Marriage of Brown

Filed 8/8/07 Marriage of Brown CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. J. Michael McCoy, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, 21.) Affirmed.

Inland Counties Legal Services, Harry E. Hicks, Aurelia Wick and Irene C. Morales for Appellant.

Janet M. Oldfield for Respondent.

1. Introduction^[1]

Petitioner and appellant Allan Brown appeals from a family law judgment in favor of respondent Linda Brothers Brown (Brothers), awarding her as her sole and separate property a condominium she purchased while they were briefly married. (Code Civ. Proc., 904.1.)

We conclude substantial evidence supports the courts findings that Brown effected a transmutation of the property ( 852), no undue influence occurred, and the condominium is Brotherss separate property. We affirm the judgment.

2. Facts

Allan Brown and Brothers were married on August 11, 2001, and separated on September 10, 2002, the day Brown filed a petition for dissolution.

In September 2002, Brown also filed an order to show cause for spousal support and seeking an injunctive order in which he asserted that, when he married Brothers, he sold his mobile home and gave up his job as the assistant manager of a mobile home park to facilitate the purchase of a Palm Springs condominium. He attached copies of a grant deed from the condominiums owners to Allan Brown and Brothers and an interspousal transfer grant deed from Allan Brown to Brothers, both recorded February 15, 2002. He also included a declaration from Michael Neill, a loan broker, who stated Brown and Brothers agreed to have Brothers purchase the property separately in order to obtain a lower interest rate.

The parties apparently reconciled for a while until September 29, 2003, when Brown filed a community property declaration listing the condominium and another order to show cause.

Brotherss response asked for confirmation of the condominium as her separate property.

At trial, Brown contended he had contributed $11,000 to buy the condominium and his name was supposed to be on the title. Brothers asserted the $11,000 from Brown was to repay her for money he had borrowed or taken from her and that she was the purchaser of the condominium.

Brown testified variously that he had purchased his mobile home for about $4,000, $5,000, or $9,000, and spent $5,000 on it. After he married Brothers, he sold his furnished mobile home in December 2001 for $23,000. She had sold her mobile home previously for $11,000. He contended Brothers brought very little furniture when she moved in with him. He used $10,000 to pay the deposit on the Palm Springs condominium. He gave Brothers an additional $1,000 for a total contribution of $11,000. He denied that the $10,000 was to repay Brothers for trips they had taken and for furniture she had moved into his condominium.

Brown said that when he and Brothers met with Neill in January 2002, Neill explained Brothers could qualify for a better loan buying the property separately but, subsequently, Browns name could be added to the title. After the purchase was completed, Brothers refused to sign a quitclaim deed to Brown. Her refusal caused ongoing conflict between them. Brown denied that he expressed an unwillingness to be responsible for the mortgage and related expenses. He denied understanding the effect of the interspousal transfer grant deed. He admitted Brothers made the mortgage payments on the condominium.

At trial, Neill confirmed the accuracy of his declaration. He recalled that Brothers had better credit than Brown but Brown wrote the check for the downpayment. He discussed with them the option of putting only Brothers on the title to secure more favorable financing. After the loan closed, Brothers could then execute a quitclaim deed to Brown. He agreed that, under those circumstances, Brown would not be liable on the mortgage.

Brothers testified that she had lived in the same mobile home park as Brown. Before marrying, they traveled together to Laughlin twice and to Las Vegas once. They went to Canada when they married. She paid his expenses of $5,000. Brown said he would repay her. She earned $57,000 annually and he earned $1,500 monthly.

After they married, she sold her mobile home and moved her furniture into his house. She kept the money from the sale of her mobile home in a separate account with other savings. His mobile home was in poor shape with little furniture. He told her he had purchased it for $4,000. She cleaned, landscaped, and redecorated. Browns mobile home was sold furnished for $23,000. He agreed to reimburse her about $5,000 for her personal property that was included in the sale.

Brothers located the condominium but Brown did not want to participate in the purchase because of the responsibility involved. Her credit was sufficient for her to complete the purchase independently. The $10,000 Brown contributed to the condominium purchase was to reimburse Brothers for the trip expenses and her personal property. She paid an additional $15,000 as the downpayment. Brown signed the interspousal grant deed willingly. She did not agree to grant him an interest in the property. She made the mortgage payments from her salary.

Brown had obtained access to Lindas ATM account and PIN number and withdrew a total of $900 from Lindas bank account before he wrote her the check for $1,000.

