Filed 12/21/18 Marriage of Blosse CA1/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

This is the third appeal Chantal Blosse has filed in her divorce proceedings. In two prior (consolidated) appeals, we reversed in part the judgment entered after a bench trial and several post-judgment orders, and remanded the case for further proceedings on limited issues. (In re Marriage of Blosse (Nov. 6, 2018, A14692, A1488256) [unpublished].) Chantal now appeals a post-judgment order directing the San Mateo County Department of Child Support Services (DCSS) to disburse funds back to her former husband, Alain Blosse. She argues the order was wrong, because the trial court miscalculated the amount of child and spousal support arrears her former husband owed her. No respondent’s brief has been filed.

We affirm the court’s order in all respects save one, and remand with directions.

BACKGROUND

We summarized the background of these proceedings in our prior opinion, with which we presume the parties’ familiarity and which we incorporate. (In re Marriage of Blosse (Nov. 6, 2018, A14692, A1488256) [unpublished].)

Beginning in approximately March 2016, approximately eight months after the trial court entered its July 2015 judgment after a bench trial, DCSS opened a case to enforce Alain’s child and spousal support obligations. In late 2016, it intercepted more than $39,000 of Alain’s funds from various sources and held the money in suspense because the parties disputed the amount by which Alain was in arrears.

Thereafter, on February 8, 2017, DCSS filed a motion captioned as one “to determine arrears and release funds.” DCSS asked the court to determine the amount of child and spousal support arrears Alain owed through the end of June 2016, and specify whether the funds it held should be applied to the arrears, or released back to Alain.[1] Attached to the motion was a six-page accounting of its calculations, embracing a roughly five-year period between 2011 and June 2016.

Chantal filed a response to DCSS’ motion six months later, on August 29, 2017, disputing DCSS’ calculations.

DCSS’ motion was eventually heard on November 15, 2017. By that point, DCSS was holding $45,234.06 in suspense. After extensive argument by the parties, the court approved DCSS’ calculations, offset Alain’s accrued support obligations by an even larger debt Chantal owed him for a 401(k) withdrawal, and ordered all of the funds released back to Alain. Its ruling was embodied in a written order on December 20, 2017, and this appeal followed.

DISCUSSION

As in her prior appeals, Chantal’s appellate briefing violates several rules of appellate advocacy which again has hampered our consideration of the issues. Our prior opinion, which is law of the case (see Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians 27 Cal.App.5th 565, 571), summarizes those rules, as well as the corresponding rule of appellate forfeiture that results from their violation, and for brevity we will not repeat that discussion. We will apply those rules here without further elaboration, and now turn to the issues.[2]

Chantal argues, first, that the DCSS calculation that the trial court adopted erroneously omitted several years of interest due on bonuses Alain received in years 2011, 2012 and 2013 (she concedes the calculation included interest beginning in July 2016). Interest should have accrued annually at ten percent on all unpaid support until paid. (See In re Marriage of McClellan (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 247; Fam. Code, § 155; Code Civ. Proc., §§ 685.010; 685.020.) We cannot tell from this record whether the trial court’s arrearage calculations included all accrued interest Chantal was due. The calculations DCSS submitted with its motion included columns tracking “monthly interest” and “interest balance,” which indicates that interest was charged. At the hearing, however, DCSS’s counsel explained that DCSS only began assessing interest as of July 2016, shortly after it opened its case, which resulted in $9,054 in interest accrued on unpaid spousal support and $775.20 for unpaid child support. It then added, confusingly, that its calculation “does not include interest but that is our practice.” DCSS’s calculations were wrong if they omitted interest that had accrued prior to July 2016. But we cannot tell from this record whether they did so, and if so how much accrued interest those calculations omitted. Accordingly, we will remand the court’s order with directions to clarify whether the court’s calculation of support arrearages includes 10 percent annual interest on the principal amount of each delinquent support payment from the time each payment became due until satisfied, and if it does not, to assess such interest.

Next, Chantal argues the DCSS calculation erroneously calculated Alain’s temporary support arrearages, pursuant to a 2011 temporary support order that directed Alain to “pay child and spousal support forthwith upon receiving any bonus or additional income pursuant to the Bonus Tables which are attached hereto.” She argues the DCSS calculations omitted “additional income” Alain earned in various years over and above the earnings taken into account in computing the base amount of his temporary support obligations. The reason, she says, is because the 2011 temporary support order was itself the product of “fraud,” because Alain’s counsel misstated Alain’s monthly income at the hearing that produced that temporary support order. She argues his counsel understated his regular income at that hearing by several thousand dollars compared to the amount reflected in Alain’s contemporaneous income and expense declaration.

