Kenya T. v. Superior Court

Filed 4/3/07 Kenya T. v. Superior Court CA2/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING; Petition for extraordinary writ. D. Zeke Zeidler, Judge. Writ denied.

Eliot Lee Grossman and Philip C. Cicconi, Los Angeles Dependency Lawyers, Inc.; and Law Firm of Timothy Martella for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

Raymond G. Fortner, Jr., County Counsel, Larry Cory, Assistant County Counsel, and Judith A. Luby, Senior Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.

* * * * * *

Petitioner, Kenya T., seeks extraordinary writ review of a juvenile court order terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing. (Welf. & Inst. Code,  366.26, subd. (l);^[1]Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452.) We find sufficient evidence supports the juvenile courts decision to deny petitioner reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and therefore deny the petition.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Dependency Petition: Petitioner is the mother of three children, A.B. (born Oct. 2002), Star R. (born Jan. 2004) and P.T. (born Oct. 2006). P. is the only subject of this writ petition.^[2]

On October 18, 2006, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a dependency petition on behalf of P., alleging petitioner had a history of illicit drug abuse which rendered her incapable of providing regular care for P. and that P.s siblings, A. and Star, were receiving permanent placement services due to petitioners drug abuse.^[3] DCFS advised that an order directing that no reunification services be provided could be sought pursuant to section 361.5.

B. Detention Hearing: A detention hearing was held on October 18, 2006. DCFS reported that petitioner was a prior dependent of the juvenile court^[4]and had many contacts with the criminal justice system both as a juvenile and as an adult. Most recently, she had been convicted of misdemeanor vandalism. A 2002 psychiatric evaluation indicated she had been treated for mental problems since the age of 13.

By the time P. was born in October 2006, his siblings, A. and Star, were receiving permanency planning services. LTonya Cole (CSW Cole), the social worker handling A. and Stars case, had been tracking P.s delivery by regularly telephoning the Antelope Valley Hospital. Although aware that DCFS wanted to be notified of the delivery, the hospital social worker did not make the notification and P. was released to petitioner a few days after his birth.

On October 10, 2006, DCFS received a referral alleging petitioners incapacity and general neglect of P. CSW Cole advised ChyChy Ekochah (CSW Ekochah), the social worker assigned to P.s case, that petitioner was known to be physically violent with social workers and that she had a history of untreated mental illness, general neglect, unresolved drug use and non-compliance with DCFS and juvenile court orders. That same day, CSW Ekochah, accompanied by police, investigated petitioners home situation. Petitioner was found sitting in a garage at a home across the street from Wanda A.s residence. Petitioner advised that P. was with her sister in Victorville. When the social worker asked why petitioner would give her four-day-old child to a relative, petitioner said that she had given her child to her sister because she did not want P. taken into protective custody.

An emergency social worker went to the Victorville address provided by petitioner. The social worker found the address to be a four-apartment complex that appeared abandoned, with no residents. When the social worker called the telephone number provided by petitioner, there was no response. In the meantime, another social worker called the number provided by petitioner and spoke with an unidentified woman who stated she sometimes received calls from petitioner, but that the phone number had been her number for over six months and her address was not the Victorville address given to DCFS by petitioner.

On October 11, 2006, CSW Ekochah learned that in June 2005 petitioner had been directed by the juvenile court to participate in a drug program and random drug testing. However, as of October 2006, petitioner had not completed the required drug program and had failed to report for scheduled drug testing. Petitioner had also failed to undergo a court-ordered Evidence Code section 730 psychological evaluation.

On October 12, 2006, petitioners aunt, Wanda A., contacted CSW Cole and was informed that a DCFS team decision making meeting had been scheduled that day concerning P. Later that day, the social worker received a call from petitioner. Petitioner advised that she was in Los Angeles and that P. was with her. When reminded that she had failed to comply with court-ordered drug testing, petitioner claimed she was testing through a drug program.^[5] Petitioner stated that she would not be attending the team decision making meeting.^[6] Later still that same day, petitioner again called CSW Cole reporting that her drug program counselor, Addie Thompson, required the social worker to send a drug test referral before the program would test her. CSW Cole explained that she had already sent a testing referral to the Tarzana Treatment Center (Tarzana).^[7] It was then petitioner stated that she was no longer in the Tarzana program and did not want to go to Tarzana for testing as she was already attending another drug program and was in compliance.

