., all reported they wanted to go home and live with either mother or both parents.
According to the report, mother had completed the majority of her case plan services. Her relationship with father was on again, off again. She reported she was no longer with father and was staying with a friend, but refused to disclose the location. Although incarcerated, father had completed the majority of his case plan services and was having weekly supervised therapeutic visits with all of the minors until the domestic violence incident on October 15, 2016.
The Department assessed the risk of returning the minors to the parents’ care and custody to be high due to mother’s inability to demonstrate her court-ordered service objectives, her continued failure to take appropriate action to avoid being a victim of domestic violence, her pattern of returning to father, and her lack of benefit from the services provided to her, and father’s failure to benefit from his court-ordered service objectives, his continued inappropriate expression of anger and acting negatively on his impulses, and his continued verbal, emotional, and physical abuse and threatening behavior. The Department concluded it was unsafe to return the minors to the parents, and assessed the likelihood of the minors returning to either parent in the next six months as low. The Department recommended continued out-of-home placement for the minors, termination of reunification services to both parents, and a permanent plan of adoption.
During the contested permanency review hearing in November 2016, social worker Lonnetta Williams testified that father contacted and spoke with mother by telephone 10 times while he was incarcerated during the month of November 2016.
Mother testified she did not leave father after the August 2015 incident because she had nowhere to go, had a family to raise, and was eight months pregnant. She claimed that, after the minors were removed (while she was in the hospital giving birth to C.M.), the social worker told her she had to complete classes and benefit from them in order to reunify with the minors, but did not state she had to separate from father to do so. Mother stated she completed domestic violence victim classes, parenting classes, general counseling, and one-on-one counseling, and started doing codependency classes but did not finish because she got a new job and worked nights. She felt the domestic violence classes helped her learn how to express her feelings and walk away and say “no.” She testified she was able to use what she learned when she and father got into a verbal disagreement. She also learned that domestic violence affected the children emotionally. She planned to protect her children from future domestic violence by moving out of Sacramento County.
Mother acknowledged that, at the time of the May 2016 TDM meeting when father became upset and had to be escorted out by security, mother was living with father and continued to do so after the May 2016 incident. She described her relationship with father as good and bad, up and down. She first left him in June or July of 2016 and went to WEAVE after an argument during which father told her it was her fault the minors were taken away. Mother felt it was her fault the minors were removed because she told social worker Sylvester about her prior CPS case and Sylvester “did not work in [mother’s] best interest at all.” Mother also stated the minors were removed because father put his hands on her. Mother admitted she initiated contact with father “off and on” while she was staying at the shelter. She stated she returned to father because they “worked things out” and father told her they “needed to be a united front [in order] to get our kids back.” She also went back because she had no extended family support and had no one else.
Mother left father again in September 2016 and went to a safe house because she was concerned about father’s anger. Again, mother initiated contact with father “[o]ff and on” while she was staying at the safe house. Father did not know where she was staying, but eventually found her at the light rail station in October 2016. At that time, mother was speaking with a person from the safe house when father grabbed her phone and threw it on the ground, accusing her of staying with another man. Later that day father received a call from his therapist, Jackie Nelson. Dr. Nelson asked to speak with mother, who said everything was fine. Mother testified she did so because she felt intimidated by father and did not want him to hurt her. Mother spent the night with father, but left again and went back to the safe house after work.
Mother testified that, on October 15, 2016, father attacked her at work, hitting her in the head with his fist and causing her to bleed. He repeatedly picked her up and threw her on the ground and stomped and kicked her, eventually causing her to lose consciousness. Mother also admitted father had previously hit her in the face with his fist and broke her jaw.
Mother testified she spoke very little about domestic violence in her counseling sessions with Dr. Nelson, claiming she learned about the “cycle of violence” at WEAVE. She recalled discussing with Dr. Nelson how battered women often go back repeatedly to their abusers and that if father did not change as time went by, things would not get better.
Mother described her relationship with father as “unhealthy.” When asked whether she had any interest in going back to father, mother said, “No. [¶] . . . [¶] Because it’s a repeated cycle,” where one minute everything is fine and the next minute he “just blows up.” Mother stated she trusted father because she had been with him for 11 years and he was all she had, but she was not going to have a relationship with him anymore because of the “cycle.” She testified she knew she was done with the relationship because she was ready to move away from Sacramento County “where it all started” and go do whatever she needed to do to get her children back.
Mother admitted she had several phone calls with father while he was incarcerated, the last one being on November 15, 2016. She denied discussing getting back together and stated her conversations with father did not change her mind about getting back together with him upon his release. Mother stated father initiated the calls, except for calls mother initiated after her attorney filed for the temporary restraining order.
Mother testified that, when she and father got together in approximately 2005, father told her about his prior marriage, that he beat up his wife, and that he had been arrested for domestic violence, none of which concerned her because their “relationship was good” and they “didn’t have that problem.” Mother testified that father was a good father to his daughters. She stated she had discussed a safety plan with her children and had a code word to let them know “it’s an unsafe situation.” Mother denied father was a risk to the minors, but admitted he was a risk to E.M. and that he abused E.M., although she claimed he never did so in front of her.
Mother testified she thought she and father would get the minors back because they were a family and they raised the children together. She said, “We raised them together, so in order to get our kids back, we needed to stay together to get them back together.” She denied the social worker told her she would need to separate from father in order to reunify with the minors. She also denied leaving father because of domestic violence issues, stating she left because it “was just overwhelming, the arguing, our kids being gone, the mistrust and the miscommunication. He’s always thinking I’m lying to him. [¶] It just got overwhelming for me, so much stuff going on.”
Father testified, admitting he told mother it was her fault the minors were removed, but stated, “[I]t was my actions that caused the kids to be taken because I put my hands on [mother].” Father believed he could reunify with the minors even though he and mother were together, and that he had to finish his classes, show progress, and have no domestic violence incidents in order for the minors to be returned. He completed his domestic violence, anger management, and parenting classes, 20 weeks of general counseling, the psychological evaluation with Dr. Hawk, drug testing, and “pretty much everything that I was asked to do.” Father testified no one from the Department told him to stay away from mother.
Father admitted that, on August 8, 2015, he became jealous and angry with mother and choked her until she passed out. He also admitted breaking mother’s jaw in 2014. Father stated he loved mother but explained, “The relationship is too toxic. I did what no man should ever do. Put my hands--you know, no man should ever put their hands on a woman, no matter the situation. I should have been--you know, I should . . . I should have been man enough to leave the relationship and walk away, because I don’t want my daughters thinking that’s okay for a man to put their hands on a woman, because it’s not.” Father testified he did not want to continue to have a relationship with mother because he would “never be able to trust her again, and it’s going to be the same thing. . . . [¶] . . . [¶] I’ll catch her in a lie and then I’ll probably overreact and I’ll be back in jail, probably, for the rest of my life.”
