Jaqueline L. v. Superior Court

Filed 4/3/07 Jaqueline L. v. Superior Court CA2/8

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING. Writ petition pursuant to rule 8.452 of the California Rules of Court. Marilyn H. Mackel, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI,  21.) Petitions denied.

Merrill Lee Toole for petitioner Jacqueline L.

Lisa J. Huerta for petitioner Leonard G.

No appearance for Respondent.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and Owen L. Gallagher, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services.

Petitioners Jacqueline L. (mother) and Leonard G. (father) are the parents of two young girls Ruby and Amber who were detained by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) after father was jailed and mother and the girls were living as transients following mothers eviction from a domestic violence shelter. The parents received over 18 months of reunification services, not once complaining about the reasonableness of those services. However, at the conclusion of a contested 18-month review hearing, counsel for mother claimed for the first time that the Department did not provide her with reasonable reunification services during the first six months of the reunification period. Counsel for the father argued only that the children would not be at risk if they were returned to his custody. The juvenile court disagreed. At the recommendation of both the Department and counsel for the children, the court terminated reunification services and scheduled a hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan for the children. (Welf. & Inst. Code,  366.26.)^[1]

The parents filed separate writ petitions challenging the juvenile courts decision. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) Both claim the juvenile courts finding that the Department provided them with reasonable reunification services is not supported by substantial evidence. In addition, father claims that substantial evidence does not support the juvenile courts finding that the children would be at substantial risk if returned to his custody. The Department opposes the granting of relief.

We conclude the parents contentions lack merit. Accordingly, we deny the petitions.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In January 2005, mother and father engaged in an altercation in which father struck mother, allegedly while mother was holding Amber, then a newborn. Father was arrested and charged with battery against a cohabitant. Mother then took Amber and two-year-old Ruby to a domestic violence crisis shelter. About three weeks later, mother was asked to leave the shelter because she failed to comply with the shelters rules. Mother had left the girls unattended, left her room in an unsanitary condition, and did not bathe the girls. After mother left the shelter, she was transient, moving from motel to motel. She stated that she had no relatives with whom she and the children could stay, apparently because some did not have adequate living situations and others refused to take mother in due to her continued relationship with father.

After the matter was referred to the Department, one of its social workers spoke with mother, who denied the extent of abuse she had received at the hands of father and denied the allegations made against her by shelter personnel.^[2] The social worker also spoke with mothers great aunt, who stated there was a history of domestic violence between father and mother. She referred to father as a very violent man who had threatened to kill mothers relatives and had pulled a knife on the girls maternal great uncle. In addition, the social worker received reports that mother was slow and that she had previously had some contact with the regional center, but she did not follow through with the regional center because of fathers objections.^[3]

In March 2005, the Department detained the girls, placed them in a foster home, and filed a dependency petition on their behalf. At the conclusion of the detention hearing, the juvenile court found a sufficient basis to warrant detention. The court ordered the Department to provide mother and father with family reunification services, and it directed that mothers services be provided through the regional center.

The following month, the Department reported in its jurisdiction/disposition report that the girls were doing well in foster care. Father was still incarcerated and had undergone psychological testing in jail. He stated that arrangements were being made in jail for him to attend counseling and parent education classes.

Father admitted hitting mother, but he claimed he had done so only once and it was after mother had hit him repeatedly. With respect to the incident giving rise to his recent arrest, father said that his hands probably hit mother by accident when mother blocked the door as he was attempting to leave.

Father also admitted that he was convicted of assaulting the girls maternal great uncle in 2003, but he claimed he was the actual victim. According to father, he took a deal because he had no family support at the time. He admitted to gang involvement and to spending time in juvenile hall as a youth, but he claimed he disassociated himself from gang members after he met mother.

Father stated he suffered from depression for which he was taking medication. He explained that he was suicidal in 2002 and he sought mental help after a stranger talked him out of jumping off a bridge. He also stated that he was dyslexic and could not read or write.

Mother was still living a transient lifestyle and her whereabouts were not always known. When located by a Department social worker, mother denied having any mental delays, but she admitted having received services from the regional center and expressed a willingness to do so again. She also claimed she had broken up with father and had enrolled in both individual counseling and parenting classes for which she had received referrals from the Department (along with domestic violence and regional center referrals).

In mid-April 2005, both parents submitted to an amended petition and signed a case plan. In open court, the court found that reasonable services had been provided to the parents, and it ordered continued services. Pursuant to the case plan, mother was to participate in domestic violence and individual counseling, as well as parenting classes. The court ordered father to attend domestic violence counseling, parenting classes, and individual counseling to address anger management and emotional problems. The court continued the matter for a six-month review hearing.

