Filed 6/20/13 Logan v. Ranken CA1/4
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIRST
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
FOUR
CHRISTOPHER
W. LOGAN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v.
CHRISTOPHER
RANKEN et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
A133836
(San Mateo
County
Super. Ct.
No. CIV 491580)
Respondents
Christopher Logan and Brian Casey purchased a house in Pacifica
next door to a house owned by appellants Christopher Ranken and Sylvia
Chupity. Logan and Casey lived in their
house, but Ranken and Chupity used theirs for short-term vacation rentals. Logan and Casey sued under nuisance and other
tort causes of action alleging that Ranken and Chupity failed to control loud
and disruptive parties and other disturbances.
After a three-day trial, the superior court awarded Logan and Casey
$25,000 in damages, enjoined Ranken and Chupity from using their house for weekend-only
rentals, and required them to include a noise-curfew restriction in their
rental agreements. On appeal, Ranken and
Chupity argue that they are not liable for the actions of their short-term
renters, the judgment was not supported by substantial evidence, Chupity lacked
actual knowledge of the disturbances, the damages were calculated incorrectly,
and the court lacked authority to enter portions of its injunction. We disagree, and affirm.
I.
FACTS
Ranken
and Chupity’s house is located at 364 Olympian Way,
and throughout this decision we will refer to it by its street address. 364 Olympian Way
is a large house that includes five bedrooms, a loft, an office, and three
bathrooms. Chupity lived in the house
from about 1997 until 2003. At first,
only her name was on the title. Ranken
and Chupity, however, considered themselves co-owners, and over the years they
made a series of changes to the title to reflect the co-ownership. At the time of trial, Ranken had a 50.5
percent interest in the property and Chupity had a 49.5 percent interest.
Logan
and Casey purchased their home next to 364 Olympian
Way in 2004.
Almost immediately after moving in, they found out that “very noisyâ€
weekend parties occurred frequently next door.
Many of the parties were hosted by short-term vacation renters, but some
of them were hosted by Ranken himself.
The parties went late into the morning hours, and the partygoers left
debris such as cans, bottles, and cigarette butts in Logan’s and Casey’s
yard. During a party in September 2004,
Casey confronted a reveler urinating onto Logan’s and Casey’s property from a
deck at 364 Olympian Way. On different
occasions, Logan and Casey endured strobe lights, fireworks, screaming, ambulance
calls, and kickball being played at 1:00 a.m.
They described some of the parties as “raves,†like “Animal House,†or
“like a casino.†Logan, who was employed
in Sacramento and stayed there during the work week, sometimes avoided going
home to Pacifica on the weekends to escape the commotion at 364 Olympian Way.
Even
when there were no parties, weekend renters of 364 Olympian Way were often
noisy and disruptive. They were loud
when they arrived on Friday and when they left on Sunday, and they would yell
between the property’s two decks and down to the parking area, which holds up
to eight cars. Car alarms would go off
regularly.
Other
neighbors of 364 Olympian Way also complained about loud parties, renters
coming and going disturbing the peace, parking and traffic problems, and trash
left in yards and on the street. Some of
these neighbors also protested to Ranken and called the police.
In
January 2005, Logan and several other neighbors met with Ranken to discuss
their concerns about the parties. The
meeting had little or no effect, and the parties continued. Logan and Casey continued to complain to
Ranken, partygoers, and the police. The
number of disturbances lessened after this lawsuit was filed in 2010, but noise
problems continued to the time of trial.
II.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In
their complaint, Logan and Casey alleged causes of action against Ranken for
negligence, private nuisance, and intentional tort. They sought damages and an injunction to stop
Ranken from operating a “weekend house rental/hotel-type business.†Chupity was later added as a defendant.
The
case was tried over the course of three days.
At the end of the trial, the trial court found in favor of Logan and
Casey on the first two causes of action.
It entered judgment against Ranken in favor of Logan for $12,000 and in
favor of Casey for $7,500. And it
entered judgment against Chupity in favor of Logan for $3,000 and in favor of
Casey for $2,500. Although the court
denied the broad injunctive relief that Logan and Casey sought, it enjoined
Ranken and Chupity from using 364 Olympian Way for weekend-only rentals and
required them to include a noise-curfew provision in their rental
agreements. On the third cause of
action, the court ruled in favor of Ranken and Chupity finding that Ranken “was
not intentionally attempting to cause harm to his neighbors.â€
No
party requested a statement of decision.
