John F. v. Sup.
Filed
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COURT OF APPEAL - FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
STATE OF
JOHN F., Petitioner, v. THE Respondent; | D049729 (Super. |
Real Party in Interest. |
PROCEEDINGS in mandate after referral to a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 hearing. Cynthia Bashant, Judge. Petition denied.
John F. seeks writ review of juvenile orders terminating reunification services and setting a permanency plan selection and implementation hearing. We deny the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
John F. and N.E.[1] are the parents of Sean F., born May 2004, and Emily F., born November 2005. The parents' circumstances were unstable. In July 2004, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) offered the family voluntary services due to concerns about the parents' ability to properly care for two-month-old Sean. The Agency continued to work with the family until August 2005, when it closed the voluntary case due to the parents' lack of compliance. During this time, the San Diego Police Department received numerous calls concerning Sean's welfare due to his presence on city streets while his parents were panhandling.
In September 2005, a downtown San Diego patrol officer saw Sean with his father on a downtown street corner late at night and decided to investigate the child's welfare. In statements to the officer, John implied he made more money panhandling when Sean was with him. The officer observed the family's squalid living conditions in a poorly maintained hotel room. She concluded that John and N.E. could not meet Sean's basic needs and the living conditions were hazardous for the 16-month-old child. The officer took Sean into protective custody.
The Agency filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300,[2] subdivision (b) alleging Sean was at risk of serious physical harm or illness due to the family's filthy, unsanitary and unsafe living conditions. Sean, then 16 months old, was developmentally delayed. He did not use words and could not stand by himself. Professionals determined Sean had a moderate receptive language delay and severe to profound expressive speech and language delays. Sean's front two teeth were decayed and required treatment.
On
On November 21, the Agency filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b) alleging N.E. could not care for Emily due to mental illness, and John was unable to protect and properly supervise the infant. On
In February 2006, John ended his relationship with N.E. when he realized their relationship was impeding his efforts to regain custody of Emily and Sean. He also completed a psychological evaluation with Kristina Franey, Psy.D., who diagnosed John's mental health condition as bipolar II disorder, provisional. Psychologist Franey recommended John consult a psychiatrist to determine whether medication would help stabilize his condition. Kimberly Corbett, Psy.D., John's therapist, had made the same recommendation approximately a year earlier. Franey believed John was reluctant to admit he might need medication. In April, John followed through with the recommendations. The next month, John complained of side effects of medication and missed three of four scheduled visits with the children.
On
During the reunification period, John consistently participated in individual therapy and completed a parenting class. He held several jobs, including gathering signatures for petitions, writing articles and selling newspapers, and working in a sandwich shop. John moved approximately four times before he secured shelter at St. Vincent de Paul Center (Center) in May 2006. He visited the children often but missed approximately one-third of the scheduled visits, including one on Sean's birthday. John expressed an interest in attending Sean's speech, physical and occupational therapy sessions but attended only seven of Sean's 27 appointments, and three of nine sign language classes designed to improve Sean's communication skills and decrease his frustration levels. John stopped taking medication when he did not feel he was benefiting from it.
Therapist Corbett opined John was making good progress meeting his treatment goals. She noted a significant improvement in John's stability when he began taking medication. Corbett believed it was not safe to return the children to John's custody. She did not have any clinical concerns about unsupervised visits because the initial risk factors in the case had been substantially reduced. Corbett was aware John had discontinued his medication for a short time.
Social worker
The court found John made some progress with his case plan. He demonstrated an improved ability to care for himself but did not show he could meet the children's needs. The court determined there was no substantial likelihood the children would return to parental custody, terminated reunification services, and set a permanency plan hearing under section 366.26.
DISCUSSION
John contends the court erred when it terminated reunification services and set a permanency plan hearing under section 366.26. He asserts the evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings the Agency provided reasonable services and there was not a substantial probability the children could be safely returned to parental custody.
At the six-month review hearing for a child under three years of age, the court is required to continue the case to the 12-month review hearing if it finds there is a substantial probability the child may be returned to his or her parent within six months or reasonable services have not been provided.[3] (§ 366.21, subd. (e); see § 361.5, subd. (a).) At a 12-month review hearing, the court may continue the case up to the 18‑ month review date only if it finds there is a substantial probability the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent within the extended period of time or reasonable services have not been provided.[4] (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
When a parent challenges an order on the grounds of insufficient evidence, the reviewing court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's order, drawing every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. (In re Shelley J. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 322, 329; In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318; see also In re Misako R. (1991) 2 Cal.App.4th 538, 545.) The party challenging the order has the burden to demonstrate there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the court's order. (In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 420.)
A
John contends the Agency did not help him implement psychologist Franey's recommendations for housing assistance and job training, and the Agency subsequently asserted that his failure to comply with these recommendations was evidence of continued risk to the children. John argues he was not provided reasonable services and the court should have extended the reunification period as mandated by statute.
The Agency responds the social worker made a good faith effort to assess and address John's problems through services, and its efforts were reasonable under the circumstances. It asserts John was employed throughout the dependency proceedings and did not require additional job training, and the case plans did not require him to obtain housing as a condition of family reunification.
