Filed 4/20/18 In re T.W. CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA



In re T.W., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.

SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

Victoria W. et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.
D073152


(Super. Ct. No. J507635)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Marian F. Gaston, Judge. Affirmed.

Amy Z. Tobin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Victoria W.
Grace Clark, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Ricky C.
Thomas E. Montgomery, County Counsel, John E. Philips, Chief Deputy County Counsel, and Patrice Plattner-Grainger, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Victoria W. (Mother) and Ricky C. (Father) appeal from juvenile court orders denying Mother's petition for modification under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to place their minor daughter, T.W., in Mother's care and terminating their parental rights under section 366.26. Mother argues she established grounds for relief under section 388, and the court erred in determining the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply. Father joins Mother's arguments. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) maintains the record does not show any abuse of judicial discretion or lack of substantial evidence. We agree, and affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Detention, Jurisdiction, and Disposition
T.W. was born in September 2013. In April 2015, the Agency received a referral indicating emergency medical services brought Mother to the hospital. Mother appeared psychotic, and stated, among other things, that her husband (Robert R.) did voodoo that made her and T.W. sick. The doctor felt there was a risk for T.W. if Mother further "decompensate[d]" her psychiatric illness. Her behavior was so concerning they would not leave her alone with T.W. An Agency social worker met with Mother, who said they were in a hotel room for multiple days without food or water, because her husband would not buy them food.
The Agency filed a petition on T.W.'s behalf under section 300, subdivision (b)(1), which stated Mother had a mental illness, as evidenced by the events at the hospital. The petition noted her statements about her husband and about being in a hotel without food and water, and the concerns about her mental state and behavior, "which rendered her incapable of providing regular care for said child . . . ." According to the detention report, Mother reported a history of taking Zoloft and Remeron. She also had a history of significant substance abuse. The court detained T.W.
The Agency provided the jurisdiction and disposition report and addendums in May and June 2015. Mother told the social worker she went to KIVA (a substance abuse program) when she was four months pregnant, and stayed six months. After KIVA, Mother and T.W. stayed at St. Vincent's for a year, then with her mother-in-law for a few months, and then in hotels. Mother had four prior dependency cases, with protective issues that included substance abuse, domestic violence, and mental health concerns. Mother also had a lengthy criminal history, with several drug-related arrests between 1990 and 2008.
Mother was now enrolled in KIVA again, and had three negative drug tests. She told the social worker she had been in recovery for two years. She admitted to issues with alcohol, methamphetamine, and marijuana. Mother was also receiving treatment for a mood disorder. She went to Project Enable, where she had previously received medication and treatment for depressive and posttraumatic stress disorders, and was back on Zoloft and Remeron.
Mother and T.W. had weekly visits. The social worker described a visit at which T.W. initially was stiff and not smiling, but lit up when she saw Mother, ran to her, and appeared happy throughout the visit. Afterward, the foster mother commented T.W. was "looser in her movement and appeared more comfortable," and that she first thought T.W. was traumatized from experiences with Mother, but now may think being separated is what is traumatizing her. T.W. received a developmental screening in June 2015, when she was 21 months old. The evaluator had significant concerns about her development and stated she was at the level of an eight- to 10-month-old child.
The court declared T.W. a dependent. T.W. was transitioned to another caregiver, K.H., by early 2016.
B. Review Hearings and Agency's Section 387 Petition
The Agency status review and addendum reports reflected Mother's progress in 2016. She completed KIVA, lived at Cortez Hill while waiting to enter a transitional housing program, Solutions for Change (SFC), and then entered SFC in January 2016. She had unsupervised visits Thursday through Sunday. Mother was discharged from SFC in March 2016, due to intimidating and combative behavior, and then had unsupervised daytime visits on Saturdays and Sundays. Mother entered East County Transitional Living Center (ECTLC) in April 2016. Overnight visits from Thursday to Sunday resumed, followed by a 60-day trial visit. The social worker visited Mother and T.W. and found T.W. was happy and comfortable, they had loving interactions, and Mother set appropriate limits. In June 2016, the court ordered T.W. placed with Mother, with family maintenance services.
On January 7, 2017, the San Diego Police Department responded to a local motel, where Mother was having auditory hallucinations, screaming while holding T.W., and swinging T.W. while almost dropping her. Mother was, among other things, rambling and not making sense; unable to focus; and had a white substance located around her nostrils. She was arrested for being under the influence of a controlled substance and released the next day, and T.W. was taken into protective custody.