Ranken and Chupity filed a timely notice of appeal.
III.
DISCUSSION
A. The Standard of Review.
The
standards under which we are to review the trial court’s judgment are well
settled and uncontroverted by the parties.
We review disputed factual evidence and
inferences drawn from the evidence under the
and ends with the determination as to whether there is any substantial
evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, which will support the finding of
fact. [Citations.] [¶] When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, a reviewing court is without power to
substitute its deductions for those of the trial court.’ [Citation.]â€
(Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002)
96 Cal.App.4th 904, 912.)
On questions of law, we make
independent determinations. (Ghirardo
v. Antonioli (1994) 8 Cal.4th 791, 799.)
And we will not disturb a permanent injunction absent a showing of a
clear abuse of discretion by the trial court.
(Shapiro v. San Diego City Council (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th
at p. 912.)
In
a case in which no statement of decision was requested in the trial court, we
apply the doctrine of implied findings.
Under this doctrine, we presume that the trial court made all necessary
findings to support its decision. (
(2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970.) This
doctrine “is a natural and logical corollary to three fundamental principles of
appellate review: (1) a judgment is
presumed correct; (2) all intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of
correctness; and (3) the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate
record affirmatively proving error.†(Fladeboe
v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58.)
B. The Negligence and Nuisance Causes of Action.
Logan
and Casey alleged causes of action for both general negligence and private
nuisance, with the negligence cause premised on the nuisance. Accordingly, we discuss the legal elements of
these claims.
Under
Civil Code section 1714, all people, including property owners, are required to
use ordinary care to prevent injury to others.
“[T]he basic policy of this state set forth by the Legislature in
section 1714 of the Civil Code is that everyone is responsible for an injury
caused to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of
his property.†(Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108, 118-119.) Rowland
established that landowners’ liability for
injuries to people on their property, or for damages occurring off the property
due to mismanagement, is governed by negligence principles. (Pineda v. Ennabe (1998) 61
Cal.App.4th 1403, 1407.) The essential elements of a negligence claim against a
property owner are: (1) the defendant
owned the property; (2) the defendant was negligent in using or
maintaining the property; and (3) the defendant’s negligence was a substantial
factor in causing plaintiff’s injury.
(See Civ. Code, § 1714, subd. (a).)
A
property owner’s duty to exercise ordinary care is owed to those whom the owner, as a reasonably prudent
person would under the same or similar circumstances, should have foreseen
would be exposed to a risk of injury.
(Rowland v. Christian, supra, 69 Cal.2d at. p. 119.) “[T]he liability
imposed is for negligence. The question
is whether in the management of his property, the possessor of land has acted
as a reasonable person under all the circumstances. The likelihood of injury to plaintiff, the
probable seriousness of such injury, the burden of reducing or avoiding the
risk, the location of the land, and the possessor’s degree of control over the
risk-creating condition are among the factors to be considered by the trier of
fact in evaluating the reasonableness of a defendant’s conduct.†(Sprecher v. Adamson Companies
(1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, 372.)
The
law of nuisance merges with principles of negligence. A nuisance is anything that interferes with
the comfortable enjoyment of life or property.
(Civ. Code, § 3479.) It
requires a substantial, unreasonable invasion of another’s interest in the use
and enjoyment of land. (
Superior Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 938-939.) “Although the central idea of nuisance is the
unreasonable invasion of this interest and not the particular conduct
subjecting the actor to liability, liability nevertheless depends on some sort
of conduct that either directly and unreasonably interferes with [the
plaintiff’s interest] or creates a condition that does so. [Citations.]
‘The invasion may be intentional and unreasonable. It may be unintentional but caused by
negligent or reckless conduct; or it may result from an abnormally dangerous
activity for which there is strict liability.
On any of these bases the defendant may be liable. On the other hand, the invasion may be intentional
but reasonable; or it may be entirely accidental and not fall within any
categories mentioned above. In these
cases there is no liability.’ †(
(1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 92, 100.) In sum,
“where negligent conduct, i.e., conduct that violates a duty of care toward
another, also interferes with another’s free use and enjoyment of his property,
nuisance liability arises.†(
Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349 [“Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on
the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence
claimâ€].)
“Whether
or not a use in itself lawful constitutes a nuisance depends upon a number of
circumstances: locality and
surroundings, the number of people living there, the prior use, whether it is
continual or occasional, and the nature and extent of the nuisance and of the
injury sustained therefrom. . . . Whether the use is unreasonable or not is an
inference to be drawn from all the facts.â€
(Hellman v. La Cumbre Golf &
Country Club (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1224, 1230.)
