Filed 6/9/22 Macanas v. County of Stanislaus CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. John R. Mayne, Judge.

Dan Farrar for Defendant and Appellant.

Villapudua and Somera, Trina C. Cervantes and Gilbert D. Somera for Plaintiff and Respondent.

-ooOoo-

At the start of the court trial, defense counsel admitted that his client, the County of Stanislaus (County), was 100 percent liable for the traffic accident and then, after the close of evidence, argued County was not liable because plaintiff failed to prove she complied with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.).[1]

Stipulations are contracts and are interpreted using the rules for contract interpretation. In view of the surrounding circumstances, we conclude that, under an objectively reasonable interpretation of the parties’ stipulation to County’s liability, plaintiff was not required to prove at trial compliance with the claim presentation requirements.

We therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS

The Accident

On October 28, 2016, plaintiff Sandra Macanas was in her Ford Mustang stopped at an intersection in Modesto. A sheriff’s deputy employed by County rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. At the time, the deputy was on patrol—that is, he was acting within the scope of his employment.

Rejection of Plaintiff’s Claim

Plaintiff presented a personal injury claim to the County’s board of supervisors on March 13, 2017, less than five months after the accident. On September 28, 2017, the board of supervisors rejected the claim on its merits. A notice of rejection dated September 28, 2017, was mailed to plaintiff’s attorney at the law firm’s street address in Stockton. The notice of rejection was on letterhead of the chief executive officer of County’s risk management division and was signed by Kevin Watson, ARM, a liability and insurance manager. The notice of rejection referred to the “Claim of Sandra Macanas dated March 13, 2017” and included the statutorily required warning that the claimant had only six months from the date of the notice to file a court action on the claim. (See §§ 913, subd. (b) [form of warning], 945.6, subd. (a)(1) [six-month limitation period].) By sending the rejection notice, County got the benefit of a shorter statute of limitations. (See § 945.6, subd. (a)(2) [two-year limitation period].)

Attached to the notice of rejection was a declaration of mailing, signed under penalty of perjury by “Karyn Watson [¶] Confidential Assistant III.” The declaration stated Karyn Watson “served a copy of the attached notice by placing said copy in an envelope addressed to [plaintiff’s attorney].”

The Complaint

On November 27, 2017, plaintiff filed a personal injury complaint against County using optional Judicial Council forms PLD-PI-001 (rev. Jan. 1, 2007) and PLD-PI-001(1) (rev. Jan. 1, 2007), which is titled “CAUSE OF ACTION—Motor Vehicle.” Plaintiff checked boxes in item 9 of form PLD-PI-001 indicating that she was required to comply with a claims statute and was excused from complying. In specifying the excuse, plaintiff alleged County “rejected Plaintiff’s claim by operation of law on September 28, 2017. Notice of said rejection was served on September 28, 2017. (See Exhibit ‘A’ attached hereto.)” The complaint was signed by Trina Cervantes, the attorney to whom County’s notice of rejection was mailed.

The Court Trial

In 2021, plaintiff’s personal injury claim was tried to the court on March 23rd, 24th and April 1st. In an opening statement, plaintiff’s attorney stated: “Liability will not be an issue in this case as negligence is established by [the deputy’s] own admission that he caused the collision.” Defense counsel did not give an opening statement. Before plaintiff’s first witness was called, the following exchange occurred between defense counsel and the court.

“MR. FARRAR: Your Honor, the county’s admitted liability in this case.

“THE COURT: Thank you.

“MR. FARRAR: So that’s not at issue.

“THE COURT: Thank you.

“MR. FARRAR: And Karyn Watson from the county is present.

“THE COURT: Thank you. And just for clarity, Mr. Farrar, county admits 100 percent liability on this case?

“MR. FARRAR: Correct.

“THE COURT: Thank you. [¶] All right. We’ll have [plaintiff] sworn.”

On April 1, 2021, the last of the evidence was presented. The trial court acknowledged that both sides had rested and summarized the issues presented for decision. The summary included the court’s statement that “[t]here’s no argument over liability.” After concluding the summary of the issues and its concerns, the court stated it was going to put the matter over for a decision and asked to hear from counsel.