Father testified he loved his children and would do anything for them, and that he understood he was wrong to treat E.M. the way he did, adding he treated E.M. like an “outsider” because E.M. was not his biological son. He admitted he took his frustrations out on E.M. because E.M. “started to pick up some of the same traits, as far as lying.”
Father also testified he thought mother was “the greatest mother in the world” because she feeds and clothes the minors and “doesn’t cuss at them, doesn’t whoop them.” He confirmed he wanted to stay in the minors’ lives, “But if me stepping out [of] the picture is what it’s going to take for my kids to be with their mother, then I give up. I give up my parental rights. I’ll pay child support. I’ll step away. I’ll be a man for once and just walk away and just step out [of] the picture.”
Father confirmed his attorney told him and mother “that if we keep separating and getting back together, that we won’t get the kids back,” and that CPS reported the reason the minors would not be returned and services would be terminated was “because [mother] always comes back to me.”
Regarding the most recent domestic violence incident, father explained he became jealous when he saw mother talking to a male customer who father assumed mother might have been staying with when she said she was at a safe house. Father did not believe mother was telling him the truth and admitted he was “trying to force something out of her that may not have been the truth. [¶] She might have been telling the truth and I didn’t accept that as the truth.” He testified that the first time he hurt mother was in 2012, when he either hit or slapped her after finding other men’s phone numbers in her purse and “a guy’s jail booking information in her apron.” With regard to the incident in 2014 when he broke mother’s jaw, father testified he did so over jealousy and the fact that mother lied to him. He also admitted he lost his job at Walmart in part because he left work “a few times” to go home because he was concerned mother was seeing someone else while he was at work.
Father testified he became angry during the TDM meeting in May 2016 due to “false accusations” that he cursed at his daughters because they did not want to talk to him on the phone. It upset him to hear his daughters were afraid of him and did not want to return home or visit with him, and he felt he was being lied to. Father stated he trusted Dr. Nelson. While he initially trusted social worker Williams, he grew to distrust her because he felt she was not working in his best interest.
Father stated he initiated contact with mother when he was incarcerated because he missed her and loved her and wanted to talk to her. He called her on a daily basis and told her he wanted to stay together as a couple.
The court found by a preponderance of evidence that return of the minors would create a substantial risk of detriment; the parents were provided with reasonable services; and both parents made minimal progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating placement. The court found by clear and convincing evidence that both parents failed to make significant progress in resolving the problems that led to the minors’ removal, and failed to benefit from their court-ordered treatment plan. The court further found that scheduling a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 was in the minors’ best interest based on the fact that mother “continues to not be insightful about the risk the father’s behaviors pose to the children”; father “continues to demonstrate aggressive behaviors”; father “is currently incarcerated”; and the parents “have visited the children consistently, until the visits were temporarily suspended by the Department.” The court ordered the minors continued as dependents of the juvenile court and committed to the care and custody of the Department for suitable placement. The court further ordered regular visitation between mother and the minors consistent with the minors’ well-being; visitation between the minors a minimum of twice per month; and no contact between father and the minors. Finally, the court terminated the parents’ reunification services and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
The March 2017 selection and implementation report stated the minors were doing well in their current placements. T.M. was prone to outbursts of crying and screaming if not within eyesight of her caretaker, but stopped crying once back in the caretaker’s line of sight. D.M. was prone to outbursts of crying, screaming, and not following instructions, as well as shoplifting and taking items from others, including the social worker. However, those behaviors had decreased since D.M. began WRAP services. M.M. had recently displayed behavioral issues related to father being incarcerated.
The caregiver for T.M., D.M., and M.M. was unwilling to adopt all three children. There was a caregiver interested in adopting T.M., D.M., and C.M., and a caregiver interested in adopting M.M. separately. The caregivers for Y.M. and A.M. were in the process of completing their home study and screening for child abuse and criminal history. All caregivers were committed to maintaining sibling contact postadoption. The report stated all of the minors were specifically adoptable due to their ages, behaviors, and sibling set. Potential adoptive families had been identified for C.M., T.M., D.M., and M.M.
Mother was regularly and appropriately participating in supervised visits with the minors. It was noted that the minors had increased behavioral difficulties following visits with mother, yet transitioned easily back to their respective caretakers. Father was not visiting with the minors due to the court’s no-contact order and father’s incarceration.
Mother had yet to complete her court-ordered services and had not benefitted from the services in which she did participate. While father had completed his court-ordered services, he had not benefitted from them. Mother reportedly continued her relationship with father, who continued to abuse her and cause physical and emotional harm to her as well as others who intervened. In particular, it was noted that telephone calls between the parents during father’s incarceration in the county jail between November and December 2016 provided evidence that mother and father intended to continue their relationship even after father’s release. Thus, it was unsafe to return the minors to the parents’ care and custody.
The Department recommended termination of parental rights, concluding it was likely the minors would be adopted and, despite some behavioral issues that were being addressed, continued to show a decrease in bad behaviors with the help of therapeutic services.
On April 21, 2017, mother requested a bonding assessment “to confirm that the children, even the youngest, are bonded to their mother.”
According to the May 2017 addendum report C.M. was placed in his current placement on March 6, 2017, and was doing well with his caretakers who expressed a desire to pursue adoption. T.M. and D.M. were placed with C.M. on March 30, 2017. Despite their history of difficult behaviors, both children were doing better and their negative behaviors had reportedly decreased “significantly.” Y.M. and A.M. were placed in their current placement on January 16, 2016, and their caretakers were committed to adoption of both children. The respective caretakers for all of these minors were certified foster families and were in the process of obtaining resource family approval.
According to the report, M.M. had multiple placement changes since the inception of the proceedings in September 2015, and was placed in her current placement on April 3, 2017. In April 2017, M.M. appeared comfortable with her caretaker, was more talkative and open with the social worker during visits, showed the social worker her bedroom and belongings, and talked about the paint colors she had chosen for her room. M.M.’s caretakers were certified as a foster family, were committed to adoption of M.M., and were in the process of obtaining resource family approval.
It was also noted that, prior to her current placement, M.M. exhibited apprehension at the mention of adoption. During a March 2017 visit by the social worker, M.M. asked questions about adoption and her permanent plan, including whether several scenarios, such as running away, refusing to be adopted, or harming herself, would prevent adoption from occurring. The social worker became concerned that M.M. might harm herself and contacted law enforcement. M.M. was evaluated and determined not to be a danger to herself.
The caretakers for all of the minors stated they were committed to maintaining sibling relationships postadoption.
