Los
Angeles Police
Protective League v. City of
Filed 10/18/13
Los Angeles Police
Protective League v. City of Los
Angeles CA2/3
NOT
TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California
Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or
relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except
as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This
opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN
THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND
APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION
THREE
LOS ANGELES POLICE PROTECTIVE LEAGUE,
Plaintiff
and Appellant,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,
Defendants
and Respondents.
B247156
(Los
Angeles County
Super. Ct.
No. BC481380)
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
County, Michael L. Stern, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Silver, Hadden, Silver, Wexler &
Levine and Richard A. Levine for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Carmen
A. Trutanich, City Attorney and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for
Defendants and Respondents.
_______________________________________
The
Los Angeles Police Protective League (League) appeals an order of dismissal
entered after the trial court granted a motion
for judgment on the pleadings as to the League’s complaint for
City of Los Angeles and Chief of Police Charles Beck’s (collectively,
respondents) practice of establishing minimum penalties to be imposed on
officers found guilty of repeating misconduct. The League contends that its complaint adequately stated causes of
action for injunctive and declaratory relief, and that the dispute is ripe for
adjudication. We agree and
reverse.
AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The
League filed its complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief against
respondents on March 22, 2012. The complaint alleges that the League is “an
employee organization . . . recognized to represent sworn
peace officers . . . within the ranks of police officers,
police detectives, sergeants, and lieutenants employed by the Los Angeles
Police Department/City of Los Angeles
with regard to all matters concerning wages, hours and working
conditions.†“At all times mentioned
herein, the [League’s] represented employees were entitled to fair and
meaningful administrative hearings, including pre-disciplinary [] proceedings
conducted before the Board of Rights of the City of Los Angeles arising from
proposed disciplinary actions as required by the Due Process Clauses of the
Federal and State Constitutions, Los Angeles Charter Section 1070
[Charter], the Board of Rights Manual [Manual] and the Government Code Section
3300 et seq. [Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights (POBRA)] . . . . â€
“At
all times mentioned herein, Charter Section 1070 provided that no permanent
peace officer employed in the Los Angeles Police Department may be subject to
suspension and/or demotion, removed or otherwise separated from employment with
the Police Department except upon a finding of guilty after a full, fair and
impartial hearing before the Board of
Rights . . . . â€
“Pursuant to Charter Section 1070 (h) members of the Board of
Rights are composed of two (2) officers of the rank of Captain or above and an
individual who is not a member of the Department.†“Pursuant to Charter
Section 1070 (n) the Board of Rights is vested, upon consideration of
the evidence presented during hearing, with the authority to render findings of
guilty or not guilty on each charge alleged by the Department against the
accused officer.â€
“In
the event the Board of Rights finds the accused officer guilty, it ‘shall
prescribe its penalty’ for recommendation to the Police Chief and in
‘prescribing the penalty, the Board shall look to the nature and gravity of the
offense of which the member has been found guilty and may at its discretion
review the departmental personnel history and record of the member.’ (Charter Section 1070 (n)(o))â€
The
complaint further alleges that, within the last two years, respondents have
been imposing “involuntary conditional Official Reprimands†(COR’s) to penalize
officers found guilty of misconduct, and that these COR’s “establish[] a
predetermined minimum disciplinary penalty which will be imposed in the event
of a future commission of the same or similar misconduct by the officer.†These COR’s allegedly violate the League’s
“represented employees’ constitutional
rights to procedural due process and contravene[] the protections and
purpose of†section 1070 of the Charter and the Manual. Specifically, the imposition of a COR
“deprives the subject officer a full and meaningful opportunity to
challenge a subsequent alleged complaint and penalty at the Board of Rights
hearing†and “undermines the objective of procedural due
process . . . by predetermining the penalty of a subsequent
offense, rather than considering all the facts and
circumstances . . . before reaching a decision on
a recommended penalty.â€
Accordingly,
the complaint seeks a declaration that respondents are precluded from issuing
COR’s, and to enjoin respondents from this practice. Respondents filed their answer on April 19, 2012, generally denying the
allegations in the complaint and asserting certain affirmative defenses.
On
November 7, 2012, respondents filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings
arguing that: (1) the complaint was
improperly vague pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 430.10,
subdivision (f);
title="">[1]
(2) the dispute was not ripe for adjudication; (3) the Charter provides
due process to officers charged with misconduct; (4) the Police Department
has the right to establish rules “for the consideration of prior discipline;â€
(5) the Manual prohibits review of an officer’s prior penalties until an
officer has been found guilty by the Board; and (6) injunctive relief is not
available to the League because officers have an adequate remedy at law,
namely, administrative appeal hearings before the Board of Rights.
to take judicial notice of section 1070 of the Charter and the Manual.
