In re Z.K. CA4/2
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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re Z.K. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
RIVERSIDE COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SOCIAL SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
M.H. et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
E069106
(Super.Ct.No. SWJ1500286)
OPINION
APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Timothy F. Freer, Judge. Affirmed.
Neil R. Trop, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, M.H.
Megan Turkat Schirn, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, K.K.
Gregory P. Priamos, County Counsel, James E. Brown, Guy B. Pittman, and Julie Koons Jarvi, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
M.H. (mother) and K.K. (father) have two young children together—Z.K., who was 16 months at the time of detention and is now just over four years old, and W.K., who was born during Z.K.’s dependency. Mother also has three children from a previous relationship. Mother’s long and severe history of prescription narcotic and opiate abuse put her children at risk of harm, and father compounded that risk by enabling her and refusing to take responsibility for his own issues with alcohol. In September 2017, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights over Z.K. and selected adoption as her permanent plan. The court also declared mother’s oldest child, K.E. (who is now 13 years old), a dependent and removed her from mother with the provision of family reunification services.
In this appeal, the parents challenge the juvenile court’s orders denying their request under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to extend the reunification period and terminating their parental rights over Z.K. Mother also challenges the jurisdictional and dispositional orders regarding K.E. We find no error and affirm.
I
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The events of this appeal span about two and a half years. During that time, Z.K. was detained from the parents, returned to their care, then removed after it became apparent they were not addressing their problems. A few months later, mother gave birth to W.K. who was severely premature and medically fragile due to her drug abuse while pregnant. Shortly after the court detained W.K., the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (the department) filed a dependency petition on behalf of mother’s three older children. Meanwhile, Z.K. flourished in the care of her foster parents, who desired to adopt her and her baby brother W.K.
For nearly two years, father lied to his family and concealed the fact both of his children had been removed from his care. When he finally told them, a few months before Z.K.’s permanency planning hearing, his great aunt asked the court to be considered for placement. The court was sympathetic to the great aunt’s situation, but found it would be detrimental to Z.K. to remove her from the home where she was doing so well at such a late stage in her dependency. The court terminated the parents’ rights over Z.K., gave them additional time to reunify with W.K., and removed K.E. from mother’s care.
A. Z.K.’s Dependency Petition and Family Maintenance Services
In April 2015, the department received referrals reporting mother had gone to several regional hospitals and used different identifying information to obtain prescription pain medication. A social worker visited the family’s mobile home in Wildomar and found it in disarray, with trash, dirty dishes, bottles of narcotic pain medication, and alcohol, all within Z.K.’s reach. The outside of the house was littered with garbage, furniture, mattresses, clothing, and toys. Mother denied using false identities to obtain pain medication and said she suffered from several debilitating diseases, including seizures, sciatica pain, disc fragments, herniated discs, and cervical cancer. She said she took Soma three times a day, Norco every four hours, and Morphine twice a day.
Shortly after that visit, mother drove to the hospital on a suspended license and high on pain medication, with Z.K. in the car, to obtain more medication. After she tested positive for opiates at the hospital, law enforcement transported her home and informed the department. The social worker interviewed mother’s pain management specialist and learned mother had not been honest about how she had obtained her prescriptions. Mother had lied and said the specialist sent her to the emergency room for “excessive bleeding” when in reality the specialist had simply suggested she go to the emergency room and seek a “short term prescription” for the myriad painful conditions she had self-reported. The specialist told the social worker mother had returned to his office a little while later seeking additional prescriptions, claiming someone had broken into her home and stolen her medication.
In May 2015, the department filed a dependency petition alleging Z.K. was endangered by mother’s opioid abuse and the parents’ failure to maintain a safe home. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (b); unlabeled statutory citations refer to this code.) The petition also alleged father knew or should have known about mother’s addiction and nevertheless left Z.K. in her care while he was at work. The court detained Z.K. from the parents and authorized placing her in a foster home.
Soon thereafter, the department learned father had a DUI conviction from 2005. He denied any issues with alcohol and also said he had no medical issues. He reported he worked fulltime as a sales coordinator for a software company. The department recommended removal from both parents and reunification services.
However, over the next couple months, the parents showed initiative to address their issues, and the department filed an amended petition deleting the allegation father enabled mother’s abuse and allowed alcohol within Z.K.’s reach and softening the medication allegation to say mother’s use (not abuse) of medication may impact her ability to safely parent. The department also changed its recommendation from reunification to maintenance services.
The parents had started services through their own private insurance instead of waiting for referrals from the department. They began a six-week parenting program and father started attending individual therapy and Al-Anon meetings. Mother enrolled in individual counseling and took a drug test in July 2015 that came out negative. However, her test results for the following month were positive for Morphine. At the jurisdiction and disposition hearing in August 2015, the juvenile court found the allegations in the amended petition true, allowed Z.K. to remain in the parents’ care, and ordered maintenance services.
B. The Section 387 Petition and Removal
Over the next few months, things took a turn for the worse, and in January 2016 the department filed a section 387 petition to remove Z.K. from the parents’ care. The maternal grandmother, who under the department’s recommendation was supposed to remain in the home to assist with Z.K.’s care, had moved out. The parents were not participating in their parenting program, SafeCare. Mother refused to sign a release of information form for all of the doctors involved in her medical care. The condition of the home devolved. As of September 2015, it was cluttered with trash, toys, and other debris, smelled badly, and was swarming with flies.
At one point, mother accidentally called the social worker while noticeably under the influence of pain medication. She was crying and slurring her words and it took her a while to realize she was speaking with the social worker instead of her mother, whom she had intended to call. Concerned, the social worker went to the family’s home, where mother was upset and defensive. She refused to drug test even after being told refusal would be considered a positive test. Father agreed to stay home with Z.K. until mother was stable.
In November 2015, hospital officials reported mother had been to all three hospitals in her area over the past several months, seeking pain medication. She had gone to the emergency rooms of each hospital in June, July, August, September, and October and had used various names and identifying information. The social worker received a report from a Department of Justice prescription tracking system designed to monitor medication abuse. The report revealed that between August and October, mother had gone to several pharmacies to fill several different prescription medications from at least six different physicians. There were days when mother filled the same prescription at different pharmacies and filled the same prescription just a few days apart.