Shortly thereafter, father was released from jail and moved into a halfway house. Shortly after his release, the Department asked the juvenile court to modify fathers visits with the girls and to order an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation to assess fathers emotional and psychological stability. The request was prompted by several incidents in which father engaged in hostile and threatening behavior with one or more Department social workers, foster care staff and other persons. Among other things, parents who came to visit their children in foster care complained about fathers behavior, prompting the Department to move fathers visits from the foster home to a Department office. Father also engaged in hostile behavior with Department personnel during his visits; on one occasion he balled up his fists and told a social worker: Alright, [if] thats how you are going to be I am going to go gangsta on you.

The court ordered that fathers visits with the girls be monitored and that they take place in a therapeutic setting. However, the court denied the request for an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation for father.

In its six-month review report filed in September 2005, the Department reported that on two occasions, it had provided mother with referrals for individual counseling, parenting education, and domestic violence counseling, but mother had not enrolled in any of the programs. Mother had been visiting the girls regularly and the visits were reportedly going well.

According to the Department, father had completed a parenting education class and had attended 11 domestic violence counseling sessions. Father was receiving outpatient mental health treatment. He was diagnosed as bipolar and was taking medication. His therapist stated he was making some progress in therapy. However, there were still problems during fathers monitored visits with the girls. The Department was having trouble arranging for monitored visits at a therapeutic setting. As a result, a couple visits took place at a police station, but another location had to be found because father became argumentative with the foster parent and the police concluded the visits could no longer take place at the station. Subsequent visits were to take place at a Department office. Father still had no permanent residence.

In September 2005, the girls were placed with a paternal cousin. They had also been referred to a regional center for assessment.

In November 2005, the Department reported that through the regional center, mother had enrolled in the GOALS (Going Onward and Living Successfully) program, where she was to receive parenting education, domestic violence counseling and independent living classes. Mother had already attended two parenting class sessions. The regional center was also scheduled to refer mother to a family services provider for money management classes and assistance in searching for an apartment.

After a contested six-month review hearing in November 2005, the court found that father was in compliance and mother was in partial compliance with the case plan, and it ordered additional reunification services until the 12-month review hearing. The court also found that the Department had complied with the case plan. The court gave the Department discretion to liberalize mothers visits with the children in consultation with the regional center.

In late December 2005, the Department learned that father moved out of his last residence following a confrontation with his landlord. At around this time, father told a Department social worker that mother was hanging around a street where dope and crystal meth were sold and he claimed that mother was always high.

In February 2006, the Department reported that mother had left threatening messages on fathers voicemail. Among other things, mother stated watch your back, youre dead. and were watching you. The court ordered that neither mother nor her relatives have any contact with father.

In late March 2006, the Department received a letter from a social worker for a mental health services provider, which stated that father had made great progress, was taking his medication regularly, and was learning to deal with his bipolar condition. He was attending an auto mechanic program and was doing well, though he was having difficulty with reading and comprehension. The social worker requested that father be afforded unmonitored visits with the girls. However, the Department also learned that father had transferred to a different domestic violence counseling program, and had attended only two sessions in approximately six weeks. In one of those sessions, father got into an argument with another client and told the client: Lets take it outside! Father denied the incident and called the counselor who reported the matter a liar. The therapist who was facilitating the session felt unsafe and father was not permitted to return.

In early April 2006, the juvenile court approved unmonitored visits for father, but it directed that they take place in a public setting.

In May 2006, and in anticipation of the 12-month review hearing, the Department reported that mother was sharing a room with her sister in a rented house. When asked by a Department social worker about drug use, mother admitted using marijuana in the past, but she denied any current drug use. A regional center representative reported that mother was diagnosed with mild mental retardation. Mother was participating in the regional centers GOALS program. She had completed eight of ten parenting classes, and had attended four domestic violence support group meetings, though none since early December 2005. Mother was not returning calls from the Department social worker. The maternal grandmother stated that mother did not trust the Department.

The Department reported the children were receiving appropriate care in the home of their paternal cousin, though father wanted the children removed from the home because he believed they were not being cared for properly.^[4]

In May 2006, the juvenile court scheduled a contested 12-month review hearing. In the interim, it ordered that no person without a valid drivers license and insurance drive the girls. The court ordered father to continue with therapy.

The following month, the Department reported that it had learned that one of the programs in which father had enrolled was a parent education/family relationship program, and not an anger management class as father had previously claimed.^[5] Father was advised that the program did not satisfy the court-ordered requirement that he participate in an anger management program. In mid-May 2006, father advised the Department he had recently switched mental health services providers. A Department social worker asked father to provide an enrollment letter and telephone contact information for the new provider, but father had not yet provided the requested information. Father was residing with his mother, 10-year old sister, and mothers boyfriend. Father was sleeping on a sofa bed in the living room. Fathers visits with the girls on weekends were viewed as appropriate, but he had not made his scheduled midweek visits.