We reject this argument. To begin with, it is forfeited because Chantal provides no record citations in support of it and we decline to comb the record in search of error. Even if we considered the argument, it is untenable. Chantal argues the erroneous base support calculation was supposedly corrected by that portion of the temporary support order requiring Alain to pay support upon “receiving any bonus or additional income.” That is the only way, she says, the order could have been “valid.” In other words, she argues the court erroneously set base support too low but intended to offset its error by requiring Alain to make up the difference anyway. We decline to adopt that illogical interpretation. What she really is saying is that the base amount was wrong to begin with. Chantal did not appeal the 2011 temporary support order, however, and it is now too late to challenge it. (See Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law (The Rutter Group 2018) ¶ 16:269 [“a direct appeal lies from temporary support and attorney fee orders, whether granting or denying relief”].) If the trial court failed to properly calculate Alain’s regular monthly income when setting the base amount of temporary support, Chantal should have taken an appeal seven years ago. Alternatively, if her argument is that the temporary support order required Alain to pay a greater amount of support if his regular income increased, she has forfeited that issue. She has not cited anything in the record demonstrating that Alain’s income did increase; she merely asserts, repeatedly, that he earned “additional income.”[3] We decline to search the record for evidence that would support her theory. By failing to cite portions of the record that would allow us to evaluate her contention, she has failed to meet her burden of demonstrating any error. The court’s determination that Alain owed no temporary support arrears on any additional or bonus income will not be disturbed, and is not subject to re-examination by the trial court.

Next, Chantal argues the court abused its discretion in awarding Alain a $19,927.60 reimbursement credit for a 401(k) distribution. The argument is forfeited for lack any summary of what this dispute concerned or the evidence that bore upon it, or any reasoned argument or legal authority. In addition, Chantal concedes the court “would seem to have acted within its discretion” in ruling as it did, yet she contends in the particular factual “context” it was arbitrary. We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court. Chantal has not demonstrated the ruling exceeds all bounds of reason, such that no reasonable judge could have made it, and therefore she fails to demonstrate an abuse of discretion.

Finally, Chantal argues the court erred in denying her various reimbursement credits for medical and educational expenses in calculating the amount of arrearages. She hasn’t met her burden to show any error, in large part because the record on this issue is extensive and confusing, as is her appellate argument, and she has not provided a cogent explanation of what went on. Chantal’s request for reimbursement of medical and educational expenses appears to have been litigated numerous times throughout the case, both before and after the court entered judgment in July 2015, with various rulings made at different times, culminating with the post-judgment order of December 20, 2017, that is now on appeal. Chantal hasn’t explained any of this procedural history, nor the underlying facts pertaining to her reimbursement requests. It appears that most of the expenses for which she tried to seek reimbursement in connection with DCSS’s post-judgment motion concerning the intercepted funds were expenses Chantal had incurred before entry of the July 2015 judgment. We express no opinion as to whether the court erred in its December 20, 2017 post-judgment order by declining to order reimbursement for that category of expenses, because any error was not prejudicial. In our prior appeal, we ruled the court improperly cut short the trial and we remanded the case for a limited retrial concerning, among other issues, all of Chantal’s reimbursement claims (which necessarily encompasses claims for expenses incurred up to and including the entry of judgment in July 2015). So Chantal will have a full opportunity to demonstrate that she is entitled to reimbursement for these expenses on remand from her prior appeals. Indeed, Alain’s counsel conceded below at the hearing on DCSS’ motion that Chantal “[could] raise those issues again” if she prevailed in her prior appeal.

To the extent Chantal is contending the December 20, 2017 post-judgment order erroneously denied her reimbursement for expenses incurred after entry of the July 2015 judgment, she has failed to demonstrate any error. With respect to post-judgment expenses, the record indicates that the court had previously, on September 23, 2016, ordered the parties to equally share in all uninsured medical costs beginning June 1, 2016, as long as the party seeking reimbursement submitted each uninsured medical bill to the other parent within 30 days of receipt; Chantal’s brief does not address whether she complied with that prior order. In the same September 23, 2016 post-judgment order, the court also noted that the July 2015 final judgment directed only that the parties equally share in tuition costs prospectively, beginning with the 2015–2016 school year, and the court thus ruled Chantal was “only entitled to reimbursement for any tuition paid during the 2015–2016 school year and beyond.” The September 23, 2016 order reflects the court considered her papers requesting reimbursement of various tuition expenses at that juncture, ruled she had provided “absolutely no documentation” substantiating her request for $58,564.74 (for a five-year period from 2011 to 2016), and ordered Alain to reimburse her $801.90. Later on, in connection with DCSS’ motion, Chantal sought reimbursement for tuition expenses from precisely the same period (i.e., 2011–2016), and so it would appear she was trying to relitigate issues already decided. She has not demonstrated, factually or legally, that she was entitled to yet another bite at that apple when DCSS’s disbursement motion was later heard.[4]

DISPOSITION

The December 20, 2017 order after hearing is remanded with directions to clarify whether the court’s calculation of support arrearages includes statutorily required interest, and if not, to recalculate those arrearages in accordance with this opinion. In all other respects the order is affirmed. Respondent shall recover appellate costs, if any.

STEWART, J.

We concur.

KLINE, P.J.

MILLER, J.

Blosse v. Blosse (A153707)