Jorge T. v. Super. Ct.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Filed 7/11/13 
Jorge T. v. Super. Ct. CA5

 

 

 

 

 

 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

> 

 

 

California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b).  This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

 

 

 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 
>

JORGE T., Petitioner,             v.   THE SUPERIOR COURT OF STANISLAUS COUNTY,   Respondent;   STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY SERVICES AGENCY,   Real Party in Interest.

F067153   (Super. Ct. Nos. 516366, 516367 & 516368)     O P I N I O N

 

THE COURThref="#_ftn1" name="_ftnref1" title="">^*

            ORIGINAL
PROCEEDINGS; petition for href="http://www.mcmillanlaw.com/">extraordinary writ review.  Ann Q. Ameral, Judge.

            Dependency
Advocates of Stanislaus County and Nadine Salim, for Petitioner.

            No
appearance for Respondent.

            John P.
Doering, County Counsel, and Robin Gozzo, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party
in Interest. 

-ooOoo-

Petitioner, Jorge T. (father),
filed an extraordinary writ petition (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452)
regarding his minor children S. T., age seven; Kaitlyn T., age five; and Jacob
T., age one.  Father seeks relief from
the juvenile court’s order issued at the six-month review hearing terminating
his reunification services and setting
a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26href="#_ftn2" name="_ftnref2" title="">^[1] hearing for September 9, 2013.  We deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

            On July 18,
2012, a section 300 dependency petition
(petition) was filed in which the following was alleged:  On July 16, 2012, police went to the home of
Brandy D. (mother) in response to a 911 call placed by one of mother’s
neighbors.  Upon arriving at mother’s
home, police found the body of Stephanie T. (Stephanie), which was in the
initial stages of decomposition.href="#_ftn3"
name="_ftnref3" title="">^[2]  The house “was dirty with animal feces, cats,
garbage and the smell of urine throughout the house.”  Mother told police the following:  She had been ill “during the weekend,” and
“after her period of convalescence,” she awoke and found Stephanie dead.  The previous night mother and a friend had
used methamphetamine.  Mother “was under
the impression” her two oldest daughters, ages six and four, were taking care
of Stephanie and Jacob, age six months.  


The detention report, filed July
18, 2012, states that in May 2012, father was arrested for “conspiracy to
commit a crime” and for illegally entering the United States in violation of
federal immigration law, and deported to Mexico.  

On July 19, 2012, the court ordered
the children detained and set a jurisdiction/disposition hearing for August 15,
2012.  On that date, the court appointed
counsel to represent father, who was not present in court, and continued the
hearing.  After several more continuances,
the hearing, for which father was not present, was held on October 22, 2012, at
which time the court found the allegations of the petition true, found father
to be the presumed father of the children, ordered reunification services
granted to father and denied to mother, and adopted and approved a case plan. 

Following a contested six-month
review hearing on April 9, 2013, the court, after finding that reasonable
reunification services were offered to father, terminated reunification
services to father and set a section 366.26 hearing for September 9, 2013.  The filing of the instant writ petition
followed.  Neither party requested oral
argument.

DISCUSSION

            Father
contends the juvenile court erred in finding that reasonable reunification
services had been provided.  We disagree.

Legal Background

            “When a
finding that reunification services were adequate is challenged on appeal, we
review it for substantial evidence. 
[Citation.]  ‘“In juvenile cases,
as in other areas of the law, the power of an appellate court asked to assess
the sufficiency of the evidence begins and ends with a determination as to
whether or not there is any substantial evidence, whether or not contradicted,
which will support the conclusion of the trier of fact.”’  [Citation.]” 
(In re Alvin >R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 (>Alvin R.).)  “We must resolve all conflicts in support of
the determination, and indulge in all legitimate inferences to uphold the
court’s order.  Additionally, we may not
substitute our deductions for those of the trier of fact.”  (Elijah
R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)

“A finding that reasonable
reunification services have been provided must be made upon clear and
convincing evidence.  [Citation.]  ‘When the sufficiency of the evidence to
support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of
proof in the trial court is clear and convincing evidence, the reviewing court
must determine if there is any substantial evidence--that is, evidence which is
reasonable, credible and of solid value--to support the conclusion of the trier
of fact.  [Citations.]’  [Citation.]” 
(Alvin R., supra, 108
Cal.App.4th at p. 971.) 