Sandra Enright testified that she visited Browns mobile home before he married Brothers and it was poorly maintained, dark and dismal without much furniture. After they married, Brothers sold her mobile home, moved in with Brown, and redecorated it nicely.

The trial court found that the interspousal transfer grant deed was validly executed by Brown and recorded properly. The court confirmed the condominium as Lindas sole and separate property.

3. Discussion

Browns first argument is the interspousal transfer grant deed was altered after he signed it, rendering it void. The deed seems to have originally been to Linda Brothers Brown, a married woman as her sole and separate property but Brown has been whited out. We do not appreciate any significance in this change. Brothers chose to retain her own name after marriage and the deed reflects that choice. This is not a case of a material alteration to the deed, such as an increase in the size of the property being conveyed. (Montgomery v. Bank of America (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 559, 561.) Nor was it a blank deed. (Green v. MacAdam (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 481, 485.) Nor does it matter whether there were two deeds, the second correcting an error in the first. Whether the deed was to Linda Brothers Brown or Linda Brothers, the effect in either circumstance was to grant her the property separately. Sufficient evidence supports the trial courts finding the deed was valid.

Furthermore, [i]f the decision of a lower court is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, the judgment or order will be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the grounds [on] which the lower court reached its conclusion. The rationale for this principle is twofold: (a) an appellate court reviews the action of the lower court and not the reasons given for its action; and (b) there can be no prejudicial error from erroneous logic or reasoning if the decision itself is correct. (In re Estate of Beard (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 753, 776; see also Davey v. Southern Pacific Co. (1897) 116 Cal. 325, 329 [[A] ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal merely because given for a wrong reason.].) (In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 624, 632.)

Brown next maintains the interspousal transfer grant deed did not effect a valid transmutation of community property to separate property. Transmutation of property between spouses is governed by section 852, subdivision (a): A transmutation of real or personal property is not valid unless made in writing by an express declaration that is made, joined in, consented to, or accepted by the spouse whose interest in the property is adversely affected. The interspousal transfer grant deed from Brown to Brothers satisfied this requirement with a writing made by Brown, granting to Brothers the subject property as her sole and separate property.

Property transmutation agreements, however, are subject to the fiduciary standards of section 721 and a rebuttable presumption of undue influence: [I]nterspousal transactions must comport with the rules controlling the actions of persons occupying confidential relations with each other. [Citation.] Thus, the competence of spouses to engage in transactions with each other is subject to the circumstances being pleasing to the fiduciary standard. . . . [] When an interspousal transaction advantages one spouse, [t]he law, from considerations of public policy, presumes such transactions to have been induced by undue influence. (Brison v. Brison (1888) 75 Cal. 525, 529.) (In re Marriage of Haines (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 277, 293.)

The standard of proof for rebutting the presumption of undue influence is by a preponderance of the evidence. (In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 631.) It was Brotherss burden to establish the deed was freely and voluntarily made, with a full knowledge of all the facts and with a complete understanding of the transfer. Substantial evidence in the record supports the conclusion that Brothers satisfied her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence and rebutted the presumption of undue influence.

The record shows Brown and Brothers agreed that he sign the interspousal grant deed to obtain a lower interest rate on the mortgage and because Brown did not want to share the financial responsibility. Sufficient evidence also established the money used to complete the purchase was Brotherss separate property and the money contributed by Brown was money he owed Brothers. Brown freely and voluntarily executed the deed to assist with the purchase of the condominium and acknowledged title would be taken in Brotherss name alone. Brown had full knowledge of all of the facts surrounding the execution of the deed. Brothers denied emphatically that she had ever promised to deed the property back to Brown.

Substantial evidence supports the trial courts conclusion that the execution of the interspousal transfer grant deed was the voluntary and deliberate act of Brown, taken with full knowledge of its legal effect, and Brothers did not unduly influence him: [W]hether the spouse gaining an advantage has overcome the presumption of undue influence is a question for the trier of fact, whose decision will not be reversed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. (Weil v. Weil (1951) 37 Cal.2d 770, 788.) (In re Marriage of Mathews, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p. 632.) Substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Brothers rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence the presumption of undue influence over Browns signing the deed. The court correctly determined the residence was the separate property of Brothers.

4. Disposition

We affirm the judgment. Brothers is entitled to her costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

s/Gaut

J.

We concur:

s/Hollenhorst

Acting P. J.

s/Richli

J.

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^[1] All statutory references are to the Family Code unless stated otherwise.