In re Tonisha T

Filed 5/8/06 In re Tonisha T. CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, William McAdam, Judge. Affirmed.

Following an adjudication hearing, the juvenile court found true allegations that Tonisha T. unlawfully used force and violence against a police officer (Pen. Code, § 243, subd. (b);^[1] count 2) and unlawfully resisted a police officer in the discharge of his employment (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 3), both misdemeanors. The maximum possible custody term was one year and four months. At a dispositional hearing, the court declared Tonisha a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, placed her on probation in the care, custody and control of the probation officer, and placed her with her mother. The court imposed and stayed a $60 fine under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5, which included a 20 percent surcharge imposed under section 1465.7.

Tonisha contends the juvenile court erred by (1) imposing the section 1465.7 surcharge as a penalty because it is not authorized by law; and (2) failing to credit her preconfinement credit in the court's dispositional order.^[2] We affirm.

DISCUSSION^[3]

I.

Tonisha contends the 20 percent surcharge of section 1465.7 does not apply to juvenile true findings and thus the juvenile court's imposition of this surcharge was unauthorized by law. Specifically, she contends the legislature intended the surcharge to apply only to criminal offenses, and juvenile delinquency matters are not criminal matters. She bases her argument on section 203 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which states that a juvenile court proceeding is not a criminal proceeding, and cases that denote such proceedings as civil matters. (See e.g., In re Kevin S. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 97, 106.) Tonisha also argues legislative history behind section 1465.7 shows the legislature intended the surcharge apply only to adult criminal fines.

We have no quarrel with the proposition that juvenile wardship proceedings are not deemed to be criminal proceedings. (See In re Luisa Z. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 978, 985; In re Bernardino S. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 613, 618.) This proposition, however, ignores the plain language of the relevant statutes, which, as we explain below, defeats Tonisha's contentions.

Fines in juvenile matters are governed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5, which states: " When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described in Section 602 . . . the court may levy a fine against the minor up to the amount that could be imposed on an adult for the same offense. . . . Section 1464 of the Penal Code applies to fines levied pursuant to this section." Penal Code section 1464, subsection (a) provides in part: " [T]here shall be levied a state penalty, in an amount equal to ten dollars ($10) for every ten dollars ($10) or fraction thereof, upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for criminal offenses, including all offenses, except parking offenses." Section 1465.7 mandates imposition of a state surcharge on any base fine used to calculate the section 1464 penalty: " A state surcharge of 20 percent shall be levied on the base fine used to calculate the state penalty assessment as specified in subdivision (a) of Section 1464. [¶] This surcharge shall be in addition to the state penalty assessed pursuant to Section 1464 of the Penal Code and may not be included in the base fine used to calculate the state penalty assessment . . . ." (§ 1465.7, emphasis added.)

The first step in construing a statute is to look at the words of the statute, which are the " best indicator of legislative intent." (Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 826.) " We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment." (Coalition of Concerned Communities, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 34 Cal.4th 733, 737.) " When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, there is no need for construction." (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 689-690.)

Each of the foregoing statutes uses language mandating imposition of the charges to which they refer. Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5 expressly mandates levy of the state penalty assessment of section 1464 in the calculation of juvenile fines imposed under that section. (In re Steven F. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1070, 1079 [" [I]f an underlying fine is imposed under [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 730.5, that section by its terms . . . mandates levy of the penalty assessment pursuant to Penal Code section 1464" ].) The section 1465.7 surcharge applies, without discretion or exception, to all base fines that are subject to section 1464's penalty assessment. Giving effect to the plain language of these statutes, it necessarily follows that the section 1465.7 surcharge must be imposed on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5 juvenile fine. Had the Legislature not intended that result, " presumably it would have included an appropriate exclusion" in either Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5 or Penal Code section 1465.7. (People v. Bryant (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1584, 1602 [" The Legislature is deemed to be aware of existing laws when it passes a statute, and to have enacted the new statute in light thereof" ].) We conclude the plain language of the statutes and statutory scheme as a whole show the Legislature intended that juvenile fines subject to a section 1464 penalty assessment be surcharged under section 1465.7.

Although the plain language of the discussed statutes is dispositive, we asked for and the parties supplied supplemental briefing on the applicability of section 1463, subsection (h) to the question presented on this appeal. In that section, the Legislature defines " offense" as " any infraction, misdemeanor, or felony, and any act by a juvenile leading to an order to pay a financial sanction by reason of the act being defined as an infraction, misdemeanor, or felony, whether defined in this or any other code, except any parking offense." (§1463, subd. (h), emphasis added.) Because the definition " shall apply to terms used in this chapter" (§ 1463, subd. (a)), it provides meaning to the penalty assessment imposed by section 1464, which includes not just criminal offenses, but " all offenses." By necessity, as we have explained above, it likewise applies to the 1465.7 surcharge. (§1463, subd. (h).) Here, the court found true Tonisha unlawfully used force and violence against a police officer and unlawfully resisted a police officer in the discharge of his employment. Both acts are defined as misdemeanors within the Penal Code to satisfy section 1463. We agree with the people that section 1463's definition of " offense," which incorporates juvenile acts in the penalty assessment of section 1464, supports our conclusion that the surcharge is not limited to adult criminal fines.^[4]