The Department determined all of the minors were adoptable and recommended termination of parental rights, concluding termination would not cause the minors significant emotional harm because C.M. had no relationship with the parents, and T.M., D.M., Y.M., and A.M. did not have a significant relationship with the parents. The Department further concluded M.M. appeared to have a relationship with the parents but, because the parents had not benefitted from services and continued to maintain a relationship with each other, there was a substantial risk to M.M. if she were returned to the parents’ care and custody “due to ongoing domestic violence between the mother and father.”
Mother subpoenaed M.M. and A.M. to testify at the contested permanency hearing. At a prepermanency hearing, the court granted the Department’s motion to quash the subpoenas.
At the subsequent contested permanency hearing, the court heard argument from counsel regarding mother’s request for a bonding assessment and denied the request.
Counsel for A.M., Y.M., and M.M. informed the court that A.M. and Y.M. were currently placed together and happy in their current home. M.M. was happy knowing she would have ongoing contact with her siblings but wanted the court to know she “loves her mother and her family and wants to return home. She feels safe with her mother, and she wants to be with her mother.” However, counsel stated she was unable to advocate for M.M.’s return to either parent given the ongoing protection and safety issues. Counsel argued termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to any of the minors, whose need for permanence outweighed any parental or sibling bond, and requested that the court adopt the findings and recommendations of the Department. Counsel for T.M. and D.M. and counsel for C.M. also requested that the court adopt the Department’s recommendations.
Mother objected to a final plan of adoption, arguing she maintained a strong bond and regular visitation with the minors, and adoption would substantially interfere with the sibling relationship pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v). Mother pointed out that she had separated from father, obtained employment, and found a place to live.
Father joined in mother’s arguments and objected to a final plan of adoption. He argued there was a sufficient bond between the minors and both parents such that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the minors pursuant to section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i).
Adoption social worker Alicia Lemster testified regarding visitation between mother and the minors. She stated M.M. was placed in a separate adoptive home in April 2017. She appeared to be very comfortable there. The prospective adoptive parents were committed to providing a permanent home for M.M. Lemster felt M.M. was “somewhat parentified,” meaning she “was taking over the role as parent for the younger children,” and she “needed to be in a separate home” from her siblings. Lemster explained that M.M. canceled the most recent visit with mother because M.M. did not want to miss school.
Lemster stated she spoke with M.M. about adoption prior to M.M.’s placement into her foster home, including the fact that “guardianship does not terminate parental rights, adoption does.” M.M. seemed to be uncomfortable with the idea of adoption. She told Lemster she was “unsure of adoption” and asked about other options, such as guardianship. At one point after discussing adoption, M.M. asked if hurting herself would prevent adoption. Lemster told her it would not and called law enforcement. However, since being placed in her current foster home, M.M. had indicated no aversion to adoption, and Lemster received no feedback from the foster parents that M.M. did not want to be adopted or that M.M. was having trouble adjusting to her foster home. M.M.’s statement about hurting herself did not change Lemster’s opinion about recommending adoption because Lemster believed adoption was the “safest, healthiest choice” for M.M.
Lemster testified that C.M., T.M., and D.M. were placed in a home in the same neighborhood as M.M.’s placement and the foster parents all kept in contact with each other and were willing to continue postadoption contact between all the minors.
The foster father of A.M. and Y.M. testified that the two minors had been placed in his home for approximately a year and a half. The minors appeared comfortable in his home and had not indicated a desire to leave or return home to live with their parents. He testified that the minors had not visited with father for a substantial period of time and, after the minors finished visits with mother, they ran back to his car “screaming ‘Daddy’ and ‘Mommy.’ ” The foster father testified that A.M. and Y.M. had a relationship with their other siblings, C.M., T.M., and D.M., and that he facilitated sibling contact and intended to continue to do so postadoption. He confirmed the siblings visited each other on a weekly basis.
Father testified he was incarcerated on October 15, 2016. Prior to that, he visited the minors approximately once a week for two to three weeks out of a month. He claimed his visits were irregular because some were “canceled” by the social worker. When father visited, he brought food for the minors, who ran to him and called him “Dad.” He talked and played with the minors. M.M. often helped him with the other minors. On occasion, M.M., A.M., and Y.M. told him they wanted to come home, and D.M. and T.M. cried after visits because they wanted to go home with the parents. The older minors did not cry, but asked when they could come home. He last visited with the minors in September 2016. Since being incarcerated, he had no visits or telephone contact with the minors. He wrote M.M. a letter and sent it to the paternal grandmother to read to M.M., causing the foster family agency to cancel the paternal grandmother’s visit.
Father testified he and mother took care of the minors’ needs. They home schooled the minors and took care of them when they were sick. He said the minors shared a deep bond with him and mother, and the minors should be returned to mother’s care. He testified it was a mistake to put his hands on mother.
Mother testified M.M. told her a caseworker had come to the foster parents’ home and “said that they’re planning to adopt” M.M., who did not want to be adopted. She testified that, every time she spoke with the minors, they told her they did not want to be adopted, and M.M. said she would run away if she were adopted. Mother clarified that M.M. only discussed adoption with her once. Mother felt the minors would benefit from maintaining a relationship with her and living together with her.
Mother testified she had been visiting regularly with the minors since removal on September 24, 2015, missing just one visit due to illness. During visits, mother had the minors wash their hands and then eat food she bought or cooked for them. She brought the minors books and things to color, read to them, played games with them, and laughed and talked with them. She also helped M.M. with her homework and looked over M.M.’s grades. She brought them cake and presents on their birthdays. As long as the minors were doing well in school, mother bought them whatever they wanted. The minors called her “Mom.” In the beginning, the minors cried at the end of the visits.
Mother testified the minors needed to be with her because she was their mom and she raised them. She acknowledged having told M.M. she “was coming home” at one of the recent visits even though she was not supposed to discuss the proceedings with the minors, but said, “Well, my daughter is telling me something. I’m going to respond back to it. Yes, I have been told, and that’s when the conversation stops.”
Mother confirmed that during some of the visits, the visitation monitor had to tell the minors to get down off the furniture, and that M.M. occasionally hit her sisters during visits, but denied she had a hard time getting the minors to follow her instructions. She also denied any conflict between the minors during visits and denied the minors argued regularly at visits.
Following a recess after the initial day of the hearing, the foster father testified that, during the court recess, A.M. and Y.M. were approached by a woman, later identified as Pat King (the mother of another child at school). King began talking to the minors about placement and “proceeded to call [mother] on the phone” and allow A.M. and Y.M. to talk with mother on King’s phone.