“‘The standard is not whether the
services provided were the best that might be provided in an ideal world, but
whether the services were reasonable under the circumstances.’”  (Katie
V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598-599.)  “Services will be found reasonable if the
Department has ‘identified the problems leading to the loss of custody, offered
services designed to remedy those problems, maintained reasonable contact with
the parents during the course of the service plan, and made reasonable efforts
to assist the parents in areas where compliance proved difficult .…’”  (Alvin
R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p.
972-973.)  The effort must be made “in
spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success.”  (In re
Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) 
“The adequacy of a reunification plan and of the department’s efforts
are judged according to the circumstances of each case.”  (In re
Ronell A. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1352, 1362 (Ronell A.).)  In assessing
the reasonableness of reunification services, the juvenile court evaluates not
only the agency’s efforts to assist the parent in accessing the services, but
also the parent’s efforts to avail himself or herself of the services.  (Ronell
A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p.
1365.) 

Additional Background

            At the
outset we seek to clarify what is not
at issue.  Father does not challenge the
content of the case plan and he implicitly concedes he did not comply with the case
plan.  Indeed, he states, “compliance
became impossible ....”  Father’s
argument is that the Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) did
not provide reasonable services because the agency failed to make reasonable
efforts to maintain contact with father and, as a result, failed to assist him
in complying with the services plan.  The
agency, he asserts, “refused to [make efforts to contact father] in a manner
calculated to actually reach him even though they had information that their
efforts were not successful through no fault of the father.” 

To address father’s contentions, we
must first summarize the evidence regarding attempts of the agency and father
to make contact with each other.  We find
it useful to separate the contacts and attempted contacts into three
periods:  (1) July 17, 2012,href="#_ftn4" name="_ftnref4" title="">^[3] to September 20, during which time there were
both attempted and successful contacts; (2) post-September 20 to February
26, during which time there were numerous attempts by the agency but no contacts;
and (3) February 27, when father contacted the agency for the first time since
September, through April. 

July 17 to
September 20

            During the
period of July 17 to September 20, there were repeated attempts by the agency
and father to contact each other.  The
detention report filed July 18 states that on July 17, Social Worker (SW) Petra
Orozco-Sandoval called what the agency believed to be a possible local
telephone number for father and spoke to father’s sister-in-law who explained
that she and her husband had not seen father for over one year and believed he
had been deported to Mexico.href="#_ftn5"
name="_ftnref5" title="">^[4]   On
July 19, Orozco-Sandoval informed SW Cynthia Hujdic by e-mail of the
following:  She had just spoken to father
in Mexico, and he was “aware about what has happened and would like to have the
children taken to Mexico.”  He left a
telephone number in Mexico.  He said he
had last seen his children on May 15. 
Orozco-Sandoval told father “to wait for a call from a social worker for
more information on background checks, etc[.] ....”

            The
jurisdiction/disposition report prepared and filed August 10 details further
contacts and attempted contacts in July and August.  Father left two different telephone numbers
on Orozco-Sandoval’s voice mail.  On July
24, Orozco-Sandoval called both numbers. 
One was busy and when she called the other one there was no answer and
no message-leaving capability.  On July
26, father attempted to reach Orozco-Sandoval, who was out of the office.  On August 3, an international call “was
received.”  It was “believed to be from
[father],” but due to “low volume” the message could not be heard.  “However, a phone number was identified on
the voice over internet protocol ....” 
On August 8, SW Maria Pasillas called father “at a number he had used in
the past,” and left a voice mail message.  


On August 9, Karla Self,
identifying herself as an agency “family finding researcher,” sent an e-mail to
the Mexican consulate in Sacramento (consulate) requesting assistance in
locating father.  The August 10 report
stated there had been no response as of August 10. 

On August 10, according to an
e-mail from Pasillas to Hujdic, Pasillas received an e-mail from father, in
which father “reported to have found (no name) a place to take [domestic
violence] classes,” and that he “has an appointment with a psychologist ....”href="#_ftn6" name="_ftnref6" title="">^[5] He provided an e-mail address:  cepavi@col.gob.   The e-mail contained what is designated by a
handwritten notation as the “newest ph #,” followed by another number which is
identical except for two transposed digits. 


An “Addendum Report” prepared by
Hujdic and filed August 24 (August 24 report) shows an address for father—C.P.
28047, 1546 Colonia las Torres, Colima, Mexicohref="#_ftn7" name="_ftnref7" title="">^[6]—and
what appears to be yet another international telephone number. 

