In re William R.
Filed 8/7/07 In re William R. CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
In re WILLIAM R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. | B177152 |
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM R., Defendant and Appellant. | (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. FJ28427) |
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Charles Q. Clay, III, Judge. Reversed.
Jan B. Norman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson and Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney Generals, Kristofer Jorstad, Deputy Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Marc E. Turchin, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
SUMMARY
Appellant challenges the decision of the juvenile court sustaining a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition against him on the grounds the trial court improperly denied his suppression motion and imposed unconstitutionally vague and overbroad probation conditions.
Our original opinion in this case concluded that the juvenile court properly denied the suppression motion and that appellants probation conditions required the addition of an element of knowledge to eliminate vagueness. The Supreme Court granted respondents and appellants petitions for review. After deciding In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128 (Jaime P.) and In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875 (Sheena K.), the Supreme Court remanded this case with a direction to reconsider our decision in light of Jaime P. and Sheena K.
Applying Jaime P., we conclude the trial court erred by denying appellants motion to suppress. Appellants contention regarding his probation conditions is therefore moot.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Los Angeles County Sheriffs Department received a call from a person who observed a young man painting graffiti on a wall on Figueroa Street. Sheriffs deputies responding to the call saw appellant walking on Figueroa and believed he matched the description of the graffiti suspect. They detained appellant and found a can of spray paint concealed inside a sweatshirt he was carrying.[1]
Appellant moved to suppress the can of spray paint and statements he made after the seizure of the can. The juvenile court denied the motion. Appellant then admitted an allegation of misdemeanor vandalism in an amended Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition. Appellant, who was already on probation, was placed in a camp community placement program for six months. The juvenile court determined that appellants aggregate maximum confinement term was four years four months.
DISCUSSION
Appellant moved to suppress the physical evidence, his statements to the deputies, and the deputies observations based on the theory he was illegally detained and searched. Although implicitly admitting he was on probation and subject to a search condition, appellant asserted that the detention and search were invalid because the deputies had no knowledge of his probationary status when they detained and searched him. Appellant argued In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68 (Tyrell J.), was invalidated by People v. Sanders (2003) 31 Cal.4th 318.
No evidence was introduced at the hearing on appellants motion. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that Tyrell J., supra, 8 Cal.4th 68, had not been overruled, and the deputies conduct was justified by appellants probationary search condition, despite the deputies ignorance of the condition at the time of their actions.
Appellant contends the juvenile court erred by denying his suppression motion. He argues that Tyrell J., supra,8 Cal.4th 68, was implicitly overruled by People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789 and People v. Sanders, supra, 31 Cal.4th 318.
Appellant is correct. In Jaime P., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 130, 133, 139, the Supreme Court overruled Tyrell J., supra,8 Cal.4th 68. The same rule now applies to juveniles and adults on probation: the law enforcement officer conducting the search must be aware that the suspect is on probation in order to justify an otherwise unlawful search.
A warrantless search is presumed to be illegal. (Mincey v. Arizona (1978) 437 U.S. 385, 390.) The prosecution always has the burden of justifying a warrantless search or seizure by proving that it fell within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. (People v. Williams (1999) 20 Cal.4th 119, 130; People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 106.) Because no evidence was introduced at the hearing on appellants suppression motion, the prosecution did not meet its burden of proof. The trial court therefore erred by denying appellants motion to suppress. Because the parties and trial court relied upon Tyrell J., supra,8 Cal.4th 68, remand for a new suppression hearing is appropriate. (People v. Moore (2006) 39 Cal.4th 168, 174.)
In light of our disposition, appellants contention regarding his probation conditions is moot.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
BOLAND, J.
We concur:
COOPER, P. J.
RUBIN, J.
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[1] This factual statement was derived from the probation report.