The
League filed an opposition arguing that:
(1) the complaint was not vague; (2) the alleged dispute was ripe
for review; (3) it is irrelevant that the Board of Right’s procedures comply
with procedural due process because the complaint alleges that COR’s violate
those procedures; and (4) injunctive relief is proper because there is no
adequate administrative remedy available
to the League. No reply was filed.
The
court did not take judicial notice of the Charter or Manual, and granted the
motion as follows: “The motion is
granted on the First Cause of Action for Injunctive Relief. Injunctive relief is an equitable remedy and
not a cause of action in California. [Citation.]
The motion is granted as to the Second Cause of Action for Declaratory
Relief. The pleading as presented is
vague as to which statutes are relied upon.
On what relief may be granted in the present factual context. [Citations.]
Moreover, the controversy is not ripe for adjudication since no
plaintiff was injured here. [Citation.] For that matter, an autonomous administrative
body has the right to make its own rules.
Finally, the Court does not find that the due rights [sic] of any person
have been violated.†The case was dismissed and the League timely
appealed.
The League contends that the complaint adequately
stated causes of action for injunctive and declaratory relief based on the
allegations that respondents’ issuance of COR’s establishing minimum penalties
for repeated misconduct conflicts with the Charter, Manual, POBRA and the due
process clauses of the federal and state
constitutions.
1. Standard
of Review
“The standard of review for a motion
for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of
the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or
conclusions of fact or law contained therein.
We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine
whether it alleges facts sufficient to
under any theory. [Citation.]†(Dunn
v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) When a demurrer is sustained without leave to
amend, we review the decision to deny leave to amend to determine “whether
there is a reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by
amendment: if it can be, the trial court has abused its discretion†in denying
leave to amend. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The burden of proving a reasonable
possibility of curing the defect “is squarely on the plaintiff.†(Ibid.)
2. The
Trial Court’s Order
The trial court
granted the motion for judgment on the pleadings on five separate grounds: (1) injunctive relief is a remedy, not a
cause of action; (2) the complaint was “vague as to which statutes are relied
upon;†(3) the controversy was not ripe because the League had not been
injured; (4) “an autonomous administrative body has the right to make its own
rules;†and (5) the League’s members’ due process rights had not been violated.
The League contends
that each of these bases was inadequate, and respondents concede that (1) a cause of action for
injunctive relief may be properly predicated on a declaratory relief cause
of action; (2) “vagueness†is not a valid ground for granting a motion for
judgment on the pleading; (3) it is irrelevant that “an autonomous
administrative body has the right to make its own rules†because the complaint
does not challenge the Police Department’s authority to establish rules, but
rather respondents’ actions that allegedly violate those rules; and (4) that
the League’s members’ due process rights have not been violated is not
dispositive because the League also alleges that its members’ rights under the
Charter, Manual and POBRA were violated.
However, respondents
contend that the motion was properly granted because the declaratory relief
cause of action does not allege specific facts showing that the controversy is
ripe for review. Respondents also make
the additional arguments that the injunctive relief cause of action does not
allege facts showing that the League is threatened with an “irreparable
injury,†and the League has not shown that it could cure the complaint’s
defects through amendment.
3.
Relief
Code
of Civil Procedure, section 1060 authorizes “[a]ny
person . . . who desires a declaration of his or her
rights or duties with respect to another . . . in cases of actual
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties,
[to] bring an original action . . . for a declaration of
his or her rights and duties . . . . †(Code Civ. Proc., § 1060, italics
added.) “The ‘actual controversy’
referred to in this statute is one which admits of definitive and conclusive
relief by judgment within the field of judicial administration, as
distinguished from an advisory opinion upon a particular or hypothetical state
of facts.†(Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura (1973) 10 Cal.3d
110, 117.)
The
League contends that the complaint adequately alleges an “actual controversyâ€
based on the stated conflict between the issuance of COR’s and the Board of
Rights’ duty to independently determine the punishment to be imposed on an
officer found guilty of misconduct.