An “ADDENDUM REPORT” prepared by
Hujdic and filed October 17 and her activity log detail the following events in
September: 

On September 10, father telephoned
and left a voice mail message with his “new” telephone number.  It was the same number he left on August
14.  Pasillas called the number twice;
each time “the phone sounded busy.” 

On September 13, Orozco-Sandoval
received a call from father, in which he left the same telephone number he left
on September 10.  An e-mail from
Orozco-Sandoval to Hujdic, a copy of which is contained in the record, states
father told Orozco-Sandoval that “he has started taking one of the classes that
were ordered for him” and “asked if someone can call him as soon as
possible.”  

On September 20, father “returned a
call to Swkr Pasillas.”  During what
appears to be an extended conversation, he told her he “did not receive the
packet [the agency] mailed him ....” 
Pasillas “recited” to father the address the agency had for him, but
father “couldn’t even say that the [address] ... recited to him was not the
right one.”  Father did say “the nearest
city to his town is Colima, Colima Mexico.” 
Father said he was taking “dv classes” from an entity called Cepavi, but
“he could not give [Pasillas]” the location or telephone number of Cepavi.  Pasillas “reminded” father that the agency
needed this information in order to “verify that he is taking his classes, what
the curriculum is, etc.”  Pasillas told father
to “get in touch w/DIF,”href="#_ftn8"
name="_ftnref8" title="">^[7] and that the agency had e-mailed DIF “asking for
their assistance” but had not received a reply. 
Pasillas asked father to “get back” to the agency and advise of his
address, an “alternate” telephone number, and “other info as to where he is
taking classes, what type, a [telephone number and address], etc.” 

Post-September 20
to February 26

            In an
October 1 log entry, SW Hujdic stated the following:  Karla Self had attempted “monthly contacts”
with the consulate, but had received no response.  Hujdic telephoned the consulate and left a
voice mail message. 

            In an
October 1 log entry, SW Hujdic stated she sent an e-mail to the consulate in
which she requested information regarding father, and she was attempting
personal contact with the consulate because Self “has sent requests each of the
last couple of months with no response from consulate .…”  She stated that father lives in “Colima
Colima Mexico” and she asked for “help as we would need [father] to complete a
case plan that has many service components.” 
She asked, “Which DEF [sic]
office would I contact and how would I go about doing so ... [?]” 

            On October
11, Hujdic sent an e-mail to the consulate in which she stated the
following:  The agency was “attempting to
work with a DIF local to the father”; father “lives in Colima, Colima Mexico”;
the agency had made “numerous” unsuccessful attempts “to reach a consulate
member”; and the agency was “still at a loss as to who to contact at which DIF
office.” 

            On October
22, following the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the clerk of the juvenile
court mailed to father a notice advising him, “You must make meaningful efforts
to comply with the Reunification Plan, a copy of which is served herewith,
prior to the next review hearing.”  The
notice was mailed to the same address in Colima, Mexico set forth in the August
24 report prepared by Hujdic. 

            In a status
review report filed February 25 (February 25 report), SW Shahbazian stated the
following regarding the agency’s attempts to contact father from October
through January: 

On October 25 she and Hujdic mailed
“a letter, case plan to [father] in Mexico.”

On November 28, Shahbazian
“e-mailed, faxed and mailed a request to the Mexican Consulate requesting
assistance ... in locating the father and providing appropriate services to him
in Mexico.”

November 29, SW Victor Pena
“attempted contact with [father] by calling him at several phone numbers the
agency had obtained previously.” 

On November 30, Shahbazian “mailed
[father] a letter with his case plan both written in Spanish.”  Also on November 30, a “Family Reunification
Clerk” faxed a letter to the consulate and called the consulate and “left a
message.”  

On December 10, the same clerk sent
a fax to the consulate and called the consulate, “again leaving voice messages
requesting a return call ....”  

On December 13, Shahbazian “mailed
a letter and case plan in Spanish to [father] in Mexico.” 

On December 17, Pena “attempted to
contact [father] in Mexico by calling him at several phone numbers that the
agency had obtained previously.”  

On December 20, Shahbazian
“attempted to contact the Mexican Consulate ... by mail, fax and e-mail.” 