C. Ranken’s Lack of Due Care.
Applying
these principles to the facts of this case, we conclude that there was ample
evidence supporting the court’s implied conclusion that Ranken acted
unreasonably in failing to control the noise and disturbances at 364 Olympian
Way. Although Ranken professes to
understand that our factual review is governed by the substantial evidence
standard of review, his argument simply discusses facts that support his
position and ignores those that do not.
(Cf. Meyers v. Trendwest Resorts,
Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 735, 749 [failure to set forth all
material evidence, including evidence supporting verdict, waives substantial
evidence argument].) The overwhelming
evidence presented at trial was that loud and disruptive activities were
regular occurrences at 364 Olympian Way and that Ranken failed to control
them. They occurred at all hours and
continued even after Logan and Casey and their neighbors complained to Ranken
about them.
A
reasonable person in Ranken’s position would have understood that these
activities at 364 Olympian Way were disruptive to the neighbors and would have
done more to prevent or control them.
Among other measures, Ranken could have screened his renters more
carefully, lengthened rental periods, insisted on more restrictive and
effective noise controls in his rental agreements, been more cooperative with
the neighbors, and abstained from exacerbating the problem by hosting his own
unruly parties at 364 Olympian Way. He
argues that Pacifica has no zoning ordinance prohibiting short-term rentals,
but this argument misses the point. 364
Olympian Way is located in a residential neighborhood and, as we discuss in
more detail below, the neighbors are entitled to the quiet and peaceful
enjoyment of their homes regardless of whether Pacifica has a zoning ordinance
banning short-term rentals.
A
good portion of the parties’ briefs is spent discussing exactly when and how
much Ranken knew about the disturbances at 364 Olympian Way. But ample evidence supports the trial court’s
implied finding that Ranken was repeatedly told about the disturbances at 364
Olympian Way but failed to stop them.
Logan testified that he notified Ranken 20 to 30 times of problems about
loud noise and renters from 2004 to 2007.
Logan’s best estimate was that he continued contacting Ranken until
about December 2008, when he “essentially†gave up talking to Ranken. Casey recalled discussing the vacation
rentals with Ranken 10 times, without specifying any particular time
frame. One neighbor remembered
confronting Ranken on two occasions in 2009 after large, noisy parties. The neighbor told Ranken “this is going on
too often.†Another neighbor testified
that he emailed, telephoned, and spoke to Ranken in person several times in the
five years before trial regarding his concerns about using 364 Olympian
Way as a vacation rental. As this
witness put it, if Ranken claimed no knowledge of problems at the property, he
had a “selective memory.†Ranken’s claims
that he cured the problem in 2005 and then received no more complaints are
belied by the record.
Published
decisions in other cases support the trial court’s conclusion that the
disturbances amounted to a nuisance and that a reasonable
person in Ranken’s position would have done more to prevent them. (See People v. Mason (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 348, 353 [amplified music,
foot stomping, and hand clapping]; Wilson v. Interlake Steel Co.
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 229, 232 [noise from steel fabricating plant adjacent to
retiree residences]; Morton v. Superior Court (1954) 124 Cal.App.2d
577, 581-582 [noise from rock quarry near residences]; Wilms v. Hand
(1951) 101 Cal.App.2d 811, 812 [barking dogs in a dog hospital adjacent to a
motel].) The parties and disturbances at
364 Olympian Way are a far cry from the kind of minor daytime noises for
which courts have been reluctant to impose liability. (See Schild
v. Rubin (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 755, 764 [playing basketball in residential
backyard during daytime].)
In
short, both the law and the facts support the trial court’s conclusion that
Ranken acted unreasonably in failing to control the noise and disturbances at
364 Olympian Way.
D. Chupity’s Liability.
Chupity
argues that the judgment against her must be reversed because she did not
manage the property and was unaware of the disturbances caused by the
vacationers. We disagree.
Chupity
held a substantial ownership interest in 364 Olympian Way at all relevant
times. She testified that although she
did not profit from the short-term rentals, she knew about them. She also testified that Ranken never told her
about noise complaints at 364 Olympian Way until Logan and Casey filed this
lawsuit. Citing landlord-tenant cases,
Chupity argues that an owner must have knowledge or notice of a nuisance in
order to be held liable for it. (See,
e.g., Reinhard v. Lawrence Warehouse Co. (1940)
41 Cal.App.2d 741, 745-746 [owner of property who had no knowledge of nuisance
not liable for injuries to workman hired by lessee]; City of Los Angeles v. Star Sand etc. Co. (1932) 124 Cal.App. 196,
197-198 [owner not responsible for nuisance created by lessee without owner’s
knowledge or notice].)
