Filed 4/10/17 Jaime O. v. Superior Court CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO


Jaime O.,
Petitioner,
v.
THE SUPERIOR COURT OF MARIN COUNTY,
Respondent;
MARIN COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Real Parties in Interest.



A150348

(Marin County
Super. Ct. No. JV25901A)


Petitioner Jaime O. (father) is the noncustodial parent of Y.O., now six years old. Father has not lived with Y.O. since she was two years old. In April 2014, when she was three years old, Y.O. became a dependent of the juvenile court. She was first detained from her mother Miranda T. (mother) in October 2015. During the dependency, Marin County Department of Health and Human Services (Department) provided father supportive services for 18 months and then reunification services for 12 months.
At the 12-month permanency hearing, the juvenile court terminated services for father and scheduled a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 for April 3, 2017. We stayed the section 366.26 hearing by order dated March 1, 2017.
Father petitions for extraordinary writ relief. We conclude substantial evidence supports, first, the juvenile court’s finding that returning Y.O. to father’s care would create a substantial risk of detriment and, second, the court’s implied finding of no substantial probability Y.O. would be returned to the physical custody of father within 18 months of detention (i.e., by April 17, 2017). We therefore deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prior Referrals to the Department
Y.O. came to the attention of the Department long before the current juvenile dependency case. In April 2011, Y.O. was 10 months old, and father was living with mother and Y.O. in the home of Y.O.’s maternal grandfather. At that time, mother was 16 years old and father was 19 years old, and the Department received a report that the young couple got into an argument while they were bathing Y.O. Mother felt an anxiety attack and tried to call 911, but father took the phone and ended the call. Father was arrested for domestic violence and false imprisonment. In July 2012, father and mother argued, and father took a steak knife and stabbed himself in the leg. Father was taken to the hospital with serious injuries and then was taken into custody under section 5150 for assessment and evaluation. Y.O. was home asleep during the argument, but woke up during the commotion.
After the July 2012 incident, father and mother agreed to a voluntary case plan with the Department. They participated in the voluntary case plan from July 24, 2012, to August 5, 2013. The family was provided a wraparound team and intensive services included individual therapy, parenting class, domestic violence therapy group, and referral to Head Start preschool.
In October 2012, mother reported that father had anger problems, and he was hitting walls, screaming, and punching things. In November 2012, mother called the Department, reporting that father was angry and throwing and breaking things. Y.O. was at home upstairs while mother and father fought. Father moved out of the house, and the family continued to receive voluntary services.
By December 2012, mother had a restraining order against father, and father could visit Y.O. only with supervision. In February 2013, a three-year protective order was issued against father. Also in February 2013, father was convicted of two counts of possession of a controlled substance (Heath & Saf. Code, § 11350, subd. (a)), criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422), and resisting an officer (Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1)). He was placed on probation, and ordered to serve jail time, pay restitution, and attend an approved treatment program. In April 2013, father was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) (Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)) and driving while license is suspended for drunk driving (Veh. Code., § 14601.2, subd. (a)). He was placed on probation and ordered to serve jail time and pay restitution, fines, and costs. In December 2013, father was again convicted of driving under the influence and driving while license is suspended for drunk driving. He was again placed on probation, ordered to serve jail time, and pay fines and fees. The criminal court also ordered father to attend a multiple offender drunk driving program.
In July 2013, mother was Y.O.’s sole caretaker. Mother had a new live-in boyfriend, and they fought in front of Y.O. Law enforcement visited mother’s home many times for welfare checks. In December 2013, officers responded to the home and found mother screaming at her boyfriend over the phone. The maternal grandfather told an officer that mother had an anxiety disorder, and she was on medication. In total, the Department received 15 referrals regarding Y.O.’s family from April 2011 to February 2014.
Current Juvenile Dependency Proceedings
On February 21, 2014, police responded to the family home (Y.O.’s maternal grandfather’s residence), and found mother yelling and banging her head very hard on the stairs. Mother rushed the officers, screamed, and tried to kick an officer. An officer reported that Y.O. was “terrified” and hid under the stairwell. Mother was taken into custody under section 5150.