The Agency filed a supplemental petition under section 387, and social worker Lashawn White prepared the detention report. Mother denied being under the influence, but admitted drinking alcohol (while still denying illegal substance use). She had been compliant with her medication until the previous month, when she missed the appointment for a refill. Mother also had left ECTLC for Cortez Hill Transitional Housing. A social worker met with T.W. She stated her "momma was lost," and thought Mother was going to the doctor. She also put her arms behind her back, mimicking handcuffs, said she saw police, and stated the police were not nice (or "didn't talk nice"). T.W. was detained and placed with her prior caregiver, K.H.
According to an addendum report, T.W. displayed some concerning behaviors, including screaming without cause and tantrums. The report reflected a drug test taken by Mother on January 10 was positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine, and Mother admitted she had relapsed by using crystal methamphetamine. She began treatment later that month, and expressed the need for residential treatment. She entered a program called the Ranch at ECTLC, and later transitioned to the Family Restoration Program there. Mother participated in other services, including aftercare at the Parent Care Outpatient Substance Treatment Program (Parent Care) and individual therapy. The court held a contested hearing on the section 387 petition, terminated reunification services, and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing.
C. Section 366.26 Hearing and Mother's Section 388 Petition
In September 2017, social worker Ronda Felder prepared the Agency's section 366.26 report. She observed a visit on August 12, which went well, but T.W. did not cry or show emotion at the end. The Agency recommended termination of parental rights and adoption as the permanent plan. T.W. was developmentally on track and attached to her caregiver, who was committed to meeting her needs and wanted to adopt her. The Agency determined the parent-child relationship was not beneficial and termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to T.W. It noted Mother's previous actions did not show consistent care for T.W. and that she did not put T.W.'s needs before her own. It also noted that "the relationship appear[ed] to be more like a friendly relationship where [T.W.] shows respect to [Mother]," explaining T.W. showed no distress upon separating from her at the end of each visit.
An October 2017 addendum report described a visit during which Mother gave T.W. a birthday party. Felder indicated that when T.W. wanted or needed something, she went to Mother or the caregiver.
Later in October, Mother filed a section 388 petition, requesting placement of T.W. She explained she had tested clean since February 2017, entered the ECTLC ministry (the Ranch) at that time and transitioned to its Family Restoration Program in June 2017, and was utilizing individual therapy and mental health treatment. She argued modification would be in T.W.'s best interests, as she would benefit by being raised by her biological mother, Mother had proven herself capable of being a fit parent, and they had a strong parent-child bond.
In a November addendum report, the Agency recommended the section 388 petition be denied. It found that although Mother had been sober for the past nine months, she had not shown "she can continue to maintain this type of life once she leaves the program as evident [sic] by past history." The Agency also found T.W. needed a permanent and stable home; had made progress with her caregiver; and was attached to her, as evidenced by calling her "mom" and separating from Mother with ease.
In November 2017, the juvenile court held a hearing on the section 388 petition and permanency planning. The court admitted Agency reports into evidence, and White, Felder and Mother testified.
White met with Mother after the relapse, and they discussed how leaving ECTLC was not the best idea. She testified that although Cortez Hill normally would have been a good idea, it was in an area known for drug use and could have been a trigger. In addressing Mother's missed medication before the relapse, White noted that substance abuse and mental health have to be treated at the same time and said: "I don't know at the time if she truly understood that, but she did know . . . that not taking the medication was probably a step to it." White also addressed T.W. The first visit was three weeks after removal; visits were offered, but Mother "had made a statement that she wasn't ready" and it was "hard for her . . . to see [T.W.] at Polinsky; supervised visits." During that first visit, T.W. was hesitant, would not go to Mother, and made statements like "you left me." It took her a couple of visits to come around.
Felder indicated T.W. had recently started therapy to cope with her emotions about her trauma and whatever circumstances she was going through. She testified the caregiver and Mother had a "very positive relationship" and she was able to let them schedule visitation.
Finally, Mother testified. When asked about her relapse, Mother explained that in late November 2017, she was told her son might be shot because he was armed and allegedly committed sexual assaults. She did not feel she could reach out to her support group, and was using Cortez Hill to get away from the situation. She also explained she missed the appointment to get her medication because she was taking T.W. to school, and did not have it for two months. She followed up, "they got me in" but "it already hit the fan by then and then [she] just started drinking."