When the social worker confronted the parents with the report, they initially denied any medication abuse. Mother claimed she had never seen any of the doctors listed on the report, then claimed not to remember, then admitted it was all true. She admitted she took too much medication and was an addict. Father claimed he knew nothing about her addiction, but mother countered that he did know, it was ruining their marriage, and he would sometimes take her medication with him to work so she would not have access to it. Father ultimately said he might have known mother was not using her medication appropriately, but he maintained he had no idea of the severity of her drug-seeking behavior. The social worker remained skeptical of father and believed he was more complicit in mother’s drug abuse than he let on. The social worker developed a new safety plan with the parents under which mother would not be alone with Z.K. until she successfully treated her addiction.
Less than two weeks later, the social worker returned to the family home, and their situation had not improved. Mother had cut off all her hair on her head to the scalp, except for a small portion in the front, and claimed she had done so because it hurt to brush. Her cut hair was still in the bathroom sink. The house had a foul smell and was still very cluttered. There were two large boxes of beer in the living room, next to additional empty beer bottles and cans.
In mid-December, the social worker inspected the home and noted it was slightly cleaner than it had been in the past. However, there was a room she could not access because it was packed so full of debris that the door would not open. She noticed insulation and other parts hanging from a large hole in the ceiling. The room reserved for mother’s three older children (who would visit on weekends) was also full of clothing and debris and “was not acceptable for anyone to sleep [in].”
Mother pulled the social worker aside and said she was worried that father had issues with alcohol and she was considering leaving him because she felt he was jeopardizing Z.K.’s placement. She said he usually kept her medication so she would not abuse it, but lately he had been so intoxicated he did not remember where he had put it, and on one occasion they ended up finding it in one of Z.K.’s toys. A few days later, mother texted the social worker attempting to backpedal her statements. She wrote, “Now father does drink some beer here and there but always after work responsibly and never put[s] Z.K. at risk. If I’m mistaken that a 31 year old who goes to work everyday to care for his family does not have the right to have a few drinks then please let me know.”
When the social worker confronted father about mother’s statements, he became defensive and denied having any issues with alcohol. He accused the social worker of looking for things to “keep the case going.” He also remained steadfastly resistant to alcohol testing. A few days later, the parents met with the social worker and father hypothesized mother had exaggerated his drinking habits in retaliation for his recent behavior. He said he had threatened to leave her and said the department would give him custody of Z.K. The social worker wrote in the section 387 detention report that she was “increasingly concerned with the enmeshment of these parents and the enabling of each of them with the other.”
Mother was set to begin a substance abuse treatment program at the end of December 2015, but a representative from the program informed the social worker that she did not show up for her initial assessment and sounded under the influence when they spoke over the phone.
In late January 2016, the court ordered random alcohol testing for father. Around the same time, the social worker made an unannounced visit to the home and found it in “complete disarray.” The parents hadn’t touched the two rooms she had instructed them to clean during the last home visit. She was “extremely concerned about the condition of the house” and found it “not acceptable.”
When the social worker interviewed father in February 2016, he said he and mother had not “done anything wrong” and he did not understand why Z.K. had been removed. He said there was “no evidence” mother abused prescription medication and he had never seen the medication affect her negatively. (This, despite both parents admitting earlier that father would hide her medication so she wouldn’t take too much.) When asked about the state of the home, he said a code enforcement official had noted leaks in the roof during an inspection but had not identified any correctible issues. When the social worker followed up with the official, he said he had deemed the parents’ home a “substandard mobile home” due to having a “compromised roof” and had given them 30 days to fix the roof.
Mother was not complying with her substance abuse testing and continued to be deceitful about medication. She did not tell her primary care physician she was also seeing a physician at the American Spine Institute for pain management, and this made the primary care physician “extremely concerned.” He told the social worker he had prescribed mother Soma and Norco, but only on the assumption she was not getting medication from other sources. The social worker contacted the American Spine Institute and learned mother’s physician there had prescribed her Contin, Hydrocodone, and Tizanidine (in place of Soma). Mother had told the social worker on several occasions that both physicians knew she was seeing the other. Mother was also taking Gabapentin, an anticonvulsant, even though her medical records did not confirm she had ever suffered from seizures.
In February 2016, the social worker learned mother was pregnant when the nurse who was assisting with mother’s scheduled hysterectomy told her the procedure had been cancelled because of the pregnancy.
The parents’ progress in the SafeCare parenting program was going poorly. Father refused to meet with the provider, citing his work schedule, and remained resistant even when the provider offered to meet him in the morning before work. SafeCare assessed the parents’ home and deemed it unsafe.
When mother did finally participate in an initial assessment at a substance abuse recovery program, she disclosed she was worried because she was 20 weeks pregnant and was taking opiates and Morphine. She admitted she was seeing multiple doctors for prescriptions and was afraid of running out of medication. After this initial assessment, father called the department to say he did not agree with placing mother in a treatment program. He became angry and argumentative, complaining that mother needed only “medication management” and the department was forcing her into a program. He told the social worker mother’s doctors wanted her to be on her medication, including opiates. Suspecting he was trying to manipulate mother’s access to medication, the social worker advised him they could no longer discuss her treatment plan.
Father missed his first two alcohol tests. He then tested negative twice in February 2016.
Later that month, mother informed the social worker she was dropping out of the treatment program because she had learned she would have to stop taking her medication immediately. Both her primary care and American Spine Institute physicians recommended she be weaned off Soma, Morphine, and Norco. In response, she found new doctors in a different city and obtained prescriptions for Norco and Morphine.
The department’s section 387 petition alleged the previous disposition had not been effective because mother continued to abuse prescription medication, the home continued to be unsafe, and the parents were not complying with their case plans. At the new jurisdiction and disposition hearing in March 2016, the court removed Z.K. from the parents’ care, authorized reunification services, and ordered both parents to undergo psychological evaluations.
C. The Six-Month Review Period and Termination of Services
During the reunification period, both parents said they planned to file for legal separation, but they never completed the relevant paperwork and they continued to live together in their mobile home, which remained classified as “substandard.”
The parents participated in psychological evaluations in March 2016. The psychologist recommended mother see a single primary care physician who would act as a gatekeeper to coordinate care with a network of pain specialists. As for father, the psychologist reported he was “less than candid” and “minimize[ed] . . . the reality of his life situation.” His personality test results demonstrated “an evasive response style,” “low empathy,” and “do[ing] only the minimum to get by.” The psychologist concluded, “While father has the ability to learn from services, it is my opinion that he probably won’t and that his future, and that of his family, will look very much like his past.”
