In re Victoria J.

Filed 10/11/06 In re Victoria J. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 977(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 977(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 977.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Harry M. Elias, Judge. Reversed with directions.

Jasmine P., the mother of Victoria J., appeals the adjudication and disposition order, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's denial of reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code^[1] section 361.5, subdivision

(b)(10), (11) and (13). Jasmine also contends reversal is required because the court failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.).

We conclude substantial evidence supports the denial of reunification services. We agree, however, that the ICWA notice was deficient as it appears the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not attempt to obtain information from Victoria's maternal grandmother. We reverse the order denying reunification services and direct the juvenile court to ensure proper notice is given under the ICWA.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

At 12 years of age Jasmine began experimenting with alcohol and drugs, including heroin, LSD, PCP, cocaine and marijuana. At 16 years of age she developed a daily amphetamine habit. During her teens she spent time in group homes, juvenile hall and the California Youth Authority. She has an arrest record dating back to 1994 for drug offenses and other crimes, including burglary, robbery, grand theft, car theft, carjacking and receiving stolen property. She estimates she was incarcerated a total of six years between 1994 and the date of the order on appeal.

In December 2004 Jasmine gave birth to Victoria while in prison. The baby lived

with Jasmine in prison until she was six months old, when Jasmine sent her to live with Victor J., the baby's presumed father^[2], and his mother. When Jasmine was released from prison in September 2005 she resumed custody of Victoria.

On February 3, 2006, while on parole, Jasmine was arrested for possession of a methamphetamine pipe. Jasmine, who was holding Victoria, attempted to evade arrest by diving under a parked truck with a running engine. For Victoria's safety, a police officer pulled her from Jasmine's arms. The baby was screaming hysterically. During an attempt to escape, Jasmine kicked an officer's shins several times. She was charged with several crimes and booked into jail. Victoria was taken to Polinsky Children's Center. At the time, Victor was incarcerated.

The Agency filed a petition on Victoria's behalf under section 300, subdivision (b). Count 1 alleged Jasmine had abused methamphetamines beginning January 1, 2006, and count 2 concerned the February arrest.

Jasmine cooperated with the social worker by revealing her drug history and various treatment attempts. Jasmine said "she had been clean for a couple of years but in January of this year she 'was trying it out again.' " She admitting she had been using methamphetamine once or twice a week and drinking two to three glasses of wine on the weekends " 'just until I get a buzz.' "

The Agency recommended that Jasmine receive no reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11) and (13), noting "Illegal substance abuse and safe parenting are incongruent." Additionally, Victoria's half-sibling, Richard G., became a dependent of the juvenile court a few weeks after his birth in November 2000, and he was adopted by his paternal grandparents in 2003 after Jasmine failed to reunify with him.

At the time of the contested adjudication and disposition hearing on May 8, 2006, Jasmine was in prison with an expected release date of July 13, 2006. She testified that on release she intended to enter a residential drug treatment program, Serenity House, and it allowed children to reside with their mothers. She explained she received reunification services for Richard for 12 months, and she did not comply with her plan because she was in and out of jail after failing to attend or complete a series of recovery programs and relapsing.

The court sustained the petition, made true findings on the two counts and declared Victoria a dependent of the court. The court continued Victoria in foster care, finding a return to parental custody would create a substantial danger to her health. The court also found there was a relative, the paternal grandmother, who was willing and able to care for Victoria. The court ordered Victor to comply with his case plan, and it denied Jasmine reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), (11) and (13). The court also found the ICWA inapplicable.

DISCUSSION

I

Denial of Reunification Services

A

A parent involved in dependency proceedings is generally entitled to reunification services for six months for a child under three years of age, and 12 months for a child three years of age or older. Services may be extended for up to 18 months if there is a substantial probability the child can be returned to the parent within that time. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)-(3).) Under certain circumstances, however, the court must deny reunification services unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the child's best interests. (§ 361.5, subd. (c).) The " 'Legislature has made the decision that in some cases, the likelihood of reunification is so slim that scarce resources should not be expended on such cases.' " (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.)

