In re Tom E. Dixson Trust
Filed 5/17/13 In re Tom E. Dixson Trust CA4/1
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts
and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT
OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
ONE
STATE
OF CALIFORNIA
>
In re TOM E. DIXSON TRUST. | |
JULIE ANN DUEPNER-DIXSON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. HARLEY M. DIXSON, et al, Objectors and Respondents. | D062439 (Super. Ct. No. 37-2010-00150222-PR- TR-NC) |
APPEAL from
orders of the Superior Court
of
County, Richard G. Cline, Judge. Affirmed.
Susan
Stricklin Wilson and Barbara K. Meserve for Petitioner and Appellant.
Procopio,
Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch and Mary V.J. Cataldo for Objectors and
Respondents.
Petitioner
and appellant Julie Duepner-Dixson (Julie), was married to Tom E. Dixson (Tom),
although they had separated and he had filed a petition for dissolution of
their marriage before he died by his own hand in 2009. Tom's property was disposed of by a will and
trust, whose trustees, Harley M. Dixson and Rosella Jean Pelzer, are the
objectors and respondents on appeal (the trustees), concerning Julie's petition
to share in Tom's estate as an omitted spouse pursuant to Probate Code
section 21600 et seq. Julie appeals
orders that deny her standing to pursue such claims and that settle the
trustees' account and report, and allow them compensation and fees.
Julie
contends the evidence that was presented at
her standing as a pretermitted spouse, was insufficient to support the probate
court's order denying her such standing and disallowing her objections to the
trustees' administration. She claims the
trial court erred by ruling (A) she did not qualify under section 78,
subdivision (d) as a surviving spouse who retained inheritance rights; (B) certain payments made to her by Tom were intended by him
to amount to a transfer to her "in lieu" of any recovery through his
estate plan, within the meaning of section 21611, subdivision (b); and
(C), she effectively agreed to waive all her inheritance rights within the
meaning of section 140 et seq., and section 21611,
subdivision (c).
We
have examined Julie's arguments in light of the record and determine that the
probate court's rulings are well supported by the evidence and the law, and
must be affirmed.
FACTUAL
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Marriage; Tom's Estate Planning Documents;
Separation
Julie and
Tom were each mature businesspersons when they married in June 2008, and Julie
was Tom's sixth wife. In 1986, Tom
executed a living trust, and he amended it seven times. The Trustees are Tom's brother and sister,
Harley M. Dixson and Rosella Jean Pelzer.
Generally, Tom's will provided that his assets would be poured over into
the Trust and allocated among his three children, one from a former marriage,
and two with his fifth wife, Christie Lange (Lange). Tom and Julie had no children from their
marriage.
Tom had
psychiatric problems, including a bipolar condition, and he and Julie quarreled
and separated in March 2009. Tom's
business was in financial trouble and he wanted to get a loan against the
marital residence to raise cash.
Attorneys for Tom (Christine Sickler) and Julie (John Anderson)
negotiated a property settlement, and on March 13, 2009, each party signed a memorandum of
settlement (the memorandum). Julie
agreed to execute an interspousal grant deed (the deed) for her interest in the
residence, upon the receipt of a $40,000 payment from Tom and a debt
forgiveness of $8,200 on credit cards (mainly for her attorney fees in
preparing for dissolution). The deed was
signed and the payments made, although the parties dispute whether the payments
were in the nature of support, a divorce property settlement and/or an
inheritance settlement.
The terms
of the memorandum anticipated that an executed marital settlement agreement
(MSA) would follow, and it would include the standard "certified
specialist" provisions, such as inheritance waivers. The memorandum provided that Julie waived
"any and all rights she may have to receive" spousal support,
community property interests, or any of Tom's retirement assets. It also stated that if either party failed to
sign the MSA, the memorandum "shall be enforceable as a Judgment under
Code of Civil Procedure § 664.6."
The parties exchanged preliminary declarations of disclosure of their
assets and liabilities.
On March 23, 2009, Tom filed a petition
for dissolution of marriage to Julie.