In June 2006, the court found that the Department and both parents had complied with the case plan. It ordered an additional three months of services.

In July 2006, the Department reported that the regional center determined Ruby did not qualify for its services, though it recommended that she be evaluated for special education and other services. The Department also reported that Amber was receiving services through the regional centers Early Start Program.

In anticipation of a hearing in September 2006, the Department reported that the children were still with their paternal cousin, who was doing a good job caring for them and with whom they had bonded. The cousin expressed a desire to be appointed legal guardian for the children. Amber had been diagnosed with an ear condition for which it was recommended that she receive equalization tubes. However, both parents had failed to provide consent for the procedure.

Mother was attending domestic violence and parenting classes, as well as individual counseling, through the regional centers GOALS program. Father was not attending domestic violence classes.

A few days before the September 2006 hearing, the Department received word from the regional center that mother admitted recent use of methamphetamines. Mothers mother confirmed that mother had a lengthy history and was a current user of methamphetamines.

At the September 2006 hearing, counsel for both parents gave consent for Ambers ear procedure. The court gave the Department discretion to allow father to have overnight visits in the paternal grandmothers home. Fathers counsel stated that father had completed some portions of the case plan. The court continued the matter for a contested 18-month review hearing.

In late October 2006, the Department reported that father and his mother were at odds with one another and father did not want to have overnight visits with the girls at the grandmothers home. Father had moved into a one-bedroom residence with a female friend and her young child. The Department found no observable health hazards in the residence. Father admitted that he had not adhered to the visitation schedule. He wanted to improve in that area and he felt that his new living arrangement would help him do so.

Shortly before the contested 18-month review hearing in late December 2006, the program director for the GOALS program reported that mother had recently tested positive for methamphetamines. It was recommended that mother admit herself into a rehabilitation program. When a space in such a program became open, mother went missing for about one week. When located, mother advised a worker that she had gone to think things through. She admitted that she would test positive for drugs if tested.

The Department reported that father had missed at least four domestic violence classes and a counselor at the program opined that he should be terminated from the program. According to the Department, father had not complied with court orders regarding individual counseling to address anger management and emotional issues. Father now had a drivers license, which he obtained in Arizona.

The contested 18-month review hearing took place in late December 2006. After the juvenile court admitted numerous Department reports and a letter from the GOALS program into evidence, father was the sole witness to testify. With respect to the case plan, father testified that he completed his parenting class. He had also completed approximately 40 of 52 domestic violence classes. He expected to finish as soon as possible but it was hard because he worked as a body guard at night clubs five or six days a week and attended an auto mechanic and technician class once or twice a week. Father was not attending individual counseling because of his work and school commitments. He last attended counseling about three or four months ago. Father was taking his medication.

Father testified that he was working on his housing situation, which he characterized as not that good at the moment. Father had been living with his mother for the last two months. If the girls were returned to him, they could reside in his mothers home for a little time because the house is so little. Father described his unmonitored visits with the girls as great. He felt ready to have the girls returned to him and he was sure he could work on things if there are any other areas [that] need to be worked on. Father was not sure what he would do for childcare if the girls were returned to him. He stated that daycare could help and he would ask for help with housing. Father was no longer on probation.

Fathers counsel asked the court to order the girls returned to father. Counsel acknowledged that father had not completed the case plan, but he had made significant efforts and strides. Counsel maintained that father seem[ed] to be getting his life on track. Counsel recognized that the parties were at the 18-month review hearing so the only decision that could be made is whether the court can return the girls to father. Fathers counsel did not complain about the adequacy of reunification services or request any additional services.

Mothers counsel stated that mother objects to termination of her reunification services and the argument that I can make is for the first six months of this particular case there were no efforts to coordinate the services for mother with the regional center . . . . Counsel acknowledged that mother had a recent drug problem, but otherwise she has been in compliance . . . . Counsel asked the court to order six additional months of services to both parents. She then reduced the request to another two and a half months of services.^[6]

Counsel for the girls asked the court to follow the Departments recommendation of terminating reunification services and setting a hearing for a permanent plan. Counsel did not believe it would be in the girls best interests to grant mother additional services. Counsel questioned the wisdom of father working as a body guard when he had anger management issues. Counsel challenged fathers credibility, especially his contention that he was residing in Arizona and that is why he obtained an Arizona drivers license.