Initial Dependency Petition
On February 26, 2014, the Department filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of Y.O., then three years old, alleging mother was unable to provide regular care for Y.O. due to her mental illness (§ 300, subd. (b)). In an initial hearing report, the Department recommended that Y.O. remain in mother’s care and that the family receive court-mandated services to ensure the safety and well-being of Y.O. It was reported that father was in an inpatient substance abuse program at Center Point. He told a social worker that he voluntarily returned to Center Point after he was released from jail for his second DUI. He said he hoped to complete the inpatient program and then participate in Center Point’s aftercare and transitional housing programs. He also planned to take “mankind” classes through the Center for Domestic Peace. Father was able to see Y.O. once a week for two hours when Center Point allowed visits.
At a hearing on February 28, 2014, at father’s request, the juvenile court designated him the presumed father of Y.O. The court did not detain Y.O. Mother was provided various services, and father was provided substance abuse treatment, parenting education, mental health services, domestic violence services, and alcohol and drug testing.
In March 2014, a social worker tried to contact father at Center Point and learned he was no longer in the program. The Department learned he was in custody at the Marin County jail. Father reported that he was kicked out of the residential program after he relapsed while on a four-hour pass. He would have to serve a suspended sentence, which was likely to be eight months to two years. Father was not sure if he should have visits with Y.O. because he did not know whether it would be good for her to see him in jail.
Amended Dependency Petition
The Department filed a first amended petition alleging father “has been unable to supervise or adequately protect [Y.O.] due to recent periods of incarceration and treatment at Center Point’s residential treatment program. The father is currently incarcerated and requires further substance abuse treatment in order to provide the child . . . regular and adequate care.” In its jurisdiction report, the Department commended father for recognizing that he had a substance abuse problem that required treatment and for acknowledging the impact his frequent periods of incarceration had on Y.O.’s life. Father’s substance abuse problems were “chronic and have continued despite previously participating in Voluntary Services,” and the Department recommended the court take jurisdiction over Y.O. in part to ensure father “achieves and maintains sobriety if he is to play a role in [Y.O.’s] care.”
In April 2014, mother and father submitted to jurisdiction. The juvenile court sustained the first amended petition and appointed a special advocate for Y.O.
In a disposition report filed in April 2014, the Department reported that father was in jail and was attending church, AA meetings, and anger management group. He had written to Y.O. and sent her drawings from jail. Y.O. remained in the care of mother, and they lived with mother’s boyfriend and the maternal grandfather in the apartment of the maternal grandfather. The Department recommended family maintenance services for mother and supportive services for father. Mother and father submitted on the Department’s recommendations. The juvenile court allowed father to have supervised visitation for two hours once a month.
In a status review report filed in October 2014, the Department recommended continued dependency and continued family maintenance services for mother and supportive services for father. Head Start staff reported that Y.O. was “decompensating” at preschool; she had sudden outbursts with no apparent trigger and tantrums lasting well over an hour. Staff requested mental health support for Y.O.
In October 2014, father was in jail, and Y.O. had not visited him because he did not want her to have a memory of seeing him in jail. He maintained contact with Y.O. over the previous six months by calling once a week and sending letters and drawings twice monthly. Father told a social worker he would like assistance from the Department in facilitating visits with Y.O. after release from custody, and he would like to participate in Y.O.’s life and be a stable father. Mother and father submitted on the Department’s recommendations. The juvenile court ordered continued services and allowed father to have supervised visitation for two hours once a week.
In its next status report filed in April 2015, the Department reported that father had been released from custody, but was arrested for violation of probation on December 8, 2014. In October 2014, the criminal restraining order mother had against father was modified to allow contact between them for the purpose of arranging father’s visits with Y.O. In January 2015, father entered a year-long residential treatment program in San Francisco under the terms of his probation, and he remained in the program as of April 2015. The Department reported, “[Father] has either been in custody, a detox program and/or residential treatment for approximately 9 out of the last 12 months and largely unavailable to parent [Y.O.]. [Father] has not been consistent with visitation and has only attended 3-out-of-6 scheduled (supervised) visits. When [father] does visit he is reportedly very attentive, caring, and involves himself with age-appropriate activities with [Y.O.]. . . . [H]e would like to be a more stable and consistent part of her life.” Since father entered the residential program in January 2015, he had not visited Y.O.