CSW Cole contacted Addie Thompson, who reported that petitioner was not in compliance with her drug program and that if she did not appear for that days session, she would be discharged from the program. Thompson further noted that petitioner had not been testing because she did not have a referral from DCFS and she had been displaying inappropriate behavior while at the program.

On October 13, 2006, P. was finally located in the Victorville home of Lavinia E. (Lavinia), petitioners cousin. Lavinia surrendered P. voluntarily to DCFS, saying that taking care of a baby was more than she was willing to do.

DCFS then concluded that petitioners mental health history, unresolved drug problems and refusal to allow DCFS access to P. placed the child at high risk of danger and harm.

At the October 18, 2006 detention hearing, the juvenile court directed DCFS to provide family reunification services for petitioner and concurrent permanency planning services for P. DCFS was directed to refer petitioner for weekly random drug testing. The court also ordered an Evidence Code section 730 evaluation of petitioner, which was to include psychological testing. Petitioner was granted monitored visitation. DCFS was directed to place P. with caretakers willing to adopt him.

The matter was continued to November 15, 2006, for a pretrial resolution conference, jurisdiction/disposition hearing and receipt of the Evidence Code section 730 evaluation and Indian Child Welfare Act notices.

C. Section 388 Petition. On November 14, 2006, petitioner filed a section 388 petition, asking that P. be returned to her care claiming she had been in compliance with the courts orders. The juvenile court denied the petition on the bases that it failed to state new evidence, show a change of circumstances or promote P.s best interest.

D. First Amended Petition. A pretrial resolution conference was held on November 15, 2006. That same date, DCFS filed a first amended petition, alleging that petitioners history of illicit drug abuse rendered her incapable of providing regular care for P.; that petitioner had failed to reunify with A. and Star; and that petitioner suffered from emotional problems which rendered her incapable of providing for P.s elementary emotional needs and placed P. at risk. It was also alleged that A. and Star had been abused or neglected and there was a substantial risk that P. would be abused or neglected as well. Petitioner was again notified that DCFS could seek an order pursuant to section 361.5 that no reunification services be provided.

E. Contested Adjudication Hearing. A contested adjudication hearing was held on December 12 and 13, 2006. The juvenile court admitted into evidence DCFS reports dated October 18, 2006, November 15, 2006 and December 12, 2006, and the Evidence Code section 730 report. The court also admitted into evidence petitioners Antelope Valley Hospital medical records. The juvenile court took judicial notice of the sustained petition, minute order and disposition case plan in the case involving A. and Star.

1. November 2006 Report. In its report of November 15, 2006, DCFS advised that petitioner had visited with all of the children twice. At the visit on October 26, 2006, petitioner was appropriate, except that, at the end of the visit, she asked if she could have P.s hat. The caregiver did not give petitioner the hat because it was windy and she did not want P. to get sick. On November 2, 2006, petitioner was polite to the social worker, but was very emotional and kept crying. She asked what she had to do to get the children back. The social worker deferred the discussion with petitioner about those issues until the visit ended.

On October 30, 2006, petitioner was interviewed by CSW Cole. Petitioner stated she was drug testing through her drug counseling program. When asked if she had signed a release so that the results of her drug tests could be released to DCFS, petitioner indicated that she had signed the release. CSW Cole advised petitioner and the program, that petitioner was required to test with Tarzana, as they were able to provide the full range of testing services that other programs do not have.

At a November 2006 interview with Denise Castillo, a dependency investigator, petitioner claimed that P.s father would not physically or emotionally harm a child, and that [h]e could buy DCFS and let his son play in it.

Petitioner explained that she had given P. to Lavinia because there had been a police investigation with 15 police cars and that at the time she surrendered P. to Lavinia she also sent baby food, milk, clothes and boxes of diapers and wipes. Additionally, she claimed she signed paper work, witnessed by a notary public.

Petitioner told the investigator she wanted Wanda A. out of the case as she no longer trusted her. She blamed Wanda A. for her loss of A. and Star.^[8] Petitioner denied ever being a drug user and said she had never put her children in danger. Petitioner also denied being emotionally unstable. She claimed she was stressed out because of the dependency case and was feeling sad because she had lost her children. She claimed she did not hit her children or yell at them and she was doing everything these people were telling her to do. She was going to classes, drug testing, seeing the children every Thursday, job hunting, tutoring her niece and nephew and providing home care for an aunt with cancer. Petitioner claimed that if they just left her alone she would have a happy family.