On January 23, Shahbazian “mailed
[father] a letter with his case plan written in Spanish.” 

On January 25, Pena “attempted to
reach [father] by phone by calling him at the numbers that the agency had
obtained previously.” 

On January 29 the family
reunification clerk again “faxed and called the Mexican Consulate regarding
assistance in this matter.” 

On January 31, Shahbazian, after
receiving a voice mail message from the consulate, returning the call and
speaking with someone at the consulate, sent an e-mail that included the
“contact information” the agency had for father, what information the agency
had that “could assist the consulate in locating [father],” and “the case plan
to assist in finding appropriate services for [father] in Mexico.”  

            At the
six-month review hearing, Pena testified that beginning around the end of
November, “approximately every month” he “sent” to father “a translated copy of
the case plan in addition to a letter ....”href="#_ftn9" name="_ftnref9" title="">^[8]  When asked to what address he sent the
letters to father, he responded that his March 27 log note indicated an
address—“C.P. 28047 1546 Colonia Las Torres Colima, Colima, Mexico
523125955841’’—but he was “not sure if that’s the same address that [he] used
for the letter .…”  

            On February
10, father sent an e-mail to the consulate in which he stated, “I received your
message” and that he would be contacting his attorney regarding what he
(father) “need[ed] to do for the reunification with [his] children.”  

On February 11 the consulate
responded to father by e-mail, stating “we will be working together with the
Delegation of SRE in Colima in regards to the reunification of your
children.” 

Attached to an “Addendum Report”
prepared by Shahbazian and filed March 5 (March 5 report) is a fax to
Shahbazian, dated February 22, from the “Consul of Protection and Legal
Affairs” (Consul of Protection) at the consulate, that provides a mailing
address, telephone number and e-mail address for father, and states, “our
coworkers in Colima informed us that through state DIF [father] is starting
some services soon (parenting classes, counseling addressing ... abandonment
and his children’s emotional needs and substance abuse assessment.)”  The address provided is “Republica de
Honduras #1546[,] Col. Las Torres[,] Colima, Colima, Mexico 28047[.]”  The March 5 report also states that SW Pena,
apparently on February 22, “sent an email to [father] and attempted phone
contact.” 

Pena testified that in the February
22 e‑mail, he asked father to provide information including the names of
all adults living with him, the name of his employer, and the telephone numbers
and addresses of “[w]ho [father] was using for drug treatment, parenting classes,
domestic violence programs, and ... drug testing and NA or AA assistance.” 

            On February
25, father sent an e-mail to “Attorney German,” in which father asked for “any
type of information regarding where I need to go for the therapy’s [>sic].” 
Father also stated he was “thinking of visiting your office” on the
upcoming Wednesday, “which is my day off work.”  

            On February
26 and 27, according to the March 5 report, Shahbazian “contacted [the Consul
of Protection] ... requesting follow up information including contact
information for the local DIF,” but as of March 5 she had “not received any
further contact from [the Consul of Protection] regarding ... [father].”  

February 27 through
April

The March 5 report further states
that on February 27, father “responded to Social Worker Pena by e-mail sent
from his iPhone.”  An interpreter
testified that in that e-mail father provided the name and address of his
employer—a car wash—and the names of the persons living with him, and stated he
had not “started ... classes” because he was “waiting for ... State Department
... of Republic of Mexico to refer [him] to the organization that will help
[him].” 

On March 8, the consulate official
sent an e-mail to Shahbazian stating he had “sent a request to our agency in
Colima in order to get the information of the DIF office who’s going to handle
this case ....” 

Pena further testified to the
following:  On March 27 he “emailed
[father] his case plan” and sent father a “letter explaining, again, what the
case plan was and the importance for him to contact [the agency]” and providing
the agency’s “contact information”; he “also emailed [father] on [March] 28th”;
and on March 29, Pena “attempted to contact [father]” by telephone.  On April 4, Pena received a voice mail
message from father, “asking about his case” and providing a telephone number
to return the call.  Pena “called that
number back three times and was unsuccessful in reaching [father].”

Problem in
Communicating with the Consulate

            On February
21, SW Shahbazian e-mailed an official at the consulate and stated she had
e-mailed the consulate two weeks previously and had not heard back; she was
“really bothered ... that [she] didn’t get [the official’s] e-mails or the
e-mail from [the official’s] supervisor”; and wondered if those e-mails “were
possibly filtered as spam[.]”  Other
agency staff log entries and e-mails indicate that thereafter an agency
“Information Systems” worker conducted an investigation, determined consulate
e-mails were not reaching the agency due to a “firewall” setting, and “resolved
[the] issue” on March 6. 