On April 21, 2016, the social worker received medical records from two regional hospitals revealing that over the previous month mother had made several visits to the emergency rooms of those hospitals seeking pain medication, sometimes visiting as many as three times in one day. She used at least four different names and various addresses, sought medication she had never been prescribed, and did not disclose she was pregnant.
In April 2016, mother gave birth to W.K. and the department received a general neglect referral from the hospital. W.K. was born prematurely at 26 weeks gestation. He weighed 1 pound, 13 ounces and was 11 inches long. Mother had taken “many pain medications while an inpatient [at the hospital] three weeks prior to W.K.’s birth.” She also had tested positive for opiates when she was admitted to the hospital on April 14, less than two weeks before she gave birth. In response, the department took W.K. into protective custody and filed a dependency petition on his behalf. The social worker later learned that when mother was in the hospital prior to W.K.’s birth, she gave false information to the hospital staff and as a result was given more and different medication than she was supposed to be taking.
Mother was referred to a pain management specialist and attended one appointment, during which she lied and said she was under the care of a neurologist for seizures and was receiving chemotherapy for cervical cancer. The specialist recommended she not be prescribed Morphine or Norco and also recommended complete and immediate detoxification as opposed to a slow weaning.
About a month after his psychological evaluation, father completed the safety component of the SafeCare program.
As of May 2016, mother was back in her outpatient substance abuse treatment program and was being cooperative. She was prescribed Suboxone to treat her addiction.
Also as of May, W.K. was still in the hospital. He was in withdrawal, ill, and severely fragile. Hospital staff informed the social worker that W.K.’s doctors no longer wanted to interact with father because he was being extremely difficult and argumentative on the issue of breastfeeding. The doctors had not authorized breastfeeding because W.K. was in withdrawal and mother had medication in her system. In response, father became upset and pushed for breastfeeding. He told hospital staff mother was not taking any medication, which was a lie because at the very least he knew she was taking Suboxone. The social worker found father’s behavior especially alarming given he had recently told her he recognized mother was an addict and there was “no defending [her] now.”
In June 2016, the social worker learned mother had stopped participating in the treatment program. She had stopped drug testing and told her counselor she was too sick to attend sessions, citing various ailments including a kidney infection. Around this time, mother went to the emergency room at Riverside University Health System claiming to have an infection and sought pain medication for “flank pain and a recent kidney infection.” She was given prescriptions for anti-anxiety and anti-depressant medications.
In July 2016, mother completed one component of her substance abuse treatment program, but the program recommended she complete an additional intensive component. Program staff believed she was still being dishonest about her addiction and thus “ha[d] a long way to go.” Medical reports from August 2016 revealed she continued to seek pain medication from new sources. She was prescribed Keppra, Protonix, and Zofran, Augmentin for an alleged breast infection, more anti-depressants, and Gabapentin for seizures and pain.
Mother’s drug test results during the reunification period were not good. On March 7, 2016—while she was pregnant with W.K.—she tested positive for a “very high level” of Morphine. She no-showed later in March then tested positive for Morphine on April 1, 2016—still while pregnant. On May 13, soon after W.K.’s birth, she tested positive for Morphine, then no-showed for tests in June, July, and August.
Father was not compliant with the court-ordered random alcohol testing during the reunification period. Most of the time he would refuse to test, fail to show up, claim to be too sick, or arrive at the wrong test site after hours. Out of several testing appointments from June to August, he attended only two, and tested negative on both occasions.
During the reunification period, the parents were allowed to visit Z.K. up to twice a week. Initially, the visits took place at a neutral location like McDonald’s or a park, but during the first month the department moved them to its offices due to reports mother was under the influence and father was inappropriately commenting on the dependency. During April visits, Z.K. interacted more with father than mother and at times refused to be affectionate with mother.
In May 2016, father visited more than mother did. During one visit, mother stayed inside the car the entire time. During another, Z.K. did not want father to hold her and she left him to stand next to department staff. Mother did not visit Z.K. for over a month, and when she finally showed up for a visit she looked into space and did not engage with her daughter.
In June 2016, the parents began visiting Z.K. separately and father was allowed to visit at a neutral location. Some of his visits went well, but during others there were issues with Z.K. not wanting to be around him and him failing to intervene when Z.K. had a confrontation with another child. On one visit, mother arrived at the department office several hours early. She had driven herself even though her license was still suspended, and department staff observed she appeared to be under the influence.
In September 2016, mother enrolled in the intensive outpatient component of her substance abuse program. The program required her to regularly visit her assigned pain management specialist and complete a 12-step program. Mother did not attend her 12-step meetings. She admitted she was taking medications the pain specialist had advised her to stop taking, including Lexapro, Keppra, and Gabapentin. She was resistant to seeing her pain specialist because, among other things, the specialist advised against Gabapentin. She lied and told the social worker the specialist had told her not to come back.
During that same time, the parents informed the social worker they were no longer going to separate. Father had called the hospital and demanded they delete any record of mother having tried to breastfeed W.K.
While all of this was happening on the parents’ end, Z.K. was thriving in her foster home. The foster parents loved her very much and were meeting her needs. They wanted to adopt her and give her stable, permanent care, and they also wanted to adopt W.K. Because W.K. was a medically fragile child, they completed medically fragile training and became certified for placement. In August 2016, the juvenile court granted their application for de facto parent status over Z.K.
The court held the six-month review hearing in November 2016. Agreeing with the department’s conclusion the parents were not benefitting from services, it terminated their services and set Z.K.’s permanency planning hearing for the end of February 2017.
D. The Parents’ Section 388 Petitions
On February 6, 2017, the department submitted a favorable adoption assessment for the foster parents, a Hispanic couple who have been married for several years and are in their mid-forties. The father works fulltime in communications and the mother stays at home to care for Z.K. The foster parents are unable to have children of their own—Z.K. would be their first adoption. At the time of the assessment, Z.K. had been in their care for well over a year and had developed a strong bond with them. She was on track developmentally, and presented as happy, active, affectionate, and very intelligent. She had her own room in the 1,986 square-foot house where the foster parents had resided for the last eight years. The department recommended the court proceed with adoption and terminate parental rights.
