Filed 1/5/18 Levy v. Levy CA4/3



NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE


MORTON LEVY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

SELMA LEVY,

Defendant and Appellant;

SIDELL LEVY,

Intervenor and Respondent.


G054104

(Super. Ct. No. 16FL000157)

O P I N I O N

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County, Sherri L. Honer, Judge. Reversed and remanded.
John L. Dodd & Associates, John L. Dodd and Benjamin Ekenes for Defendant and Appellant.
The Buncher Law Corporation, Lauren Mullee; and Alan S. Yockelson for Intervenor and Respondent.
* * *
INTRODUCTION
Morton Levy failed to pay child support and spousal support as ordered by a court in New Jersey. In 2016, Selma Levy, Morton’s ex-wife, registered the New Jersey support order in the family law court in Orange County, California. Sidell Levy, Morton’s second wife, requested that the registration be vacated or cancelled. The trial court granted Sidell’s request on the grounds the matter belonged in probate court because Morton was deceased.
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, Family Code section 5700.101 et seq. (UIFSA), does not specify in which court a support order may be registered. (All further statutory references are to the Family Code.) The local rules of the Orange County Superior Court, however, require that UIFSA proceedings be filed in family court. Under UIFSA, a support order from another state that is registered in California may be challenged on specific grounds; the death of the party ordered to pay support is not one of those grounds. Whether the registered support order may be enforced if the party is deceased is not a proper matter for the trial court to consider when ruling on a challenge to the registration of the order.
The trial court did not reach the statutory grounds for challenging the registered order. We reverse and remand to the trial court so that the parties may address and the court may consider Sidell’s defenses, including but not limited to the appropriate statute of limitations and the correct amount of the arrears claimed by Selma.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Morton and Selma married in 1950 and had three children. In 1976, a New Jersey court issued a judgment of divorce, in which Morton was ordered to pay Selma $50 per week in spousal support and $50 per week in child support for their one minor child. Morton never made any of the support payments.
Morton moved to California and married Sidell. Morton died on November 4, 2014; no probate proceeding was initiated to administer Morton’s estate, and no notice to creditors was sent. On August 10, 2015, Morton’s children from his marriage to Selma first received notice of his death.
On April 28, 2016, Selma filed a notice of registration of out-of-state support order and a statement for registration of an out-of-state support order in the family law court in Orange County, California. Selma alleged Morton owed almost $600,000 in principal and interest for spousal support and child support. Sidell specially appeared in intervention, requesting that service of the registration of support be vacated or cancelled. Sidell also filed a request for an order quashing or dismissing the action on grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction over Morton, and of forum non conveniens.
Following a hearing, the family law court dismissed the action without prejudice, finding “[t]he family law court lost jurisdiction once the husband died. This matter belongs in probate court.” Selma timely filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. (Kavanaugh v. West Sonoma County Union High School Dist. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 911, 916; Huntington Continental Townhouse Assn., Inc. v. Miner (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 590, 598.)
“The UIFSA provides a comprehensive and efficient scheme for the enforcement of foreign support orders. . . . [¶] Under the UIFSA, a support order issued by a tribunal of another state may be registered in California for enforcement. [Citation.] A registered foreign support order is enforceable in the same manner and is subject to the same procedures as a California order. [Citation.] However, although the California court must recognize and enforce a registered order, it may not modify the order if the issuing tribunal had jurisdiction.” (Scheuerman v. Hauk (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1143-1144.) “A support order . . . issued in another state . . . may be registered in this state for enforcement.” (§ 5700.601.)
The first step in enforcing a support judgment issued by a sister state is to register that judgment in a California court; no specific court (general civil, family, or probate) is specified. However, rule 700(H) of the Local Rules of the Superior Court of California, County of Orange, requires that all proceedings pursuant to UIFSA be filed in family court. The trial court was not authorized to dismiss, vacate, or cancel the registration of the support order because it was filed in the family court.
