Khalil v. San Bernadino County Employees Retirement Assn.

Filed 6/5/07 Khalil v. San Bernadino County Employees Retirement Assn. CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Bob N. Krug, Judge. Affirmed.

Enayat Khalil appeals from the trial court's denial of her petition for a writ of mandate regarding the denial of disability benefits by the San Bernardino County Employees' Retirement Association (SBCERA). As we will explain, we determine that the trial court's decision is supported by substantial evidence, and accordingly, we affirm.

I

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Khalil was employed as a registered nurse by the County of San Bernardino Sheriff's Department (the County) from June 20, 1998, to August 27, 1999. On May 20, 1999, while performing her employment duties, she crashed an electric cart that she was driving and was thrown off of it (the 1999 cart accident). Khalil returned to work for a short time after the 1999 cart accident, but was then identified as temporarily totally disabled due to what a psychiatrist diagnosed as major depressive disorder. The 1999 cart accident followed a work-related injury to Khalil's neck and shoulders that occurred in 1996 during Khalil's previous employment.

In 2003, Khalil applied to SBCERA for service-connected disability retirement benefits, stating that she could not be gainfully employed because of "physical pain and psychological . . . and mental problems" that were allegedly the result of the 1999 cart accident.

SBCERA denied Khalil's application. It found that although Khalil was incapacitated from gainful employment, Khalil's incapacity was not caused by her employment at the County, but instead was caused by psychological and mental problems and possibly by rheumatoid arthritis.

Khalil appealed the decision. A hearing officer held an administrative review hearing and issued a 58-page report containing his findings, conclusions of law and recommendation, which found no service-connected disability. The hearing officer recommended that the appeal be denied.

SBCERA adopted the findings and recommendation of the hearing officer, and denied Khalil's application for service-connected disability retirement.

Khalil filed a petition for writ of mandate in the trial court pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5, seeking to set aside SBCERA's decision. The trial court denied the petition.

Reviewing the evidence in the administrative record, the trial court stated, "[Khalil] has been seen and examined by . . . numerous doctors, some fifteen in number. Ten physicians felt [Khalil's] disability was not service connected; three found the problems were connected with the May 20th, 1999 cart accident; and two were undecided."

The trial court stated that "the evidence supports a finding that [Khalil] is permanently disabled," but it concluded that "[t]he preponderance of the medical evidence indicates that [Khalil's] problems are primarily due to psychological and emotional difficulties which result in her embellishment on the physical [dis]ability she does have." The trial court noted that "[t]here was substantial medical evidence that the 1999 cart accident may have aggravated injuries suffered in 1996," but it also concluded that "there is no substantial evidence that her 1999 cart accident aggravated any injuries from the 1996 accident to cause her present disabilities." (Italics added.) The court concluded that Khalil did not meet her burden to show "that her disabilities are the result of the cart accident in 1999 and not the result of her exaggeration of her physical problems as well as her . . . rheumatoid arthritis and fibromyalgia."

Khalil appeals from the trial court's decision.

II

DISCUSSION

A. TheApplicable Law

Khalil's claim for disability retirement is governed by the County Employees' Retirement Law of 1937. (Gov. Code,  31450 et seq.) Government Code section 31720 provides: "Any member permanently incapacitated for the performance of duty shall be retired for disability regardless of age if, and only if: [] (a) The member's incapacity is a result of injury or disease arising out of and in the course of the member's employment, and such employment contributes substantially to such incapacity, or [] (b) The member has completed five years of service, and [] (c) The member has not waived retirement in respect to the particular incapacity or aggravation thereof . . . ."

It is undisputed that Khalil did not complete five years of service at the County. Thus, the issue here is whether Khalil is entitled to receive disability retirement under Government Code section 31720, subdivision (a) because (1) she is incapacitated, and (2) her incapacity is the result of injury arising out of and in the course of her employment, which contributed substantially to her incapacity. Put another way, the issue in the case is whether Khalil's incapacity is service connected.

The parties do not dispute that Khalil is incapacitated, but they do dispute whether Khalil's incapacity is service connected. "[T]he substantial contribution test of [Government Code] section 31720 requires substantial evidence of a real and measurable connection between an employee's disability and his employment in order for the employee to qualify for a service-connected disability retirement." (Hoffman v. Board of Retirement (1986) 42 Cal.3d 590, 593, italics added, citing Bowen v. Board of Retirement (1986) 42 Cal.3d 572, 579.) " 'An "infinitesimal" or "inconsequential" connection between employment and disability' " is not sufficient. (Bowen, at p. 578.) In the trial court, the burden was on Khalil, as the petitioner, to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her incapacity was service connected. (Glover v. Board of Retirement (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 1327, 1337 (Glover).)