The dependency investigator was able to verify petitioner had been admitted to the High Desert facility on August 30, 2006, but she did not participate in drug testing for two months after her enrollment. Nor did she test at Tarzana during that time. As of November 3, 2006, petitioner had tested twice, once on October 24, 2006, and once on October 31, 2006. The results were negative. Petitioner had attended one drug and alcohol education class, three relapse prevention classes, two codependency classes, no domestic violence classes, three 12-step education classes and six parenting classes.

On November 9, 2006, the dependency investigator advised petitioner that the case involving P. had been [f]ast [t]racked to [p]ermanence because of her failure to comply with court orders involving A. and Star. Petitioner stated she understood and would comply with the orders of the court. On November 13, 2006, DCFS provided petitioner with referrals.

Ultimately, the dependency investigator concluded that petitioner had failed to demonstrate that she could be a responsible parent capable of providing a safe, nurturing environment for her children because she had twice given her children to be cared for by family members and was in denial about her mental health issues. The investigator noted that there were sustained allegations of petitioners drug use in connection with the case involving A. and Star, and that petitioner had not properly arranged for P.s care while he was with Lavinia. Although petitioner claimed she had signed a notarized consent form authorizing Lavinia to care for P., she failed to provide it to DCFS. DCFS recommended that no family reunification services be offered to petitioner and that P. receive permanent placement services.

2. Psychological Evaluation. On November 15, 2006, Dr. Ronald Fairbanks reported on his examination of petitioner. The purpose of the evaluation was to assess petitioner and answer the juvenile courts questions concerning P.s care.

Prior to the evaluation, Dr. Fairbanks was provided background information concerning petitioner, including information that petitioner had been placed in juvenile hall as a minor, had a psychiatric evaluation in 2002, received medications, and may have had cognitive problems. Dr. Fairbanks concluded that there was a manipulation of information going on based on petitioners contradictory statements concerning whether she gave Lavinia a notarized paper at the time petitioner delivered P. to Lavinia in Victorville.

Dr. Fairbanks found it noteworthy that A. and Star were found to have had very significant behavioral problems, some of which could be related to their treatment and some of which could also be related possibly to their innate condition.

Petitioner advised Dr. Fairbanks that she was currently attending the High Desert facility for parenting, drug relapse and random drug testing. Dr. Fairbanks described these statements as remarkable, because petitioner later denied any substance abuse, apart from trying marijuana at 18 years of age. Dr. Fairbanks noted that petitioner denied virtually everything that was negative in her history, and concluded that this extremely primitive defense system was not particularly effective. Dr. Fairbanks suspected petitioner was not firmly based in reality, as her description of her life history conflicted with information about her family that he trusted as being true.

The test results obtained by Dr. Fairbanks indicated petitioner had very poor parenting skills. She was also assessed as being in denial of her problems, rebellious, narcissistic, blaming, self-centered and angry. She did not take responsibility for her own actions, and had limitations in terms of intellectual ability, which compounded the problem. She was in complete denial of her drug abuse issues and her prognosis if she were given therapy was pretty limited as she was very rigid.

Dr. Fairbanks concluded that petitioner did not have the patience to care for children and would have problems raising a child effectively. According to Dr. Fairbanks, it was not likely she could produce continuity, i.e., evenness in terms of presentation that will allow them to settle down and be productive citizens. Dr. Fairbanks indicated that petitioner was in complete denial about her substance abuse and concluded it was not likely petitioner would be able to expose her problems freely should she be referred to a psychiatrist. As a result, Dr. Fairbanks could not be positive about reunification. He ultimately concluded that the prognosis was not good and that he could not recommend that reunification services be offered.

3. December 2006 Report. In a report dated December 12, 2006, DCFS reported that petitioner had had a visit with P., A. and Star on November 16, 2006. Petitioner brought food for the children and, for the most part, the visit went well. During another visit on November 22, 2006, petitioner became very angry because P. had a rash on his cheek. She remained upset for the first 20 minutes of the visit even though a public health nurse told her the rash was nothing to worry about. For the rest of the visit, despite being redirected, petitioner continued to talk to the children about their placement.

