Filed 4/28/21 Khalili v. Hoag CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
| JOHNNY KHALILI,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
BRETT RAYMOND HOAG,
Defendant and Respondent.
| B302744
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 19STRO02981)
|
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Emily T. Spear, Judge. Affirmed.
Dennis P. Block and Associates and Dennis P. Block for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Brett Raymond Hoag, in pro. per. for Defendant and Respondent.
_____________________________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Johnny Khalili appeals from an award of attorney fees in favor of respondent Brett Raymond Hoag. We affirm.
Khalili sought a restraining order against Hoag, his neighbor, under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6. Before the matter was heard, Hoag agreed to move out of the apartment building in which both parties lived in order to settle an unlawful detainer action with his landlord. As a result, Khalili decided not to pursue the restraining order. He did not notify the trial court or Hoag that he was no longer pursuing his case. The petition was dismissed when Khalili failed to appear for the hearing.
Hoag moved for attorney fees in the amount of $11,500 under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6, subdivision (s), which entitles a prevailing party in a civil harassment proceeding to recover his attorney fees and costs. The trial court found the fees claimed to be excessive and instead awarded Hoag $5,000.
Khalili claims the trial court erred. He claims the fee motion was untimely, Hoag was not entitled to fees because he was self-represented, and Hoag was not the prevailing party. His contentions are unavailing.
We review a trial court’s fee award using an abuse of discretion standard. (Hjelm v. Prometheus Real Estate Group, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1177.) We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case.
Khalili first contends Hoag failed to timely file his motion for attorney fees – within 60 days of the trial court’s dismissal of the request for civil harassment restraining order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(b)(1).) Here, Hoag filed the motion approximately four months after the dismissal. At the hearing, the trial court refused to deny the motion for untimeliness, indicating it was exercising its broad discretion to excuse the delay due to Hoag’s attorney’s “family health situation.” Under California Rules of Court, rule 3.1702(d), “the trial judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney’s fees . . . .” Rule 3.1702(d) is remedial and is to be given a liberal, rather than strict interpretation. (Lewow v. Surfside III Condominium Owners Assn., Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 128, 134.) Khalili does not address the trial court’s authority to extend the time for filing, much less argue the court abused its discretion in exercising it. Accordingly, he has failed to demonstrate prejudicial error. (Hotels Nevada, LLC v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 336, 348 (Hotels Nevada).)
Khalili next asserts Hoag was not entitled to recover attorney fees because he was self-represented. He relies on the fact that a substitution of attorney form was not filed until after the scheduled hearing date. (Trope v. Katz (1995) 11 Cal.4th 274, 277.) He is mistaken because the form is not dispositive. The trial court expressly noted in its order that attorney Arron Treadway appeared for Hoag on the date set for the hearing. Further, Hoag submitted a declaration in support of the fee motion stating he retained Treadway to represent him in the civil harassment proceedings the day before the hearing.
Khalili last contends that he, and not Hoag, was the prevailing party. Khalili claims he achieved his litigation objectives because Hoag settled the unlawful detainer action and agreed to move. Again, he is mistaken. Khalili presents no authority for the proposition that a settlement in a different action involving different parties[1] overrides the dismissal in favor of Hoag in this case. (Adler v. Vaicius (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1770, 1777 [restrained party was entitled to attorney fees under Code of Civil Procedure section 527.6 as prevailing party because dismissal was entered in his favor].) He has again failed to meet his burden to establish prejudicial error. (Hotels Nevada, supra, 203 Cal.App.4th at p. 348.)
DISPOSITION
The attorney fees award is affirmed.[2]
BIGELOW, P. J.
We concur:
STRATTON, J. WILEY, J.
[1] In his declaration opposing the fee motion, Khalili’s attorney states, “Through my office, Petitioner herein had also filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer against Respondent[.]” However, the unlawful detainer complaint identifies LF 26 LLC, a California limited liability company, as the plaintiff, not Khalili.
[2] Khalili argues in passing that the amount awarded by the trial court is punitive. However, he fails to substantiate his argument with any reference to legal authority or the record to show how and why a $5,000 fee award is punitive. Instead, he merely repeats his argument that Hoag’s attorney substituted into the case after it was dismissed and any award is thus punitive. His argument fails for the reasons stated above.