In arguing that the Legislature intended to limit the section 1465.7 surcharge to adult criminal fines, Tonisha points to legislative history of that section. She asserts " [t]he legislative history associated with . . . section [1465.7] makes it very clear that the Legislature intended the words 'base fines' as used in the code section to refer to criminal fines." She cites to the Legislative Counsel's Digest, the Assembly Floor Analysis, and the Senate Floor Analysis, all of which refer to the surcharge as a state penalty on a criminal fine or fines imposed for criminal offenses. We are not persuaded that this discussion evinces Tonisha's proposed legislative intent in view of the express language of section 1464, and the other statutes. We are bound by the plain language of sections 1463 and 1464, levying a state penalty on fines for juvenile offenses, and section 1465.7, which mandatorily applies to the base fines subject to section 1464.

Tonisha further contends the Legislature did not intend to extend section 1465.7 to juvenile matters under the statutory maxim expressio unius est exclusio. The rule states that " 'where exceptions to a general rule are specified by statute, other exceptions are not to be presumed unless a contrary legislative intent can be discerned.' " (State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1029, 1045.) As a threshold matter, we do not read Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5's reference to Penal Code section 1464 as making an " exception" subject to that maxim. We read the statute as merely incorporating Penal Code section 1464, which logically results in application of the surcharge of Penal Code section 1465.7 to juvenile fines under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5.

II.

Tonisha is not entitled to preconfinement custody credit. Section 726 of the Welfare and Institutions Code reads in part: " (c) If the minor is removed from the physical custody of his or her parent or guardian as the result of an order of wardship made pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 602, the order shall specify that the minor may not be held in physical confinement for a period in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult convicted of the offense or offenses which brought or continued the minor under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court."

" Since an adult's term is reduced by credit for preconviction custody, [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 726 should be interpreted as entitling a minor to credit for time previously spent in physical confinement when physical confinement is subsequently selected as a disposition." (In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503, emphasis added.) The statute defines physical confinement as " placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to [Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 730,^[5] or in any institution operated by the Youth Authority." (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 726, subd. (c).)

Here, the probation officer's social study indicates Tonisha was booked and released from juvenile hall on the day she was arrested. Although Tonisha faced a maximum possible commitment sentence of one year and four months, the court placed Tonisha on probation to live with her mother, under supervision of the probation officer. Accordingly, Tonisha was not committed to a facility of physical confinement. (See, e.g., In re Randy J., supra,22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1504 [house arrest or commitment to a nonsecure institution is not " physical confinement" requiring custody credit].) Under the circumstances, Tonisha's dispositional order need not be amended to reflect credit for the day of preconfinement custody.

DISPOSITION

The dispositional order is affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

BENKE, Acting P. J.

IRION, J.

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^[1] All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

^[2] Tonisha's notice of appeal states she appeals " from the Judgment hearing on August 3, 2005." The record indicates the dispositional hearing took place on August 3, 2005. We deem her appeal as from the dispositional order issued on that date. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 37(c)(2).)

^[3] We omit the traditional statement of facts because the issues raised on appeal are not dependent on the facts of the case. Relevant procedural facts are set forth where appropriate in the discussion portion of this opinion.

^[4] Egar v. Superior Court (2004) 120 Cal.App.4th 1306, 1308-1309 holds that Penal Code section 1465.8, imposing a $20 court security fee " on every conviction for a criminal offense," does not apply to juvenile wardship proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 because " juvenile adjudications of wardship are not criminal convictions." This case is distinguishable from Edgar for two reasons. First, unlike Penal Code section 1465.8, section 1465.7 does not contain language applying it only to a conviction for a criminal offense. Second, the Legislature has expressly chosen to apply the Penal Code section 1464 penalty assessment to juvenile wardship fines under Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5, and thus the language of Penal Code section 1464 referencing " criminal offenses" does not prohibit application of the mandatory surcharge of Penal Code section 1465.7. Our holding is narrowly limited to the interaction of the fines, penalties, and surcharges imposed by Welfare and Institutions Code section 730.5, and Penal Code sections 1464 and 1465.7. In applying the section 1463, subsection (h) definition of " offense" to this case, we are not making any statement about the applicability of other Penal Code section fines on juveniles. We express no opinion whether Edgar, which did not consider section 1463 in its analysis, was correctly decided.

^[5] Welfare and Institutions Code section 730, subdivision (a) states in part: " When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is a person described by [Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 602, the court may order any of the types of treatment referred to in [Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 727, and as an additional alternative, may commit the minor to a juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp. If there is no county juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp within the county, the court may commit the minor to the county juvenile hall."