On February 21, 2017, one week before the scheduled permanency planning hearing, father filed a section 388 petition asking the court to reinstate his services. Mother filed a section 388 petition requesting the same relief a few days later. In his petition, father argued his circumstances had changed because he was complying with his case plan in W.K.’s dependency, visiting Z.K. regularly, and addressing his enabling behavior in therapy. He submitted a letter from his marriage and family therapist, who said he had attended 14 sessions from October 2016 to February 2017 to work on “learning to be more assertive around [his] wife [who] . . . reportedly suffered from dependency to opiates.” The therapist said father had been “able to overcome this issue very successfully.”
Father also attached a handwritten worksheet where he had identified his therapy goals. He described the problem that led him to therapy as “Dealing with the stress and frustration of having my children removed because of my wife’s dependency on medication.” Asked the top three outcomes he desired from therapy, he wrote, “(1) I would deal with the grief of loss in a healthy manner; (2) I would have better rest and overall health; (3) I would be able to identify negative behavior so I will never be put in this situation again.” Additionally, father submitted certificates showing he had completed medically fragile and CPR training for W.K. and a sign-in sheet indicating he had attended several Al-Anon and Nar-Anon meetings since his services had been terminated.
Mother argued her circumstances had changed because she was complying with her case plan in W.K.’s dependency and regularly visiting Z.K. Like father, she submitted certificates for medically fragile and CPR training for W.K. She also submitted a letter from her substance abuse program dated February 17, 2017, stating she had attended 13 sessions of their AfterCare program and regularly attended Al-Anon and Nar-Anon meetings. Presumably to show she was going to only one pharmacy to obtain her medications, she submitted a record from a pharmacy in Temecula reflecting she had filled several prescriptions there between November 2016 to February 2017. The record reflected she was seeing at least five different doctors and had filled prescriptions for several different medications, including Gabapentin.
A few days after the parents filed their petitions, the department filed an addendum report covering their behavior from April 2015 to February 2017. A few days after the six-month review hearing, the parents had told the social worker they were going to stay married and planned to attend all visits together. Their mobile home was still in “substandard” condition and still had a compromised roof, and as a result the department continued to classify the home as unsafe. Although the parents had completed medically fragile training for W.K., they attended only a handful of his 30 appointments from November 2016 to May 2017.
Mother was referred to hair follicle testing on five occasions in November and December and refused to go. In January, she said she had “no intention” of complying with hair follicle testing and had still not provided proof she was seeing only one physician for pain medication or attending a 12-step program.
On March 23, 2017, the department filed another addendum report. The social worker had learned from the social worker in W.K.’s case that mother was still refusing to submit to hair follicle testing, the parents had not complied with court-ordered conjoint therapy, and the home was still unsafe. When she met with the parents to discuss these issues, they said they had no idea their case plan components for W.K.’s dependency were court-ordered. Mother became so angry about having to submit to hair follicle testing that the social worker asked her to step outside. Once mother was gone, father indicated he had no plans to leave her and maintained he did not enable her. He asked the social worker why she was “doing this” to his family based on “just the issue of the house.” He said their home currently “look[ed] great” and they had “come a long way.” The social worker told father he was enabling mother if he stayed with her while she refused to drug test. He responded, “I know, I’m dumb,” but again said he had no plans to leave her.
About two weeks after that conversation, father told the social worker in W.K.’s case that he would be hesitant to find out how mother would fare on a drug test because he was “not certain” she had been compliant with her treatment program. He asked if he “still ha[d] time” to move out and find a place of his own.
Also around that time, mother’s three older children began living with her and father after their biological father moved to Montana. The social worker found the inside of the home cleaner than it had been in the past, but concluded the outside was still dangerous. It was littered with junk and debris (including old barbeque parts and other safety hazards) and housed three unlocked sheds also full of debris and accessible to children.
In April 2017, mother finally went to the lab for hair follicle testing, but only after bleaching all of the hair on her head, which rendered the test results unreliable. In May, the department learned father had failed to disclose he had been arrested for another DUI, while driving on a suspended license, in July 2016.
There were also issues with visits during this period. Some of the visits were appropriate and without incident. However, on multiple occasions, the parents tried to discuss the dependency with the department’s visitation supervisor and took Z.K. to the restroom unsupervised, both of which were against visitation rules. On another occasion, mother struggled with feeding W.K. and became frustrated and impatient. Of more concern, however, was Z.K.’s reaction to the visits. After seeing her parents, her behavior would markedly regress. She would become confused, throw tantrums, sleep excessively, and revert in toilet training.
E. Dependency Petition for Mother’s Three Older Children
On May 9, 2017, the department filed a dependency petition on behalf of mother’s three older children, alleging her unresolved opiate and narcotic addiction put them at risk of harm. About a week later, father filed legal separation paperwork.
School staff reported the three children were frequently tardy or absent, K.E. (mother’s eldest, who was then 12) had four failing grades, and mother was “absent-minded” whenever she would come to the school. Staff also reported K.E. was responsible for getting her siblings to and from school because mother did not wake up in time to transport them. When the social worker interviewed the children, their statements revealed mother was still abusing medication and father was still living, or spending significant time, at the home. The six-year-old boy said father lived at their home and the parents did not get along. He said mother took “bad” medication that “she should get rid of” and mother had told him the medication could not be taken in public. The seven-year-old girl said father had moved out, but only so he could get Z.K. and W.K. back, and nevertheless spent “a lot” of time at the home. She said the home was messy and mother took “a lot” of pills every day to “stop her from getting mad.” She said mother had many pills in her room and also kept a “secret stash.” Mother would take the pills before they went to school and at night. The girl said she thought mother “ha[d] a problem.”
K.E. said mother was her best friend. She said mother took medication for migraines and back pain, but she made sure mother didn’t take too much. She said she was responsible for waking herself up and getting herself to and from school because mother would be asleep. She said her biological father planned to return in the summer and take her and her siblings to Montana, but she was not going with him because she hated him. The social worker believed K.E. was protecting mother and exhibiting parentified behavior.
The home was in complete disarray when the social worker visited in early May 2017. There was food on the floor and piles of dirty dishes throughout the home crusted with rotted food, and mother refused to let the social worker see her bedroom. Mother also refused to drug test, and the social worker observed her pupils were dilated and she appeared “very fidgety.” Her hair was bleached and she did not have much hair on the rest of her body.