We review an order denying reunification services for substantial evidence. (In re James C. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 470, 484; In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1401 & fn. 4; Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) "When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence -- that is evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value -- to support the conclusion of the trier of fact." (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) We look at the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling and resolve all inferences and conflicts in favor of the party prevailing in the trial court. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.)

Subdivision (b)(10) and (11) of section 361.5 provide, respectively, that services need not be provided to a parent who failed to reunify with the child's sibling or half-sibling, or to a parent whose rights over the child's sibling or half-sibling were permanently severed. Both of these subdivisions also require that the parent "has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to the removal of the sibling or half-sibling" from the parent's custody. (Ibid.)

Jasmine concedes she did not reunify with Richard and her parental rights to him were permanently severed. She contends, however, that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding she did not make a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to his removal from her custody in 2000, as the petition in his case alleged the parents exposed him to domestic violence and did not allege drug abuse. Jasmine asserts the record shows she made a reasonable effort to address domestic violence, as the court's minutes from Richard's detention hearing indicate a restraining order was issued against Richard's father, and notices of mailings contained different addresses for the parents.

Further, Jasmine submits there "was no evidence that [she] was using drugs at or around the time of the [domestic violence] incident, or that drugs played any role in the incident," and thus she was not required to have made a reasonable effort to address her drug abuse. Alternatively, she asserts the evidence shows she did make a reasonable effort to do so. We disagree with both points.

Although Richard's petition did not allege drug abuse, "when the court is aware of other deficiencies that impede the parent's ability to reunify with his [or her] child, the court may address them in the reunification plan." (In re Christopher H. (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1001, 1008.) During Jasmine's pregnancy with Richard she was in two different residential treatment programs, the latter of which was KIVA, where he was born in November 2000. She did not complete the KIVA program, and left there when Richard was one month old because she was upset after learning his father was cheating on her. Richard's dependency petition was filed in December 2000. In February 2001 the court ordered Jasmine to participate in the SARMS program as part of her case plan. Due to her incarceration, she was terminated from SARMS in June 2001. Services were terminated for Richard in February 2002. During the reunification period, she was in and out of jail because of drug relapses; she did not comply with the terms of her parole, which included drug testing.

"A court's overriding purpose in construing a statute is to ascertain legislative intent and to give the statute a reasonable construction conforming to that intent. . . . Statutes must be given a fair and reasonable interpretation, with due regard to the language used and the purpose sought to be accomplished." (Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc. v. Contractors' State License Bd. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1592, 1601.) " '[W]e do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute "with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is a part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness." [Citation.]' " (Calatayud v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1065.) "Literal construction of statutory language will not prevail if contrary to the legislative intent apparent in the statutory scheme. [Citation.] Statutory language should not be given a literal meaning that results in absurd and unintended consequences." (Gomes v. County of Mendocino (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 977, 986.)

"The 'no reasonable effort' clause [in subdivision (b)(10) and (11) of section 361.5] provides a means of mitigating a harsh rule that would allow the court to deny services based only upon a parent's prior failure to reunify with the child's sibling 'when the parent had in fact, in the meantime, worked toward correcting the underlying problems.' " (Cheryl P. v. Superior Court, supra, 139 Cal.App.4th at p. 97.) Certainly, Jasmine's habitual drug abuse was an underlying problem during Richard's dependency proceedings and in her failure to reunify with him. In our view, it would be absurd to interpret subdivision (b)(10) and (11) of section 361.5 to exclude drug abuse merely because it was not alleged in Richard's petition. Jasmine's long-term drug abuse makes reunification unlikely and thus scarce resources should not be extended to her.