In response to the foster father’s testimony, mother admitted she spoke with the two minors on the phone and that the call was initiated by King, one of mother’s friends. Mother denied talking to the minors about placement, but admitted she told the minors she “got a house” and “they’re coming home.” Mother also revealed, after some prodding, that she lived with King in an apartment that King helped mother secure. Mother also admitted she told the minors she had a house.
The court found the minors adoptable and concluded neither the sibling relationship exception nor the beneficial parental relationship exception applied. The court terminated parental rights and ordered a permanent plan of adoption as to all the minors.
DISCUSSION
We address each of the parents’ contentions, not necessarily in the order in which they were presented, as follows.
I
Substantial Evidence Supported the Finding That
M.M. Was Likely to Be Adopted
First, the parents contend there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that M.M. would likely be adopted.
“If the court determines, based on the assessment . . . and any other relevant evidence, by a clear and convincing standard, that it is likely the child will be adopted, the court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) “Although a finding of adoptability must be supported by clear and convincing evidence, it [i.e., the determination that it is likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time] is nevertheless a low threshold.” (In re K.B. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292.)
Determination of whether a child is likely to be adopted focuses first upon the characteristics of the child; therefore, a finding of adoptability does not require that the child already be in a prospective adoptive home or that there is “a proposed adoptive parent ‘waiting in the wings.’ ” (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649.) A finding that a child is not adoptable depends on whether the child suffers from any problems, such as “age, physical condition, [or] emotional state,” that would make it difficult to find a willing adoptive parent. (Ibid.; see also In re I.I. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 857, 870.) The fact that a prospective adoptive parent has shown interest in adopting a minor is substantial evidence the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time, either by that parent or some other. (In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.)
We review the juvenile court’s finding on this issue under the substantial evidence standard, giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any evidentiary conflicts in favor of affirming. (In re I.I., supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 869.) That is, we must determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which the court could find clear and convincing evidence that the child was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time. (In re B.D. (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 1218, 1232.) If so, “[i]t is irrelevant that there may be evidence which would support a contrary conclusion.” (In re K.B., supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1292.)
Here, according to the May 4, 2017 addendum report, and the testimony of social worker Lemster at the contested permanency hearing, M.M. had been placed in her current placement for one month. She appeared comfortable with her caretaker and was more talkative and open with the social worker during visits, showing the social worker her bedroom and belongings, and talking about the paint colors she had chosen for her room. M.M.’s caretakers were certified as a foster family, were committed to adoption of M.M., and were in the process of obtaining resource family approval. M.M.’s placement was in the same neighborhood as the home in which C.M., T.M., and D.M. were placed, and the foster parents all maintained contact with each other and maintained contact between the siblings.
The parents contend there was insufficient evidence of adoptability given the fact that M.M. had only been in her current placement one month after having been in numerous foster homes prior thereto, and that M.M. was opposed to adoption. The parents also contend that, with the exception of information that M.M.’s new placement was a certified foster home, neither the addendum report nor the social worker’s other reports or testimony contained any of the information mandated in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(D), (1)(E) (requiring the Department to prepare an assessment that includes, among other things, information regarding the prospective adoptive parents, their history of child abuse or criminal conduct, their ability to meet the minor’s needs, the nature and duration of their relationship with the minor, the degree of the minor’s attachment to them, their motivation to adopt, and a statement from the minor concerning adoption or guardianship).
While the parents’ failure to raise these issues at the contested hearing did not forfeit their claim of insufficient evidence, it did forfeit any claim of omissions or defects in the reports. (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 622; In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 399-400.) In any event, the fact that M.M. had been in numerous foster homes prior to her current placement does not call into question the fact that she was, by all accounts, doing well in her current placement and becoming more comfortable, despite having previously stated she was not comfortable with adoption and inquiring about ways to avoid being adopted. The social worker testified that, since being placed in her current placement, M.M. indicated no aversion to adoption and there had been no negative feedback from the foster parents regarding M.M.’s adjustment to her new home. And, while it was clear that M.M. preferred returning home and living with her mother, the social worker believed adoption was nonetheless the “safest, healthiest choice” for M.M. M.M. was not yet 12 years old and the juvenile court could consider, but was not obligated to abide by, her wishes.
The parents also contend the social worker did not recall having explained to M.M. the option of guardianship and the fact that M.M. could continue to have contact with her parents. The social worker testified she discussed the issue of guardianship with M.M. “in an age-appropriate level” and explained that guardianship “does not terminate parental rights, adoption does.” Given that M.M. was under the age of 12, the extent of the discussion between the social worker and M.M. was appropriate.
Finally, citing In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 512 (Asia L.), the parents claim the Department failed to provide any evidence of other appropriate foster families willing to adopt M.M. The claim lacks merit. In Asia L., the minors required “specialized placement,” which was initially not available in the county. (Ibid.) Here, M.M. was already in a placement and, while she had some behavioral issues, she was doing well and becoming comfortable with her caregivers. There was no need to identify other approved families willing to adopt.
The fact that the prospective adoptive parents, knowing M.M.’s issues and problems, were willing to adopt is substantial evidence that M.M. was likely to be adopted, either by the current caregivers or by some other family, within a reasonable time. (In re Lukas B., supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1154.)
There was no error in the juvenile court’s finding that M.M. was likely to be adopted.
II
Insufficient Evidence to Support Beneficial Parental Relationship Exception
The parents next contend the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption did not apply. In particular, father contends he met his burden of showing he regularly visited M.M. as much as the juvenile court would allow him and that the benefit of his relationship with M.M. outweighed any prospective adoption. Mother contends that, contrary to the court’s findings, she maintained a parental role in the minors’ lives and had positive interactions with the minors, and termination of parental rights would cause the minors great harm. As we will explain, the parents’ claims lack merit.
“ ‘At the selection and implementation hearing held pursuant to section 366.26, a juvenile court must make one of four possible alternative permanent plans for a minor child. . . . The permanent plan preferred by the Legislature is adoption. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] If the court finds the child is adoptable, it must terminate parental rights absent circumstances under which it would be detrimental to the child.” (In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1368.)
“One exception to adoption is the beneficial parental relationship exception. This exception is set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) which states: ‘[T]he court shall terminate parental rights unless either of the following applies: [¶] . . . [¶] (B) The court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child due to one or more of the following circumstances: [¶] (i) The parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ [Citation.] The [parent] has the burden of proving [the parent’s] relationship with the children would outweigh the well-being they would gain in a permanent home with an adoptive parent. [Citations.]” (In re Noah G. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1292, 1300.)
“Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child’s needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
As previously noted, the party claiming the exception has the burden of establishing the existence of any circumstances that constitute an exception to termination of parental rights. (In re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 549, 553.) The factual predicate of the exception must be supported by substantial evidence, but the juvenile court exercises its discretion in weighing that evidence and determining detriment. (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 622; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315.)