Negotiations continued on finalizing the MSA terms and counsel exchanged
drafts and communications. As of July
2009, they were still debating the tax status of the $40,000 payment from Tom,
but the attorneys believed that the deal was done. After the separation, Tom told his brother
(one of the trustees) that "it's all over." He told Lange that Julie and he were incompatible.
Back in
December 2004, when Tom was divorced from Lange, he executed the pour-over will
disinheriting her and amended the trust to exclude her from benefiting from
it. On April 10, 2009, Tom wrote on a copy of that will,
"getting divorced from Julie," and wrote in the name of Julie to
replace Lange's name as the spouse to be excluded from inheriting, and he
initialed it and had it witnessed. At
trial, the probate court determined it was not an enforceable codicil to the
will.
At some
other point, Tom got a copy of the trust from his estate planning attorney, and
he wrote on the trust copy to identify Julie (not Lange) as his wife and to
nominate her as a successor trustee.
Julie did not seek to replace the trustees, since Tom's attorneys told
her that copy of the trust was not complete.
The
original 2004 will and trust documents were unavailable at the time of trial
and it appeared that they had been lost in a burglary of Tom's safe. The trustees found copies of estate planning
documents after Tom's death. Copies of
the will and trust were produced at trial.
On August
16, 2009, Tom killed himself. Julie
helped get the death certificates and told Tom's brother that she did not want
anything more than she had received, except for a few of Tom's personal
possessions. The petition for
dissolution was still pending, and the MSA was never finalized.
B. Litigation
The
trustees requested that Julie sign a waiver of rights regarding the trust, and
in response, she retained counsel. In
October 2010, Julie filed a petition for an order declaring she should share in
Tom's estate as an omitted spouse pursuant to section 21600 et seq. (§§ 17200, subds. (b)(4), (7); 850,
subd. (a)(3).) The trustees answered,
alleging that Tom had clearly shown his intent to provide for Julie outside the
Trust, and she had effectively waived any inheritance rights. Julie brought a motion for summary judgment,
which the trustees opposed, and they provided a declaration from Tom's family
law attorney, Ms. Sickler. The motion
was denied.
The probate
court bifurcated trial, to determine first whether Julie had standing to object
to the trustees' accounting as an omitted spouse. The court heard the testimony of numerous
witnesses and admitted into evidence numerous documents on those issues
(described as necessary in the discussion portion of this opinion).
In the
court's statement of decision, the court set forth extensive background
information and ruled, in relevant part, on the contentions of the parties as
follows. The $40,000 and $7,500-plus
payments made by Tom to Julie amounted to an in lieu transfer to her in place
of any inheritance rights, within the meaning of section 21611, subdivision
(b). The court relied, inter alia, on
testimony about statements Tom had made to his family law attorney, Ms. Sickler,
his brother (trustee Dixson), and his ex-wife Lange. Tom apparently believed and intended that
those two payments, made in anticipation of dissolution, would finally resolve
all property rights between the parties, such as inheritance rights.
The court
determined that the memorandum of settlement was a binding written agreement
between Tom and Julie, entered into in anticipation of dissolution of the
marriage and completely settling their property disputes and
relationships. The court ruled that Julie
had waived her right to inherit from Tom.
Even though the MSA was never completed, the evidence showed that the
parties intended the memorandum to amount to a binding, full and complete
settlement of their property issues, made in anticipation of dissolution, and
operating to waive Julie's right to inherit as a surviving spouse.
Moreover,
the probate court found that Tom had provided a preliminary declaration of
disclosure of assets and liabilities, and that Julie was knowledgeable about
his financial status from the outset of the marriage. The court thus ruled that she had waived any
further requirement of disclosure of his assets and liabilities, she remained
bound by the memorandum, and the finalization of the MSA was not essential to
the agreement.
In response
to Julie's argument at trial that Tom had violated his fiduciary duties to her
under Family Code section 721, subdivision (b), the court found that Probate
Code sections 143 and 144 separately provided that such a Family Code provision
was not applicable, when the alternative Probate Code criteria for
enforceability of a waiver of inheritance rights were satisfied. The court next ruled that the Probate Code
requirements of sections 143 and 144 had been satisfied, and Julie's waiver was
enforceable. Thus, both subdivisions (b)
and (c) of section 21611 had been proven to apply, and they provided exceptions
to any inheritance rights of a surviving spouse. The trial court denied Julie's petition. The trustees filed an amended accounting and
request for compensation and attorney fees, which the trial court approved.