Further, substantial evidence supports a finding that after Richard's case was resolved she did not make a reasonable effort to treat her drug problem. Indeed, her drug abuse led to her arrest in February 2006 and the commencement of dependency proceedings for Victoria. Jasmine told the social worker that about two weeks before her arrest she attended Serenity House for one day, but left after having an argument with another resident. She claimed to have been off drugs two years but admitted that in January 2006 she " 'was trying it [methamphetamine] out again,' " and before that she was drinking to get high.

The court properly denied reunification services under subdivision (b)(10) and (11) of section 361.5. Given our holding, we are not required to consider whether subdivision (b)(13) of section 361.5 is also applicable. (See Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 72.)

B

Alternatively, Jasmine contends substantial evidence does not support the court's finding the best interest exception is inapplicable. Again, subdivision 361.5, subdivision (c) provides the court shall deny reunification services based on factors enumerated in subdivision (b) of section 361.5 unless it finds by clear and convincing evidence that reunification is in the child's best interest.

Jasmine points out that Victoria was born drug free and lived with Jasmine in prison until she was six months old. While incarcerated Jasmine completed a mother-infant program, but she did not obtain a certificate because she was transferred from one facility to another. After Jasmine's release from prison in early September 2005, Jasmine was about nine months old, and she lived with Jasmine until this case commenced in February 2006.

Jasmine asserts that in light of her incarceration she "took every step she reasonably could to maintain a connection with Victoria after her removal." She testified that when she was in a detention facility, before going to prison, she telephoned Victoria approximately 30 times. Although Victoria was not yet very verbal, she called Jasmine Mommy. Jasmine wrote to Victoria every week and sent her drawings. She also had telephone contact with the foster mother, and she asked about how Victoria was getting along with other children in the home, her health, her eating habits and her development. Further, Jasmine intended to enter a residential drug treatment program on her release from prison.

That evidence, however, falls far short of establishing reunification would be in Victoria's best interest despite the applicability of subdivision (b)(10) and (11) of section 361.5. Jasmine has a history of chronic drug abuse, which by her admission dates back to her teenage years, and a pattern of noncompliance with drug treatment programs dating back to 2000. The exceptions to reunification programs based on substance abuse "reflect a legislative determination that an attempt to facilitate reunification between a parent and child generally is not in the minor's best interests when the parent is shown to be a chronic abuser of drugs who has resisted prior treatments for drug abuse." (In re Levi U. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 191, 200.) The court's ruling is supported by substantial evidence.

II

ICWA Notices

A

Jasmine contends the court's finding that ICWA is inapplicable was premature, and thus erroneous, because the notices provided the Cherokee and Blackfeet tribes were deficient.

"The ICWA provides that 'where the court knows or has reason to know that an Indian child is involved, the party seeking the foster care placement of, or termination of parental rights to, an Indian child shall notify the parent or Indian custodian and the Indian child's tribe, by registered mail with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and of their right of intervention.' [Citation.] If the tribe is unknown, the notice must be given to the Bureau of Indian Affairs [BIA] as the agent for the Secretary of the Interior. [Citations.] 'No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be held until at least ten days after receipt of notice by the . . . tribe [or] the [BIA].' " (In re Daniel M. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 703, 707.)

"Notice under the ICWA must, of course, contain enough information to constitute meaningful notice. The Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings . . . (Guidelines), which are designed to implement the ICWA, require the notice include, among other things, the name of the Indian child; his or her tribal affiliation; a copy of the dependency petition; the petitioner's name and address of the petitioner's attorney; and a statement of the right of the tribe to intervene in the proceedings." (In re Karla C. (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 166, 175.)

"Additionally, by federal regulation an ICWA notice must include, if known, (1) the name, birthplace, and birth date of the Indian child; (2) the name of the tribe in which the Indian child is enrolled or may be eligible for enrollment; (3) names and addresses of the child's parents, grandparents, great-grandparents and other identifying information; and (4) a copy of the dependency petition. [Citations.] '[T]o establish tribal identity, it is necessary to provide as much information as is known on the Indian child's direct lineal ancestors.' " (In re Karla C., supra, 113 Cal.App.4th at p. 175.)

