Marriage of Betts

Filed 9/30/08 Marriage of Betts CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Richard G. Vogl, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, 21.) Reversed and remanded.

Bruce G. Schweitzer for Appellant.

Peter H. Wernicke for Respondent.

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Nicole Betts appeals from the judgment of the superior court that dissolved her marriage to Jordan Betts, made child custody and support orders, and divided their property. She challenges only the portion of the judgment that finds a community debt to her father was satisfied, claiming it is not supported by substantial evidence. As a result, she contends, the equalization payment she was ordered to make to Jordan is too high. We agree; accordingly, we reverse and remand for a limited retrial.

FACTS

In dissolving their marriage, the parties reached an agreement on everything but the valuation of and the community interest in the real property located on Palmwood Avenue in Garden Grove (the Property). The trial court took evidence on those issues.

The Property was originally owned by Nicoles father, August Martin, and his wife, Patsy. In 2003, Jordan, Nicole, and their two children lived with the Martins; in the summer of 2003, Jordan was deployed to Iraq. While he was there, the Martins decided to separate, and August paid Patsy $41,500 to buy out her interest in the Property. In December 2003, Nicole and her father agreed that she and Jordan would be placed on the title to the Property in exchange for their obligation to pay $41,500 worth of home improvements and repairs to the Property and help with the mortgage payments. A grant deed was recorded in December 2004, conveying the Property to August Martin, an unmarried man, and Jordan Betts and Nicole Betts, Husband and Wife, as joint tenants. The court found that the community owned one-half of the Property, and, upon division, Nicole and Jordan each owned one-fourth.^[1]

Jordan testified he and Nicole painted the whole inside of the house, which contained four bedrooms. It was like an hour thing. We did it. Additionally, Jordan testified, I had my uncle, we rewired the garage, had electrical work done, fixed lights, put in a brand new wood floor in the living room, and performed small fixing up jobs new garbage disposal, maintenance, and stuff like that.

Nicole testified the only painting done in the house was done by her mother. The new living room floor cost approximately $800.

The court found that during the period that the parties resided in the realty they satisfied the payment of $41,500 in repairs and improvements. It found the community property equity in the Property was $99,435. It deducted an outstanding community personal loan and the amount owed on a community property car, resulting in the amount of $82,342 as [t]he true community to be divided in [the Property] . . . . After awarding all the community equity in the Property and a community property gun to Nicole, the court ordered her to pay Jordan the sum of $41,551 to create an equal division of the community property.

DISCUSSION

Nicole contends there is no substantial evidence to support the trial courts finding that she and Jordan paid $41,500 in repairs and improvements to the Property. She acknowledges only that they spent $800 on the new floor and contends there is an unpaid community debt to her father in the amount of $40,700.

Before we address Nicoles contention, we deal with two preliminary issues raised by Jordan. First, he claims Nicole has no standing to appeal the trial courts finding that the debt to her father has been satisfied because she is not aggrieved by the ruling. (Code Civ. Proc.,  902.) He argues neither he nor Nicole is liable to her father by virtue of the ruling, thus it is her father who is aggrieved. Jordan is wrong.

Nicoles father was not a party to the action, and the trial court had no jurisdiction to determine his rights. The existence or nonexistence of the community debt to the father, and the amount thereof, affects the amount of each partys equity share in the Property, and thus affects the amount of the equalization payment Nicole must pay to Jordan. She is clearly aggrieved by the finding she challenges. (See County of Alameda v. Carleson (1971) 5 Cal.3d 730, 737.)

Second, Jordan contends Nicoles failure to request a statement of decision is fatal to her argument that the courts finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Jordan correctly points out that in the absence of a statement of decision, we must presume the trial court made all factual findings necessary to support the judgment. (See Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 58-60.) But we cannot affirm the judgment unless there is substantial evidence in the record to support those implied findings. (Ibid.) Nicole contends there is not.

We agree there is no substantial evidence to support the trial courts finding that the community debt to Nicoles father was satisfied in full. While it is commonly stated that our power begins and ends with a determination that there is substantial evidence [citation], this does not mean we must blindly seize any evidence in support of the respondent in order to affirm the judgment. The Court of Appeal was not created . . . merely to echo the determinations of the trial court. A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on review. [Citation.] [I]f the word substantial [is to mean] anything at all, it clearly implies that such evidence must be of ponderable legal significance. Obviously the word cannot be deemed synonymous with any evidence. It must be reasonable . . . , credible, and of solid value . . . . [Citation.] (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633, fns. omitted.)

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, as we must (Whiteley v. Philip Morris, Inc. (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 635, 642, fn. 3), we find support for an $800 floor and the value of the parties labor to install it; the cost of the paint for the inside of a four-bedroom house and the parties labor to apply it (keeping in mind that Jordan testified it took them one hour to do so); and the value of the parts and labor to do some electrical work, fix lights, and perform small fix-up jobs. There were no receipts or estimates of the cost of these activities. This evidence does not support the conclusion that the parties met their obligation to provide $41,500 in repairs and improvements to the Property.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and the case is remanded for a limited retrial on the value of the repairs and improvements made to the Property by the parties. After the value is determined, the trial court is directed to recalculate the amount of the remaining obligation to Nicoles father and the amount of the equalization payment from Nicole to Jordan. Nicole is entitled to recover costs of appeal.

SILLS, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

RYLAARSDAM, J.

IKOLA, J.

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^[1] We use the parties first names for convenience.