Filed 3/8/18 Keegan v. Quarle CA1/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE


MEAGHAN KEEGAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
MARCIA QUARLE and DANIEL E. KANER,
Defendants and Respondents.

A150642

(Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG15-796301)

Appellant Meaghan Keegan challenges the dismissal of this case after the trial court purportedly required her, over her objection, to accept a payment to satisfy a judgment in a separate case and to file a satisfaction of judgment in that case. Because Keegan has failed to provide us with an adequate record to consider her claims, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
For years, Keegan and respondent Marcia Quarle have fought, engaged in contentious litigation, and at times acted in bad faith. We describe only the part of the parties’ history that is related to this appeal, but this description is limited because the record with which we have been provided is incomplete and the parties’ briefing is lacking.
What we can discern is that years ago, Quarle tape recorded phone conversations with Keegan without Keegan’s knowledge. Keegan sued Quarle in 2010 over these recordings, alleging several claims including one under the California Invasion of Privacy Act (Pen. Code, §§ 630–638.55). That case was assigned number RG10-537233, and we will refer to it as the “2010 case.” The litigation of the 2010 case involved “lengthy and repetitive motion practice,” but judgment was eventually awarded in Keegan’s favor in the amount of $6,000 and “[this] judgment has . . .long since been final.”
Quarle refused to pay the $6,000 judgment. Keegan had every reason to insist on payment, but she exacerbated the conflict by not undertaking reasonable collection efforts. She did nothing, for example, “to collect the judgment by securing a writ of execution, attaching Quarles’s bank accounts, applying to the court to issue an order of examination, or filing post-judgment collection interrogatories or requests for production.” Instead, she tried to “place a judgment lien on Quarle’s house.” When Keegan discovered she could not file the lien because the property was sold and not titled in Quarle’s name, she filed this case and the parties recommenced their litigation battles. Eventually, Keegan filed a second amended complaint, which became the operative complaint. It alleged a number of causes of action, all based on the idea that Quarle wrongfully transferred her house and “placed the asset beyond [Keegan’s] ability to collect the money awarded in the . . . judgment [in the 2010 case].” This case, therefore, was premised on the dubious idea that Keegan was not only entitled to have the judgment satisfied, but was also entitled to have it satisfied by her preferred method, i.e., collecting it through the enforcement of a lien.
In the midst of the parties’ contentious litigation, Keegan filed motions to compel discovery, to deem certain discovery requests admitted, and for sanctions. Before the scheduled hearing, which was set for January 26, 2017, the trial court published a tentative ruling that proposed a stay of further proceedings until Keegan “exhausted the avenues available to her to enforce the $6,000 judgment [in the 2010 case].” The court explained that it would “not devote further resources to overseeing a meritless action involving voluminous motion practice that Keegan is pursuing instead of good-faith collection efforts, and which she is only able to pursue because Quarle is openly refusing in bad faith to pay a judgment debt that she admittedly has adequate assets to pay.”
Before the hearing, in a series of emails between the parties and the clerk of the court, Keegan contested the tentative ruling and Quarle said she was “willing to settle the matter by paying Ms. Keegan the $6,000.00 judgment today in open court.” In response, the clerk indicated that the “court expects you both to appear today at 2:30 pm for the hearing and request[s] Ms. Quarle to bring the funds she has offered.”
Our record does not include a transcript of what transpired at the hearing. We know, however, that the court approved its tentative rulings in orders that stayed further proceedings in this action, deemed Keegan’s discovery requests to be post-judgment discovery in the 2010 case, ordered Quarle to serve supplemental responses to include “all account numbers for bank, brokerage, and other financial institution accounts, CDs, safe-deposit boxes, and the like that she has withheld from her responses,” and required any further discovery to be filed in the 2010 case. We also know that on January 30, 2017, Keegan filed an acknowledgement in the 2010 case that the judgment was “satisfied in full.” Lastly, we know that a docket entry shows that a case management conference was held on January 31, 2017, and on that date a written order of dismissal was entered.
The parties have continued their contentious and sloppy motion practice on appeal, requiring the court to devote resources to motions that often failed to comply with the California Rules of Court. Each side requested that the other’s appellate brief be stricken.
II. DISCUSSION
Keegan contends that the trial court erred in “ordering” her to accept Quarle’s $6,000 payment and to file the satisfaction of judgment in the 2010 case. According to Keegan, these orders wrongfully deprived her of punitive damages in this case and of costs and attorney fees in the 2010 case. We conclude that she has failed to sustain her burden on appeal of demonstrating reversible error.
“ ‘It is the duty of an appellant to provide an adequate record to the [appellate] court establishing error. Failure to provide an adequate record on an issue requires that the issue be resolved against [the] appellant. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] This principle stems from the well-established rule of appellate review that a judgment or order is presumed correct and the appellant has the burden of demonstrating prejudicial error.” (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348.) Keegan’s briefing purports to challenge trial court rulings ordering Keegan to accept Quarle’s payment and to file the satisfaction of judgment in the 2010 case. But our record contains no such rulings, and Keegan points to nothing in the record to show that any such orders were issued. As we have said, our record shows that the court requested Quarle to bring the $6,000 she had offered as settlement to the January 26 hearing, and it later ordered the proceedings stayed and ordered Keegan’s discovery requests deemed as post-judgment discovery in the 2010 case. Keegan does not challenge these orders. Our record also shows that an acknowledgement of satisfaction was eventually signed and filed in the 2010 case by Keegan’s counsel. None of these materials demonstrate that the trial court ordered Keegan to accept Quarle’s $6,000 or required Keegan to file the satisfaction of judgment. If anything, they suggest otherwise.
Keegan also contends that the trial court “abused its discretion in ordering dismissal of the instant action.” She maintains that after the satisfaction of judgment was filed in the 2010 case, the court “scheduled a Case Management Conference and made an order dismissing the instant and viable lawsuit.” Again, we have an inadequate record upon which to consider the claim. Although the docket shows that a case management conference was held on January 31, 2017, we have no record of what happened at any such conference and no record of any orders that may have been made in connection with it. While we know that the trial court entered an order of dismissal on January 31, nothing in our record shows that Keegan objected to it in the trial court. We decline to speculate on its context and bases. Given the absence of an adequate record, we must presume the judgment is correct. (See, e.g., Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296; Gee v. American Realty & Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)
In any event, Keegan fails to show why reversal is mandated. She claims she has “viable claims” against Quarle, but does not elaborate. It is abundantly clear that the trial court considered Keegan’s claims to be without merit, and Keegan does not convince us otherwise.
III. DISPOSITION
The order of dismissal is affirmed. Respondent’s motion for sanctions, filed on September 20, 2017, is denied. Respondent Quarle shall recover her costs on appeal.



_________________________
Humes, P.J.


We concur:


_________________________
Margulies, J.


_________________________
Banke, J.















Keegan v. Quarle, et al. A150642