A visit for November 30, 2006, was arranged for petitioner, but she did not appear and did not call to cancel. The children had been brought to the DCFS offices and after 30 minutes of waiting they were returned home. On December 7, 2006, petitioner had a monitored visit that went fairly well.

On November 28, 2006, petitioner called the social worker and told her Tarzana personnel had refused to allow her to drug test. The social worker corrected the problem by sending over a new referral and instructing staff personnel that petitioner had tested at that facility in the past. The social worker was thereafter unable to contact petitioner at the number she provided. The Tarzana staff person waited in vain until the end of the day for petitioner to return and test.

4. Petitioners Medical Records. Petitioners medical records disclosed that petitioner understood DCFS had an interest in P. and knew the hospital would be contacting DCFS regarding the babys birth. When petitioner completed a Self-Medical History form on June 13, 2006, she indicated she had been treated for emotional/psychiatric problems during the past three years. She answered both yes and no to questions having concerning her addiction to alcohol and drugs. She answered yes to the question, Has anyone objected to your drinking or drug use? On this same form, she said she did not smoke tobacco but also said she had smoked or used tobacco for five years and smoked three cigarettes a day.

According to the same records, on August 4, 2006, petitioner had been taken to the hospital because she had eaten an entire box of baking soda as she was craving it. She was almost 35 weeks pregnant. At that time, she checked a box on a form saying, I have never smoked.

When petitioner was admitted to the hospital at the time of P.s birth she noted on a form that she smoked cigarettes a few times a day but did not drink alcoholic beverages. A day after P.s birth hospital records show that petitioner appeared to be bonding appropriately with him. A day later, petitioner was allowed to go home with the child. Two days later, petitioner became dizzy and passed out during an anger management class. She was taken to the hospital by paramedics where she tested negative for drugs.

5. Petitioners Testimony. Petitioner testified that she tested drug free at the time of P.s birth. On September 8, 2006,^[9]about a month before P.s delivery, she enrolled in the High Desert facility. Before that, she had been at Tarzana for a month. Petitioner claimed she tested for drugs three times at Tarzana and five or six times while at the High Desert facility, and that all the test results were negative.^[10] According to petitioner, the last time she used illegal drugs was years ago. She stated she did not currently drink alcohol, and did not believe she had a drug problem now or prior to P. being born. Nor did petitioner believe she had a drug or alcohol problem while she had custody of A. and Star.

Petitioner denied that she had left P. with various relatives. She claimed she had made a proper plan for P. by leaving him with Lavinia, her cousin. She had placed him with Lavinia because she was afraid DCFS was going to detain him. Petitioner claimed she provided Lavinia with baby wipes, boxes of diapers, several cans of milk and clothing for P.

In response to a question of whether she had been evaluated by anyone other than Dr. Fairbanks, petitioner related that an unknown person at Tarzana had evaluated her and had declared her to be perfectly fine. Petitioner claimed she had never been hospitalized for any type of emotional or mental disability, had never been put on a 5150 hold, and had never taken any type of medication for emotional or mental disability.

Petitioner testified that she was currently living in Los Angeles with Mary A., her great aunt. However, because her social worker gave her a packet of classes in Lancaster, she go[es] back and forth. If P. was released to her, petitioner would live with him at her aunts home. Petitioner believed she was doing everything she could to get A., Star and P. back, but claimed the social worker did not want her to have them. She knew she had messed up in the past. But nobody was helping her except herself and she had lost her children because her family did not like her and because her aunt, Wanda A., lied.

Petitioner said she would tell the truth to a doctor if she were seeking treatment, and that she had been in the dependency system since she was 14 years of age.

Petitioner stated that she had attended certain classes at the High Desert facility, including codependency classes, 12-step education, domestic violence classes, parenting classes, anger management classes, drug prevention classes and individual counseling.^[11] She claimed she had been involved in these programs for three or four months, but she was unable to tell the court what the first step consisted of, i.e., that a person is powerless over drugs and/or alcohol. Petitioner said she did not understand what the court meant by powerless over drugs or alcohol or that her life had become unmanageable. She added that since she did not do drugs or alcohol, it was irrelevant to her. Yet, she also claimed she had completed her parenting class and had almost completed her 12-step.