However, respondents contend that the complaint does not state an
“actual controversy†because the conflict is not “ripe†without specific
allegations showing that an
officer’s due process rights were violated by the imposition of a minimum
penalty. Respondents further argue that the Board of Rights
would never impose a minimum penalty established by a COR precisely because
doing so would violate the Charter and Manual.
a. Lack
of Specific Facts Showing Individual
Violations
Have Occurred
“ ‘The “actual controversyâ€
language in Code of Civil Procedure section 1060 encompasses a probable future
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties. [Citation.]
[However,] [f]or a probable future controversy to constitute an “actual
controversy,†[] the probable future controversy must be ripe. [Citations.]
A “controversy is ‘ripe’ when it has reached, but has not
passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently congealed to permit an
intelligent and useful decision to be made.â€
[Citation.] . . . [Citation.]’ †(County
of San Diego v. State of California (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 580, 606.)
“A two-pronged test is used to
determine the ripeness of a controversy:
(1) whether the dispute is sufficiently concrete so that
declaratory relief is appropriate; and (2) whether the parties will suffer
hardship if judicial consideration is withheld.
[Citation.] ‘Under the first
prong, the courts will decline to adjudicate a dispute if []the abstract
posture of [the] proceeding makes it difficult to evaluate . . . the
issues [citation], if the court is asked to speculate on the resolution of
hypothetical situations [citation], or if the case presents a “contrived
inquiry [citation].†Under the second
prong, the courts will not intervene merely to settle a difference of opinion;
there must be an imminent and significant hardship inherent in further
delay.’ [Citation.]†(City
of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 64.)
Here,
respondents contend that the controversy is not sufficiently concrete and that
there is no “imminent†hardship because the allegations in the complaint are
too general and fail to allege specific facts showing that any officer has been
subjected to a minimum penalty.
Even if this controversy were not sufficiently concrete without such
allegations, leave to amend should have been granted because the League argues
that it could allege such facts.
Furthermore,
declaratory relief does not require that a plaintiff establish an injury prior
to seeking relief. The primary purpose
of declaratory relief is to settle an actual
controversy before it has ripened into
a violation of an obligation or a breach
of duty. (Rimington v. General Accident Group of Ins. Cos. (1962) 205
Cal.App.2d 394; Roberts v.
Los Angeles County Bar Assn. (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604.)
“ ‘Another purpose is to liquidate doubts with respect to uncertainties or
controversies which might otherwise result in subsequent
litigation . . . . ’
[Citation.]†(
Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1566.) Accordingly, the League was not required to
show that minimum penalties have been imposed on its members.
Furthermore,
although the trial court cannot issue an “advisory opinion upon
a . . . hypothetical set of facts,†such an exercise is not
required here. If the court were to
resolve the League’s claims, the court would have to interpret the
provisions at issue in the Charter, Manual, POBRA, and the federal and state
constitutions to determine whether they conflict with respondents’ imposition
of minimum penalties. The issue could be resolved without resort to
a hypothetical set of facts as it involves a pure legal question of statute and
contract interpretation.
In
addition, the League is not challenging any specific decision or order by the
Board of Rights or Chief of Police such that the complaint need allege the
details of a particular penalty imposed on any individual officer. Instead, the League seeks to address
respondents’ policy of issuing COR’s in violation of the Board of Rights
process. “[D]eclaratory relief has been
held to be the proper remedy when it is alleged an agency has a policy of
ignoring or violating applicable laws.
[Citation.]†(
Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at p. 1566.)
“[J]udicial economy strongly favors the use of declaratory relief to
avoid a multiplicity of actions to challenge the
City’s . . . alleged policies. [Citations.]â€
(Ibid.) The League’s complaint alleges that
respondents’ imposition of COR’s establishing mandatory minimum penalties is a
recurring problem. “As against the
piecemeal review of similar issues by individual challenges,†challenging the
overarching policy through the present action for declaratory relief would be
“singularly economical.†(
Furthermore,
a reasonable inference can be drawn from the complaint that minimum penalties
will be imposed on officers who repeat misconduct based on the authority of
respondents − the Chief of Police and the City − over the Board of
Rights, and the complaint’s allegation that the minimum penalties are
“establish[ed],†not suggested or recommended.
Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint has adequately alleged facts
showing an imminent hardship and the existence of an “actual controversyâ€
between the parties.
b. Lack
of Conflict Between Respondents and the Board of Rights
Respondents
also contend that the complaint does not allege facts showing that their
issuance of COR’s “has any effect upon, or violates the rights and procedures
afforded to the League’s members†because, under the Charter and Manual, the
Board of Rights is not allowed to consider COR’s “in determining a penalty
recommendation upon finding an officer guilty of misconduct.†By this argument, respondents concede that
the Board of Rights may not impose mandatory minimum penalties without
violating the League’s members’ rights.