Julie
timely filed a notice of appeal of the order denying her standing to object,
and also filed a notice of appeal of the subsequent order settling the amended
account.
DISCUSSION
In the
initial phase of the bifurcated proceedings, the probate court issued a
statement of decision determining that Julie had no standing as a pretermitted
spouse to contest the account of the trustees.
This statement of decision included findings on all those initial,
material controverted issues. On appeal, Julie challenges the resulting
orders by contending that no sufficient evidence supports them, regarding: (A) whether she, as a surviving spouse,
retained inheritance rights under section 78 et seq.; (B) whether the payments to her in connection with the deed
amounted to a transfer by Tom to her, in lieu of his estate plan, within the
meaning of section 21611, subdivision (b); and (C) whether she had
effectively waived her inheritance rights within the meaning of section 140 et
seq., and section 21611, subdivision (c).
We first
outline applicable legal principles and then address these arguments in
sequence.
I
A. Statement of Decision; Review
Julie
initially argued in her opening brief for a de novo standard of review, based
upon her views on statutory and documentary interpretations. In her reply brief, she seeks to have us
apply a standard for mixed questions of law and fact. At trial, the parties disputed the intent of
both Tom and Julie in entering into the various settlement documents and
discussions. The probate court's
statement of decision was issued after the court heard testimony and reviewed
documents to resolve the issues identified in the trial briefs.
Because the
key trust interpretation issues here were decided on such a record of
conflicting evidence, and by means of a statement of decision, "any
conflict in the evidence or reasonable inferences to be drawn from the facts
will be resolved in support of the determination of the trial court decision." (In re
Marriage of Hoffmeister (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 351, 358; Eisenberg, et al.,
Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals and
Writs (The Rutter Group 2012) ¶ 8:62, pp. 8-28 to 8-29; § 1000 [Code Civ. Proc. rules of practice apply in
probate proceedings].) The
ultimate facts found in the court's statement of decision necessarily include
findings on the intermediate evidentiary facts that sustain them. (Muzquiz
v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1125 (
Generally,
"[w]hen the trial court has resolved a disputed factual issue, the
appellate courts review the ruling according to the substantial evidence
rule. If the trial court's resolution of
the factual issue is supported by substantial
evidence, it must be affirmed."
(Winograd v. American Broadcasting
Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.)
The substantial evidence standard of review involves two steps. "First, one must resolve all explicit
conflicts in the evidence in favor of the respondent and presume in favor of
the judgment all reasonable
inferences. [Citation.] Second, one must determine whether the
evidence thus marshaled is substantial.
While it is commonly stated that our 'power' begins and ends with a
determination that there is substantial evidence [citation], this does not mean
we must blindly seize any evidence in support of the respondent in order to
affirm the judgment. . . .
[Citation.] '[I]f the word
"substantial" [is to mean] anything at all, it clearly implies that
such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. Obviously the word cannot be deemed
synonymous with "any" evidence.
It must be reasonable . . . , credible, and of solid value
. . . .' [Citation.] The ultimate determination is whether a
found for the respondent based on the whole
record." (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627,
1632-1633, fns. omitted.)
"[T]he
power of an appellate court begins
and ends with the determination as to
whether, on the entire record, there
is substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the
determination, and when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from
the facts, a reviewing court is without power to substitute its deductions for
those of the trial court.
of no consequence that the trial court believing other evidence, or drawing
other reasonable inferences, might have reached a contrary conclusion." (Bowers
v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.) We may not reweigh the evidence and are bound
by the trial court's credibility determinations. (Ibid.;
see Heller v. Pillsbury Madison &
Sutro (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1384.)
B. Extrinsic Evidence; Review
To the
extent the probate court was required to interpret
documents containing ambiguous language, a de novo standard of review
applies to the threshold determination of the ambiguity of their
provisions. (Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1165-1166 (
The probate court correctly determined that these settlement and
testamentary documents were ambiguous on the status of Julie as a surviving
spouse with regard to inheritance matters, so the probate court appropriately
considered the extrinsic evidence offered. (Ibid.)