The exception “must be examined on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the many variables which affect a parent/child bond. The age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ effect of interaction between parent and child, and the child’s particular needs are some of the variables which logically affect a parent/child bond.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576 (Autumn H.).)
“On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) “ ‘[E]valuating the factual basis for an exercise of discretion is similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling. . . . Broad deference must be shown to the trial judge.’ ” (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
Father
Father failed to establish the first prong of the exception--that he maintained regular visitation and contact with M.M. As father testified, between July and September 2016, he visited the minors approximately once a week for two to three weeks out of a month. He claimed he did not visit regularly because his visits were “canceled” by the social worker. However, the record makes plain that father’s visitation was initially suspended by the court on May 27, 2016, due to safety concerns as a result of father’s “aggressive behaviors during visits, telephone calls and while interacting with the Department and other professionals associated with the case,” namely during a May 4, 2016, visit with his therapist and a May 16, 2016 TDM meeting. While father’s visitation was reinstated on June 24, 2016, he engaged in a vicious act of physical violence against mother at her place of work just four months later on October 15, 2016. As a result of that incident, father was incarcerated on October 16, 2016, and the juvenile court found visitation with the minors “would jeopardize the safety of the children” and issued a no-contact order. Once incarcerated, he had no visits or telephone contact with the minors. However, he attempted to contact M.M., in contravention of the court’s no-contact order, by writing her a letter and sending it to the paternal grandmother to read to M.M. He acknowledged the fact that it was his actions--the domestic violence incident--that caused him to not be able to visit the minors after October 2016.
Father claims he would have established the parent-child relationship exception had the juvenile court not “curtailed his visitation upon his October 2016 incarceration for domestic violence upon the mother.” Virtually ignoring the fact that his visitation and contact with the minors was terminated due entirely to his own domestic violence against mother, father spends a significant amount of time discussing the factors set forth in Autumn H. to establish the second prong of the exception--the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) We are not persuaded. Given his inability to establish the first prong--regular visitation and contact--his claimed ability to establish the second prong is of no consequence.
While father acknowledges that visitation was temporarily suspended due to his aggressive behaviors, and that the no-contact order was issued due to the October 2016 domestic violence incident, father claims the court erred in ordering no contact between him and the minors following his incarceration because he consistently visited the minors, he completed the court-ordered service objectives prior to incarceration, and the October 2016 incident did not occur while the minors were present. As previously discussed, father’s visitation with the minors between July and September 2016 was interrupted by periods of suspension due to father’s repeated aggressive behaviors. Further, the Department made clear and the court found that, despite having completed services, father obtained little or no benefit from those services, as evidence by his continued anger, aggression, and violence.
We also reject father’s claim that the court ignored Dr. Nelson’s recommendation that visitation continue with the three oldest minors while he was in custody in the local jail in order to decrease the minors’ potential trauma reactive behaviors, anxiety, and depression. The court considered the social worker’s reports, which included Dr. Nelson’s opinions and recommendations. In light of the court’s ruling, including the court’s statements regarding the fact that father was “steadily moving . . . towards less restrictive visitation” until he “committed another act of domestic violence that landed him in custody,” it is clear the court was not inclined to permit any contact with any of the minors notwithstanding Dr. Nelson’s recommendation.
There is insufficient evidence to support the beneficial parental relationship exception as to father.
Mother
With regard to the first prong of the beneficial parental relationship exception--whether the parent has maintained regular visitation and contact with the child (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i))--it is undisputed that mother’s visits and contacts with the minors were consistent. However, “[e]vidence of frequent and loving contact is not enough to establish a beneficial parental relationship.” (In re Noah G., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) Mother must also show she “occupies a parental role in the children’s lives.” (Ibid.) In that regard, mother concedes that limited time with the three younger minors (D.M., T.M., and C.M.) restricted her ability to develop and maintain a parental role, but claims the same was not true of the three older minors (M.M, A.M., and Y.M.), who all looked to her as their parent and expressed a desire to return to her custody and care. Mother also claims that visits with the three older minors generally went well and were appropriate in nature. She asserts that any conflict between the minors was normal behavior between children.
Despite mother’s rather self-serving recitation of the facts regarding visitation, the record of visits between mother and the minors depicts a much more chaotic scene. As described in the visitation logs, the younger minors often acted out by throwing things, hitting others, running off, standing and climbing on furniture, and calling people names. When mother instructed them to stop, they either said “no” or ignored her altogether. M.M. often bickered with mother or had inappropriate conversations including telling mother she needed to get her life together or saying mother was cheating on father. There were also occasions when M.M. tried to tell mother about her successes and achievements but mother failed to listen. In short, aside from mother’s testimony that she helped M.M. with her homework and looked over her grades, there is little evidence in the visitation logs that any of the minors looked to mother, or engaged with her, as a parental figure.
Even assuming mother occupied a parental role with the minors, mother has not demonstrated her “relationship with the children would outweigh the well-being they would gain in a permanent home with an adoptive parent. [Citations.]” (In re Noah G., supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) By all accounts, the minors were comfortable and doing well in their current placements. Their behavioral issues that had arisen immediately after father’s incarceration in October 2016 appeared to have decreased significantly. A.M. and Y.M. called their foster parents “Daddy” and “Mommy.” The respective foster families were maintaining regular contact between the siblings and were committed to or in the process of obtaining family resource approval. Although M.M. had multiple placements since September 2015 and had, on one occasion, expressed concerning statements of possible self-harm when the issue of adoption was discussed, she had not made any similar statements since being placed with her current caretakers in April 2017. Indeed, she appeared comfortable with her new caretakers and was more talkative and open with the social worker during visits, showing interest in her new home despite that she felt safe with mother and wanted to return home.
On the other hand, it was reported in March 2017 that, following visits with mother, the minors demonstrated increased behavioral difficulties but nonetheless transitioned easily back to their respective caretakers. More important, perhaps, was evidence that mother and father were not only maintaining an ongoing relationship, but intended to do so upon father’s release from custody, as evidenced by their telephone discussions while father was incarcerated. While stating she had no intention of getting back together with father, she also testified she thought she and father would get the minors back and raise them together and denied ever being told by the social worker that she would need to separate from father in order to reunify with the minors. Even more troubling is the fact that, as recent as November 2016, mother denied father was a risk to all the minors except for E.M. notwithstanding father’s abusive behavior and physical attacks on both E.M. and mother and his aggressive and threatening behavior towards social workers, staff, and the foster parents. In addition, mother persisted in her minimization or outright denial of father’s domestic violence against her. Given father’s failure to benefit from his court-ordered services and continued inappropriate expressions of anger and verbal, emotional, and physical abuse and threatening behavior, any semblance of a continuing relationship with mother posed a serious risk to the minors.