F. Psychological and Bonding Studies
Mother completed a second psychological evaluation in June 2017, in which she was diagnosed with opiate use disorder and avoidant personality disorder. The psychologist concluded she had a “long-term history of drug seeking behavior” and recommended she be under the care of a clinical psychologist “who can confront her on her ongoing denial of her substance abuse problem and its severity.” He was unable to answer whether she could be an appropriate parent because he was unsure whether she was capable of remaining sober and being responsible for an extended period of time.
In August 2017, the parents and the foster parents participated in court-authorized bonding studies as to Z.K. The psychologist observed the foster parents with Z.K. and W.K., and concluded Z.K. was “very well bonded to both of her foster parents [and] . . . looks to them as a source of safety and security.” During the visit, both children would spontaneously give the foster parents hugs without being asked or prompted. The psychologist found the foster parents to be “very intelligent . . . college educated, very mature, and are very well-stabilized in their lives.” They exhibited the stability and financial capability to care for Z.K. and her brother. Neither foster parent “demonstrated the slightest indication” of a mental or substance abuse disorder. The psychologist concluded, “In short, every aspect of the evaluation of these two foster parents is indicative of sustained stability . . . [B]oth are able to provide an environment which is loving, caring, nurturing, intellectually stimulating, and socially desirable for Z.K . . . [I]t would be virtually impossible to identify any deficits of these two foster parents in terms of their abilities to fully and completely provide a wholesome and desirable life for this delightful little girl.”
During mother’s bonding study visit, Z.K. asked about father twice and was concentrated on playing with the toys mother had brought, although she would comply when mother asked for hugs. The psychologist concluded Z.K. was “comfortable” around mother. However, the psychologist was concerned Z.K. would experience emotional difficulty if removed from her foster parents.
Z.K. appeared more excited to see father than she had been to see mother. She spent the entire visit giggling and playing with him and a bubble toy he had brought. The psychologist concluded Z.K. “does have a bond” with father and “enjoys being with him.” However, the psychologist had concerns about whether it would be appropriate to place Z.K. with father. He observed father was reluctant to be honest during the interview and psychological testing; had “difficulty maintaining an adaptive relationship with the foster parents”; had “remained with mother very long after it would have been prudent to end the relationship with her [if he were] seeking to have his children placed with him”; and had a history of “maladaptive use of alcohol which has not been adequately addressed.” Of “significant concern” were the results of his personality tests, which “revealed he had considerable difficulty being open and honest [and] . . . a heightened degree of defensiveness.” The results of the Michigan Alcoholism Screening indicated “probable alcoholism.” The psychologist was also concerned that father had picked up a second DUI “even after his daughter was removed from [his] care.” When asked why Z.K. had been removed, father said the social worker had concluded mother was still obtaining too many prescription drugs and the house was “still messy.” Father also denied that W.K. had any special medical needs.
G. Trial on the Petitions
Before trial, the parents submitted additional evidence to support their petitions. Mother submitted a letter from a licensed contractor who made repairs to her home in November 2017 and then concluded it was safe for habitation. She submitted several negative drug tests from November 2016 to April 2017 and a May 2017 letter from a doctor at her outpatient substance abuse program saying she was “coming up on 1 year of sobriety.” The doctor did not state his basis for concluding mother had been sober for a year, however. Mother also submitted another letter from the same doctor, dated August 3, 2017, in which he reported she had been visiting him on a monthly basis and he was not aware of “any accidental misuse or misplaced medication.” He said while she had urine tested randomly with clean results, he believed “it would be in her best interest to continue [outpatient treatment] given her history of abuse.”
In an August 21, 2017 letter, mother’s therapist wrote that she “hope[d] the court will deem mother fit to regain custody of her children [as s]he appears in all our conversations to have a good understanding of what it takes to be a good parent and refrain from using or abusing prescription narcotic medications.” Mother’s therapy goal was to “handle the stress and anxiety of having an open case with CPS.” According to the therapist, mother reported “100% compliance with her SSA case plan and she reports 100% sobriety from all mind-altering chemicals.”
Father submitted a June 2017 letter from a marriage and family therapist intern who said he had been cooperative during the three sessions they had together. Father also submitted an agreement showing he had rented an apartment in April 2017. Finally, he submitted support letters from two of his relatives and a letter from his great aunt requesting to adopt Z.K. The great aunt said she had been completely unaware of the dependency proceedings until father finally told her on May 18, 2017.
The court held a five-day trial on the petitions in late August 2017. The social worker in Z.K.’s case testified that while father’s visits over the last six months had been consistent and positive, Z.K. did not seem upset when visits ended, did not ask about the parents, and did not appear emotional over not being with them. She did not believe father had benefitted from the case plan components he had completed. She remained concerned he was not capable of being honest and was not truly separated from mother or would not remain so. She believed he needed more therapy and more parenting assistance in keeping a safe home.
As to mother, the social worker believed she was still incapable of safe parenting and questioned her claim of year-long sobriety. She acknowledged mother had submitted negative tests spanning several months, but pointed out she had also frequently refused to test and family members had reported she would slur her words and nearly fall asleep during FaceTime visits with her older children.
The social worker in W.K.’s case recommended terminating the parents’ reunification services. She was concerned about the fact father had not been forthcoming about his DUI conviction and she was not confident he would protect W.K. from mother. She said father had refused to participate in the alcohol assessment the department had referred him to and instead used a provider of his choosing, who opined he did not need treatment. She shared her colleague’s skepticism about whether the parents had truly separated. As to mother, the social worker had a “list of concerns” regarding her parenting abilities, which included her inability to keep the home consistently clean and hazard-free and her four- to five-month delay in complying with hair follicle testing.
Father’s great aunt who wanted to adopt Z.K. said she had raised father since he was 12 years old. Father concealed the dependencies from her for two years, during which time she repeatedly tried to see his children and he gave her evasive responses. When he finally came clean, he told her it was all because of mother’s medication use. The great aunt said she would let father and Z.K. live with her if he were given more services.
Father said he had been living in his own apartment for the last five months and had filed separation paperwork at the end of March 2017. He said he was going to therapy on a weekly basis to learn “how to be a responsible parent while not being in a romantic relationship.”
When asked why he did not tell his family about the dependency or inform the court he had relatives who might be available for placement, he said he didn’t want to worry them and never thought the case “would get this far.” He admitted his counselors at Nar-Anon had advised him not to lie to his family and to disclose the dependencies. Asked to identify the first step of the Nar-Anon 12 steps (telling the truth), he said he could not remember because he wasn’t “good at the steps.”