In the six months prior to the April 2015 status report, mother failed to participate consistently in offered services and her relationship with her live-in boyfriend became more volatile. An argument between mother and her boyfriend resulted in her being taken into custody under section 5150 in March 2015. The Department recommended an additional six months of family maintenance services for mother. As to father, the Department wrote he “has largely been absent from [Y.O.’s] life and he still needs to demonstrate that he can be a safe and stable person in her life given his long history of alcohol abuse and domestic violence.” The Department suggested monthly supervised visits, “with the option to increase if [father] continues to demonstrate his sobriety and consistency in visitation.”
On October 14, 2015, the Department filed another status report. At that time, father remained enrolled in a year-long residential treatment program in San Francisco. The Department recommended that the court dismiss the dependency.
Supplementary Dependency Petition and Removal
The next day, however, there was an explosion in mother’s home. Mother’s boyfriend was cooking hash oil in the kitchen, and the butane he was using exploded. Police officers responding to the explosion observed the boyfriend with visible burns on his forearms and skin sloughing off. Mother told a social worker Y.O. was not at home when the explosion occurred, but a witness reported to the police that she observed the maternal grandfather and Y.O. leave their apartment after the explosion. Also, Y.O., then five years old, told a social worker that there was a fire in the house, and she heard a “boom boom” coming from the kitchen. The next day, October 16, 2015, the Department obtained a custody warrant and placed Y.O. in foster care for her safety.
The Department filed a supplemental dependency petition for a more restrictive placement. The juvenile court ordered Y.O. detained and granted father supervised visitation. Y.O. was placed in a foster care home. On December 7, 2015, the juvenile court sustained the supplemental petition. The court granted father supervised visitation two times per month for a total of four hours per month.
In the disposition report filed January 7, 2016, the Department recommended family reunification services for mother and father. Father was working and was compliant with his probation requirements. He was living in a sober living house with other men and recognized it was not a suitable environment for Y.O. He was looking for subsidized housing so that he would have a better chance of reunifying. The Department reported that father understood “that it may take some time to stabilize his circumstances and be prepared to be a full-time parent to his daughter.” Y.O. was observed to be hypersensitive with a low tolerance for frustration. She experienced emotional outbursts and lengthy crying episodes.
At the uncontested disposition hearing on February 29, 2016, the juvenile court ordered Y.O. removed from parental custody. Father was granted supervised visitation two times per month for a total of four hours per month. Father’s court-ordered case plan set as goals that he obtain safe and stable housing, stay sober and free from drugs, show knowledge of age-appropriate behavior (by taking parenting class), and follow all conditions of probation.
Six-Month Review
On August 18, 2016, the Department filed a report for the six-month review. Father was working in San Francisco and “staying on the couch” at his parents’ home. He was in compliance with probation, which required that he submit to random drug/alcohol tests and attend a 52-week domestic violence program. Father was waiting for a placement in a sober living house for adult men in Marin County. The Department noted that father’s “complex work schedule” left little extra time to participate in services and visitation. Out of 21 scheduled visits, he missed six visits. It was reported that Y.O. was very excited to spend time with father, and he was very attentive and gave her lots of hugs and kisses. The Department determined that neither mother nor father demonstrated “the capacity to safely care for [Y.O.] on a day-to-day basis,” and recommended continuing reunification services for both mother and father. The juvenile court found that father made adequate progress toward alleviating or mitigation the causes necessitating placement and ordered continued reunification services.
12-Month Review
On November 30, 2016, the Department filed a report for the 12-month review. Y.O. was six years old and in first grade. She was performing at the bottom of her age group academically and often had difficulty focusing and completing her work. Y.O.’s teacher reported that she was extremely clingy and anxious, and over the previous month Y.O. was significantly more emotionally distressed. She remained in her foster home placement and “greatly benefitted from the calm home environment and the predictable structure of the home.”
Father’s probation officer reported that father was maintaining his sobriety while on probation. However, father had two new “law violations.” On August 27, 2016, father was cited by the San Rafael police for furnishing alcohol to a minor. Father said he made a poor decision and was sorry he had purchased alcohol for a minor standing at a liquor store. On September 20, 2016, father was cited for driving with a suspended license and at an unsafe speed. He was driving his sister-in-law’s car, which was impounded. Father continued to live with his family. He left his job in San Francisco and was working with his brother in construction in Sonoma County. Father told a social worker he was proud that he was able to stay out of jail. The Department wrote, “He has begun to rebuild the trust of his family and is committed to working hard and moving forward in his construction career.”