Additionally, in contravention of the court’s admonition not to discuss the proceedings with the minors, mother admittedly spoke with the minors on a friend’s telephone and told them she “got a house” and “they’re coming home”; she told the minors during a visit that she had obtained a house; and she told M.M. during a recent visit that M.M. “was coming home.” She admittedly had these inappropriate discussions knowing she was not permitted to discuss the proceedings with the minors. As the juvenile court noted, these conversations revealed mother lacked insight, placed the minors’ needs before her own, and was unable to recognize the potential negative emotional impact such statements might have on the minors.
The record makes plain that there is insufficient evidence to demonstrate the benefit of a continued relationship with mother outweighed the well-being of the minors in a permanent home with their prospective adoptive parents. The juvenile court did not err in finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) does not apply.
III
Insufficient Evidence to Support Sibling Bond Exception
The parents contend the juvenile court erred in finding the sibling bond exception to adoption did not apply. The claim lacks merit.
As previously stated, there are only limited circumstances which permit the court to find a “compelling reason for determining that termination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child . . . .” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B).) One such circumstance is when “[t]here would be substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship, including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).)
There is a “heavy burden” on the parent opposing adoption under the sibling exception. (In re Daniel H. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) The authors of the legislation adding the sibling exception envisioned that its applicability would “ ‘likely be rare.’ ” (In re L. Y. L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 950.) This language has been interpreted to mean “that the child’s relationship with his or her siblings would rarely be sufficiently strong to outweigh the benefits of adoption.” (Ibid.) “To show a substantial interference with a sibling relationship the parent must show the existence of a significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be detrimental to the child. Many siblings have a relationship with each other, but would not suffer detriment if that relationship ended. If the relationship is not sufficiently significant to cause detriment on termination, there is no substantial interference with that relationship.” (Id. at p. 952, fn. omitted.)
Here, all of the minors save the youngest, C.M., lived together with their parents until their removal in 2015. At the time of the permanency hearing, Y.M. and A.M. were placed in a foster home together, and T.M. and D.M. were placed in another foster home together. M.M. was in a separate foster home, and C.M., who was removed at birth and never resided with his siblings in the family home, was placed in yet another foster home.
As the juvenile court recognized, there was evidence the minors had relationships with each other. However, given the minors’ respective ages and issues, there was insufficient evidence that severance of those relationships would be detrimental to the minors. For example, M.M. was initially placed with Y.M. and A.M., and then with T.M. and D.M., but was eventually moved to a separate foster home due to controlling and “parentified” behaviors towards her siblings. In particular, M.M. spoke with father on the phone without her foster parents’ permission and, when she was forced to end the call, she instructed her younger sisters not to eat or play in protest. The next day, she asked several strangers to borrow their phones to contact her parents, and told the neighbors that she and her sisters were being abused by their foster mother. After law enforcement intervention, it was determined that the claims M.M. instructed Y.M. and A.M. to make were false. On one occasion, M.M. snuck out of her foster home through a window and coaxed her younger sister, D.M., to go with her. M.M. was temporarily placed with T.M. and D.M. until another placement could be located. M.M. was eventually moved to another foster home, and T.M. and D.M. were reportedly doing better following M.M.’s removal. M.M., too, became comfortable with her new placement.
Similarly, C.M. was initially placed with A.M. and Y.M. but was soon placed in another foster home after his sisters reported to the foster parents that he “cry’s [sic] a lot and [they] did not care whether [C.M.] was placed in a different home as long as they were able to visit with him.”
Father claims the adoptive placements of four of the six minors were relatively recent and thus tenuous, tipping the scales in favor of continuing the sibling relationship and against a plan of adoption. We are not persuaded. The minors proved themselves to be resilient in the face of change, adapting to their new environments relatively quickly and settling in, as discussed above.
Although not dispositive of the issue, current and future sibling visitation between the minors is also a factor for consideration. (In re D.O. (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 166, 175.) Here, the respective foster parents lived in the same neighborhood, maintained regular contact between the siblings, and expressed their willingness and intent to continue to do so postadoption.
As the Department aptly notes, the visitation logs provided further insight into the minors’ sibling relationships. While one would expect a certain amount of horseplay and sibling rivalry during a visit between six siblings ranging from infancy to just under 11 years old, the visitation logs reveal a great deal of chaos during visits, with the minors pushing and hitting each other, throwing things, threatening each other, calling each other names, destroying toys, climbing on furniture, acting out, and generally ignoring each other as well as the instructions and admonishments of mother and other supervising adults. These behaviors exemplified the tenuousness of the sibling relationships and demonstrated that separating the minors into sibling groups was indeed beneficial to all of the minors.
Under the facts presented here, there was insufficient evidence to show severance of the sibling relationship would be detrimental to the minors.
IV
Motion to Quash Subpoenas Regarding M.M. and A.M.
Next, the parents contend the juvenile court abused its discretion in granting the motion to quash subpoenas seeking the testimony of M.M. and A.M. Father contends there was no evidence to support the court’s finding that compelling the minors to testify would “re-traumatize” them and be emotionally damaging, and their testimony could have provided important information relevant to the sibling relationship exception to adoption. He claims he was prejudiced by the court’s refusal to, at the very least, allow the minors to testify in chambers. The claims lack merit.
Mother’s counsel subpoenaed A.M. and M.M. to testify at the hearing. Minors’ counsel filed a motion to quash those subpoenas. In response to the court’s request for an offer of proof as to the general nature of the testimony sought from the minors, father’s counsel stated that, prior to father’s incarceration, father had regular visitation with the two minors and the minors would be able to provide testimony to support an exception to a permanent plan of adoption. M.M. (then 11 years old), and A.M. (then almost seven years old) would testify to whether or not they wished to be adopted and whether they understood what adoption is and that it “means that they may never be able to see their father again.” Father’s counsel also sought to elicit testimony to demonstrate the existence of a strong bond between the minors and father. Counsel suggested the minors could testify in chambers without the parents present. The court noted that, because both minors were under the age of 12, their wishes could be considered by, but were not binding on, the court.
Minors’ counsel argued the minors’ wishes were adequately addressed in the motion to quash and the pretrial statement filed with the court. Counsel further argued it was indeed important for the court to know the minors’ position on adoption but that such information could be ascertained through counsel as well as the testimony of visitation monitors, the social worker, and the reports on file. Thus, the minors’ testimony would therefore be duplicative and unnecessary. Counsel also argued that, due to “the trauma that the children have experienced and their current level of functioning,” testifying would not be in their best interest and would instead be detrimental.