Initially, Jasmine denied having any Indian heritage. On February 8, 2006, however, she advised the court she had some Native American heritage. On the same date, she completed an ICWA information form that claimed she may be a descendent on her mother's side of the Cherokee or "Blackfoot" tribes. She provided her father's and mother's names, and her mother's maiden name, and the months and days of their birthdays. She indicated with question marks, however, that she did not know the year they were born. She gave the names of her grandmother and grandfather, indicating the grandfather is deceased. She did not give birthdays for them and she did not list an address for any maternal relative. She did, however, state her maternal relatives reside or resided in Michigan. The Agency transferred that information to a form adopted for mandatory use by the Judicial Council of California, form JV-135, and sent copies of the forms and notice of Victoria's dependency proceedings, by registered mail with return receipts requested, to the Blackfeet tribe, the three federally recognized Cherokee tribes (In re C.D. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 214, 226) and the BIA. No tribe chose to intervene.

Jasmine complains that the JV-135 form did not provide the year and place of her mother's birth and current and former addresses; an indication of whether the grandmother she listed was on her mother's or father's side; and the grandmother's year and place of birth, maiden name and current and former addresses. She also submits the form was deficient because her mother's maiden name was listed between the first and last names, suggesting it may be a middle name.

The record does not suggest that when the Agency sent the required notices to the Indian tribes and the BIA on February 22, 2006, there was additional information available concerning Jasmine's relatives. Jasmine submits, however, that the Agency potentially had access to additional information based on its March 6, 2006 jurisdiction and disposition report, in which the social worker wrote Jasmine had reported that "[h]er mother is currently incarcerated and they have written contact." Jasmine asserts the social worker "could have easily written to the [minor's] maternal grandmother and requested the additional pertinent information."

The Agency complains that Jasmine did not object to the ICWA notices at the juvenile court. The Agency submits that while it "is aware the need to notice pursuant to the ICWA cannot be waived, it does not make sense to allow a parent . . . to simply sit by and allow the court to make an inappropriate finding, only to challenge it on appeal. That constitutes invited error." The Agency misunderstands the invited error doctrine. The "doctrine of invited error applies where a party, for tactical reasons, persuades the trial court to follow a particular procedure. The party is estopped from claiming that the procedure was unlawful." (In re Jamie R. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 766, 772.)

In Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 257, this court held a parent's silence on the ICWA notice issue at the juvenile court does not constitute invited error or any other type of waiver. "Because the court's duty continues until proper notice is given, an error in not giving notice is also of a continuing nature and may be challenged at any time during the dependency proceedings. . . . Though delay harms the interests of dependent children in expediency and finality, the parents' inaction should not

be allowed to defeat the laudable purposes of the ICWA." (Id. at p. 261.)^[3]

The Agency also asserts the ICWA does not "require[] a social worker to continually grill the parents and relatives regarding Indian heritage." Jasmine does not suggest such a requirement. Rather, the social worker has " 'a duty to inquire about and obtain, if possible, all of the information about a child's family history' required by 25 Code of Federal Regulations part 23.11(d)(3)." (In re S.M. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1116; In re C.D., supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 225.) It appears the social worker could have contacted Victoria's maternal grandmother in an effort to obtain additional information on the family heritage. The maternal grandmother would surely know the year and place of her own birth, and it is likely she could also provide information pertaining to the maternal great grandmother. Obtaining the address of the maternal grandmother from Jasmine would not be "continually grill[ing]" her for information.

Additionally, the Agency relies on In re Gerardo A. (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 988, in contending we should reject Jasmine's argument as speculative. In In re Gerardo A., the mother asserted Indian heritage. In the father's appeal, he contended the ICWA notices were insufficient because "the department should have inquired of the children's

maternal grandmother or other older maternal relatives for additional family history, such as the birthplaces and/or birthdates for those listed on the request-for-confirmation form whose birthplaces and/or birthdates were noted as 'unk' or unknown." (Id. at pp. 994-995.) The court found the father's position speculative, since the record's silence "regarding whether the department spoke with anyone other than the children's mother and maternal aunt does not necessarily mean the department failed to make an adequate inquiry for Indian heritage information." (Id. at p. 995.) The court noted that "appellant assumes without any basis in the record that the maternal grandmother or other older maternal relatives were available to be interviewed in 2001 and could have supplied the missing birthplaces and birthdates." (Ibid.)