The Department referred father to weekly parenting class, but he was unable to attend because of his work schedule. The Department also referred father to a one-on-one parent advocate, who was intended to “support [father’s] relationship with [Y.O.] and help him to better understand her day-to-day social, emotional and educational needs as he had not been the primary caregiver and they had not lived together since she was a toddler.” The parent advocate reached out to father a number of times, but father did not follow through to schedule a time to meet.
Father had weekly unsupervised visits with Y.O. In September 2016, he missed three visits scheduled for weekday afternoons. After he changed jobs, father was able to visit on Sunday, his only day off. Father recently became more consistent in his visits, but he was still not available every week.
A social worker met with father on November 17, 2016. He said that things were going well for him with his new job and living with his family (his parents and his brother, sister-in-law, and their children). Father said he struggled to balance everything given that he works six days a week, leaving for work early in the morning and getting home in the evening. He put off completing a DUI class required for probation “until such time that he can afford the fees.” Father “stated that he is looking forward to eventually getting his own housing independent from his family and would want the opportunity to ‘get [Y.O.] back’ at some point in the future.”
Under the heading “prognosis of returning [the] child home,” the Department concluded, “Although they both love [Y.O.] dearly, after 18 months of Court Family Maintenance Services and 12 months of Family Reunification services, neither parent has demonstrated that they currently have the capacity to safely care for [Y.O.] on a day-to-day basis in order to create a consistent, safe and stable home environment which will ensure that all of [Y.O.’s] physical, educational and social needs are met. In fact, both parents have expressed to the [social worker] that they are not ready to parent [Y.O.] and would hope to reunify with her in the future.”
The Department observed that father failed to meet with the parent advocate and had two recent law violations, which put his judgment into question. These law violations resulted in father being “even further away from completing his probation requirements,” and they “placed him even further behind financially.” Overall, the Department was concerned about father’s ability to care for himself and the needs of a young child. Therefore, it recommended setting a section 366.26 hearing.
Father requested a contested hearing on the Department’s recommendation to terminate reunification services. The Department filed an addendum report on January 10, 2017. In early December 2016, father told a social worker he was very frustrated with mother for “not getting [Y.O.] back.” Later in December, father told the social worker he was looking forward to spending the holidays with his parents and brother, and he would be cooking the Christmas meal. He was very happy with his newfound relationship with his family. In the previous several years, father had been estranged from his family or was in custody or in treatment during the holidays. Father was to begin his mandatory DUI class in January 2017. He had a criminal court date scheduled for January 19, 2017, regarding his two recent law violations. Father said he was hopeful that he would be allowed to wear an electronic monitoring bracelet instead of serving time in jail.
Contested Hearing
On January 13, 2017, the juvenile court held the contested 12-month permanency hearing. Social worker Kristen Shore and father testified.
Shore worked on Y.O.’s case and prepared the Department’s 12-month status report and addendum. She testified the 18-month review date was April 17, 2017. Shore worked with father for almost three years, and she offered reasons the Department was not in favor of continuing his services for an additional three months (until an 18-month review).
First, father was not “particularly involved in the child’s life in terms of being a caregiver.” At the beginning of the case, he was in and out of jail and was not able to provide care for Y.O. Then he was in and out of a detox center and ultimately entered a treatment program. “[S]o he’s been largely unavailable. . .due to his substance abuse issues to care for [Y.O.]” Second, the Department was involved with the family for almost three years of Y.O.’s dependency plus a previous year of voluntary services. Shore testified, “[A]fter receiving so many services over such a long period of time for this young child, the fact that [father] is not prepared at this moment in time after extensive services to care for his daughter, concerns the Department very much . . . .” She expressed concern for Y.O. in “prolonging this process” further. Third, even though the Department “bent over backward to try to accommodate” father, there were periods when his visitation was very inconsistent. Shore recognized father was now more consistent with visiting Y.O., “but this is a very recent development.” Fourth, Shore was concerned about father’s recent law violations and opined his judgment was still questionable. She commended father for “working on getting himself on track so that he can take care of himself as an adult,” but stated that Y.O. deserved the opportunity to have “consistent caregiving.”
On cross-examination, Shore said she had no safety concerns with father’s unsupervised visits with Y.O. Unsupervised visits began in October 2016. Father told Shore he believed his sister could watch Y.O. while he was at work, but Shore understood this to be a possibility, not a definite childcare plan. Shore had met father outside his parents’ home, but father “indicated that his parents don’t like to have people inside the home.” So she had not been in father’s home and could not say whether Y.O. could reside there.