Plaintiff’s attorney stated: “Obviously, I don’t have to discuss the liability issue.” The attorney then addressed the damages caused by the rear-end collision.

Defense counsel began his closing argument by stating: “As a threshold matter, the Plaintiff is required to prove compliance with the claims presentation[] requirements of the Government Code and has failed to do so. That is an essential element of their claim, so that is the end of the case because of their failure to do that.” The court then stated: “All right. I would like that matter briefed.”

Also on April 1, 2021, the parties filed closing briefs. Plaintiff’s brief did not address compliance with the claim presentation requirements, stated liability was not an issue, and discussed the evidence relating to causation and damages. County did not ask for its closing brief to be included in the clerk’s transcript.

On April 6, 2021, plaintiff filed a rebuttal brief to County’s closing argument and brief. Plaintiff argued she proved compliance, referred to the notice of rejection attached to her complaint and appended to her rebuttal brief, and asked the trial court to take judicial notice of the document. As a second ground, she argued the failure-to-comply issue should have been raised by County in a demurrer or summary judgment motion. As a third ground, plaintiff asserted:

“In any event, a duty, a breach, and a condition precedent thereto constitutes liability. The Court is aware that the parties stipulated to liability in this case and the trial would — and did — proceed as to causation and damages only. Pursuant to CACI 106, this Court must consider the facts stipulated to as true. Any statutory bar challenge is not only without merit; but has been waived.”

The rebuttal brief also argued the uncontroverted medical testimony of two experienced neurologists established the causal link between the physical trauma plaintiff suffered during the collision and her subsequent seizures and headaches. The rebuttal brief also argued County presented no evidence of any other causal factor for plaintiff’s seizures and headaches and, therefore, it would be speculation to conclude such a cause existed.

The Proposed Decision

At an April 15, 2021 hearing, the court informed counsel that a written tentative ruling would be issued the next day, stated it would provide a preview, and said it was not looking for input from counsel at that time. The preview included the following statement:

“The preliminary question, is Plaintiff barred for failure to prove compliance with the [Government] Claims Act? The answer to that is no. The – in that situation, I have reviewed the law fairly extensively, and I – I disbelieve that this is a post-trial remedy, which means that I don’t even reach the issue of whether there was any proof, or notice, or anything because time after the trial, it’s not a claim that I believe can be made.”

The next day, the trial court filed a proposed statement of decision that cited California Rules of Court, rule 3.1590 and stated any objections or corrections should be filed within 10 days. The proposed statement of decision stated that “Defendant has stipulated to liability” and reiterated this point by stating that “Defendant has 100% liability for the crash” was an issue agreed upon by the parties. It also stated the first issue presented to the court was: “Is Plaintiff barred from any recovery due to the failure to prove compliance with the California Tort Claims Act?” The following analysis was provided:

“TORT CLAIMS ACT: Defendant raised this issue post-trial, asserting that compliance must be proven or Plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Case law appears to permit filing demurrers or motions for summary judgment for failure to allege compliance, but the Court can find no case in which a post-trial motion of this sort has been granted.

“While this Court does not believe at this stage compliance is relevant, Plaintiff alleged that it was excused from compliance and attached a rejection letter to [her] complaint. (Plaintiff did not affirm she had complied with the Act.)”

County’s written objections to the proposed statement of decision asserted it did “not set forth the Court’s factual finding as to the controverted issue of whether plaintiff prove compliance with the claims presentation requirements.” County also asserted:

“The Court’s legal conclusion is somewhat ambiguous as to whether proof of compliance was not necessary, was excused or something else. The statement references ‘a post-trial motion of this sort,’ but defendant did not make a post-trial motion. Instead, defendant argued a failure of proof.”

County’s written objections did not challenge the trial court’s findings (1) that “Defendant has stipulated to liability” or (2) that the parties agreed “Defendant has 100% liability for the crash.”