Petitioner said she was participating in all of the classes in case the court would want them for her. All of her drug tests had been negative. The classes had been helpful and very interesting. She attended classes four days a week. She had not missed any classes except when she came to court. She wanted reunification services and wanted P. returned to her care.

Before the juvenile court ended the hearing, petitioner accused the DCFS social worker of sleeping in the same home where A. resided.

6. Closing Arguments. Counsel for DCFS pointed out some of the discrepancies in the information petitioner had given the hospital. Counsel also pointed out that petitioner had never completed any drug program and argued it was clear she had a history of mental and emotional problems.

Petitioners counsel asked the juvenile court to dismiss the petition, claiming that petitioner did not have emotional or mental problems that would prevent her from taking care of P. He also claimed petitioner now lived in a stable residence, and emphasized that she was testing clean and was in good standing in her drug program.

P.s attorney joined DCFS in asking that the petition be amended according to proof and sustained. She pointed out petitioner had only been in her drug program for one month. Petitioners sincerity was questioned in that she lived in Los Angeles with an aunt, but was in a program in Lancaster. Counsel further argued that petitioner clearly needed mental and emotional help based on her demeanor during her testimony and her behavior at previous hearings. Moreover, petitioner was argued to be in complete denial about the reasons for her problems. P.s attorney asked that petitioner receive reunification services even though she shared some of the concerns expressed by county counsel, pointing out that P. was in a pre-adoptive home and petitioner would only have six months of services.

7. Juvenile Court Orders. The juvenile court dismissed counts B-2, B-4 and
G-1, and found counts G-2 and J-1 to be true. The court found count B-1, that petitioners drug history had caused her to lose custody of A. and Star, to be true.^[12] The court also found count B-3 to be true with amendments to conform to proof, changing the term disability to read problems.

Regarding disposition, the juvenile court said it would take into consideration the evaluation performed by Dr. Fairbanks, who concluded petitioner had a high level of denial and a very poor prognosis for parenting. The juvenile court noted that Dr. Fairbanks report was quite compelling, in that the doctor usually was so supportive of parents.

The juvenile court declared P. to be a dependent of the court, noting that it previously had terminated reunification services over P.s half-siblings, and that petitioner had not made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that had led to the half-siblings removal. The court opined that reasonable efforts would mean the parent was no longer in denial, and noted that petitioner was in complete denial, not admitting she had a problem even though two of her children were in a permanent plan and another had been removed from her care.

The juvenile court also observed petitioners behavior had been unstable at the hearing that day, although it had been somewhat better than at previous hearings. The history of the case showed there were psychiatric issues that need to be addressed. Whatever the problem was, it was obvious petitioner had emotional problems.

The juvenile court found that there was so little chance petitioner would regain custody, it would not be in P.s best interest to provide petitioner reunification services. The court denied petitioner reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10), and set the matter for a section 366.26 hearing. Petitioner then filed a notice of intent to file writ petition.

II. CONTENTIONS

Petitioner contends that section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) does not apply in this case because no reasonable court could find that there is clear and convincing evidence that she did not exercise reasonable efforts to treat her drug problem. In a related argument, petitioner claims the juvenile court applied the wrong test when it found that petitioner had failed to exercise reasonable efforts to treat her drug problem.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Applicable Standard of Review

An appellate court reviews an order denying reunification services under section 361.5, subdivision (b) for substantial evidence. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1393; Cheryl P. v. Superior Court (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 87, 96.) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we look to the entire record for substantial evidence to support the findings of the juvenile court. [Citations.] Evidence sufficient to support the courts finding must be reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid value; it must actually be substantial proof of the essentials that the law requires in a particular case. [Citation.] (In re N. S. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 167, 172.) We have no power to judge the effect or value of, or to weigh the evidence, to consider the credibility of witnesses; or to resolve conflicts in, or make inferences or deductions from the evidence. (In re Sheila B. (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 187, 199.)

B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Err in Denying Petitioner Reunification Services.