Shahbazian’s
Testimony

Shahbazian, called as a witness by
father, testified to the following:  She
became aware that the address in Mexico the agency had for father was not
correct when, beginning “[p]robably in December or January,” the letters sent
to father at that address were returned as undeliverable.  Nevertheless, letters to father were sent to
him at that address until the agency obtained a new address for him because
until that time, the address to which the letters were sent was the only one
the agency had for father.href="#_ftn10"
name="_ftnref10" title="">^[9] 

Shahbazian had spoken to another
social worker “who [had] had cases that involved DIF before ....”  Shahbazian had been “‘attempting to work with
the local DIF’” but she and the agency had been unable to learn “who the local
DIF is ....”  She was advised by a
co-worker to contact DIF “via the Consulate.” 
When asked, “wouldn’t it have made sense to try to contact DIF
directly,” she responded:  “That’s not what
I was instructed to do as our procedure.” 


Even though she had been sending
letters to father at a Colima address, she did not “try to Google the DIF in
Colima” because, she testified, “I don’t know that he is in Colima for sure,
because we haven’t had contact from him.” 


When asked if she would have called
the “local DIF” if she had a telephone number to call, she responded:  “Once I knew where he was living, then I
would -- and I had a phone number for the local DIF, and I was told that he was
-- I mean, I guess.  I don’t know.  I was waiting for information from the
Consulate at the last point, so ...[.]” 

When asked if prior to the
consulate providing her with contact information for father she had “sent
letters to the Consulate asking for assistance in locating the father,” she
responded:  “I sent letters, I phone
called, I faxed, and I e-mailed the Consulate every month.” 

Father’s Offer of Proof

            Father
made, and all counsel accepted, an offer of proof that if called to testify, he
would testify to the following:  “the
first line of his address is Republica ... De Hondorus [sic]”; he “started contacting External Relations, an Agency in
Mexico, [in] November of 2012”; “he contacted his local DIF on his own”; “he
... contacted the Mexican Consulate on his own”; “He was waiting ... [for] the
Mexican Consulate to respond to him so DIF would accept his case,” and “two
months after that, the Consulate told him to go to DIF”; one month after that
“he was accepted and started classes”; he “is doing,” and he “has done,” four
“combined parenting and domestic violence classes”; and “he did not contact the
Agency ... because he thought the Mexican Agency was supposed to do that.” 

Analysis

As indicated earlier, father
contends the agency did not provide reasonable reunification services because
the agency failed to make reasonable efforts to contact him and, as a result,
failed to assist him in complying with the case plan.  We disagree.

The record contains evidence of the
following:  The agency began attempting
to contact father immediately after Stephanie’s death, and after some
unsuccessful attempts, contact was made on September 20, when father and SW
Pasillas spoke by telephone.  However,
during that conversation, father was unable to provide the agency with his
address, and when Pasillas recited the address the agency had for him, father
could not confirm it was his.  The best
father could do was state that he was living near the city of Colima in Mexico.  Pasillas directed father to “get back” to the
agency and provide his address and an alternate telephone number. 

Father contacted the consulate on
February 10, but he did not contact the agency again until February 27, more
than five months after Pasillas directed him to do so and provide his contact
information.  In that period when the
agency was getting no help from father in establishing contact, the agency made
numerous, regular attempts to find father by attempting to contact the
consulate through various means, mailing father material at the only address
the agency had for him and placing telephone calls to various numbers the
agency had for father.

As indicated above, when evaluating
the reasonableness of reunification services, we consider not only the agency’s
efforts to assist father in obtaining services, but also father’s efforts to
avail himself of services.  (>Ronell A., supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p. 1365.) 
Here, the juvenile court reasonably could have concluded that for a
critical five-month period, father’s efforts were nonexistent.  Father’s offer of proof does not establish
otherwise.  The court was not compelled
to believe that father believed some unspecified “Mexican agency”href="#_ftn11" name="_ftnref11" title="">^[10] was going to provide the Stanislaus County
agency with the information Pasillas asked father to provide.  We note that father’s offer of proof does not
indicate on what basis father formed this belief.  Moreover, the offer of proof suggests that
the first Mexican agency he contacted was External Relations and that he did
not contact that agency until November. 
Thus, his offer of proof contains no support for the claim that he
thought someone else would contact the agency in Stanislaus County on his
behalf during the period from September 20 to the unspecified date in November
when, according to father, he contacted External Relations.