When
required to consider extrinsic evidence as a means of clarifying an ambiguous
provision, the courts will follow accepted guidelines:
"The
decision whether to admit parol evidence involves a two-step process. First, the court provisionally receives
(without actually admitting) all credible evidence concerning the parties'
intentions to determine 'ambiguity,' i.e., whether the language is 'reasonably
susceptible' to the interpretation urged by a party. If in light of the extrinsic evidence the
court decides the language is 'reasonably susceptible' to the interpretation
urged, the extrinsic evidence is then admitted to aid in the second
step--interpreting the contract.
[Citation.]" (
Based on
the conflicting evidence presented about the respective intentions of the
parties, the probate court interpreted the memorandum, and determined that the meaning urged by the trustees was the most
reasonable and appropriate. The court
declined to rely on the MSA as an enforceable document, since it was not
executed, but nevertheless considered the evidence about the negotiations and
drafting efforts for the MSA. These
constructions of the documents by the trial court will be upheld on appeal, so
long as they are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. (Winet, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166.)
This is not a case in which no parol evidence was introduced or
there was no conflict, such that this appellate court could or must
independently construe the writings. (
C. Status of Record
on Appeal
Julie
brought a request for judicial notice on appeal, and for an order confirming
certain documents are part of this record.
(Evid. Code, § 459.) The
subject documents are the petition for dissolution filed by Tom, and an
opposing declaration filed in connection with Julie's motion for summary
judgment, giving the views of Tom's family law attorney, Sickler. In those summary judgment proceedings, the
trial court took judicial notice of the petition for dissolution, and denied
the motion.
On
appeal, the trustees opposed Julie's motions to supplement the record,
contending that neither of the documents she identified had been admitted as an
exhibit at trial, although there was some general discussion at trial about the
dissolution petition, and it was not disputed that Tom had filed one and when.
On
February 15, 2013, this court ruled upon the motion, granting it insofar as
judicial notice of the documents' filing was concerned, but denying the motion
for an order to confirm the documents are part of the record on appeal. In any case, we adhere to the rule that
judicial notice properly extends to the existence of the documents, but not to
the truth of the allegations contained in them.
(Wolf v. CDS Devco (2010) 185
Cal.App.4th 903, 915.)
Further,
Julie's second notice of appeal has challenged the final order settling the
accounting and report of the trustees.
Substantial evidence review standards apply to appellate examination of
a probate court's decision to accept an accounting, and Julie, as appellant,
has the burden of showing error. (
Cal.App.4th 462, 471; Estate of Massaglia
(1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 767, 774-778.)
"[I]in the absence of a challenge to findings it is assumed that
they are supported by the evidence and that they support the judgment.
" (Id. at p. 778.) Mainly,
Julie is challenging the initial order in the bifurcated proceedings that
determined she had no standing as a pretermitted spouse to contest the account
of the trustees, and we next address that dispositive issue.
II
SPOUSES
Section
21600 states that "[t]his part shall apply to property passing by will
through a decedent's estate or by a trust . . . that becomes
irrevocable only on the death of the settlor." Section 21610 provides for omitted spouses to
share in a decedent's estate under certain circumstances, stating:
"
a decedent fails to provide in a testamentary instrument for the decedent's
surviving spouse who married the decedent after the execution of all of the
decedent's testamentary instruments, the omitted spouse shall receive a share
in the decedent's estate, consisting of the following property in said estate:
[¶] (a) The one-half of the community
property that belongs to the decedent . . . [¶] (b)
The one-half of the quasi-community property that belongs to the
decedent . . . [¶]
(c) A share of the separate property of
the decedent equal in value to that which the spouse would have received if the
decedent had died without having executed a testamentary
instrument . . . ."
(Italics added.)
Julie
argues the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court's finding that
section 21611 applied in this case, to provide one or more exceptions to the
omitted spouse provisions of section 21610.
Under section 21611:
name="_ftnref3" title="">[3]
"The
spouse shall not receive a share of the estate under Section 21610 if any of
the following is established: [¶] . . .