B. Standard of Review

Our resolution of this matter turns to a large degree on the applicable standard of review.

The record contains medical reports from numerous doctors. These medical reports offer several different opinions about (1) the extent of Khalil's incapacity, (2) the medical reasons for her incapacity, and (3) whether the incapacity was caused, at least in part, by the 1999 cart incident. The trial court's role was to independently assess all the medical evidence and weigh the credibility of the different medical reports to determine whether Khalil's incapacity is service connected. (See Glover, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1337; Pellerin v. Kern County Employees' Retirement Assn. (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 1099, 1105 (Pellerin).) In making its findings, "[t]he trial court may accept the relevant and considered opinion of one medical expert over the other medical opinions even though inconsistent with them." (Glover, at p. 1338.)

We stress that our role, however, is limited to determining whether any substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court's conclusion. (See Pellerin, supra, 145 Cal.App.4th at p. 1105 ["we review a trial court's denial of administrative mandamus for substantial evidence. [O]ur task is limited to a determination of whether substantial evidence in the administrative record supports the trial court's ruling"].) "[T]he fact-finding function is that of the trial court, and we are bound by its determination [citation]; we cannot reweigh the evidence." (Glover, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p. 1338, italics added.) Under the substantial evidence test, we inquire "whether the evidentiary record reveals substantial support, contradicted or uncontradicted, that the trial court's determinations are correct. [U]nder the traditional standards which apply, all conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the respondent, indulging all reasonable inferences to uphold the judgment, and deferring to the trial court on inferences reasonably deduced from the facts. Additionally, if undisputed facts can support more than one interpretation, the reviewing court is bound by the factual interpretation made by the trial court." (Geoghegan v. Retirement Board (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1525, 1529, citations omitted.)^[1]

C. The Trial Court's Decision Is Supported bySubstantial Evidence

We commence our review of the trial court's decision by observing that the trial court's findings can be broken down into two parts. First, the trial court determined that "[Khalil's] problems are primarily due to psychological and emotional difficulties which result in her embellishment on the physical [dis]ability she does have." Second, the trial court determined that those psychological and emotional difficulties were not the result of the 1999 cart accident. As we will explain, applying the applicable standard of review, we conclude that the record contains substantial evidence to support both of these findings.

1. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding thatKhalil's Incapacity Is Based on Psychological and Emotional Problems

Several medical reports provide substantial evidence to support the first component of the trial court's decision  a finding that Khalil suffers from psychological and emotional problems that incapacitate her.^[2]

In November 1996, after Khalil suffered a neck and shoulder injury at her previous employment, she was unable to work and was evaluated by Dr. Bassett.^[3] Dr. Bassett diagnosed adjustment disorder with depressed mood and opined that, at the time, Khalil was temporarily totally disabled. In 1997, Dr. Bassett determined that Khalil was able to return to work without restriction from a psychiatric point of view, but retained a slight degree of psychiatric disability.

In July 1999, Dr. DeSilva diagnosed Khalil with major depressive disorder that prevented her from working.

In September 1999, Dr. Feldman diagnosed Khalil with depressive disorder, and concluded that from a psychiatric point of view, she was temporarily totally disabled.

In August 2001, Dr. Frank diagnosed Khalil with chronic major depressive disorder.

In August 2003, Dr. McDaniel concluded that Khalil was incapacitated from employment due to "a degree of depression caused by the progression of rheumatoid arthritis which she has exaggerated to some extent for reasons that may have more to do with her family situation." He stated, that unless Khalil's psychological problems are dealt with, "she remains too emotionally labile to successfully perform work."

Thus, based on these reports, the record contains substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Khalil is incapacitated primarily because of psychological and emotional problems.^[4]

2. Substantial Evidence Supports a Finding that Khalil's Disabling Psychological Condition Was Not Caused by the 1999 Cart Accident

The second component of the trial court's decision is the finding that Khalil's disabling psychological and emotional problems were not caused by the 1999 cart accident. The record contains substantial evidence to support that finding.

