In re Vincent B.
Filed 4/17/07 In re Vincent B. CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
In re VINCENT B., A Person Coming Under
the Juvenile Court Law.
SANTA CLARA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
FAMILY AND CHILDRENS SERVICES, H030536
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Clara County
Super. Ct. No. JD11110)
v.
DIANE B.,
Defendant and Appellant.
________________________________________/
Diane B. appeals from an order entered after a post-permanency planning hearing that was held pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3.[1] She contends that the juvenile court violated her due process rights by denying her request to participate in the hearing telephonically and by excluding relevant evidence. We find no error and affirm.
I. Statement of Facts[2]
In July 1999, appellants son Vincent was removed from her care when he was six years old. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Childrens Services (Department) filed a petition pursuant to section 300, subdivision (b). The petition alleged, among other things, that Vincent had been found alone and unsupervised and had been physically abused by appellant and her boyfriend. The juvenile court sustained the petition, removed Vincent from appellants care, placed him at Eastfield Ming Quong, and ordered family reunification services.
In July 2000, appellant abducted Vincent from his placement and fled to Canada. When appellant was eventually apprehended, Vincent required psychiatric hospitalization. Vincent was returned to the United States while appellant sought political asylum in Canada.
In February 2001, the 12-month review hearing was held, and appellant did not attend. The juvenile court terminated reunification services, ordered no contact between appellant and Vincent, and adopted the permanent plan of long term foster care. Appellant then brought a section 388 petition in which she sought Vincents return to her in Canada. The juvenile court denied the petition.
The report for the post-permanency planning hearing in February 2002 stated that Vincent continued to display anxious behaviors, and was non-compliant, physically aggressive, fearful, and hyperactive. It was also reported that only three of appellants 17 letters to Vincent were deemed appropriate. In June 2002, Vincent was transferred to a higher level placement. Vincents psychiatrist diagnosed him with post-traumatic stress disorder, oppositional defiant disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and episodic enuresis.
In early 2002, appellant was returned to Santa Clara County to face a charge of child abduction.
In April 2003, another post-permanency planning hearing was held. Vincent continued to have personal boundary issues, poor social skills, a tendency to run away, and difficulty trusting others. Vincent also expressed concerns about appellants behavior towards him.
In July 2003, Vincents attorney requested a restraining order against appellant after Vincents caretakers received a suspicious phone call indicating that appellant was attempting to locate him. Appellant did not attend the hearing, and the juvenile court issued a permanent restraining order.
The next review hearing was scheduled for November 2003. The social workers report stated that there were three warrants for appellants arrest and her whereabouts were unknown. Vincent did not refer to appellant in positive terms. He was making progress in his therapy, though he continued to suffer from anxiety and to display aggressive, sexualized, and oppositional behaviors. Appellant did not attend the hearing.
In May 2004, the next review hearing was held. The social worker reported that appellants whereabouts were unknown and she had not communicated with Vincent in the past year. However, appellant claimed that Vincent was dead, continued to express her innocence, and sought help in pursuing legal action on various web sites. Vincent remained in a residential treatment facility where he spoke only fearfully and negatively about appellant.
In April 2005, appellant filed a section 388 petition for modification in which she alleged that the conditions in her life had improved and that it would be in Vincents best interest if he were returned to her care. The Department opposed the petition based on the family history, the kidnapping, Vincents current emotional and behavioral needs, his fear of appellant, and the lack of changes in appellants circumstances.
In August 2005, appellant sent a letter to the social worker in which she claimed that she had no criminal record. She also stated: You must work to free Vincent and facilitate his return to me and his family. She informed the social worker that she would attend future hearings by telephone.
In October 2005, an addendum report summarized Vincents relationship to appellant. He did not ask for her letters or to write to her. He was afraid of appellant and did not want to live with her. During therapy, Vincent expressed his desire for a mother who would not hurt him, and confronted a doll designated as appellant about her mistreatment of him.
Following several continuances, the juvenile court held a hearing in November 2005 to determine whether there would be an evidentiary hearing on appellants petition for modification. After the Department objected to appellant appearing telephonically, appellant made a statement in which she accused the juvenile court of putting her in jail on bogus charges, claimed that she never violated a court order, and accused Vincents attorney of lying and violating the law. The juvenile court then terminated the call to preserve confidentiality. The juvenile court denied the petition on the ground that appellant had failed to show that her changed circumstances would serve the best interests of Vincent.
On June 27, 2006, the social worker filed status review and addendum reports, which recommended that Vincent continue to be placed in a confidential community care facility. The report stated that Vincent was physically healthy, but he was taking three psychotropic medications. He continued to address issues in therapy relating to anxiety, communication, boundaries, coping skills, family issues, and preoccupation with sex. He was functioning academically at the third and fourth grade level. Due to Vincents emotional and behavioral issues, the social worker stated that he was not a likely candidate for adoption or legal guardianship. While appellant and the maternal grandmother sent Vincent cards, he left them in his therapists office after reading them. However, Vincent was willing to write to appellant and his grandmother. Vincents treatment team recommended that appellant continue written communication with Vincent.