The Agency asserts there "is no indication [in the jurisdiction and disposition report] whether the mother and maternal grandmother had on-going written contact, or even whether the mother had a current address." We disagree, as the report states "[h]er mother is currently incarcerated and they have written contact." (Italics added.) Here, information putting the Agency on notice of potential additional information removes this case from the realm of sheer speculation. We conclude the Agency should have followed up with the maternal grandmother in an effort to obtain additional information bearing on Victoria's possible Indian heritage.

B

Jasmine also asserts the court's ICWA finding is faulty because the Agency did not send the notices to tribal chairpersons or their designated agents for service, but rather sent the notices to the tribes at large. Under California Rules of Court, rule 1439(f)(2), "Notice to the tribe must be to the tribal chairperson unless the tribe has designated another agent for service." The BIA "periodically publishes a current list of designated tribal agents for service of notice, along with the appropriate mailing addresses, in the Federal Register." (In re H. A. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, 1213.)

The Agency sent the notices here to the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma; the United Keetoowah Band, also in Oklahoma; the Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians in North Carolina; and the Blackfeet Tribal Business Council. Jasmine does not claim the notices were sent to the wrong tribes or addresses, or that any additional tribes were entitled to notice. Citing In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, she asserts that "[b]ecause none of the responses received were from the tribal chairpersons or a designated agent for service . . . , it cannot be presumed that the negative responses are determinative."

In In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th 498, the Contra Costa County Department of Children and Family Services (the department) failed to submit the required ICWA documentation to the juvenile court for its review. (Id. at p. 508.) The social worker testified she sent ICWA notices to the " 'Business Committee' " of several tribes, instead of to the chairpersons or designated agents for service. (Id. at p. 509.) She also testified she " 'received a number of responses from the tribes' " and " 'they all indicated that neither parent nor child is registered nor eligible to be registered.' " (Id. at p. 507.)

The Court of Appeal held the department failed to comply with the second step of In re Marinna J. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 731. (In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 508-509.) In In re Marinna J., the court devised a two-step process for ICWA notice compliance: " 'To satisfy the notice provisions of the [ICWA] and to provide a proper record for the juvenile court and appellate courts, [a social service agency] should follow a two-step procedure. First, it should identify any possible tribal affiliations and send proper notice to those entities, return receipt requested. [Citation.] Second, [the agency] should provide to the juvenile court a copy of the notice sent and the return receipt, as well as any correspondence received from the Indian entity relevant to the minor's status.' " (In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 507.)

The In re Asia L. court concluded that neither it nor the juvenile court could evaluate the sufficiency of the notices and the testimony of the social worker was insufficient. (In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.) The court further noted "the record does provide reason to question whether there was a defect in the notice given to several of the tribes because the department failed to serve the notice on the chairperson or designated agent for service of process as required by statute." (Ibid.) Relying on In re H. A., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pages 1213-1214, the court concluded that "[a]bsent some evidence that the various business committees had authority to speak for the tribes or that the responses received by [the social worker] came from an authorized agent, the failure to submit the necessary documents to the court [regarding notice] cannot be considered harmless." (In re Asia L., supra, 107 Cal.App.4th at p. 509.)