The Final Decision

On April 29, 2021, the trial court issued a statement of decision stating it had considered County’s objections and had made some changes. The final decision did not change the findings that “Defendant has stipulated to liability” or that “Defendant has 100% liability for the crash” was an issue agreed upon by the parties. The court’s revised analysis of whether plaintiff needed to prove compliance with the claim presentation requirements stated:

“TORT CLAIMS ACT: Defendant asserts that Plaintiff was required to prove compliance with the Tort Claims Act as part of the trial. The Court found ample case law supporting the necessity of proving up compliance upon a demurrer or motion for summary judgment, but can find no authority — whether case law, statutory law, or CACI instruction — that compliance must be proven to a fact-finder at trial.

“No finding of compliance or lack thereof is made. The Court notes that the complaint contains an allegation that Plaintiff was excused from compliance and attached a rejection letter from Defendant for her claim. This appears to indicate actual compliance, but the issue of compliance with the Tort Claims Act is not properly before the court because it is not an element that must be proved at trial.”

The statement of decision found $216,849 in past economic damages and $150,320 in future economic damages, for a total of $367,169.

Judgment and Appeal

In June 2021, the trial court implemented the findings and determination made in its statement of decision by entering a judgment requiring County to pay plaintiff a total of $367,169 plus interest. County timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

I. GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ACT

A. The Claim Presentation Requirement

In 1963, the Legislature enacted the Government Claims Act to provide a comprehensive statutory scheme governing the liabilities and immunities of public entities and public employees for torts. (Quigley v. Garden Valley Fire Protection Dist. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 798, 803 (Quigley).) Section 815 eliminated all common law tort liability for public entities by providing such entities are not liable for an injury “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.” (See Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 803.) “[S]ection 815.2, subdivision (a) holds public entities vicariously liable for injuries caused by their employees’ negligent operation of a motor vehicle.” (Cavey v. Tualla (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 310, 327.) Accordingly, section 815.2 provides the statutory basis for County’s liability for plaintiff’s injuries.

The liability imposed on local public entities and their employees by the Government Claims Act is subject to the condition that “all claims for money or damages against local public entities” be “presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910).” (§ 905.) Chapter 2 sets forth requirements for the presentation of claims, including the time for presenting the written claim (§ 911.2) and the contents of the claim (§§ 910, 910.2). As to timing, when a personal injury is involved, the written claim for damages must be presented to the public entity “not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action.” (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) One of plaintiff’s arguments about the claim presentation requirement involves an interpretation of section 945.4, which provides in full:

“Except as provided in Sections 946.4 and 946.6, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) and Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3 of this division until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board, in accordance with Chapters 1 and 2 of Part 3 of this division.” (Italics added.)

The text of section 945.4 refers to bringing suit and does not identify how the claim presentation requirement is addressed during the lawsuit. For example, it does not say that the claimant must prove compliance at trial. It does not refer to the lack of compliance as an affirmative defense, which would imply that it must be raised and proven by the public entity. (See Quigley, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 809 [as a general rule, privileges or immunities must be pleaded and proved by the party seeking their protection].)

B. Issue of Statutory Interpretation

Plaintiff contends the plain language of the statute (1) simply requires a claimant to comply with its requirements before proceeding with a lawsuit and (2) “omits any rule whatsoever requiring [claimants] to present evidence of compliance at trial.” Plaintiff argues that courts should not insert a requirement into the statute that the Legislature omitted. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1858 [when construing a statute, a judge’s role is “not to insert what has been omitted”].)

County relies on California Supreme Court precedent stating that compliance with the claim presentation requirement is an element of the cause of action against a public entity and argues that, like other elements of a cause of action, it must be proven by the plaintiff. For instance, in DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, the court stated: “ ‘The filing of a claim is a condition precedent to the maintenance of any cause of action against the public entity and is therefore an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail.’ ” (Id. at p. 990, italics added.)