At the conclusion of the post-permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court ordered that its previous orders remain in effect.
II. Discussion
Appellant contends that the juvenile court violated her due process rights when it denied her request to participate in the review hearing telephonically.
A parent in a dependency proceeding has a due process right to notice and a hearing. (In re Crystal J. (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 413; see also Rules of Court, rule 5.682.) However, in dependency proceedings, a parents right to due process is limited by the need to balance the interest in regaining custody of the minors against the states desire to conclude dependency matters expeditiously and . . . exercise broad control over the proceedings . . . . (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 759-760.) Trial courts are afforded discretion to work within existing guidelines to determine the admissibility of evidence. (See Wagner v. Benson (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 27, 36.) The reviewing court will not disturb their findings absent an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination . . . . (In re Raymundo B. (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 1447, 1456.) (In re Nada R. (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 1166, 1176.)
Here appellant was living outside the country. After the Department denied her request to pay for her transportation from Seattle to the hearing, she requested that she be allowed to participate telephonically. Noting that appellant made a choice not to attend the hearing, the Department objected to appellants request. The Department then argued that a telephonic appearance did not protect the confidentiality of the proceedings, because appellant had a history of violating the protective orders in the case. Appellants counsel responded that participation by telephone would not affect Vincents security, because appellant did not know the location of Vincents placement. Vincents counsel joined in the objection. The juvenile court then denied the request, stating: I am going to deny the right to participate in a telephone conference call without prejudice if you want to renew that. I think its basically a balancing of the -- I dont think its precluded in a proper situation where there is a need for the court to obtain necessary information. You have to balance the risk of confidentiality being undermined and the need to gain important information, allow the mother to be heard. But she has counsel, I see no compelling reason why the normal customary procedure of this court which is not to carry on its proceedings telephonically, why that should be changed today. So its going to be denied without prejudice. If there is another occasion and you want to renew it and there is a proper showing the court can balance and make a determination.
We first note that a parent in dependency proceedings does not have a constitutional right to transportation to the courthouse. When appellant was in custody, she was transported to hearings. However, once she was released from jail, it was her choice to move abroad. Thus, the Department did not err in denying her request to pay her transportation costs.
Appellants reliance on Wantuch v. Davis (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 786 is misplaced. At issue in Wantuch was an indigent prisoners right to defend against and prosecute a civil action. In contrast to Wantuch, here appellant was not in custody and she was represented by counsel.
We next conclude that appellant was not deprived of due process when the juvenile court denied her request to appear telephonically. Juvenile court proceedings are confidential to protect the childs privacy rights. ( 300.2, 827.) Appellant has a lengthy history of violating the juvenile courts orders on confidentiality. She has sent e-mails related to the case and posted information from the social workers reports on web sites. Appellants counsel acknowledged that she was unable to control appellants violation of the prior court orders not to disseminate information about Vincent to the media and general public. If appellant had participated in the hearing telephonically, it was unknown whether she would have recorded the hearing or allowed unauthorized people to be present. Moreover, the juvenile court would have been unable to observe her demeanor while testifying. (Evid. Code, 780, subd. (a).) Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellants request.
Appellant next contends that the juvenile court violated her due process right to present evidence.
The due process right to present evidence is limited to relevant evidence of significant probative value to the issue before the court. [Citations.] (In reJeanette V. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 811, 817.) This court reviews the trial courts determination as to the admissibility of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Alavarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 201.)
Here appellant sought to introduce the following: (1) a brief addressing the issues in one of her prior appeals; (2) letters, dated December 10, 2002 and February 6, 2003, from a neurologist to Judge Leonard Edwards regarding ADHD; (3) e-mails to her counsel to which she had attached articles on ADHD medication and long-term institutional care; (4) an e-mail to her counsel in which she states that [i]f the bitch judge wont let me attend by phone, I may come down there with armed bodyguards; (5) e-mails about investigations regarding the Department of Family and Children Services; (6) copies of police reports, dated July 12, and September 18, 2000; (7) law relating to special education evaluation informed consent; and (8) a declaration for Vincent to sign indicating that he understood his right to testify that he wanted placement with appellant.
A writing must be authenticated to be admissible in evidence. (Evid. Code, 250.) A writing is authenticated by testimony or other evidence that it accurately depicts what it purports to show. (People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 747, quoting People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 859.) Here some of the documents could not be authenticated without appellants testimony. It is unclear how appellant would have authenticated the remaining documents. More importantly, none of these documents was relevant to any issue at the hearing. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in excluding them.
III. Disposition
The order is affirmed.
_______________________________
Mihara, J.
WE CONCUR:
_____________________________
Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J.
_____________________________
Duffy, J.
Publication courtesy of California free legal advice.
Analysis and review provided by Carlsbad Property line Lawyers.
[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless stated otherwise.
[2] This court has taken judicial notice of the records in prior appeals (case numbers H029660, H022368, and H023110). The statement of facts is based in part on the record in those cases.