Father denied ever having an alcohol problem in his life, and blamed his failure to disclose his second DUI on his former attorney. He admitted he was currently taking Norco and Gabapentin for back pain and had been for the last two years. He admitted that at the time of Z.K.’s removal he was taking 10 milligrams of Norco four times a day and mother was taking the same dosage six times a day, but he maintained he had no idea she had been abusing her prescription. He had noticed she “seemed tired a lot back then,” but she would blame it on headaches or sleep issues and he “didn’t really second-guess” her.
Asked why he filed for separation and not divorce, he said he thought separation was “quicker” and didn’t learn “until afterwards that going the route of divorce would actually show more.” He blamed his decision on his “lack of knowledge . . . in the system.” He said if he could go back and do things differently, he would not have defended mother so much or have had such “blind faith” in her. Asked why he stayed in the marriage after learning of her addiction and its severity, he blamed his former therapist, who, according to him, had advised he remain with mother. At the time of the trial, father believed mother was complying with her case plan and no longer abusing drugs.
After a detailed and thorough explanation of its reasoning, the court denied both parents’ petitions. It found, at best, they had demonstrated they “may be [in the process of] changing their circumstances,” but they had not shown their circumstances had changed. (Italics added.) On the other hand, the court found “overwhelming evidence” that it was in Z.K.’s best interests to deny the parents additional time to reunify, and to proceed with adoption. The court stated, “There is love that the Court can see for Z.K. for mother and father, and they are appropriate . . . in their visits. That’s good. But the evidence is overwhelming that the benefit is to keep Z.K. in her current placement, and taking her out of her placement and providing reunification services would send not only a confusing, disturbing, and distorted message to her, it would almost be cruel at this point in her life.”
H. Termination of Parental Rights
The court held Z.K.’s permanency planning hearing in early September 2017. The parents argued the parent-child relationship exception applied and asked the court to select guardianship instead of adoption. They argued they visited Z.K. consistently and their bonding studies concluded each shared a bond with her. The court acknowledged the parents shared a bond with Z.K., but found the permanency and stability the foster parents gave her far outweighed her relationship with her parents, and accordingly terminated parental rights.
I. W.K.’s 12-Month Review Hearing
Against the recommendation of the department and W.K.’s counsel, the court awarded the parents additional reunification services. The court also granted the foster parents’ application for de facto parent status over W.K.
J. K.E.’s Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
As noted above, after awarding sole physical custody of K.E.’s siblings to their biological father, the court terminated their dependencies and the jurisdiction and disposition hearing continued as to K.E. only. Mother provided the following stipulated testimony at that hearing: She believed she was capable of caring for K.E. She had secured a job as a waitress three weeks earlier, her aunt was providing her with free housing, and she had arranged for a friend to pick K.E. up from school while she was at work. Her counsel argued she had changed and “grown tremendously” over the last year and could now safely parent. Counsel pointed out that mother’s therapist believed “they ha[d] discussed the issues of parenting significantly,” and he argued mother would ensure K.E. would attend therapy and even wanted to participate in conjoint therapy with her.
The court declared K.E. a dependent under section 300 subdivisions (b) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling), found clear and convincing evidence she could not safely remain in mother’s care, and awarded mother reunification services.
II
DISCUSSION
A. Denial of the Section 388 Petitions and Termination of Parental Rights Was Proper
The parents argue the court erred when it denied their petitions to reinstate reunification services and terminated their parental rights over Z.K. We find no error.
“A juvenile court order may be changed, modified or set aside under section 388 if the petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) new or changed circumstances exist, and (2) the proposed change would promote the best interest of the child. [Citation.] The parent bears the burden to show both a ‘“legitimate change of circumstances”’ and that undoing the prior order would be in the best interest of the child.” (In re S.J. (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 953, 959.) The change necessary to support a section 388 petition must be substantial. (In re Heraclio A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 569, 577.) The petition must allege changed circumstances, not merely circumstances that are in the process of changing. (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.) Addressing a section 388 petition lies within the discretion of the juvenile court, and we will not overturn its decision unless it clearly abused that discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination. (In re S.J., at pp. 959-960; In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.)
1. Mother
The primary cause of Z.K.’s removal was mother’s long-term and severe abuse of prescription narcotics and opiates. Her dependence on pain medication interfered with her ability to provide a safe environment for Z.K. and her other children, to the point where she put W.K.’s life at extreme risk by continuing her drug abuse while pregnant with him. She was unable to keep the home in a safe condition, and she repeatedly engaged in deceptive behavior—lying to the department and her medical providers—to sustain her harmful addiction.
Mother contends she demonstrated a change in circumstances. She points out that when she filed her February 2017 petition she was complying with her case plan in W.K.’s dependency, had undergone counseling, and was obtaining all of her medications from a single pharmacy. Notably, what mother did not argue in her petition was that she had treated her drug addiction or had remained sober for an extended period of time. This alone is fatal to her petition. It is well established that parents with substance abuse problems must show more than a short period of progress or sobriety to demonstrate changed circumstances. “It is the nature of addiction that one must be ‘clean’ for a much longer period . . . to show real reform.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 531, fn. 9; see also In re C.J.W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1081 [no changed circumstances where “recent efforts at rehabilitation were only three months old at the time of the section 366.26 hearing”].)
It was not until May 2017, when she filed supplemental evidence to support her petition, that mother argued she had treated her addiction and remained sober for an entire year. Like the department and the court, however, we are skeptical of her claim of year-long sobriety. In March 2017, mother angrily refused to submit to hair follicle testing, and, just a couple months later, her three older children told the social worker she was sleeping a lot, taking a large amount of pills, and seemed to have a problem. Additionally, the psychologist who evaluated her in June 2017 concluded she was currently in “ongoing denial of her substance abuse problem and its severity” to the point he could not opine on her ability to parent because he did not know if she was capable of remaining sober “for an extended period.” As late as August 2017, a doctor from her outpatient substance abuse program acknowledged she had recently produced several negative drug tests, but nevertheless believed she required continued treatment.
The most positive assessment of mother comes from her individual therapist, who concluded she “appear[ed] . . . to have a good understanding of what it takes to be a good parent” but that conclusion is marred by the fact it was based on mother’s own report of “100% sobriety” and “100% [case plan] compliance.” Mother’s evidence is a far cry from the rehabilitation a parent must demonstrate to warrant additional services at this late stage. We conclude the juvenile court’s finding of changing but not changed circumstances is amply supported by the record.