The trial court, perhaps seeking to provide unequivocal guidance to County on how to proceed in future lawsuits before it, decided the broad issue of statutory interpretation and did not decide the other grounds raised by plaintiff. The court concluded the Government Claims Act requires a plaintiff to plead compliance with the claim presentation requirement but does not require a plaintiff to prove compliance to the trier of fact. The trial court, like the parties and this court, was unable to locate a published decision in which a plaintiff’s noncompliance was first raised by a public entity after the close of evidence.

Here, we do not reach the issue of statutory interpretation resolved by the trial court. Instead, we address a narrower ground raised by plaintiff’s contention that the stipulation to liability resolved (1) whether a duty of care existed, (2) whether that duty was breached, and (3) whether plaintiff complied with the claim presentation requirement. Under plaintiff’s interpretation of the stipulation, causation and damages were the only remaining elements of her cause of action that she had to prove at trial.

Defense counsel acknowledges that before the start of evidence, County admitted liability. Defense counsel interprets the stipulation as “an admission the deputy caused the accident. It is not, and cannot be reasonably construed as, an admission the plaintiff was injured, that plaintiff sustained damages or that plaintiff presented a timely claim. Contrary to plaintiff’s argument …, immunity is not an issue in this case. Failure of proof is.” Based on its interpretation of the stipulation and plaintiff’s failure to present evidence of compliance at trial, County requests this court to vacate the judgment and direct the trial court to enter judgment in its favor.

II. INTERPRETATION OF THE PARTIES STIPULATION

A. Legal Principles Governing Interpretation

“A stipulation is an agreement between counsel respecting business before the court.” (Palmer v. City of Long Beach (1948) 33 Cal.2d 134, 142.) A stipulation is regarded as a contract between the parties and, therefore, must be construed as any other contract. (Cuenca v. Cohen (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 200, 222 (Cuenca); Harris v. Spinali Auto Sales, Inc. (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 215, 219 [rules for interpreting a stipulation “are those applied to the interpretation of contracts”].)

“Unless the interpretation of a contract turns on the credibility of extrinsic evidence, the matter is a question of law.” (Roden v. AmerisourceBergen Corp. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1548, 1561.) Consequently, we conduct a de novo review of the meaning of the parties’ stipulation. (Ibid.)

California’s statutory rules provide that the mutual intention of the parties at the time the contract is formed governs interpretation. (Civ. Code, § 1636; see Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18; Cuenca, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) “A contract may be explained by reference to the circumstances under which it was made, and the matter to which it relates.” (Civ. Code, § 1647.)

The meaning of a contract’s terms “are determined by objective rather than subjective criteria. The question is what the parties’ objective manifestations of agreement or objective expressions of intent would lead a reasonable person to believe.” (Winograd v. American Broadcasting Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.) Stated another way, the existence of mutual intent generally is determined by applying an objective standard to the outward manifestations or expressions of the parties and ascertaining the reasonable meaning of their words and their conduct. (Alexander v. Codemasters Group Limited (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 129, 141; see Civ. Code, § 1581.) As a result, a party’s unexpressed intentions or expectations are irrelevant to determining the meaning of a stipulation. (See Winet v. Price (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1166, fn. 3.) Furthermore, the words of the agreement are given their ordinary and popular meaning, unless the parties have used them in a technical sense. (Civ. Code, § 1644, see Cuenca, supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 222.) The interpretation adopted by a court must not lead to unfair or absurd results but must be reasonable. (See California National Bank v. Woodbridge Plaza LLC (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 137, 143.)

B. Application of Rules of Interpretation

The statement of decision found that County “has stipulated to liability.” This finding was based on defense counsel’s statement in court that “the county’s admitted liability in this case” and his answer of “[c]orrect” to the court question: “And just for clarity, Mr. Farrar, county admits 100 percent liability on this case?” Based on these statements, we must interpret what was meant by the words “admitted liability in this case” and “admits 100 percent liability on this case.”