“On receipt of a request for registration, the registering tribunal shall cause the order to be filed as an order of a tribunal of another state or a foreign support order, together with one copy of the documents and information, regardless of their form.” (§ 5700.602, subd. (b), italics added.) “A support order . . . issued in another state . . . is registered when the order is filed in the registering tribunal of this state.” (§ 5700.603, subd. (a).) Therefore, the support order from New Jersey was registered at the time Selma filed the notice of and statement for registration on April 28, 2016.
The next step in the process gives the nonregistering party the right to challenge the registered support order. “A nonregistering party seeking to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered support order in this state . . . may seek to vacate the registration, to assert any defense to an allegation of noncompliance with the registered order, or to contest the remedies being sought or the amount of any alleged arrearages pursuant to Section 5700.607.” (§ 5700.606, subd. (a).) The following defenses are available to a party to contest the validity or enforcement of a registered support order or to vacate its registration: “(1) the issuing tribunal lacked personal jurisdiction over the contesting party; [¶] (2) the order was obtained by fraud; [¶] (3) the order has been vacated, suspended, or modified by a later order; [¶] (4) the issuing tribunal has stayed the order pending appeal; [¶] (5) there is a defense under the law of this state to the remedy sought; [¶] (6) full or partial payment has been made; [¶] (7) the statute of limitation under Section 5700.604[ ] precludes enforcement of some or all of the alleged arrearages; or [¶] (8) the alleged controlling order is not the controlling order.” (§ 5700.607, subd. (a).) These are the only grounds for vacating the registration of an out-of-state support order. (County of Los Angeles Child Support Services Dept. v. Superior Court (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 230, 237-238.)
In this case, Sidell requested that service of the registration be cancelled or vacated because: (1) she was not the obligor named in the registration; (2) the amount of arrears listed in the registration was incorrect; (3) some or all of the arrears were unenforceable; (4) Morton, the obligor, was deceased and the California courts lacked personal jurisdiction over him; and (5) the equitable doctrines of waiver, estoppel, and res judicata barred registration or enforcement. Sidell also filed a request that the entire action be quashed or dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction, and stayed or dismissed on the ground California was an inconvenient forum.
The trial court dismissed the case, which we view as the equivalent of granting Sidell’s request to cancel or vacate the registration. In its order of dismissal, the trial court found: “Orange County Superior Court Case No. 16FL000157, initiated by Respondent/Defendant Selma Levy in Family Law Court, is hereby dismissed without prejudice, in its entirety. [¶] The Family law court lost jurisdiction once the husband died. This matter belongs in probate court.” The trial court did not base its order of dismissal on any of the grounds for vacating the registration set forth in section 5700.607, subdivision (a). While Selma’s remedies for enforcement of the registered New Jersey support order may be governed by the rules applicable to probate cases, this does not mean that it was improper for Selma to register the New Jersey support order in the family court.
We next turn to the defenses to registration raised by Sidell. The trial court did not address these defenses, and we decline to address them in the first instance. As the party challenging the registration of the New Jersey support order, Sidell will bear the burden of proving these defenses. (Cima-Sorci v. Sorci (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 875, 883 885.) Without limiting the trial court in any way, we note that among the issues to be decided are: (1) whether a statute of limitations is a defense to the New Jersey support order; (2) whether the California or New Jersey statute of limitations applies; (3) whether any statute of limitations applies to the accrual of arrears on either a spousal support or a child support order, or both, originally issued in New Jersey; (4) what is the correct amount of arrears; (5) whether equitable tolling applies to an applicable statute of limitations; (6) whether and how any applicable statute of limitations should be extended; and (7) whether the enforcement of a New Jersey support order registered pursuant to UIFSA is an action brought on a liability of Morton or is an action to enforce a child support or spousal support order. The matter must be remanded to address these and any other defenses raised by Sidell.

DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings. Appellant to recover costs on appeal.



FYBEL, J.

WE CONCUR:



O’LEARY, P. J.



MOORE, J.