Respondents
appear to be attempting to moot any “actual controversy†and thereby dispose of
the declaratory relief claim through this concession. There are multiple reasons why they may not
do so. First, respondents may not raise
this argument for the first time on appeal.
(In re Marriage of Arceneaux
(1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1138.)
Second, respondents’ argument defies common sense. According to the complaint’s allegations, the
Chief of Police and the City have been “establish[ing]†minimum penalties which
“predetermine[] minimum disciplinary penalt[ies]†for officers found guilty of
repeating misconduct. Respondents’ claim
that the Board of Rights − which, according to the complaint, consists
primarily of officers subordinate to the Chief of Police and employed by the
City − could and would simply ignore these orders based on the Board of
Rights’ own contrary interpretation of the Charter’s and Manual’s provisions is
unlikely. Respondents’ argument also
suggests the unlikely conclusion that the Chief of Police and the City are
issuing orders for penalties with the understanding that they cannot be
enforced.
Lastly,
it is unclear why respondents filed an answer denying all of the complaint’s
allegations if all parties agree that the imposition of these minimum penalties
is not permitted by the Charter and Manual.
4.
Respondents acknowledge that a request for
predicated on another cause of action.
Here, as explained above, the underlying cause of action for declaratory
relief was adequately alleged. However,
respondents still contend that the complaint did not state a cause of action
for injunctive relief because there was no irreparable injury alleged. “[I]n order to
obtain injunctive relief the plaintiff must ordinarily show that the
defendant’s wrongful acts threaten to cause irreparable injuries, ones
that cannot be adequately compensated in damages. [Citation.]â€
(Intel Corp. v. Hamidi (2003)
30 Cal.4th 1342, 1352.)
Respondents argue that the complaint
did not allege facts showing an irreparable injury because the League did not exhaust its
administrative remedies. Specifically,
respondents argue that the League’s members may opt for a hearing before the
Board of Rights where they will have the opportunity of challenging the
imposition of any unfair penalties. This
argument relies on circular logic. The
complaint alleges that the League’s members are being denied the procedural
safeguards provided for by the Charter and Manual with respect to a Board of
Rights hearing. Therefore, respondents’
argument that the League’s members must rely on the Board of Rights’ process to
address their grievance here ignores the complaint’s allegations.
Respondents also argue that the League’s members have an
adequate legal remedy available to them because any individual officer may
challenge a penalty recommendation by the Board of Rights by filing a petition
for writ of administrative mandate.
However, here, the complaint’s purpose is not to reverse the Board of
Rights’ penalty recommendation as to any particular officer. This action is designed to address the
broader problem of respondents’ policy of establishing minimum penalties in
violation of the League’s members’ rights.
A writ for administrative mandate in any one particular case would not
reach respondents’ issuance of COR’s, and therefore, would not provide an
adequate remedy of law to the League’s claims here. (Knoff
v. City and County of San Francisco (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 184, 199 [holding
that the trial court correctly determined that the petitioner taxpayers did not
have a precedent remedy in the form of appealing assessments to the Board of
Equalization where petitioners did not seek judicial relief from any specific
assessment but rather to bring about correction of wholesale deficiencies in
the assessment process].)
The judgment is reversed.
The trial court is ordered to vacate its order granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings and enter a new order denying the motion for judgment
on the pleadings. The League shall
recover its costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE
OFFICIAL REPORTS
CROSKEY,
J.
We Concur:
KLEIN, P. J.
KITCHING, J.
name="_ftn1" title="">[1] Code
of Civil Procedure, section 430.10, subdivision (f) provides that the court may
sustain a demurrer when the pleading is uncertain.
name="_ftn2" title="">[2] Respondents’
motion for judgment on the pleadings purported to “demur†to the complaint
pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure, section 430.10 on the grounds that
(1) the court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the alleged cause s of
action; (2) the League did not have the legal capacity to sue; (3) the
complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; and
(4) the pleading was uncertain. However,
a defendant may only move for judgment on the pleadings on the following
grounds: (i) “[t]he court has no
jurisdiction of the subject of the cause of action alleged in the complaint,â€
and (ii) “[t]he complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action against that defendant.†(Code
of Civ. Proc., § 438, subd. (c)(1)(B).)
As the motion did not argue that the court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, the motion, in essence, only challenged the complaint’s attempt
to state a cause of action.