Counsel for the Department also asked the court to terminate reunification services for both parents.

The court acknowledged that both parents had made progress. The court noted that father was taking medication and his appearance in general and demeanor in general has changed significantly since the beginning of the case. However, the court expressed concern over father not attending individual counseling and not completing the domestic violence program. The court did not feel father had demonstrated significant progress with respect to counseling. The court also noted that father did not have a stable residence and had provided no indication that he was able to care for the children on a full-time basis. The court also expressed concern over mothers recent drug problems and it urged mother to listen to those around her and enroll in a residential treatment program.

The court found that the Department had provided the parents with reasonable services, which were tailored to meet the parents needs.

The court terminated reunification services and set a permanent plan hearing. The court noted that the recommendation for a permanent plan was guardianship. The court encouraged father to obtain individual counseling. The court suggested the girls could be placed with him at a later time if he made progress.

Mother and father filed separate writ petitions challenging the juvenile courts order setting the section 366.26 hearing. Both claim there is no substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the Department provided them with reasonable reunification services. In addition, father claims there is no substantial evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the girls would be at risk if returned to his custody.

DISCUSSION

1. The Standard of Review

We review the juvenile courts findings of fact under the substantial evidence test, which requires us to determine whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value to support the order. (In re Brian M. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1398; Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 470.) In so doing, we must resolve all conflicts in support of the courts determination and indulge all legitimate inferences to uphold the courts order. If substantial evidence exists, we must affirm. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1020-1021; In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820; In re Katrina C. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 540, 547; In re Tracy Z. (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 107, 113.) The substantial evidence standard also applies to findings that must be made by clear and convincing evidence. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 422-423; In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154.) Whether the court made the correct decision based upon its findings of fact is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. (In re Brian M., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1401, fn. 4; In re Brequia Y. (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1068.)

2. Reasonableness of Reunification Services

Both parents claim the juveniles courts finding that the Department provided them with reasonable reunification services is not supported by substantial evidence.^[7]

Fathers contention fails for numerous reasons. First, at no time during the lengthy proceedings below did father ever complain about the reasonableness of the services he received. (See In re Kevin S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 882, 885 [mother waived right to contest finding of reasonable reunification efforts by not objecting to adequacy of those efforts before the juvenile court].) Indeed, even during her argument at the conclusion of the contested 18-month review hearing, fathers counsel did not complain about the adequacy of the services or request that additional services be offered. (As we discuss below in connection with mothers contention regarding the adequacy of services, it is not appropriate to raise the issue for the first time at the close of the reunification period.) On the contrary, fathers counsel recognized that the court was not in a position to order additional reunification services, stating that the only decision that could be made is whether the court can return the girls to father.

Second, even in fathers petition, father never explains why the services he received were inadequate. Father does not identify any additional services that he believes he should have received. Finally, even if we were to consider fathers argument on the merits, we would conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile courts finding that the Department provided father with reasonable services. The problem was not a lack of adequate services. Rather, it was fathers failure to take full advantage of the services he received. Father had more than a year and a half following his release from jail to complete domestic violence classes, yet he failed to do so. He stopped attending individual therapy months before the contested 18-month review hearing, precisely when he should have been doing his best to demonstrate to the juvenile court that he was complying with the case plan and was ready to have the girls returned to his custody. The Department was not required to take the parent by the hand and escort him or her to and through classes or counseling sessions. (In re Michael S. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1448, 1463, fn. 5; see also In re Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1365 [ Reunification services are voluntary . . . and an unwilling or indifferent parent cannot be forced to comply with them ].)

As for mothers claims regarding reunification services, she never complained about the adequacy of the services until the conclusion of the contested 18-month review hearing, when her attorney argued only that mother did not receive reasonable services during the first six months of the reunification period. However, if mother felt during the reunification period that the Department was not providing adequate services, she had the assistance of counsel to seek guidance from the juvenile court in formulating a better plan[.] (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.) Mother cannot sit idly by and wait until the close of the reunification period to challenge the adequacy of services provided. Otherwise, a parent could   be silent as to his objections until it would be too late to obviate them, and the result would be that few judgments would stand the test of an appeal. [Citations.]  (Ibid.; see also Los Angeles County Dept. of Children etc. Services v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 1088, 1093 [Neither may a parent wait silently by until the final reunification review hearing to seek an extended reunification period based on a perceived inadequacy in the reunification services occurring long before that hearing].)

In any event, there was more than enough evidence to support the juvenile courts finding that the Department provided mother with reasonable services. While it appears that it took some time before mother made contact with the regional center, the Department attempted to assist mother from the outset. Within weeks of the detention hearing, the Department referred mother to the regional center. At around this same time, mother claimed she had already enrolled in parenting education classes and individual counseling, for which she had received referrals from the Department. The Department provided additional referrals on at least two additional occasions during the next several months.