Another problem with mother’s challenge is that even if she had demonstrated a change in circumstances, the evidence that reunification services would not be in Z.K.’s best interest was, as the juvenile court observed, overwhelming. In no uncertain terms, the psychologist who conducted mother’s bonding study concluded Z.K. had a stronger bond with the foster parents than she did with mother and would likely experience “emotional difficulty” if removed from their care. He concluded “every aspect of the [foster parents’] evaluation” was “indicative of sustained stability.”
“After the termination of reunification services . . . ‘the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability.’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 317; In re D.R. (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1513 [“Once a case has advanced to the permanency planning stage, it is important not only to seek an appropriate permanent solution, but also to implement that solution promptly to minimize the time the child is in legal limbo and to allow the child’s caretakers to make a full emotional commitment to the child”].) Z.K. has lived with her foster family for over half of her young life. She has formed a strong and healthy bond with them and they have provided her with a stable and nurturing environment. Extending the reunification period would delay selection of a permanent home for Z.K. and not serve her best interests. (In re Casey D., supra, 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) “‘Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate.’” (In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 219, 224.) “The nurturing required must be given by someone, at the time the child needs it, not when the parent is ready to give it.” (In re Debra M. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1038.) Mother may truly desire to change her circumstances and become a safe parent for Z.K., but she had not done so when the court ruled on her petition. After two years of failed reunification efforts, the time has come to provide Z.K. with a permanent, stable home.
Mother also argues the court erred when it determined the parental benefit exception to terminating parental rights did not apply. We disagree. Once the juvenile court finds a child adoptable, the parent bears the burden of proving one of the exceptions to terminating parental rights exist. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1343.) “[I]t is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent’s rights will prevail over the Legislature’s preference for adoptive placement.” (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1350.)
The parental benefit exception “applies when there is a compelling reason that the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. This exception can only be found when the parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (In re Anthony B. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 389, 395; see also § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) California courts have interpreted this exception to apply to only those parent-child relationships the severance of which “would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.)
“[T]he court balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent’s rights are not terminated.” (In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 528-529.) We defer to the juvenile court’s determination whether a beneficial parental relationship exists, reversing only where the court has abused its discretion by basing findings of fact on less than substantial evidence or by acting arbitrarily or capriciously in determining whether the relationship provides “a ‘compelling reason’ for finding detriment to the child.” (In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1315.)
Here, mother maintained somewhat regular visitation and contact with Z.K., so we focus on the nature of the parent-child relationship. Mother argues Z.K. would benefit from continued contact with her because the child spent the first 16 months of her life with her plus another six months during the dependency before the section 387 removal. Mother argues Z.K. formed an attachment to her as a result of this time spent in her care. We cannot agree. Most dependencies do not have the benefit of multiple bonding studies like this case had. In mother’s study, the psychologist concluded that although “there [was] bonding present” between mother and Z.K., the child would likely experience “emotional difficulty” if removed from the foster parents, with whom she shared a stronger bond.
In any event, the existence of a parent-child bond (even one that is very strong, unlike the one here) does not trigger the parental benefit exception on its own. The bond must be coupled by an effort on the parent’s part to play a significant role in the child’s life and a desire on the child’s part to not be separated from the parent. Here, mother’s efforts to play a significant role in Z.K.’s life were minimal and ultimately took a backseat to her longstanding addiction. Put differently, the parental benefit exception is not satisfied by evidence the parent might “‘confer some incidental benefit to the child.’” (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418-1419.) Instead, the evidence must show the child would be “greatly harmed” if adopted. (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) The evidence in this case demonstrated the opposite—that Z.K. would be greatly harmed if separated from her prospective adoptive home. At best, mother established she had pleasant contacts with a child for whom she had not provided primary care for two years, and with whom she had not progressed to unmonitored contact. That is insufficient.
2. Father
As with mother, even if father could demonstrate he had truly addressed his evasive and enabling behavior, he also could not satisfy the best interest element of section 338. Although the record indicates he may have a stronger bond with Z.K. than mother had, that fact does not disrupt the conclusion we arrived at above—that Z.K. is thriving in her prospective adoptive home and would be harmed if the reunification period were extended.
In any event, when we do consider father’s circumstances, our review of the record reveals he remained evasive, irresponsible, and unprotective right up to the termination of his parental rights. In July 2016, after both Z.K. and W.K. had been removed from his care—in part due to concerns over his use of alcohol—he received a second DUI and did not tell the court or the department. The psychologist who conducted his bonding study in August 2017 voiced “significant concern[s]” about his ability to safely parent. He found father evasive and defensive and, based on the results of the Michigan Alcohol Screening, suspected he suffered from alcoholism and was minimizing his problem.
As late as the trial on his petition, father continued to evade responsibility for his own decisions. He blamed his failure to disclose his second DUI on his attorney and his failure to separate from mother on his therapist. Shockingly—given his two DUIs and the amount of alcohol the social worker found at the parents’ home early on in Z.K.’s dependency—he testified he has never had a problem with alcohol. Another shock to come out of father’s testimony was that he had been taking many of the same prescription pain medications as mother, and had therefore lied to the social worker at the outset of the case when he said he had no medical issues. Also damaging to his credibility were the reports of mother’s three older children, who said he still lived with her or spent a significant time at the home as late as May 2017, despite his claim he had separated from her.
Father’s therapy worksheet is additionally revealing. He placed the sole blame for the dependency proceedings on mother’s addiction, mentioning nothing of his deceitful, evasive behavior. Even more telling, however, were his goals for therapy—obtaining “better rest and overall health” and learning how to identify negative behavior so he wouldn’t find himself in the same situation again. Nowhere in his therapy worksheets does he express remorse for the part his behavior played in harming his children; nowhere does he mention a goal of protecting his children.
Father argues the juvenile court’s provision of additional services to him in W.K.’s case shows the court did in fact view his circumstances as changed. This argument ignores the different stages of Z.K.’s and W.K.’s dependencies. As we explained, once reunification services have been terminated as they were in Z.K.’s case (but not W.K.’s) the focus shifts from reunification to providing the child a stable and permanent home. (In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 317.) These distinct concerns explain the court’s findings in each case. Indeed, in deciding not to terminate services, the court warned father he had less than six months to prove he could safely parent W.K. In Z.K.’s case, that time had already run.