Father testified Y.O. could live with him because his parents said they would make some space for her in their room. Father’s sister-in-law could take Y.O. to school, pick her up from school, make sure she was fed, and take care of her until father got home from work. On at least four occasions, Y.O.’s foster family called to reschedule visits only one or two days before the scheduled visit. Father would like overnight visits with Y.O., but he never asked for them because he did not know it was an option. Father attends AA meetings twice a week at most. He talks to his sponsor every other day.
The Department attorney took the position that the court should not continue the case because there was no substantial probability Y.O. would be returned to father’s care and safely maintained in his home within the 18-month review date in April 2017. She argued, “The Department had hoped that with all the services that have been offered this family, at least one of the parents would have been able to do what was necessary to have [Y.O.] back in the home by now. Unfortunately, that has not happened, and while there is no question that the parents love their daughter very much, the time has come for the focus of this case to switch from giving the parents an opportunity to reunify, to creating a more permanent home for [Y.O.].”
Father’s attorney argued the Department had not met its burden to show there was no substantial probability that Y.O. would be returned to father by the 18-month review date. She acknowledged the case had gone on for long time, but “the time line that we are dealing with is the point of the [section] 387 detention, and that is when the father became engaged. . . . [T]hat is when he, I think we could agree, turned his life around and has made substantial progress in that time period in the last year.” Father’s attorney continued, “So I would argue that there is a substantial probability that this child can be returned to him within the next three months because he has housing, because he is available and has shown that he has visited, he is ready and willing to have overnight visits, he’s asked for increased visitation, and he has done his part to facilitate those visits with the foster parents and get himself to those visits.” Mother’s attorney told the court that mother supported reunification with father.
Y.O.’s attorney supported the Department’s position. She asserted the parents were given “every single opportunity to engage in services to demonstrate their ability to care for [Y.O.], and, unfortunately, despite that lengthy period of time, [they have] been unable to show that even as we sit here today.” “[Y.O.] was five years old when [father] started getting his life together, and he has some ways to go, especially in light of the fact that there are recent violations . . . .” Y.O.’s attorney emphasized that Y.O. needed and deserved stability and consistency in her life.
The court noted that father had made “significant changes in his life that he’s to be applauded for; but these are nascent changes,” and father committed two violations of law within the previous 90 days. The court further observed that the longest visit father had with Y.O. was four hours “and there’s a big difference between four hours and full-time care for a child.” The court addressed father: “I’m not sure that you have articulated for me a well thought out plan for your intentions to care for [Y.O.]. I would expect a parent who actually intends to care for a child to have investigated the matter and tell me much more about their plan . . . .” [¶] This is a child who was described as needing—craved stability and needs one-on-one adult time. She has a very difficult time handling anxiety. She has been diagnosed with PTSD. She has lots of educational issues, both academic and behavioral. These parents do not appear to have the ability to address those needs. [¶] . . . [Y]ou have a long ways to go. Raising a child doesn’t mean just sitting back and waiting for everybody to tell you how to handle things. For example, you never asked for an overnight. You never presented me with specifics of how you would actually care for [Y.O.] I don’t see you at this time having the tools necessary to advocate for [Y.O.], to make sure that she gets the assistance she needs at school, the programs she needs, the therapy she needs. You don’t appear to me to be someone who’s prepared to do that or has the ability to do that at this time.”
The juvenile court found that return of Y.O. (to either father or mother) would create a substantial risk of detriment to her safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being, and terminated reunification services for father and mother.
DISCUSSION
A. The Court’s Finding that the Return of Y.O. to Father Would Create a Substantial Risk of Detriment
Section 366.21, subdivision (f)(1) provides that, at the 12-month permanency hearing, “the court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
We review for substantial evidence the juvenile court’s finding that returning Y.O. to father’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to Y.O. (In re Yvonne W. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1400-1401.) “In so doing, we consider the evidence favorably to the prevailing party and resolve all conflicts in support of the trial court’s order. [Citation.] ‘Substantial evidence’ means evidence that is reasonable, credible and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case. [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 1401.)
Father asserts the court used the clear and convincing standard when it concluded father made insufficient progress in his services, and argues, “Considering this high standard of proof . . . , the trial court should not have concluded that return of the minor to her father would create a substantial risk or detriment to her safety.” Father is mistaken about the standard of proof applicable to the relevant finding. Section 366.21, subdivision (f)(1), requires that the detriment finding be made by a preponderance of the evidence, and the juvenile court here applied the correct standard.