On this record, given the evidence
of the agency’s efforts to contact father and father’s failure for a five-month
period to contact the agency, we conclude that the juvenile court could
reasonably find that it had been proved by clear and convincing evidence that
the agency had “made reasonable efforts” (Alvin
R., supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at pp.
972-973) to contact father and assist him in complying with the case plan.

Father challenges the adequacy of
the agency’s efforts to contact him.  He
asserts that in his September 20 telephone conversation with SW Pasillas, in
asking father to confirm the address the agency had for him, recited both the
address and the telephone number in Mexico that the agency believed was
his.  The agency was remiss, father
suggests, because the inclusion of the telephone number confused him and was
the reason he did not confirm the address was his.

The record does not support the
claim that Pasillas incorrectly recited father’s address to him.  Father asserts that Hujdic’s August 24 report
incorrectly indicates father’s address by including in the notation of the
address a numerical sequence which is actually a telephone number, and he
suggests that this is what Pasillas recited to him.  However, assuming the August 24 report was
the source of Pasillas’s information regarding father’s address, that report,
although it contains both the address and the numerical sequence, does so under
the heading “Address/Phone.”  This does not suggest, much less compel the
conclusion, that Pasillas incorrectly included a telephone number in the
address she asked father to confirm. 
Moreover, and more fundamentally, even an incorrect recitation of an
address could not be expected to prevent father from providing his correct
address, if he knew it, nor prevent him from conveying that information to the
agency at some point in the five months that followed.

Father also finds it “remarkably
telling” that SW Shahbazian testified that even if she had a number for the
local DIF in Colima she does not know if she would have called it.  He argues, “There can be no reason for this
other than the Agency did not wish [father] to reunify.” 

We disagree.  Shahbazian’s testimony on this point does not
compel the conclusion that the agency deliberately, or would have deliberately,
sabotaged its own efforts to find father and assist him in complying with his
case plan.  From the evidence of the
agency’s many attempts to contact father, the court reasonably could have
concluded the agency did not act in bad faith as father claims.

Father also criticizes the agency’s
efforts to make contact with him on three other bases.  First, implying that had the agency been able
to make contact with the local DIF office in the city of Colima, the agency would
have discovered his address, he criticizes the agency’s efforts to locate a DIF
office in Colima, asserting the agency was remiss in failing to contact other
DIF offices with which it had worked in the past and in failing to utilize an
internet search engine.  He challenges
Shahbazian’s explanation that notwithstanding that the agency’s only address
for father was in Colima, she did not “‘Google’” DIF in Colima because she did
not know whether father actually lived there.

Second, father argues that the
agency’s efforts to find him by contacting the consulate were unreasonable
because the agency “did nothing to change its ways” when it received no reply
from the consulate “after months of effort.”  
He attributes the delay in the agency’s failure to obtain information
from the consulate, in large part, to a firewall setting in the agency’s own
communications system which prevented e-mails from the consulate from reaching
the agency.

Finally, referring to the evidence
in an e-mail on August 10 that he provided the agency with an e-mail
address—cepavi@col.gob—and that on September 20 he told Pasillas he was taking
a domestic violence class at “Cepavi,” father notes there is no evidence the
agency ever sent an e-mail to the address given.

These matters do not establish that
the court erred in terminating reunification services.  The court reasonably could have concluded
that although in an ideal world the agency could have made more and/or better
efforts to make contact, its efforts here were reasonable under the circumstances.  The factors cited by father militate in favor
of the opposite conclusion, but, as indicated earlier, “we may look only at
whether there is any evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which supports
the trial court’s determination” and “[w]e must resolve all conflicts in
support of the determination.”  (>Elijah R. v. Superior Court, >supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 969.)  As also indicated earlier, there was ample
evidence that the agency worked long and hard to try to contact father, and
that father, though instructed to get back to the agency with contact
information, did not do so for five months. 
On this record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the court’s
determination.

DISPOSITION

The petition for extraordinary writ
is denied.  This opinion is final
forthwith as to this court.