Section 361.5, subdivision (b) provides: Reunification services need not be provided to a parent or guardian described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: [] . . . [] (10) That the court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or half-siblings of the child because the parent or guardian failed to reunify with the sibling or half-sibling after the sibling or half-sibling had been removed from that parent or guardian pursuant to Section 361 and that parent or guardian is the same parent or guardian described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent or guardian has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half-sibling of that child from that parent or guardian.

In enacting section 361.5, subdivision (b), the Legislature has recognized that, notwithstanding the crucial role of reunification services when a minor is removed from the home, it may be useless under certain circumstances to provide services. [Citations.] Section 361.5 reflects the Legislatures desire to provide services to parents only where those services will facilitate the return of children to parental custody. The exceptions in subdivision (b) to the general mandate of providing reunification services demonstrate a legislative determination that in certain situations, attempts to facilitate reunification do not serve and protect the childs interest. [Citation.] [Citation.] (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1137, citing In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470.)

It is undisputed that A. and Star, P.s half-siblings, were removed from petitioner because of an unresolved drug problem and that petitioner failed to reunify with A. and Star. The question presented by this petition is whether petitioner subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the drug problem that led to the removal of P.s half-siblings. Petitioner claims she did, that no reasonable court could find that there is clear and convincing evidence that Kenya did not exercise reasonable efforts to treat her drug problem. We disagree.

According to petitioner, the juvenile court ignored evidence showing that she had ceased taking drugs and had been drug-free for almost a year. While evidence was submitted to show that petitioner enrolled in the High Desert drug rehabilitation program on August 30, 2006, and that P. was born drug free a little over one month later in October 2006, nothing contained in the record shows when petitioner ceased taking drugs. Although petitioner testified at the December 2006 hearing that she tested at Tarzana, the evidence presented to the juvenile court showed that petitioner did not test at Tarzana prior to P.s birth and did not begin drug testing at the High Desert facility until October 24, 2006, more than two weeks after P. was born. While petitioners medical records indicate that P. did not have drugs in his system at the time of birth, this fact, alone, does not support an inference that petitioner was drug free during her entire pregnancy. It merely shows that sometime prior to P.s birth petitioner was not taking drugs. Moreover, on October 11, 2006, a few days after P.s birth, petitioners drug counselor, Addie Thompson, advised DCFS that petitioner was in danger of being evicted from her program due to non-compliance and inappropriate behavior. The extent of petitioners participation in her program prior to the contested adjudication hearing consisted of the last week in October through December 7, 2006, a period of about six weeks.

The juvenile courts finding that petitioner did not make reasonable efforts to treat her drug problem was also based on petitioners failure to acknowledge the existence of a drug problem. The court acknowledged petitioners drug rehabilitation efforts and indicated that petitioners drug problem could be resolving. However, the court was concerned that petitioner would not be able to resolve the problem unless petitioner acknowledged that a problem existed. The juvenile courts concern was well justified. Although petitioner had nine months of services in her prior case due to her drug problem, she nonetheless testified that she absolutely did not have and never had had a drug or alcohol problem. During her evaluation interview with Dr. Fairbanks petitioner admitted only to a small amount of marijuana use and denied any alcohol use. Dr. Fairbanks noted petitioners paradoxical thinking, in that she denied ever having had a substance abuse problem, yet reported she was attending a drug program. Dr. Fairbanks concluded that because petitioner was in complete denial of her drug abuse issues and because she was very rigid, her prognosis if she were given therapy was pretty limited. In the face of petitioners denial it was reasonable for the juvenile court to conclude that additional services would be unavailing. Services should be provided only where they will facilitate the return of children to parental custody. (In re Diamond H., supra, 82 Cal.App.4th at p. 1137.)

The juvenile courts order was further supported by the negative evaluation provided by Dr. Fairbanks. The court found the report compelling because, by reputation, Dr. Fairbanks is an evaluator who is very supportive of parents. Dr. Fairbanks suspected petitioner was not firmly based in reality, as her description of her life conflicted with information about her family that he trusted as being true. Dr. Fairbanks concluded, based on testing, that petitioner had very poor parenting skills. In addition, petitioner was assessed as being in denial of her problems, rebellious, narcissistic, blaming, self-centered and angry. She did not take responsibility for her own actions and would have problems raising a child effectively. Further, she had limitations in terms of intellectual ability, which compounded the problem. Dr. Fairbanks was so negative about petitioners chances of reunification that he refrained from suggesting any services that might be recommended for her.