Mother discussed her new participation in Parent Care, and stated she did not feel like she was alone anymore and had more support. She testified that if T.W. were sent home with her, they would stay at ECTLC (noting people have been there for 13 or 15 years, and do not have to leave). She also testified T.W. referred to her and the caregiver as "mommy" and says she has two mommies.
During cross-examination, Mother acknowledged she had a relapse prevention plan in place prior to her relapse. She also noted she had been in recovery "on and off all [her] life." Mother agreed that "maintaining [her] sobriety outside of a structured living facility is an important and necessary step to growing in [her] sobriety and recovery over time."
The juvenile court denied the section 388 petition. It found that "while recent sobriety is commendable," that "reflect[s] changing, but not changed circumstances." The court noted there are allowances for brief relapses, but there was at least a month during which Mother was not taking advantage of services. The court explained that Mother testified she had "been in and out of recovery her entire life," she was aware of substance abuse and mental health services, and she was "still learning how to use these tools when she needs them most."
The court also found placement with Mother would not be in T.W.'s best interests. The court explained that when first removed, T.W. showed signs of trauma and had developmental deficiencies, and these problems had been ameliorated by the stability and love in the home of the current caregiver. It found T.W. "cannot afford the risk of another relapse and all the instability that comes with all of that." The court observed things appeared to be going well in Spring 2016, but "unfortunately, that was a mistake because it didn't work well and [T.W. has] now been re-traumatized [by Mother's relapse] and [by being removed] from [Mother] again."
Turning to termination of parental rights, the court found T.W. was adoptable, and addressed the beneficial parent-child relationship exception. The court found Mother's visits were consistent. It also found, however, that Mother's relationship with T.W. "does not meet that high threshold" of a parent-child bond, such that any detriment T.W. would suffer from termination of Mother's parental rights would be outweighed by the benefits of adoption. The court found there was no doubt Mother loves T.W. and T.W. looks forward to seeing her, but the visits "more closely resemble visits by a beloved family member than by someone who is responsible for consistently taking care of her daily needs." The court concluded: "[G]iven [TW]'s young age and her need for the kind of care that a small child needs in this case, the benefits of the permanency and stability of adoption outweigh the benefit of the parent/child relationship."
Mother's counsel asked for a last visit. The court stated it would ask the Agency to facilitate a visit, and it "wouldn't be surprised if visitation were ongoing."
Mother and Father timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Modification Petition
Mother argues the juvenile court abused its discretion when it denied her modification petition seeking placement of T.W. This contention lacks merit.
"A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new evidence or changed circumstances exist and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interests of the child." (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 611 (A.A.).) "The parent bears the burden to show both a legitimate change of circumstances and that undoing the prior order would be in the best interest of the child." (Id. at pp. 611-612.)
After "reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability." (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309 (Marilyn H.).) A "court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stage of the proceedings must recognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child." (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317 (Stephanie M.); In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 526 (J.C.) [accord].)
A petition under section 388 "is addressed to the sound discretion of the juvenile court, and its decision will not be overturned on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion." (A.A., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 612.)
First, the juvenile court reasonably concluded Mother had not established changed circumstances. The court found that although her recent sobriety was commendable, she was still learning how to use services when she needed them most. The record supports this conclusion. Mother had a long history of substance abuse and mental health issues, and acknowledged being in and out of treatment her whole life. She had lived in controlled environments while pregnant with T.W. and after her birth. But by March 2015, Mother was living in hotels and exhibiting psychotic symptoms, leading to T.W.'s initial removal. Mother again entered controlled environments, and apparently did well. However, when faced with a stressful situation regarding her son, she chose to move living situations instead of using available services. She also missed two months of medication, started drinking, and was arrested for use of controlled substances—and T.W. was removed again.
Thus, although Mother has achieved progress in controlled settings, she has not learned how to manage stress and function on her own, while sustaining her sobriety and mental health. Indeed, she was prepared to simply stay at ECTLC, despite acknowledging that maintaining sobriety outside a controlled program was essential to recovery. In sum, Mother's latest period of sobriety and mental health does not demonstrate changed circumstances. (See In re Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [father's "seven months of sobriety . . . , while commendable, was nothing new"]; In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [mother's recent sobriety was " 'changing', not changed, circumstances"].)