Family reunification services play a critical role in dependency proceedings. (In re Alanna A. (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 555, 563; In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 467..) Unless a specific statutory exception applies, the juvenile court must provide services designed to reunify the family within a statutory time period. (§ 361.5; see 42 U.S.C. § 629a(a)(7); In re Alanna A., supra, 135 Cal.App.4th at p. 563.) If reasonable services were not provided, the court is required to continue the case for the period of time permitted by statute. (§ 366.21, subd. (e); § 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
To support a finding of reasonable services, " the record should show that the supervising agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult. . . ." (In re Riva M. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 403, 414.) " The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances." (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
The record belies the Agency's assertion stable housing was not a requirement of John's reunification plan. The case plans specifically required John to " [o]btain and maintain a stable and suitable residence for yourself and your child(ren)." In her March 2006 report, psychologist Franey stated John was currently homeless and needed assistance finding more stable housing. Social worker
Once John had a safe and stable place to live, it was reasonable for the Agency to focus on stabilizing John's mental health and improving his parenting skills. At that point, making additional housing referrals or insisting John rent his own home could reasonably be considered unnecessary or even counterproductive. The psychologist was concerned with John's immediate homelessness when she made her recommendation for housing assistance. The record shows this issue was resolved successfully. With his therapist's advice, John was able to develop and implement a housing plan, thus the limited assistance provided by the Agency was reasonable under the circumstances.
In addition, the record does not support John's assertion his housing situation was held against him at trial. By the October 2006 hearing, John had been at the Center for more than five months. In its status review report, the Agency reported John's living conditions had stabilized. The report also noted the Center had a family section, indicating the children would not be precluded from living at the Center were John able to safely care for them in other respects.
The record shows the Center provided job-training services, and these services were available to John. Thus, substantial evidence supports a finding John was offered the job training services recommended by psychologist Franey. Alternatively, the court could reasonably infer John's participation in job training services was not required for family reunification. Social worker
The record shows the Agency identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, and offered or provided services designed to remedy those problems. These services were reasonably focused on stabilizing John's mental condition through therapy and medication, and improving his ability to care safely for his children and to meet Sean's special needs. The Agency provided a psychological evaluation, individual therapy, and parenting classes. The social worker approved John's plan to secure housing at the Center, where he could easily access other services such as job training. (In re Riva M., supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 414.) We conclude the services provided by the Agency were reasonable under the circumstances. (In re Misako R., supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 547.)
B
John contends insufficient evidence supports the court's finding there was no substantial probability Sean and Emily could be returned to his care within the next six months and therefore, the court's order terminating reunification services was erroneous.
Under section 361.5, subdivision (a) and section 366.21, subdivision (g)(1), the reunification period can be extended within statutory limits if the court finds there is a substantial probability the child will be returned to the physical custody of his or her parent and safely maintained in the home within the extended period of time. The court is required to find all of the following:
" (A) That the parent . . . has consistently and regularly contacted and visited with the child.
" (B) That the parent . . . has made significant progress in resolving problems that led to the child's removal from the home.
" (C) The parent . . . has demonstrated the capacity and ability both to complete the objectives of his or her treatment plan and to provide for the child's safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs." (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
Here, the court found John participated in his case plan and made progress in being able to meet his own needs, but did not demonstrate he had the capacity and ability to safely provide for the children. John's decision to stop taking medication troubled the
court, but the court's finding was primarily based on John's failure to attend many of Sean's medical and therapeutic appointments as well as the number of visits he missed with the children. The court determined John did not show he understood the children's needs and declined to extend the reunification period.
On this record, John does not meet his burden to demonstrate there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the court's order. (In re Geoffrey G., supra, 98 Cal.App.3d at p. 420.) During the reunification period, John missed approximately one-third of his scheduled visits with the children. Sean had significant developmental delays, and required extensive physical, occupational and speech therapy. John's participation in only seven out of 27 sessions permits the reasonable inference he did not understand the nature of Sean's special needs, the importance of consistent treatment, and the role of a parent in meeting his or her child's special needs. John resisted the recommendations of his therapist, psychologist and social worker to consult with a psychiatrist to determine whether medication might help stabilize his mental health condition. When John did comply with the recommendation, he was inconsistent with the medication component of his treatment plan.
These facts fully support the court's finding that John did not demonstrate the capacity and ability to complete the objectives of his treatment plan and to provide for his children's safety, protection, physical and emotional well-being, and special needs. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1)(C).) We conclude that the court did not err when it found there was not a substantial probability the children would be returned to John's physical custody and safely maintained in the home within an extended period of time. (§ 366.21, subd. (g)(1).)
DISPOSITION
The petition is denied. The request for a stay is denied.
NARES, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
BENKE, J.
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[1] N.E. did not seek review and is mentioned only when relevant to this proceeding.
[2] Further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
[3] In Emily's case, the court terminated reunification services at the six-month review hearing.
[4] In Sean's case, the court terminated reunification services at the 12-month review hearing.