[¶] (b) The decedent provided for the
spouse by transfer outside of the estate passing by the decedent's
testamentary instruments and the
intention that the transfer be in lieu of a provision in said instruments is
shown by statements of the decedent or from the amount of the transfer
spouse made a valid agreement waiving the right to share in the decedent's
estate." (Italics added.)
III
A. Surviving Spouse Status
Under
section 78, subdivision (d), a " 'surviving spouse' for purposes of
the Probate Code does not include '[a] person who was a party to a valid
proceeding concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital property
rights.' " (
Cal.App.4th 458, 461 (McDaniel).) In the Law Revision Commission Comment to
section 78, the reader is referred to sections 140 through 147, regarding a
surviving spouse's waiver of rights at death.
(Cal. Law Revision Com. com., 52 West's Ann. Prob. Code (2002 ed.) foll.
§ 78, p. 74.) The trustees do not
deny that Julie was still married to Tom when he died, or that his dissolution
petition was not finally adjudicated, but they contend that she cannot rely on
the pure language of this section, due to the contractual interactions between
the parties, even though there was never any dissolution or legal separation
judgment.
In
a more common fact pattern, in McDaniel,
supra, 161 Cal.App.4th 458, the
parties entered into a judgment dividing their marital property and they waived
any rights to appeal. That judgment
became final before the husband died, even though their marital status had not
yet been terminated. Thus, the wife was
prevented from inheriting from his estate, due to the operation of the
judgment, which precluded her status as a surviving spouse who could
inherit. The property settlement
judgment reached before his death made her into "a party to a valid
proceeding concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital property
rights" within the meaning of section 78, subdivision (d). (McDaniel,
supra, at p. 462; see Estate of Lahey
(1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 1056 [a legal separation judgment amounted to an order
for termination of marital property rights, under section 78, subdivision
(d)].)
This
trial involved the presentation of extrinsic evidence and testimony from Tom's
family law attorney Sickler, his ex-wife Lange, his brother and other
witnesses, about the terms and scope of the contractual settlement, as it was
represented in the memorandum. Julie and
her family law attorney Anderson also presented evidence going toward the
appropriate purpose of illuminating all the circumstances under which the
documents, including the memorandum, were created. (See Wells Fargo Bank v. Marshall (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 447,
453.) The memorandum provided
that Julie waived "any and all rights she may have to receive"
spousal support, community property interests, or any of Tom's retirement
assets, and allowed for enforcement under Code of Civil Procedure section
664.6. The
probate court determined that the memorandum was proven to be a binding
contract between the parties, even though no MSA was completed. The court had to decide the scope of the
settlement and the property rights covered, according to the evidence, and it
determined that its scope was broad and Julie's inheritance rights were waived.
Although
the court did not have the dissolution petition before it as an exhibit, it was
not disputed that Tom had filed one.
Julie seeks to support her surviving spouse status by citing to evidence
suggesting that she hoped there would be a reconciliation and the marriage
would not eventually be terminated, and that she had received the $40,000 and
debt forgiveness as support, not as a final payment, because she did not have a
place to live when they separated. She
also points out that she was self-supporting and knowledgeable about Tom's
financial circumstances when they married, and thus she did not marry him for
his money and should not be viewed as a gold digger, but nevertheless, she
claims the assets he disclosed in April 2009 were greater than she
expected. However, she does not deny
that she received timely disclosures of his assets and liabilities, pursuant to
the memorandum obligations, and she accepted the payments as negotiated, and
they were made in anticipation of dissolution.
That the dissolution petition remained pending and could have resulted
in a different property allocation is not dispositive, because the parties did
not pursue the petition, and it can be inferred that neither of them believed
that it was necessary to do so, in view of the agreement they had reached.
Moreover,
when Julie points out portions of the evidence that might support her view of
things, that is not equivalent to demonstrating that there was no substantial
evidence in support of the trial court's conclusions that she did not qualify
as a surviving spouse for inheritance purposes.
Instead, the extrinsic evidence showed there were settlement negotiations
about many different kinds of property rights, culminating in the terms of an
enforceable memorandum of agreement covering termination of all the usual
marital property rights, and Tom understood that this would include inheritance
rights, and did not hide his understanding from Julie. He sent her an e-mail on March 18, 2009,
telling her that with respect to signing the quitclaim deed, she had
"taken a simple bank formality and made it into a total divorce
settlement."