In short, the record in this case spans about two and a half years and contains not a single indication father ever recognized that he—not just mother—was to blame for endangering Z.K. and causing W.K.’s severely fragile condition. The juvenile court made a similar observation at the end of trial when it remarked that father had not named his children when asked whom he had let down over the course of the dependency. “The point when he was talking about all the people that he let down . . . Curiously, he mentioned his mother and all the people in his family. You forget two people in there: Z.K. and W.K. Z.K. and W.K. That’s the lightbulb. That [should be] the benefit of all those services. It’s that lightbulb that you have to do something to protect [the] poor children.”
We find substantial evidence in the record indicating father was still struggling with the issues he exhibited at the outset of the dependency, and as a result the juvenile court was reasonable to conclude delaying adoption to provide him additional time to reunify with Z.K. would not serve her best interests.
B. The Jurisdictional and Dispositional Orders as to K.E. Were Proper
Mother also challenges the court’s jurisdictional and dispositional findings as to K.E. When reviewing an evidentiary challenge to the juvenile court’s factual findings, “we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports them.” (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) Our task is to determine “whether ‘a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent based on the whole record.’” (In re Alexzander C. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 438, 446.) “‘We do not reweigh the evidence, evaluate the credibility of witnesses or resolve evidentiary conflicts.’” (In re Lana S. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 94, 103.)
1. Jurisdictional findings
The purpose of section 300 and dependency proceedings in general is to “protect the child, not to punish the parent.” (In re Joshua G. (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 189, 202.) To declare a child a dependent under section 300, the juvenile court must find by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) neglectful conduct or substance abuse by a parent in one of the specified forms, (2) causation, and (3) serious physical harm to the child, or a substantial risk of such harm.” (In re Rebecca C. (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 720, 724-725.)
Here, the court found true the section 300, subdivision (b) allegations that mother’s history of prescription medication abuse put K.E. at risk and created an unsafe home and that she had failed to reunify with Z.K. in an earlier dependency stemming from her substance abuse. Mother concedes there was substantial evidence to support those allegations, but argues there was not substantial evidence her history of drug abuse or failure to reunify with Z.K. put K.E. in danger. We disagree.
K.E. and her siblings told the social worker mother kept stashes of pills in the house, was taking a lot of medication, and slept a lot—to the point K.E. undertook responsibility for getting herself and her siblings to and from school and for monitoring mother’s pill intake. The children’s school records reflected they were absent or late an extremely high number of times and K.E. had four failing grades. This evidence, on its own, supports a finding that mother’s medication addiction endangered K.E. However, the court also had the benefit of a psychologist’s opinion from June 2017 that mother continued to deny her substance abuse problem “and its severity.” In addition, there was evidence mother’s drug use was still interfering with her ability to keep the home free of safety hazards. When the social worker visited her in May 2017, around the same time the department filed K.E.’s petition, the home was once again in disarray, with unsafe debris in the yard and rotting food in the kitchen. All of this evidence strongly suggests mother was not meeting K.E.’s basic needs. The fact K.E. was not an infant like Z.K. when she was removed does not mean mother’s drug abuse was any less dangerous to the 12-year-old child.
We are unpersuaded by mother’s attempts to poke holes in the psychologist’s opinion and the children’s statements to the social worker. She argues the psychologist had an insufficient basis to conclude she struggled from ongoing addiction because he had not seen all of the evidence of her treatment progress. She also argues the children’s comments about her taking a significant amount of pills do not demonstrate what kind of pills she was taking. These arguments go to the weight of the evidence, which we do not reassess on appeal. (In re Lana S., supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 103.)
This brings us to mother’s challenge of the court’s section 300, subdivision (j) (sibling neglect) finding that she had neglected Z.K. and K.E. was also at risk of being neglected. Mother argues there was insufficient evidence the risk to K.E. was similar to Z.K.’s risk. As an initial matter, there is no requirement the risk of harm to the child and the sibling must be alike. Indeed, the two children need not be abused or neglected as defined under the same section 300 subdivision. (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774 [“Subdivision (j) does not state that its application is limited to the risk that the child will be abused or neglected as defined in the same subdivision that describes the abuse or neglect of the sibling”].) But in any event, we have no trouble seeing the nexus between Z.K.’s and K.E.’s endangerment. By abusing prescription narcotics and opiates while caring for Z.K. and K.E., mother jeopardized her ability to meet either girl’s basic needs. The record reflects the home was unsafe when Z.K. lived there and when K.E. moved in. The record also reflects mother was abusing prescription drugs when each girl was in her care.
2. Removal (dispositional finding)
Finally, mother argues the evidence was insufficient to warrant removing K.E. from her care. Again, we disagree. Removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1) is proper if it is based on clear and convincing evidence the parent is unable to provide proper care for the child and the child could potentially suffer physical or emotional detriment if allowed to remain with the parent. (See § 361, subd. (c)(1); see also In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1136, disapproved on other grounds in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.) “The parent need not be dangerous and the minor need not have been actually harmed before removal is appropriate. The focus of the statute is on averting harm to the child.” (In re Diamond H., at p. 1136.) Here, the same evidence supporting the court’s jurisdictional finding provides sufficient evidence for removal. Mother has had a long history of severe addiction, which she had not successfully treated when the court removed K.E. There was evidence she was still taking a significant amount of medication when she should have been supervising her children and was allowing them to miss school and live in a hazardous environment. As a result, the juvenile court could reasonably conclude she was unable to provide proper care and K.E. was at risk of suffering physical or emotional harm if allowed to continue living with her.
III
DISPOSITION
We affirm the orders appealed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
SLOUGH
J.
We concur:
CODRINGTON
Acting P. J.
FIELDS
J.
Description | M.H. (mother) and K.K. (father) have two young children together—Z.K., who was 16 months at the time of detention and is now just over four years old, and W.K., who was born during Z.K.’s dependency. Mother also has three children from a previous relationship. Mother’s long and severe history of prescription narcotic and opiate abuse put her children at risk of harm, and father compounded that risk by enabling her and refusing to take responsibility for his own issues with alcohol. In September 2017, the juvenile court terminated their parental rights over Z.K. and selected adoption as her permanent plan. The court also declared mother’s oldest child, K.E. (who is now 13 years old), a dependent and removed her from mother with the provision of family reunification services. |
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