Dr. Feldman opined that Khalil's "[c]urrent psychiatric state [was] secondary to prior injury and abrupt discontinuation of medications, and not from employment or injury at [the County]." Specifically, Dr. Feldman noted that Khalil's psychiatric medications were discontinued in April 1999 because she had not kept her appointments with her psychiatrist, and that she became nervous, irritable, frustrated and depressed as a result. Dr. Feldman concluded that Khalil's "issues relate to abrupt discontinuation of antidepressant medications which should have been tapered, not discontinued, and depression following discontinuation of medication."

Dr. McDaniel concluded that Khalil's psychological problems stemmed from "non-service connected depression that is secondary to the progression of an autoimmune disease described as rheumatoid arthritis," and that "there exists some domestic problem . . . , which is causing her to become dependent upon complaints of pain and inactivity."

Dr. Weissbein, who was the medical advisor to SBCERA, opined in his report, based on his review of the medical records, that Khalil had a non-service-connected impairment that was caused by her psychological condition. Specifically, Dr. Weissbein stated, "Neither the incident in 1996 nor [the 1999 cart accident] appears to me to have resulted [in] injuries that would logically incapacitate [Khalil] for months or years. She appears to have tremendous psychiatric dysfunction and overlay symptoms that render her unwilling, or unable, to function, either at her place of employment or at her home."

We conclude that these reports provide substantial evidence for a finding that Khalil's disabling psychological and emotional problems were not caused by the 1999 cart accident, and thus were not related to Khalil's employment with the County.^[5]

Accordingly, because substantial evidence supports a finding that Khalil's incapacity is not service connected but is instead based on a psychological problem that was not substantially contributed to by the 1999 cart incident, we affirm the trial court's decision.^[6]

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

____________________________

IRION, J.

WE CONCUR:

HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.

McDONALD, J.

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^[1] Khalil argues that the trial court inaccurately characterized the record as containing reports from 10 doctors who felt that Khalil's disability was not service connected, three doctors who found the problems were connected with the May 20, 1999 cart accident, and two doctors who were undecided. Khalil argues that a greater number of doctors found her disability to be service connected. Because we apply a substantial evidence standard of review, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the trial court correctly quantified the medical reports contained in the record. Instead, as we will explain, we will affirm the trial court because its predicate findings as to the cause of Khalil's incapacity are supported by substantial evidence in the record.

^[2] We note that some of the medical reports opine that Khalil's incapacity may result, in part, from fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis. The trial court's decision is not inconsistent with these opinions and acknowledges that Khalil's physical maladies play a role in her incapacity, but concludes that because of her psychological problems, Khalid embellishes her physical problems.

^[3] Several of the medical reports in the record were issued in connection with Khalil's worker's compensation claim resulting from the 1996 injury.

^[4] Khalil argues that the record contains evidence that the 1999 cart accident aggravated the injury she sustained in 1996, and thus the evidence required the trial court to find that the 1999 cart accident was a substantial cause of her incapacity. However, this argument fails because the record contains substantial evidence that the 1996 injuries were not the cause of Khalil's current incapacity. Thus, it is legally irrelevant whether or not the 1999 cart accident aggravated the injuries Khalil sustained in 1996.

^[5] The trial court found that tosomeextent Khalil's physical disabilities (i.e., fibromyalgia and rheumatoid arthritis) contribute to her incapacity, but that those physical conditions are exaggerated because of her psychological problems. The record lacks any evidence tying those physical conditions to the 1999 cart accident, and thus there would be no support for a finding that those physical problems are service connected. For example, Dr. Weissbein stated that "[t]he cause of fibromyalgia is unknown, and it has never been shown to be related to cumulative trauma or to using the musculoskeletal system." Dr. McDaniel, who discussed rheumatoid arthritis, noted that it was an autoimmune disease and that Khalil's condition was not service connected.

^[6] Khalil argues that the trial court's decision is not supported by substantial evidence because it was based on the medical report of Dr. Giddings, who evaluated Khalil in 2002. Requesting that we take judicial notice of several documents pertaining to the revocation of Dr. Giddings's medical license, Khalil argues that Dr. Giddings's report lacks credibility. We reject this argument because, as shown by our discussion of the evidence, we do not rely on Dr. Giddings's report to find substantial evidence in support of the trial court's decision. We also deny Khalil's request for judicial notice, as the documents pertaining to Dr. Giddings are not relevant to our decision. (See Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 748, fn. 6 [declining to take judicial notice of materials that are not "necessary, helpful, or relevant"].)