Mother’s counsel indicated mother would be agreeable to having the minors testify in chambers without the parents present, but argued it was important for the court to speak with the minors directly as opposed to through a social worker or some other person.
The Department submitted on the motion to quash and added that, if the court granted the subpoenas, the minors should only testify in chambers.
The court concluded as follows: “I think that the children’s testimony has--the weight of their testimony has very little relevance to the Court. And when I have to balance that against the prejudice that could result from their testifying, I find that prejudice outweighs the relevance. [¶] Forcing these children to come in here at the ages of, what, seven and eleven and have them testify as to whether or not they wish to be adopted and perhaps not see their parents any longer, in the Court’s opinion would re-traumatize them. I’m not sure why we would do that. I’m not sure why the parents would want to put their children through that. [¶] They clearly have had emotional struggles from the onset of this case because of, in the Court’s opinion, the violence they observed in the family home. [¶] They’ve had trauma because of removal. They’ve had trauma because of having to readapt to living with strangers, and they’re in a place where they are now adjusting to that. [¶] But I find it would be emotionally damaging to have these children come in and testify and to offer testimony again, of what the Court finds has really little relevance of--to the issues. And the issues in this case are whether or not they’re likely to be adopted, whether or not there is an exception to adoption. [¶] And I agree that [father] will have a difficult time meeting the first prong of maintaining consistent visitation and contact with the children. But because that’s not the issue. [¶] I also think whether or not the girls are likely to be adopted is established through other witnesses and through other means. How they feel about being adopted is established through other witnesses and they’re unnecessary for that. [¶] But, ultimately, whether or not they wish to be adopted is certainly something for the Court to consider but doesn’t bind the Court legally to making that decision. [¶] So for all of these reasons, I find that the prejudice of having them testify far outweighs any relevance, and I am going to grant the motion to quash [the] subpoena and not bring the girls in to testify.”
There is a statutory presumption that minors will not be present for jurisdictional or dispositional hearings unless the minor or counsel for the minor requests the minor’s presence, or the court orders the minor’s presence. (In re Jennifer J. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1085, 1089; § 366.26, subd. (h)(2).) A “juvenile court judge in a proper case may refuse to require the attendance and testimony of the child who is the subject of the litigation. This power derives, we believe, from a recognition of the overriding objective of the dependency hearing--to preserve and promote the best interests of the child. It would be a perversion of the procedure to impose upon it a requirement that the child’s testimony always be presented, regardless of the trauma resulting to the child therefrom, and regardless of the necessity of such testimony in the resolution of the issues before the court. The refusal of the court to issue process requiring the attendance and testimony of the child should, assuredly, be a decision made only after a careful weighing of the interests involved. . . . Where, however, the child’s desires and wishes can be directly presented without live testimony, where the issues to be resolved would not be materially affected by the child’s testimony, and where it is shown that the child would be psychologically damaged by being required to testify, we hold the juvenile court judge has the power to exclude such testimony.” (Id. at p. 1089, fn. omitted.)
Here, there was ample evidence of the three oldest minors’ wishes regarding adoption (the three youngest minors, all under the age of four, were far too young for such an inquiry). M.M. clearly indicated she was apprehensive about adoption. The minors’ counsel testified that M.M. wanted the court to know she “loves her mother and her family and wants to return home. She feels safe with her mother, and she wants to be with her mother.” A.M. and Y.M. both liked their foster parents’ home, but wanted to live with their parents.
Next, as the juvenile court pointed out, the issues to be resolved at the permanency hearing were whether the minors were likely to be adopted and whether there was an exception to a permanent plan of adoption. The minors’ testimony was not necessary for the resolution of those issues given the abundance of information in the various reports filed by the Department, the visitation summaries, and the testimony of witnesses including the social workers, the foster parents, and the parents themselves. For example, the addendum report filed days before the permanency hearing stated the minors were all doing well in their placements and negative behaviors had greatly decreased. The foster parents for the minors were in communication with each other and were maintaining sibling contact, and remained committed to continuing to do so postadoption. The various caretakers were certified foster homes who were interested in adopting the minors and were in the process of obtaining resource family approval for that purpose. The matter of adoptability did not require the minors’ testimony.
As demonstrated in parts I and II of this opinion, the testimony of M.M. and A.M. was unnecessary to the determination of whether either the beneficial parental relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) or the sibling relationship exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)) applied. Again, as previously discussed, there was an abundance of evidence before the juvenile court, including visitation summaries, reports, and the parents’ own testimony, demonstrating the nature and extent of contact between the parents and the minors and whether the minors would benefit from continued contact.
Finally, there was evidence in the reports and the testimony presented at the contested hearing to support the court’s finding that the risk the minors would be psychologically damaged by being required to testify outweighed any possible benefit of their testimony. As the court noted, M.M. and A.M., both under the age of 12, had “emotional struggles from the onset of this case because of . . . the violence they observed in the family home,” and they had “trauma because of removal” and “having to readapt to living with strangers.” Dr. Nelson reported that, during visitation, five of the six minors “displayed trauma reactive behaviors such as initiating inappropriate conversation topics and pushing boundaries.” However, over time, those behaviors “appeared to reduce” as the minors became more comfortable.
Acknowledging the “extensive history of domestic violence in the home which the children have witnessed,” Dr. Nelson opined that, because of father’s incarceration due to the recent domestic violence incident, it was recommended that the minors receive continued support to “decrease future potential trauma reactive behaviors, as well as decreased subsequent anxiety and depression” and “be supported through their grief and loss issues to minimize the amount of trauma they will endure.” Indeed, the reports indicated the minors were finally settling into their placements and were becoming comfortable in their new circumstances. Negative behaviors previously exhibited were either decreasing or ameliorated altogether. Even M.M., whose behavioral issues resurfaced when father was incarcerated, was settling into her new home with her new caregivers and was doing well under the circumstances, albeit only having been in her new home for a relatively short period of time. The risk of setting the minors back in their hard-fought progress weighed heavily against compelling them to testify.
The parents’ behavior also supported the court’s decision to grant the motion to quash. As previously discussed, both parents communicated with the minors about the proceedings in contravention of the court’s orders and admonishments not to do so. Mother’s repeated statements that she obtained a house and the minors were “coming home,” and father’s letter sent to the minors via the paternal grandmother, raised the concern that the parents could and would place undue pressure on the minors to testify in a manner that would benefit the parents.
Finally, as the Department aptly notes, father’s offer of proof to support his request to have the two minors testify was premised on his belief that the minors’ testimony “does go towards the parent-child bond exception” to adoption. However, as previously discussed, father was unable to establish the first prong of the exception--regular visitation and contact with the minors--due to his violent acts leading to his incarceration. As such, there was little if any probative value in the minors’ proposed testimony.