The elements of a negligence cause of action are (1) a defendant’s legal duty to use due care, (2) a breach of that duty, (3) proximate causation—that is, a connection between the defendant’s breach of duty and resulting injuries, and (4) damages. (Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Superior Court (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1096, 1106.) When the defendant is a public entity, another element of the cause of action is compliance with the claim presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act. (See DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 990 [filing of a claim is “an element that a plaintiff is required to prove in order to prevail” on a cause of action against a public entity].)

Here, the parties agree that their stipulation resolved in plaintiff’s favor the issues of the existence of a duty of care and the breach of that duty when the deputy rear-ended plaintiff’s vehicle. They also agree that, under the stipulation and applicable law, plaintiff had to prove her injuries were caused by the collision and the amount of her damages. The parties disagree on whether the stipulation that County was 100 percent liable covered the element of compliance with the claim presentation requirement.

We assume for purposes of this appeal that the stipulation of liability was ambiguous as to whether the element of compliance needed to be proven at trial. (See Smith v. Adventist Health System/West (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 729, 754–755 [a threshold question of contract interpretation is whether the contract’s terms are ambiguous—that is, reasonably susceptible to more than one interpretation].) Based on this assumption, which is favorable to County, we may consider the surrounding circumstances that existed when the stipulation in evaluating its meaning. (See Civ. Code, § 1647.) In reviewing those contemporaneous circumstances, we conclude the following facts are significant to understanding the meaning of the stipulation.

First, County’s notice of rejection and the related declaration of mailing were attached as an exhibit to the complaint. Second, County did not raise the issue of noncompliance in a demurrer or a motion for summary judgment. Third, the attorney for County did not mention the issue of noncompliance before or at the time of making the stipulation. Fourth, when the stipulation was made, Karyn Watson was present in the courtroom. She was the person who signed the declaration of mailing for the rejection notice under penalty of perjury. Because she was in the courtroom, it would have been simple for plaintiff to call her as a witness and have her authenticate both the declaration of mailing and the rejection notice. Had the notice of rejection been authenticated, its contents were sufficient to show plaintiff had presented a timely claim to County’s board of supervisors.[2]

Furthermore, the legal context for County’s notice of rejection is established in part by the statutory provision that addresses how a public entity may handle a defective claim. Under section 910.8, the public entity “may, at any time within 20 days after the claim is presented, give written notice of its insufficiency, stating with particularity the defects or omissions therein.” If the public entity chooses not to warn the claimant about a defect or omission, the public entity is deemed to have waived or forfeited any defense as to the insufficiency of the claim. (§ 911.) Accordingly, by issuing a rejection notice and gaining the benefit of a shorter statute of limitations (see § 945.6, subds. (a)(1) [six-month limitation period] & (a)(2) [two-year statute of limitations]), County waived any defects in the claim submitted by plaintiff.

Based on the surrounding circumstances, we conclude an objectively reasonable person would interpret the parties’ stipulation that County was 100 percent liable as including the element of compliance with the claim presentation requirements and, as a result, plaintiff was not required to prove that element at trial. In other words, it was unreasonable for County to state it was 100 percent liable for the injuries, if any, plaintiff suffered when her vehicle was rear-ended and then claim it had no liability whatsoever because of an element of the cause of action (which is a condition precedent to liability) was not proven. (See People v. Pijal (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 682, 697 [a defendant is bound by the stipulation or open admission of his counsel and cannot mislead the court by seeming to take a position on an issue and subsequently repudiate the stipulation and dispute that issue].) In short, the issue of compliance goes to liability and the stipulation to liability made it unnecessary for plaintiff to prove compliance.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff shall recover her costs on appeal.

FRANSON, J.

WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

PEÑA, J.

[1] Unlabeled statutory references are to the Government Code.

[2] An alternative method of proving compliance would have been for plaintiff’s trial attorney, Gilbert Somera of the Somera Law Group, to call the attorney who submitted the claim and received the notice of rejection and have her testify to those facts. That attorney was Trina Cervantes of the same law firm. This method of proof also could have been easily accomplished. The ease of proof at trial and the fact County had never asserted a failure to comply supports the inference that the stipulation to liability, which was designed to save the parties’ and court’s time, resolved the issue of compliance.