We also observe that during the first few weeks following the childrens detention, mother continued to lead a transient lifestyle; she did not return Department calls and her whereabouts were not always known to the Department or to her mother.

A social services agency is required to make a good faith effort to address the parents problems through services, to maintain reasonable contact with the parent during the course of the plan, and to make reasonable efforts to assist the parent in areas where compliance proves difficult. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.) A reunification plan must be tailored to fit the circumstances of each family and designed to eliminate the conditions that led to the juvenile courts jurisdictional finding. (In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) When the problems requiring removal of a child from a parents custody stem (at least in part) from the parents developmental disability, the court and the Department are required to tailor the reunification plan to accommodate [the parents] special problems and limitations. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 416.)

However, [t]he fact that a parent suffers from emotional problems does not excuse her from the statutory requirement of participating in a reunification plan, as some capacity to achieve the reunification goals is presumed. (Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 762.) Moreover, the standard for the adequacy of such services is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 547; see also Katie V. v. Superior Court, supra, 130 Cal. App.4th at p. 598 [in most cases more services might have been provided and the services provided are often imperfect].) In this case, the services mother received were reasonable under the circumstances.

Finally, even if one accepts the argument mothers counsel advanced at the conclusion of the contested 18-month review hearing, the court could award no more than two and-a-half months of services. (See fn. 6, ante.) However, it is inconceivable that mother whose visits with children were still monitored would be in a position to regain custody of her children in such a short time period, especially considering her recent drug problems. (See  361.5, subd. (a)(3) [court-ordered services may be extended up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of his or her parent . . . if it can be shown . . . that he or she will be returned and safely maintained in the home within the extended time period].)^[8]

3. Risk to Children if returned to Fathers Custody

Section 366.22, subdivision (a), provides in pertinent part that at the conclusion of the 18-month review hearing, [t]he court shall order the return of the child to the physical custody of his or her parent or legal guardian unless the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child to his or her parent or legal guardian would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.

Father challenges the juvenile courts finding at the conclusion of the 18-month review hearing that returning the girls to his custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to them. We reject this contention.

First, although father had made considerable progress since his release from jail, the juvenile court found that he had not completed his domestic violence program and was not attending individual counseling. Second, during the reunification period, father was involved in numerous incidents demonstrating that he had not fully overcome his anger management problems. Third, as the juvenile court noted, father did not have a stable residence and had provided no indication that he would be able to care for his two young girls (both of whom appear to have special needs) on a full-time basis.

In light of all these factors, we cannot say that the juvenile courts finding that returning the girls to fathers custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to them.

Disposition

The writ petitions are denied on the merits. This opinion is final forthwith as to this court. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.264(b)(3).)

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

COOPER, P. J.

BOLAND, J.

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^[1] All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

^[2] This was the third time the Department had received a referral about the family. In 2002, the Department received two referrals, one alleging physical abuse (apparently between the parents) and the other alleging emotional abuse and general neglect. Both were deemed inconclusive.

^[3] Regional centers are operated by private nonprofit community agencies and are responsible for coordinating the delivery of services for developmentally disabled persons. (See  4620; Morohoshi v. Pacific Home (2004) 34 Cal.4th 482, 486, 487-488.)

^[4] Father was also upset with the paternal cousin because she had questioned the propriety of his driving the girls without a drivers license.

^[5] However, anger management was one of the issues addressed in the parenting education program.

^[6] After asking for six more months of services (to compensate mother for the first six-month period during which, allegedly, there were essentially no services), mothers counsel realized that mother had already received three and a half months of services more than the maximum 18 months the court was authorized to award. (See  361.5, subd. (a)(3) [court may extend the period of services up to a maximum time period not to exceed 18 months after the date the child was originally removed from physical custody of his or her parent].) Therefore, she asked the court for only two and a half more months of services.

^[7] Where the Department fails to provide reasonable reunification services, a court may order additional services beyond the 18-month statutory deadline. (See, e.g., Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1015; In re Daniel G. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1205; In re Dino E., supra, 6 Cal.App.4th 1768.)

^[8] Both parents complain that the court did not state the evidence upon which it was basing its finding that reasonable services were provided. Neither parent provides any authority requiring a court to detail the services the parents received (and with which parents and their counsel are very familiar). They cite only two cases which hold that in certain limited situations, courts will not imply findings that a trial court failed to make. In this case, while the parents challenge the evidence supporting the finding, they do not dispute that the court found the Department had provided them with reasonable services.