Mother maintains her circumstances have changed, describing her efforts following her January 2017 relapse (including her new participation in Parent Care) and characterizing the January incident as isolated. But as discussed ante, her recent efforts do not demonstrate sustained progress. We also disagree the incident was isolated. Mother contends there was no evidence of current drug use and the original removal was based on mental health; and explains the relapse was caused by her son's situation, missing her appointment (and thus missing medication), and her reluctance to reach out for help. Mother's argument minimizes her long-standing challenges with both sobriety and mental health, and the need for her to continue addressing each issue. As for her explanation of the relapse, it illustrates that she had not learned to address challenging situations without jeopardizing her sobriety or mental health, and there remains no evidence she has learned how to do so.
Second, the juvenile court was within its discretion in concluding that placement with Mother was not in T.W.'s best interests. At this stage, the focus is on permanence and stability. (Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 309; Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) When T.W. was 21 months old, shortly after her initial removal, she was at the level of an eight- to 10-month-old child. She also showed signs of trauma after the initial removal, possibly due to separation from Mother, and experienced trauma when removed from Mother again. Mother has not established she can maintain her sobriety and mental health such that she can provide a stable home for T.W. and eliminate the risk of further removals. Meanwhile, the caregiver did provide stability and the prospect of permanence. T.W. had spent substantial time with the caregiver and viewed her as a parental figure, was doing well there and was developmentally on track, and the caregiver was committed to adoption.
Mother argues placement with her is in T.W.'s best interests, contending they have a strong parent-child bond and citing the fact that T.W. lived with her for significant periods of time. As we discuss in addressing termination of parental rights, post, there is substantial evidence that Mother did not have a parental bond with T.W., regardless of the time they lived together. Further, T.W. also lived with the caregiver for long periods, and there was evidence she was bonded to her. In any event, neither a strong bond, nor time together, would establish Mother could provide T.W. with permanence and stability.
Mother also attempts to contrast this case with J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th 503. There, the Court of Appeal found the mother demonstrated changed circumstances, but placement was not in the minor's best interests, where she had a stable placement with a maternal aunt, who was the only "constant and stable" parent she had known. (Id. at p. 526; ibid. [mother "failed to present any evidence J.C.'s best interests in permanency and stability would be furthered" by placement].) Mother contends that, unlike the mother in J.C., she had one relapse and was committed to making necessary changes (while also citing reasons to distinguish the case). But Mother has not yet made those changes, and has not provided evidence that placement will further permanency and stability for T.W.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's section 388 petition.
B. Termination of Parental Rights
Mother argues the juvenile court erred in finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception inapplicable here. We reject this contention.
At a section 366.26 hearing, if the juvenile court finds the child likely will be adopted, the court "shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption," absent certain exceptions. (§ 366.26, subd. (c).) The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies where "[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent bears the burden in the juvenile court of showing the exception applies. (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 529.)
The juvenile court found that Mother had maintained regular visitation with T.W. Accordingly, the only issue here is whether the court erred in determining that Mother had not met her burden of showing sufficient benefit to T.W. to invoke the exception.
"The 'benefit' prong of the exception requires the parent to prove his or her relationship with the child 'promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents.' " (In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621 (K.P.).) In other words, "to establish the exception a parent must prove that the benefit of continuing a parental relationship outweighs the child's interest in the stability and permanence of adoption." (In re Logan B. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1000, 1012.) " 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' " (In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 594.)
The beneficial parent-child relationship exception applies only in exceptional circumstances. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) "Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350 (Jasmine D.).) " 'The factors to be considered when looking for whether a relationship is important and beneficial are: (1) the age of the child, (2) the portion of the child's life spent in the parent's custody, (3) the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and the child, and (4) the child's particular needs.' " (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315 (Bailey J.).)