As
we interpret section 78, subdivision (d), it is not dispositive here that the
memorandum was contractual in nature, rather than a court filed "valid
proceeding concluded by an order purporting to terminate all marital property
rights." (Ibid.) The memorandum
anticipated enforceability as a judgment under Code of Civil Procedure section
664.6. In the current litigation, Julie
was provided with an adequate opportunity to attempt to prove that as a matter
of law, she qualified as a surviving spouse in this trust matter, as defined by
statute. She was unable to do so, and
the current orders confirm the parties' previous contractual arrangements and
serve to establish the termination of her marital property rights, including
inheritance. It would have been
premature for the probate court to cut off the inquiry as a simple matter of
definition under section 78, without considering the otherwise applicable
provisions of section 21610 et seq., together with sections 140 et seq.
Under
all the circumstances shown at trial, it was not enough for Julie to rely on
section 78, subdivision (d), or to argue that neither the dissolution judgment
nor MSA was ever finalized. Instead, the
court properly proceeded to determine whether the statutory criteria of section
21611, subdivisions (b) or (c) were satisfied, such that the memorandum was
intended by the parties to accomplish a final adjudication of their respective
property rights, including a waiver of inheritance.
B. Transfer In Lieu
of Estate Plan
Julie
next argues there was no substantial evidence supporting a finding that under
section 21611, subdivision (b), her circumstances fell within an exception to
section 21610's omitted spouse provisions.
Specifically, the probate court found that Tom had provided for Julie by
transfers outside the trust and that he had intended those transfers to be in
lieu of providing for her under the trust.
(§ 21611, subd. (b).) It is
a different question whether Julie intentionally waived her inheritance rights,
as we shall discuss in part III.C, post.
Julie
claims that not all of the criteria of sections 140 through 147 were met here,
regarding the regulation of contractual arrangements about rights at death,
which must be in writing. (§ 142.) The purposes of these enactments are to
provide standards of enforceability of property settlements (usually
prenuptial) that are intended to act as a waiver of inheritance rights. (Estate
of Gibson (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1486, 1492.) The Legislature sought in these sections to
ensure that the circumstances of such a waiver of rights would be subject to
evaluation by a court to determine enforceability. (Id.
at p. 1493.)
Under
section 145, these standards regulating contractual dispositions of rights at
death also apply to a "written agreement" or a "property settlement"
that was " 'entered into after or in anticipation of separation or
dissolution or annulment of marriage.' " (Estate
of Gibson, supra, 219 Cal.App.3d
1486, 1492.) "Probate Code section
145 thus appears to be directed at two types of situations: (1) where the
parties do not intend an agreement to be merged into a dissolution judgment;
and (2) where one party dies after both have executed a marital settlement
agreement but before the court has heard the matter for the purpose of
rendering a judgment incorporating the agreement." (Gibson,
supra, at p. 1492.) This section
provides that a waiver of "all rights" or equivalent language in the
property or estate of a spouse is deemed to include, absent contrary language,
a waiver of rights listed in section 141, subdivision (a), which includes
inheritance rights.
An
enforceable waiver of inheritance rights must comply with the requirements of
sections 143 or 144 (setting the criteria for enforceability of a waiver, e.g.,
adequate disclosure being made of assets if disclosure was not waived,
representation by counsel, or possession of independent knowledge about such
assets). (§§ 142, subd. (b); 143,
subd. (a)(1).) No such issues are argued
on appeal about whether at the time of signing, the decedent had violated any
fiduciary duty to the spouse.
(§ 144, subd. (a)(2); In re
Estate of Will (2009) 170 Cal.App.4th 902, 908; Fam. Code, § 721.)
Here, the
memorandum of settlement is written, was signed by Julie, and it shows
compliance with the requirements of section 143 and 144 regarding his
disclosures and her knowledge of assets.