In In re H. A., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1206, the Kern County Department of Human Services (the department) also failed to submit documentation to the court pertaining to ICWA notices. (Id. at p. 1210.) In an assessment report, the social worker stated she sent ICWA notices to the BIA, the " 'San [sic] Ynez Tribal Health Clinic in San [sic] Ynez, California,' " and to the " 'San [sic] Ynez Band of Mission Indians in San [sic] Ynez, California.' " (Id. at p. 1209.) The report also stated " 'George Armenta, Enrollment Committee Chairman, San [sic] Ynez Band of Mission . . . Indians, sent a response to [the department] stating [the minors] have no affiliation with the San [sic] Ynez Band of Mission Indians.' " (Id. at pp. 1209-1210.) Actually, the agent for service of ICWA notices was " 'Santa Ynez Band of Mission Indians, ICWA Coordinator.' " (Id. at p. 1213.)

The In re H. A. court found several problems with the ICWA notice. The department did not establish it gave notice by registered mail, with return receipt requested, of the pending proceedings and the right to intervene; the department's reliance on certified mail was misplaced; and it did not send the notice to the tribe's chairperson, and there was no indication the health clinic was the designated agent for service. (In re H. A., supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1212-1213.) The court rejected the department's argument the notice inadequacies were harmless since it received a response stating the minors had no tribal affiliation. The court explained that Armenta may have had the tribe's authority to speak on ICWA matters, but the record did not show he did. (Id. at p. 1214.)

Certainly, the Agency should have addressed the ICWA notices to the tribal chairpersons or the designated agents for service. This case, however, is distinguishable from In re Asia L. and In re H. A., in that the Agency filed the ICWA notice documentation, and thus the juvenile court and this court can assess its adequacy. The record shows the Agency received responses from (1) the Blackfeet Tribe's "Indian Child Welfare Act Program," by Quana L. Old Chief, "Inquiry Technician"; (2) the "Office of Indian Child Welfare" of the United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians in Oklahoma; (3) the Cherokee Nation, by Stacia Goodnight, "Indian Child Welfare Cherokee Nation," and (4) the Cherokee Center for Family Services, by Barbara Jones, "Director Family Support Services." The latter response does not contain a reference to the ICWA in its letterhead, but it expressly states Victoria "is not considered an 'Indian Child' in relation to the Eastern Bank of Cherokee Indians as defined in 25 U.S.C., Section 1903(4)." In our view, the responses evidence the responders' authority to address ICWA matters for the tribes.

In any event, neither In re Asia L. nor In re H. A. concerns a record that contains copies of the tribes' responses. "A decision is authority only for the point actually passed on by the court and directly involved in the case. General expressions in opinions that go beyond the facts of the case will not necessarily control the outcome in a subsequent suit involving different facts." (Gomes v. County of Mendocino, supra, 37 Cal.App.4th at p. 985; Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1182, 1195.)

Given the record here, we conclude the Agency's failure to address the ICWA notices to the tribal chairmen or designated agents for service is harmless error.

DISPOSITION

The order denying Jasmine reunification services is reversed. The court is directed to order the Agency to make good faith efforts to obtain more information from the maternal grandmother or other known relatives pertaining to Victoria's possible Indian heritage, and if additional information is found to provide the tribes with supplemental notices.^[4] If the Agency is unable to obtain additional information, or if the tribes are given supplemental notices but no tribe intervenes, the juvenile court shall reinstate the order. (See Dwayne P. v. Superior Court, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 261.)

McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

NARES, J.

AARON, J.

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^[1] Further statutory references are also the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified.

^[2] Victor J. is not a party to this appeal.

^[3] In In re X. V. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 794, 803, this court held the parents waived a second appellate review of ICWA notice issues by failing to raise the issues during a hearing on remand from the first appeal for the specific purpose of ensuring adequate notice. We concluded Congress did not anticipate or intend "to require successive or serial appeals challenging ICWA notices for the first time on appeal" (id. at p. 804), and as "a matter of respect for the children involved and the judicial system, as well as common sense, it is incumbent on parents on remand to assist the Agency in ensuring proper notice is given." (Ibid.)

^[4] Any supplemental notices should clearly indicate the maiden name of the maternal grandmother and not suggest it could be a middle name. Further, any supplemental notices should be sent to the tribal chairpersons or designated agents for service.