Petitioner claims that the juvenile court applied the wrong test when it found that she had not exercised reasonable effort to treat her drug problems. According to petitioner it appears the juvenile court was under the misapprehension that a parent must effect a 100% cure of the problem which resulted in previous removal of a sibling in order to demonstrate that he or she exercised reasonable efforts to treat the problem. Nothing contained in the record suggests the juvenile court was under such a misapprehension. Petitioners contention is based on the faulty premise that evidence was presented during the adjudication hearing which demonstrated that petitioner had not used drugs for almost a year prior to the December 2006 hearing. As noted above, the evidence presented to the juvenile court did not support an inference that petitioner had remained drug free for a significant period prior to P.s birth. In addition, although petitioner downplays her continued denial that she has a drug abuse problem, this is itself a significant factor for the juvenile court to consider in making a determination as to whether petitioner had made reasonable efforts to treat her drug problem. In sum, nothing in the record suggests the juvenile court was unaware of the correct standard or applied an improper standard in making its determination that petitioner had failed to make reasonable efforts to treat her drug problem.

We conclude that the trial courts order denying petitioner reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (b)(10) was supported by substantial evidence.

IV. DISPOSITION

The juvenile courts decision to deny petitioner reunification services and set a section 366.26 hearing was correct. Accordingly, the order to show cause is discharged and the petition denied.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

_______________________, J.

CHAVEZ

We concur:

______________________, P. J. _______________________, J.

BOREN DOI TODD

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^[1] All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.

^[2] Oliver B. is P.s alleged father. He is not a party to this petition.

^[3] On March 4, 2005, DCFS detained A. and Star after petitioner left them with a maternal aunt, Wanda A., and failed to return for a month. In addition, Wanda A. said she saw petitioner use marijuana. In the past, petitioner had assaulted the maternal grandmother and maternal aunt with a knife. On June 13, 2005, a section 300 petition was sustained based on petitioners abandonment of the children and her unresolved drug problems. Petitioner was directed to enroll in a drug rehabilitation program, submit to weekly drug tests and enroll in parenting classes. Petitioner visited A. and Star sporadically, had not taken any drug tests and had not completed her parenting classes or drug counseling. On November 15, 2005, petitioners reunification services were terminated.

^[4] Petitioner was removed from her home at age six and spent the rest of her childhood and her adolescence to age 18 in foster care, including two years in juvenile hall. Petitioners father is alleged to have physically abused her and her mother is in a wheelchair as a result of falling from a 12-story building while under the influence of PCP.

^[5] Later it was determined that on August 30, 2006, petitioner had been admitted to High Desert Recovery Services (High Desert), an outpatient chemical dependency treatment program operated by the Los Angeles County Department of Public Health and the Antelope Valley Rehabilitation Centers, which treats adult men and women for alcoholism and drug addiction.

^[6] It was decided at this meeting that P. would be taken into protective custody once he was located.

^[7] Petitioner had been in the Tarzana program for almost a month prior to enrolling in the program at High Desert Recovery Services.

^[8] A. and Star were removed from Wanda A.s care based on a referral alleging caretaker neglect.

^[9] Documentation contained within the record shows petitioner was admitted to the High Desert facility on August 30, 2006.

^[10] Petitioner did not present documentation verifying she drug tested at Tarzana, either before or after P.s birth. Nor did she present evidence to show that she tested at High Desert prior to P.s birth.

^[11] Petitioners attorney submitted a packet of materials showing petitioners progress in her program. A December 7, 2006 letter from substance abuse counselor Addie Thompson stated petitioner had enrolled at the High Desert facility on August 30, 2006. By the time of the December 2006 adjudication hearing she had completed 10 of 10 sessions of a 10-week advanced parenting class and had received a certificate of completion. She had attended two of two individual counseling sessions at her request for assistance in securing full-time employment. She had also attended four drug and alcohol education classes, three relapse prevention classes, two codependency classes, four domestic violence classes and six 12-step education classes. She had had five clean drug tests between October 24, 2006 and December 6, 2006.

^[12] The court stated: Shes lost siblings because of her drug history. Her drug history would clearly place this child at risk, if it had not been adequately resolved. It might be resolving, it is not clear that it is resolved, but it has not been resolved.