But even if
Chupity lacked actual knowledge of the complaints, she had constructive
knowledge of them based on the trial court’s implied finding that Ranken was
her agent. Chupity testified that
she trusted Ranken to manage the affairs of 364 Olympian Way. She stated that Ranken had her authority to
manage the property as he saw fit and that she thought he “was being the
property manager.†Chupity’s testimony
established a sufficient basis for the court to conclude that Ranken was her
agent for managing the property. (See
562-563 [co-owner who represented plaintiff in leasing property was her agent
for purpose of renting the property].)
Information about a property known by an agent is
imputed to the owner. “As against a
principal, both principal and agent are deemed to have notice of whatever
either has notice of, and ought, in good faith and the exercise of ordinary
care and diligence, to communicate to the other.†(Civ. Code, § 2332.) It was thus reasonable for the trial court to
find that Chupity had failed to exercise ordinary care of 364 Olympian Way
because she had constructive knowledge of the noise and disturbance complaints
and yet did nothing to control them.
Not
only is Ranken’s knowledge imputed to Chupity, but so too is his
negligence. Negligence of an agent is the negligence of the
principal. “[A] principal is
responsible to third persons for the negligence of his agent in the transaction
of business of the agency . . . .†(Civ. Code, § 2338; see also
407, 412 [tenants in common who delegate control and management of property to
separate entity should not be immunized from liability to third parties for
tortious conduct].) Chupity’s argument
that imputation of liability is only permissible in employment contexts
misstates the law.
Thus,
Chupity’s liability is established under at least two different
rationales. First, it is supported by
the implied agency relationship between Chupity and Ranken, which leaves
Chupity with having constructive knowledge of the noise and disturbances at 364
Olympian Way (upon which her negligence is based). Second, it is supported by the imputation to
her of Ranken’s negligence.
D. Landlord Liability for Nuisance Created by
Tenants.
Ranken
and Chupity argue that the judgment against them must be reversed because they
are not liable for nuisances created by their tenants. They rely on Chee v. Amanda Goldt Property Management (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
1360, 1373, which declined to impose liability on a landlord for an attack by a
tenant’s dog when the landlord had no knowledge that the dog was
dangerous. In doing so, they correctly
point out that “[t]he general duty of care owed by a landowner in the
management of his or her property is attenuated when the premises are let
because the landlord is not in possession, and usually lacks the right to control
the tenant and the tenant’s use of the property.†(Id.
at p. 1369.) But their argument is
nonetheless unpersuasive.
To
begin with, and as we have discussed, Ranken had actual knowledge, and Chupity
had constructive knowledge, of the noise and disturbances at 364 Olympian
Way. Equally important, Ranken and
Chupity never established that their short-term renters were tenants with
exclusive possession of the property, as opposed to mere licensees or lodgers
with a nonpossessory right to use the property.
(See Spinks v. Equity Residential
Briarwood Apartments (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1040 [key characteristic
that distinguishes “tenancy from a mere license is the right to exclusive
possession as against the whole world, including the landownerâ€].) In a true landlord-tenant situation, the
landlord’s liability is limited because he or she has relinquished
possession. “For landlords, reasonable
care ordinarily involves making sure the property is safe at the beginning of
the tenancy, and repairing any hazards the landlord learns about later.†(Stone
v. Center Trust Retail Properties, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 608,
612.) In contrast, landowners who
maintain at least concurrent possession of their property must remain vigilant
and take measures to protect third parties from harm. (See Salinas
v. Martin (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 404, 413 [property owner was not an
absentee landlord with limited access to the property].)
Precisely
how much contractual control of the property Ranken retained over the
vacationers is unclear because Ranken failed to produce copies of the
short-term rental agreements, claiming that they were on a laptop computer that
was stolen in March 2010, shortly after Logan and Casey filed their lawsuit. But we can infer that he retained at least
some degree of concurrent possession of 364 Olympian Way because the
rentals were for weekends and other short periods of time. And, as Logan and Casey point out, Ranken
conceded at trial that he “probably†should be paying the local temporary
occupancy tax on his rentals, suggesting his renters were more like hotel
guests, not tenants with a right of exclusive possession.