Given the evidence before the juvenile court, there was no abuse of discretion in granting the motion to quash the subpoenas.
V
No Error in Denial of Request for Bonding Study
Finally, mother contends, and father joins in her claim, that the juvenile court erred in denying mother’s request for a bonding study. Mother further claims any finding that her written request for a bonding study was untimely was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel. The claims lack merit.
Mother first raised the issue of a bonding assessment on December 30, 2016, at which time mother’s counsel stated she would file a motion requesting the assessment, and the Department requested notice and an opportunity to be heard.
On March 17, 2017, the court set a contested section 366.26 hearing date at mother’s request and confirmed April 7, 2017, as the date for a pretrial conference and a hearing on mother’s request for a bonding assessment. The court confirmed the request and all responses needed to be in writing.
At the April 7, 2017, pretrial conference, mother’s counsel confirmed she had yet to file a written request for a bonding assessment. The court set a new pretrial conference date of May 5, 2017, and a new contested hearing date of May 8, 2017, and instructed mother’s counsel to file the request for a bonding assessment by April 21, 2017, with all responses due April 28, 2017. The court acknowledged having already received the Department’s written opposition to the requested assessment.
On April 21, 2017, mother filed a statement of issues for trial, which included a one-sentence request for a bonding study that read, “Mother requests a bonding assessment to confirm that the children, even the youngest, are bonded to their mother.” The Department’s opposition argued, among other things, that the nature and extent of any bond between mother and the minors would be sufficiently clear by the time of the permanency hearing, and a bonding study would significantly delay the permanency of the minors.
At the contested permanency hearing on May 9, 2017, mother’s counsel argued the bonding assessment was necessary to provide more detail than was presented in the supervised visitation reports. Mother also argued the oldest minor, M.M., “stated very plainly that she doesn’t want to be adopted,” and “the children [as] a whole don’t want to be split up.” The Department opposed the bonding assessment, arguing all the evidence in the case provided sufficient insight into the relationship between mother and the minors, particularly given the late stage of the proceedings, and an assessment would unnecessarily delay the minors’ permanency.
The minors’ various counsel also opposed the bonding assessment, joining in the Department’s arguments and noting in particular that there was ample evidence regarding the relationship in the record and it would not be in the minors’ best interest to delay the proceedings. Counsel also disputed mother’s representations about the minors’ wishes and desire not to be separated from one another.
Father joined in mother’s request and argued that a bonding assessment was necessary in order for the parents to meet their burden to show an exception to a permanent plan of adoption. Father argued the parents had been the primary caregivers for all of the minors (with the exception of C.M., who was removed as an infant and never lived with the parents) and a bonding assessment was particularly important in light of the social worker’s statement in the addendum that the oldest minor, M.M., was very upset and had many questions about the possibility of being adopted.
The court denied mother’s request for a bonding assessment, stating as follows: “So I think that bonding assessments can be helpful, but a bonding assessment is helpful when there’s a specific set of facts, I think, before the Court. [¶] And those set of facts are when there is--there is evidence of a continuing strong bond between the parent and child that it would be detrimental to sever. And I don’t believe our facts support that. I don’t believe our facts support a continuing strong bond. [¶] These children will always have a bond with their parents to some degree, but I don’t believe the evidence rises above more than the parent-child bond that they established in the years that they lived with them. [¶] I don’t believe--the bonding assessment really is something that would be presented to the Court to assist the Court in making a decision. And I don’t believe that the Court needs the benefit of expert testimony to do that in this case, and I also agree that it would delay permanency.”
A bonding study is not required prior to termination of parental rights. (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1195; In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1339.) The court has discretion to order a bonding study even late in the process. (In re Richard C., at p. 1197.) Absent a showing of clear abuse, the exercise of the court’s discretion will not be overturned. (In re Lorenzo C., at p. 1341; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
A bonding study is, of course, an expert opinion on the relationship between the parent and child. The juvenile court is never required to appoint an expert when making a factual determination unless “it appears to the court . . . that expert evidence is . . . required.” (Evid. Code, § 730.) Thus, when there is ample evidence in the record of the relationship between parent and child, the juvenile court can properly conclude a bonding study is unnecessary.
Here, as detailed in our summary of the relevant facts and procedure and various portions of our opinion, there was ample evidence of the nature and extent of the bond, or lack thereof, between the minors and each parent. The oldest minors’ wishes were made clear either in the reports or by virtue of the statements of their counsel. The specifics of the relationship between mother and the respective minors was also described in the various reports and demonstrated in the visitation logs. Father’s relationship with the minors was described in Dr. Nelson’s October 2016 termination report regarding the six therapeutic visits between father and the minors, including Dr. Nelson’s opinion that there was a “strong bond and attachment” between father and each of the minors. Both parents testified regarding their relationships with the minors at the contested prepermanency review hearing in November 2016 as well as the contested permanency hearing in May 2017.
Mother claims the court should have granted her oral request for the bonding study in December 2016, and notes she has found no authority requiring the request be in the form of a written motion. However, as she properly concedes, mother never objected to the Department’s request for notice and an opportunity to be heard. In fact, it was mother who offered to file a written motion. As of April 7, 2017, mother had yet to file the promised motion despite that the Department had already filed its written opposition to the requested bonding study. When mother finally did file her written request, it consisted of a single sentence which read, “Mother requests a bonding assessment to confirm that the children, even the youngest, are bonded to their mother.” While she claims the bonding study “could have provided crucial information pertinent to” the court’s decision regarding termination of parental rights in light of “the dichotomy of opinions regarding mother’s relationship with the children,” all information crucial to that decision was already before the court. As mother concedes, the permanency review report contained information, both positive and negative, about her relationship and interaction with the minors, as well as statements by the three oldest minors regarding their wishes concerning their current placements and where they wanted to live. However, the fact that the information available to the court may have varied in terms of the characterization of the bond between mother and the minors did not necessitate a bonding assessment, as mother urges.
Mother also spends a good deal of time challenging the information contained in the reports and visitation logs or provided via testimony at the permanency hearing. Again, her argument simply emphasizes the fact that the record contained a significant amount of information regarding the bonds between each parent and the minors from which the court could make its determination. In light of the substantial information before the court from both the Department and the parents, we reject mother’s assertion that she was prejudiced by the lack of a bonding study because the court ultimately “only had the biased unsubstantiated opinion of the Department upon which to decide this important issue.”
We conclude that, on this record, it was not an abuse of discretion to deny mother’s request for a bonding study. In light of our conclusion, we need not address mother’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s orders are affirmed.



HULL , Acting P. J.



We concur:



ROBIE , J.



MAURO , J.