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding. Y.O. had not lived with father since she was toddler, and when father did live with her, he was arrested for domestic violence involving mother. As social worker Shore testified, father was not involved in Y.O.’s life as a caregiver. Over the nearly three years of the dependency, father was inconsistent in visiting Y.O.; his consistency in attending visitation was “a very recent development.” Father only began having unsupervised visits three months prior to the hearing. Father had a history of domestic violence and substance abuse. He was in and out of jail since February 2013, and, most recently, he committed law violations in August and September 2016. Six-year-old Y.O. had a history of emotional problems. Currently, she was extremely clingy and anxious and benefitted greatly from the calm home environment of her foster home and the predictable structure of the home. But father was unable to attend parenting class, and he failed to meet the parent advocate, whose services were offered to “support [father’s] relationship with [Y.O.] and help him to better understand her day-to-day social, emotional and educational needs as he had not been the primary caregiver and they have not lived together since she was a toddler.” Further, in November 2016, father himself indicated to Shore that he currently was “not ready to parent” Y.O., and he wanted the opportunity to “get [Y.O.] back” at some point in the future. This was substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that returning Y.O. to father would create a substantial risk of detriment to her safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being.
Father points to evidence that he was sober, that he completed his treatment program, that he had a place to live, a job, and a “childcare plan” for Y.O. But this evidence does not defeat the substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court’s finding. “Evidence not favorable to the petitioner cannot be simply ignored as if it does not exist.” (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1021 (James B.).) “If there is substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court, we uphold those findings. [Citation.] We do not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, reweigh the evidence, or resolve evidentiary conflicts. Rather, we draw all reasonable inferences in support of the findings, consider the record most favorably to the juvenile court’s order, and affirm the order if supported by substantial evidence even if other evidence supports a contrary conclusion.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 947.)
B. Termination of Family Reunification Services
At the 12-month review hearing, the court may “[c]ontinue the case for up to six months for a permanency review hearing, provided that the hearing shall occur within 18 months of the date the child was originally taken from the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian. The court shall continue the case only if it finds that there is a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time or that reasonable services have not been provided to the parent or legal guardian.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
“[I]n order to find a substantial probability that the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time, the court shall be required to find all of the following: [¶] (A) That the parent or legal guardian has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child. [¶] (B) That the parent or legal guardian has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child’s removal from the home. [¶] (C) The parent or legal guardian has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for the child’s safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs.” (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
We review the juvenile court’s order terminating family reunification services for substantial evidence. (James B., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1021.)
Father contends, “Here, the court set [the section 366.26] hearing despite failing to undergo the analysis to consider whether the child could be returned to her father within 18 months.” We are not persuaded. The issue whether father’s reunification services should be extended to an 18-month review was fully litigated by the parties. Shore was specifically asked why the Department was against continuing reunification services for three additional months, and she offered her reasons. Father’s attorney expressly argued there was “a substantial probability that this child can be returned to him within the next three months.” During argument, the Department attorney identified the three findings required under section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1), in order to find a substantial probability that Y.O. would be returned the father’s physical custody within the 18-month review date. In terminating reunification services, the juvenile court implicitly rejected father’s argument. We infer, therefore, that the court determined there was no substantial probability that Y.O. would be placed with father by April 17, 2017. (See Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58 [“The doctrine of implied findings requires the appellate court to infer the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment.”]; In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 405 [juvenile dependency appeals governed by generally applicable rules of appellate procedure].)
Substantial evidence supports this implied finding. Father’s visitation in the previous six months was inconsistent. He did not make significant progress on his case plan as he did not take a parenting class or meet with the parent advocate, and he committed two law violations in violation of his probation. And, as the juvenile court observed, father’s recent changes in his life were significant but nascent, and he did not demonstrate a realistic understanding of what full-time care of Y.O. would entail. In sum, the record supports the juvenile court’s decision to terminate father’s reunification services rather than extend services for approximately three months.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied. Our decision is final as to this court immediately. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.490(b)(2)(A).) The stay we ordered on March 1, 2017, is dissolved.














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Miller, J.


We concur:


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Kline, P.J.


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Stewart, J.