Finally,
the general rule that landlords are not responsible for the nuisances of
tenants who have exclusive control of the property is inapplicable here for the
simple reason that the alleged nuisance was not about the conduct of any
individual renter. Instead, Logan and
Casey alleged that Ranken and Chupity failed to exercise ordinary care over 364
Olympian Way by engaging in a pattern of repeatedly renting it to short-term,
disruptive vacationers. The only ones
who had the ability and responsibility to control the succession of loud
vacationers at 364 Olympian Way were Ranken and Chupity. Thus, they cannot escape liability merely
because the noise and disruptions were primarily generated by a series of
individual vacationers who rented the property for short periods of time.
E. Damages Awarded to Logan.
Ranken
and Chupity also contend that the trial court awarded excessive damages. They argue the court awarded Logan “damages
as if he had been a full-time resident,â€
and that the damages award “appears†to be based on incidents outside
the applicable statute of limitations.
These contentions are meritless.
Ranken
and Chupity failed to request a statement of decision and, accordingly, there
is no way to know with precision how the trial court determined or calculated
damages. (Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton Real Estate Group, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th
959. They also failed to move for a new
trial on damages, a prerequisite to reviewing a damage award. (Jamison
v. Jamison (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 714, 719.) Further still, Ranken and Chupity never
properly presented a statute of limitations defense to the trial court. Indeed, Ranken did not even assert the
defense in his pleadings. With no
citation to authority, Ranken and Chupity claim that the statute of limitations
is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.
But they are mistaken. The
defense may be waived by failing to plead the defense in the answer or as a
ground for general demurrer. (
581.)
The
compensation a plaintiff should receive in a nuisance case for personal
discomfort and annoyance is a matter for the trial court to determine. (Griffin
v. Northridge (1948) 67 Cal.App.2d 69, 73 [a homeowner is “entitled to just compensation for
annoyance, discomfort and inconvenience caused by a nuisance on the adjoining
propertyâ€].) Logan suffered
anxiety, sleep disturbances, elevated blood pressure, a racing heart, and was
normally at his Pacifica home only during the weekends when the parties and
disturbances were the most bothersome.
Casey experienced some, but not all, of these problems. He suffered sleep disturbances, edginess, and
was unable to find peace in his home. In
absolute terms, the $15,000 awarded to Logan is modest. In relative terms, while the amount is higher
than the $10,000 awarded to Casey, it is rationally supported by the additional
injuries that Logan had suffered as found by the trial court.
In
short, we find no basis to disturb the award of damages.
F. Authority to Enjoin Weekend Rentals.
In
their final argument, Ranken and Chupity contend the trial court lacked the
authority to impose restrictions on their rental activities through an
injunction. Once again, we disagree.
In
entering its injunction, the trial court declined to grant Logan and Casey’s
request to stop Ranken’s “weekend house rental/hotel-type business.†Instead, the court entered a more narrow
injunction preventing Ranken and Chupity from using 364 Olympian Way for
weekend-only rentals and requiring them to include a noise-curfew provision in
their rental agreements.
The
law permits a trial court to enjoin a nuisance:
“An action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously
affected, or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by a nuisance, as defined in
Section 3479 of the Civil Code, and by the judgment in that action the nuisance
may be enjoined or abated as well as damages recovered therefor.†(Code Civ. Proc., § 731; see also Civ. Code,
§ 3501 [the remedies against a private nuisance are a civil action or
abatement].)
Ranken
and Chupity argue that the injunction against weekend-only rentals is unauthorized
because no Pacifica ordinance bans them.
But whether weekend rentals are permissible under local ordinances is
irrelevant. Even if short-term weekend
rentals are otherwise lawful, Ranken and Chupity negligently failed to
sufficiently control the unreasonable noise and disturbances of the partygoers
at 364 Olympian Way. (
(1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 116, 128-129; see also Williams v. Blue Bird Laundry Co. (1927) 85 Cal.App. 388,
392 [operation of business under municipal permission does not justify the
creation or continuance of a private nuisance].)
We
conclude that the trial court acted well within its authority to abate the
nuisance by entering a narrow injunction prohibiting weekend-only rentals and
requiring a noise-curfew provision in future rental agreements.
IV.
DISPOSITION
The
judgment is affirmed.
_________________________
Humes,
J.
We concur:
_________________________
Ruvolo, P. J.
_________________________
Rivera, J.