The lack of a subsequently signed MSA does not make any difference,
because the extrinsic evidence about the circumstances under which this
memorandum was signed by both spouses, while represented by counsel, shows that
it was done in anticipation of dissolution, mentions "any and all rights
she may have to receive" different kinds of known property rights,
expressly including spousal support, community property, or retirement assets. Under all the relevant circumstances, this is
a complete enough list to satisfy the requirements of sections 143 through 145,
and we can find no requirement that inheritance rights must be more
specifically mentioned in any other type of writing, in order for an
enforceable waiver to occur.
Further,
Julie cannot claim any entitlement to a different type of writing, in addition
to the memorandum, on the basis that she and Tom did not exchange their
financial information until after the memorandum was signed, rather than before
it. She waived any right to demand an
additional writing following up on such disclosures, by agreeing that the
disclosure could take place within 30 days of signing of the memorandum. She also admitted that she knew and understood
Tom's financial condition during the marriage, and that after separation, she
received disclosures as agreed.
The court's
findings of Tom's in lieu transfer are well supported by the testimony
regarding the purpose of the transfers and the context in which they were
made. First, Tom told Julie he had made
the transfers outside the Trust because she made it clear to him that she
wanted to accomplish a complete property settlement. That these transfers were to be in lieu of
providing for her under the trust is also shown by the testimony from Tom's
attorney, Sickler, that she and Julie's attorney, Anderson, agreed that the
boilerplate provisions from "certified specialist" documents, about
waiver of inheritance rights, would be included in the MSA, and neither Tom nor
Julie expressed any opposition to that.
In the opinion of Attorney Sickler, the $40,000-plus payment to Julie
was more than reasonable for a nine-month marriage, as an equalizing payment.
According
to Tom's ex-wife Lange, he told her that his divorce from Julie was final and
that once he paid Julie the money, he assumed the dissolution matters were
concluded. Tom's intention to exclude
Julie from his estate plan was also shown in the handwritten additions he made
to his copy of the will. The probate
court had a reasonable basis in the evidence to conclude that the payments were
made and accepted in lieu of provisions for Julie under the trust. (§ 21611, subd. (b).) Substantial evidence was provided to support
a reasonable inference that Tom had the intention his transfers to Julie in
connection with the dissolution, outside the trust, would prevent Julie from
sharing in the Trust's assets. (
C. Waiver
Under
section 21611, subdivision (c), a spouse shall not receive a share of the
decedent spouse's estate under section 21610, if she has made a valid agreement
waiving that right. This section is read
together with the requirements of sections 143 through 145, controlling the
enforceability of a contractual waiver of inheritance rights (such as the
making of adequate disclosures, representation by counsel, or independent
knowledge of the financial standing of the decedent).
To the
extent that the probate court determined that the memorandum included
inheritance rights, even though it did not expressly list them, the court's
conclusions were legitimately based on express and implied findings that the
memorandum language was ambiguous, that extrinsic evidence was essential to
resolve those issues, and that such evidence supported a finding that the
memorandum was intended to be a final settlement of the parties' respective
property rights, in anticipation of dissolution, and it would terminate all of
their responsibilities to each other. (§ 145;
Estate of Gibson,
Cal.App.4th 1106, 1125.) The attorneys
for the parties who were drafting the documents testified they had reached that
understanding, and nothing they heard from their clients contradicted it, so
they thought that the deal was complete.
Julie cannot now contend that any additional writings were required,
pursuant to section 142, once Tom had changed his position by paying the money to
her and forgiving the credit card debt, under the demonstrated understanding
that these were equalizing payments.
Without
reweighing the evidence, and accepting the substantial evidence in the record,
"contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the determination, and
when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,"
this reviewing court is entitled to accept the trial court's resolution of the
disputed factual and legal issues. (
court's conclusions that she waived her inheritance rights in return for other,
in lieu compensation are lacking in any substantial evidence support. (Winograd
v. American Broadcasting Co., supra,
68 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.)
DISPOSITION
The orders
are affirmed. Costs on appeal are
awarded to Respondents.
HUFFMAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL,
P. J.
HALLER,
J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] All statutory references are to the Probate Code unless
otherwise specified.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] As part of the record in this case, Julie designated the
lodged exhibits and the declaration of Ms. Sickler that were filed in
connection with her motion for summary judgment. As explained in part I.C,
and additional orders about those filings, which we granted in part and denied
in part.