Appellate courts have applied different standards of review to the parent-child beneficial relationship exception. (See K.P., supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 621.) Some courts, including this one, have applied a "hybrid standard." (See, e.g., J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531; Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315; In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395.) There, "[w]e apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether there is a compelling reason for finding that termination would be detrimental to the child." (Anthony B., at p. 395.) We will apply the hybrid standard.
Under the hybrid standard, we view the juvenile court's determination of whether a beneficial parental relationship exists as a factual finding that we review for substantial evidence. "On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.) "Unless the undisputed facts established the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, a substantial evidence challenge to this component of the juvenile court's determination cannot succeed." (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p. 1314.)
"The second determination in the exception analysis is whether the existence of that relationship or other specified statutory circumstance constitutes 'a "compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental" ' to the child. [Citation.] This ' " 'quintessentially' discretionary decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption," is appropriately reviewed under the deferential abuse of discretion standard.' " (J.C., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531, italics omitted.) " ' "The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." ' " (Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 318-319; see Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.)
We conclude there is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's determination that Mother and T.W.'s relationship was not a parent-child bond. Mother's role was that of a friend or family member, not a parent. It is not enough that they had loving interactions and pleasant visits. (See In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1527 ["[T]he parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits—the parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the life of the child."].) T.W. may have looked to Mother for her needs during visits, but she also looked to the caregiver, and was not distressed when the visits ended. Further, Mother is still learning how to manage her own challenges, calling into question her capacity to focus on T.W's needs. It was her inability to utilize services and remain on her medication that led to her relapse, and T.W's second removal—after which she apparently did not visit for three weeks. Mother may have her reasons, but her actions do not reflect a parental focus on T.W.
Mother argues she and T.W. had a close bond, citing their visits, the length of time they lived together, and T.W.'s distress following removal. We recognize Mother and T.W. had good visits, Mother cared for her during her early life (and periods of unsupervised visitation and, briefly, placement), and T.W. experienced trauma from removal. But none of this establishes that Mother was consistently functioning in a parental role for T.W. Mother also contends there is no evidence that T.W.'s ease at separating from her was due to lack of attachment, and it was "just as likely that T.W. felt secure and confident that [Mother] would return . . . ." The Agency cited T.W.'s lack of distress for its finding there was no beneficial parent relationship; one can reasonably infer it was offered as evidence that attachment was lacking. Mother is essentially asking us to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. (Mosesian v. Bagdasarian (1968) 260 Cal.App.2d 361, 368 ["it is axiomatic that a reviewing court will not reweigh the evidence"]; see Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 319.)
Even if there were sufficient evidence to support a finding of a beneficial parent-child relationship between Mother and T.W., we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in determining the benefits of adoption outweighed those of the parent-child relationship. Mother related to T.W. only as a loved one, not a parent, and although visits went well, they occurred while Mother was living in a controlled environment. When she left those environments and/or failed to utilize services, she put T.W. at risk. Following removal, T.W.'s developmental issues resolved, she was doing well, and the caretaker was committed to meeting her needs. There is no evidence T.W. had "needs only [Mother] can satisfy," or "the type of emotional attachment" to her that would cause T.W. "to be greatly harmed if parental rights were terminated." (Jason J. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 922, 938.)
Mother disagrees, focusing on the difficulty of removal for T.W. She argues T.W. "could not afford to be kept from [her] again," citing T.W.'s purported feelings of abandonment following removal. There is no dispute T.W. was impacted by removal, however those feelings are characterized. But, as discussed ante, there remains risk of another relapse—and, if T.W. were placed with Mother, another removal. Mother also argues T.W. could feel abandoned "once visits were permanently terminated." It is unclear why she assumes visits would end; she had a positive relationship with the caregiver, and the court suggested they appeared likely to continue. Even if visits ceased and T.W. experienced some feelings of abandonment, she would no longer face the prospect of another removal and the trauma it has entailed for her.
We conclude the juvenile court did not err in finding the beneficial parent-child relationship exception inapplicable.
DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.




HALLER, J.

WE CONCUR:




HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.




NARES, J.